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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examined the ethical decision-making process as it transpired in the everyday 
context of the therapeutic space. In-depth interviews explored the subjective experiences of 
six South African psychologists, practicing as psychoanalytic psychotherapists, and their 
efforts to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas. The theoretical framework used to interpret the 
data subsumed professional literature in psychology on principle-based ethical decision-
making as well as contemporary psychoanalytic debates on the phenomenon of 
countertransference enactments.  
 
A review of ethics codes, survey research and seminal decision-making frameworks 
suggests that ethical dilemmas have traditionally been resolved by recourse to an objective 
and impartial “principle ethics” perspective. Empirical evidence shows, however, that 
logical thinking and the rational application of codes, principles and standards are often 
insufficient to secure ethical action. The establishment of reflective space and the core 
theoretical notion of “ethical decision-making enactments” were proposed in order to 
address the subjective, irrational and unconscious dimension of professional decision-
making.  
 
This study used a broadly hermeneutic research method which transformed participants‟ 
descriptions of engagement with real-life dilemmas into a psychoanalytically informed 
interpretive account of ethical decision-making. Twelve aspirational ethical principles were 
found to guide participants‟ daily analytic work. Beneficence was the principle most 
strongly identified with and nonmaleficence was the most neglected ethical principle. 
Unprocessed countertransference responses were shown to drive earlier prereflective phases 
of the ethical decision-making process. Mature ethical judgment was predicated upon the 
retrospective analysis of enactment phenomena.  
 
Dissatisfaction was expressed by all participants with regard to the role of professional 
resources in aiding the resolution of stressful ethical dilemmas. Risk factors for 
compromised professional decision-making included the paucity and perceived irrelevance 
of postgraduate ethics training, supervisory failure to confront the ethical and 
countertransference dimensions of common dilemmas and professional isolation. Rather 
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than eliciting the hope of emotional support and greater insight, professional resources on 
the contrary mostly appeared to induce anxiety, mistrust and fearfulness. 
 
Based on the data and the literature, a pragmatic psychoanalytically informed ethical 
decision-making model was finally generated. The model, which considers both principle 
ethics as well as countertransference phenomena, offers a preliminary contribution to 
professional dialogue on the development and evaluation of empirically based decision-
making frameworks. Practical recommendations are made for both the revision of the 
current South African ethics code and for improving the postqualifying ethics education of 
psychoanalytic practitioners and supervisors. The limitations of the data are discussed and 
directions for future research initiatives are proposed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. PROLOGUE 
Psychoanalysis has traditionally been conceived of as a morally neutral and value-free 
enterprise. The famous metaphor of the psychoanalyst as a surgeon adjures the latter to set 
aside “even…human sympathy” in the quest to perform the task of psychoanalytic treatment 
as objectively and dispassionately as possible (Freud, 1912, p. 115). The analyst‟s ethical 
values were accordingly not presumed to enter into the analytic process “and the great 
company of psychoanalysts who have followed in [Freud‟s] footsteps have taken great pains 
to disassociate themselves from anything that smacks of the ethical or the moral” (Meissner, 
1994, p. 454).  
 
These original assumptions of value neutrality were contradicted by the ethically 
challenging, complex and conflictual situations that I confronted in my several roles as 
therapist, patient, supervisee, colleague and ethics committee member. The latter subjective 
experiences, which contain the origins of and motivations for undertaking the present study, 
suggested that the practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy includes in its endeavour an 
ineliminable ethical dimension. The intertwining of psychological practice with normative 
ethics, which seeks to determine what an individual ought to do (Beauchamp & Childress, 
1994), is evident in Bersoff‟s (2003) definition of ethics as “the study of those assumptions 
held by individuals, institutions, organisations and professions that they believe will assist 
them in distinguishing between right and wrong and, ultimately, in making sound moral 
judgments” (Introduction, xxiii). 
 
The observation that ethical considerations are integral to professional practice pertained not 
only to my subjective experiences (which are discussed in later chapters) but also to the rise 
in recent years of professional interest in ethical dilemmas and concerns. This has marked 
the field of both ethics and psychology as well as the psychoanalytic literature. Kast (1995), 
for example, cautions that handling unethical collegial behaviour in an ethical way 
necessarily involves considerations of rehabilitation and careful monitoring of 
countertransference reactions by “fact finders” to pre-empt retaliatory identification with the 
role of the aggressor. Bollas (1999) argues that the principle of absolute analytical 
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confidentiality has been eroded as the psychotherapeutic sanctuary comes under untenable 
pressure from mandatory reporting laws and demands for disclosure from courts of law. 
Glass (2003) distinguishes between the benign use of “boundary crossings”, exploitative 
“boundary violations” and controversial “gray areas” of therapist-initiated interventions 
which can substantially disrupt the frame but which, if worked through, may result in a 
strengthened therapeutic alliance.  
 
Underlying these and other diverse areas of interest is the psychoanalytic practitioner‟s 
inevitable encounter with the ethical decision-making process. Extensively surveyed and 
documented in the field of psychology and ethics, the phenomenon of ethical decision-
making and the role of unconscious influences appear to have received less explicit and 
systematic professional attention in the literature on ethics and psychoanalysis. Awareness 
and analysis of the ethical decision-making process as it emerges in the analytic space in 
response to quotidian ethical dilemmas thus apparently represents a hiatus in contemporary 
psychoanalytic literature and comprises the core focus of the present study.  
 
The remainder of this first chapter outlines the essential features of the psychoanalytic 
approach, situates this study in the context of South African psychoanalytic practice and sets 
out the aims and structure of the thesis.  
2. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH 
Three distinguishing features differentiate the psychoanalytic approach from alternative 
therapeutic modalities. Firstly, the unconscious or hidden dimension of the patient‟s world is 
recognised, dispelling any illusion that “the ego … is master in its own house” (Freud, 1917, 
p. 143). Psychoanalysis may be construed, as Frosch (1997) remarks, “ as a discipline and 
practice of uncovering latent meanings, of reaching below the surface of action and 
consciousness to reveal the disturbing elements of unconscious life” (p. 112). The self is 
decentred not only by the division between conscious and unconscious life but also by its 
“containing aspects of others in a way that … allows psychoanalysis to acknowledge that 
motives may not only be mysterious to the participants involved but also that they may be 
multiple, contradictory and generated independently of rational intervention” (Gibson, 2002, 
p. 39).  
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The psychoanalytic approach focuses, secondly, on the transference relationship wherein 
early traumatic interpersonal relationships are unconsciously recreated by the patient in the 
present psychotherapeutic setting. This suggests that powerful and irrational emotions may 
be experienced in relation to another person without identifying the original source or 
ongoing meaning of the affects concerned (Frosch, 1997). The core psychoanalytic notion of 
resistance refers to the patient‟s unconscious opposition to the uncovering and exploration 
of these potentially conflict-laden areas within him/herself (BMA, 1991). Thirdly, the use of 
verbal interpretations traditionally comprises the primary means of therapeutic intervention; 
this is used to foster insight into the meaning of the patient‟s emotional difficulties and how 
these unconscious conflicts may be lived out interactionally in the present transference-
countertransference matrix (Ivey, 1992).  
 
These well-known features of the therapeutic space are accompanied by a particular 
professional attitude, the analytic attitude, a simultaneously participatory and self-
observational state of consciousness wherein the analyst allows him/herself “to be „sucked 
into‟ … temporary disruptions of the barrier between self and object, while carefully noting 
the determinants and meanings of such disruptions” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 45). The 
analytic attitude is given pragmatic expression in the treatment process through the 
actualisation of the analytic task, the analytic process and the analytic setting. The analytic 
task comprises the raison d‟être of the analytic endeavour and consists of consistent efforts 
by the therapeutic dyad to understanding the patient‟s psychic state. It remains the analyst‟s 
particular responsibility to adhere to that task in a non-narcissistic manner that does not 
demand to be repaid or mirrored (Twyman, 2003). The analytic process refers to the gradual 
evolution of this task over time (Ivey, 1999). The analytic setting or “therapeutic frame” 
(Langs, 1982) refers to the ground rules which function to establish both a literal as well as a 
metaphorical space (Siegelman, 1990) wherein the often turbulent transference-
countertransference relationship can be held and the meanings of strong unconscious 
emotional reactions can be safely explored.  
 
One further distinction may be made between psychoanalysis „proper‟ and the practice of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. Although fundamental assumptions and understandings 
about the nature of the therapeutic enterprise are substantially shared, „true‟ psychoanalysis 
involves three to five times a week contact, with the patient lying down on a couch and 
greater emphasis being given to interpretation of the transference and the role of insight in 
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fostering therapeutic change. Psychodynamic psychotherapy entails sessions on a once or 
twice a week basis with face-to-face contact or use of the couch and greater emphasis may 
be given to the supportive elements of therapy (Prochaska & Norcross, 1999, in Haumann, 
2004). The practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in South Africa generally conforms to 
the latter paradigm.  
 
Contemporary psychoanalysis emphasises that the patient and the analyst mutually, 
reciprocally and unconsciously engage one another in the therapeutic relationship. Thus the 
apprehension and analysis of the therapist‟s countertransference currently occupies the same 
theoretical and clinical significance as the understanding and interpretation of the patient‟s 
transference. Gabbard (1999) accordingly argues that the phenomenon of 
countertransference has shifted to the very core of psychoanalytic theory and technique, 
evolving from a traditionally “narrow conceptualisation of the therapist‟s transference to the 
patient to a complex and jointly created phenomenon that is pervasive in the treatment 
process” (p. 21).  
3. THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA  
Professional interest in psychoanalytic ideas and practices has long been evident in this 
country and included the brief establishment in 1949 of the first South African Psycho-
Analytic Society (Gillespie, 1992). The political climate under apartheid appeared to curtail 
the development of psychoanalytic activities, expediting the departure and permanent loss of 
luminaries such as J. Sandler, Edna O‟Shaughnessy and Michael Feldman (Hamburger, 
1992). This resulted in a situation where, ironically, a relatively strong South African 
presence prevailed in the international psychoanalytic community but “very little of this 
permeated, through the academic isolation under apartheid, into South Africa itself” 
(Gibson, 2002, p. 36). Psychoanalysis was additionally viewed with scepticism by 
proponents of progressive psychology in South Africa since it remains associated with 
wealth and social privilege in a country “where resources are few and there are pressing 
material and political realities asserting priority” (Gibson, 2002, p. 36). The lack of an 
enduring psychoanalytic tradition and professional isolation both from within South Africa 
and from the international psychoanalytic community at large arguably continues, with the 
need often being expressed by local practitioners for a “pyramid topped by the greats – the 
thinkers, innovators and experienced clinicians with specialist skills” (Gillespie, 1992, p. 3). 
Arguments for the extension of psychoanalytic theory into understanding organisational or 
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social processes and a detailed outline of the history of South African psychoanalysis are 
beyond the scope of the present study. The following comments are limited to situating this 
study in the broader landscape of psychoanalytic psychotherapy as it is generally practised 
in South Africa at present.  
 
There currently exists no formal psychoanalytic training in South Africa nor any 
internationally recognised psychoanalytic society or institute. Thus the title “psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist”1 is essentially self-conferred, generally indicating adherence to the 
foregoing outline of the psychoanalytic approach and membership of one or more local 
psychoanalytic societies, reading or study groups. In Cape Town, different professional 
groups include the Cape Town Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (CTSPP) and the 
Self-Psychology Group. A journal entitled Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in South Africa 
was established in 1992 and continues to provide a national forum for psychoanalytically 
oriented practitioners to present, discuss and evaluate their work. The Cape Town-based 
South African Association of Jungian Analysts (SAAJA) offers a four year accredited 
training in Jungian analysis.  
 
Local psychoanalytic societies and reading groups provide ongoing opportunities for their 
membership to pursue continuing professional development through the regular presentation 
of lectures, meetings and workshops where theoretical and clinical material is discussed. 
The practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is not confined in South Africa to 
psychologists alone but is the province also of psychiatrists, social workers and psychiatric 
nurses. Entry criteria for admission into professional groups require that prospective 
members have received personal therapy and regular supervision is encouraged for novice 
and experienced therapists alike.  
 
The emphasis on the clinical significance of countertransference in contemporary 
psychoanalytic practice has been highlighted above. In the local context Ivey (1992) has 
raised the salience of countertransference management and argues that South African 
psychologists are particularly prone to compromising the therapeutic treatment process 
through the enactment of their own idiosyncratic “countertransference pathology”. Ivey 
(1992) links the persistence of countertransference pathology to the predominantly 
                                                 
1  The present study uses the terms “psychoanalytic psychotherapist”, “psychoanalytic practitioner” and 
“therapist”interchangeably.  
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humanistic and cognitive theoretical orientations apparently prevalent in psychology 
departments at South African universities which tend “to minimise the transference-
countertransference dimension of the therapeutic relationship” (p. 38).  
 
By comparison with the USA and Europe, the domain of ethics has received relatively little 
professional attention in South Africa (Slack & Wassenaar, 1999). In particular, the ethical 
decision-making processes of South African psychologists practising as psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists have not to date been explored. The present study thus hopes to consider 
the role that psychoanalytic thinking may play in ethical judgment and to contribute an 
interpretive account of the subjective and unconscious dimension of ethical decision-making 
as it emerges in the therapeutic space.  
4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of nine chapters including the introduction and conclusion. Chapters 2 
and 3 together comprise the theoretical framework which informs an interpretive account of 
psychoanalytic practitioners‟ struggle to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas in the context of 
the therapeutic space.  
 
The first part of the theoretical framework is drawn from professional literature on ethics in 
psychology (Chapter 2). This includes a critical overview of traditional principle-based 
approaches to ethical decision-making. The core characteristics of the “voices” of justice 
and care, two predominant modes of moral reasoning, are outlined. This is followed by a 
review of the uses and limitations of codes of ethics, survey research investigating 
professional decision-making and seminal ethical decision-making models. The sparse 
psychoanalytic writing on ethical decision-making is also considered.  
 
The second part of the theoretical framework examines psychoanalytic literature on 
countertransference enactments and considers their potential impact on the ethical decision-
making process (Chapter 3). This includes discussion of different definitions, subcategories 
and the classification of countertransference enactments along a “beneficence-maleficence” 
gradient. The establishment of reflective space and the core notion of an “ethical decision-
making enactment” are proposed in order to address the irrational and unconscious 
dimension of professional decision-making.  
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Chapter 4 describes the process of how the current study was carried out. This includes 
discussion of the aims, assumptions, ethical considerations, the recruitment and interviewing 
of participants, and the detail of how the data were analysed and interpreted. The influence 
of the researcher‟s subjectivity on the research process is evaluated.  
 
Chapters 5 to 8 present the findings of this study grouped according to main themes. The six 
ethical dilemmas used in the study are first presented. Chapter 5 then discusses research 
participants‟ avowed ethical principles and how these fare in the context of 
countertransference pressures generated by real-life ethical dilemmas. In Chapter 6 
countertransference constitutes the central theoretical „hub‟ from which research 
participants‟ responses to real-life ethical dilemmas are explored. Prereflective as well as 
mature levels of ethical decision-making are distinguished. Chapter 7 discusses participants‟ 
own experiences of accessing available professional resources to aid the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas. These include postgraduate ethics training, ethics codes, professional bodies, 
supervision, personal therapy and peer consultation. Chapter 8 presents preliminary work 
towards the building of a psychoanalytic ethical decision-making model which is directly 
based on the detailed analysis in preceding chapters.  
 
In the concluding chapter (Chapter 9) the most important findings and conclusions are 
drawn together with a discussion of the limitations of the study and recommendations for 
further training and research. Practical strategies for changed ethical decision-making 
practices in the therapeutic space are made.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CONCEPTUALISING THE ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS: PRINCIPLE ETHICS AND PSYCHOANALYTIC 
APPROACHES 
 
5. INTRODUCTION 
This and the next chapter (i.e. Chapters 2 and 3) comprise the theoretical framework which 
is later used to interpret qualitative data pertaining to ethical decision-making as it emerges 
in analytic space.  The theoretical framework is drawn from professional literature on ethics 
in psychology as well as from psychoanalysis. The framework consists of a critical 
overview of, firstly, rational principle-based approaches to the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas and, secondly, to consideration of countertransference enactments and their 
potential impact on the ethical decision-making process. The two chapters together thus 
provide a theoretical basis for the final interpretive account of six psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists‟ struggles to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas in the context of the 
therapeutic space.   
 
The four sections of this chapter move sequentially from traditional rational responses to 
apparently less familiar and innovative approaches to the ethical decision-making process.  
The first section outlines the core characteristics of the “voices” of “justice” and “care” 
which comprise two predominant modes of moral reasoning discernible in the professional 
literature.  Existing controversy is explored as to whether the two approaches concerned are 
potentially complementary or inherently antagonistic.  This first section provides a broad 
conceptual background to the ensuing discussion of the “objective” and “subjective” poles 
of the ethical decision-making process which are arguably exemplified by “principle-based” 
systems and by psychoanalytic approaches respectively.  
 
The second section explores the “objective” pole of ethical decision-making and sets out 
well established arguments regarding the uses and limitations of professional codes of 
ethics. It is suggested that the formulation of ethical judgments requires engagement with 
multiple “decision bases” (Woody, 1990, p. 134) or “norm systems” (Allen, 2001, p. 2), 
only one of which is comprised of formal ethics codes.  Attention is given to the South 
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African Professional Board for Psychology‟s current code of ethics2. Review of possible 
lacunae includes comment on the absence of any decision-making framework and on the 
need to provide practitioners seeking to make sound ethical judgments with greater and 
more detailed assistance in relation to the ethical decision-making process.  
 
The present study is situated, in the third section, in the context of international and local 
research investigating ethical decision-making in professional practice. Empirical studies 
suggest three primary difficulties which may beset ethical judgment and action.  These 
include the failure to recognise the ethical dimensions of clinical practice, widespread 
disagreement among clinicians regarding the ethically most appropriate intervention and the 
discrepancy between intellectual comprehension of the ethically preferred course of action 
and ensuing unwillingness to actually implement the required ethical behaviour. Descriptive 
survey findings suggest the need for supplementary qualitative data which may contribute to 
the construction of a theoretically informed account of what potentially transpires in the 
widely observed hiatus between the declared ethical ideal and subsequent compromised 
ethical practice.  
 
Discussion of seminal ethical decision-making frameworks in the fourth section brings to a 
closure examination of the “objective” pole of ethical decision-making. Frequently cited in 
the professional literature, the frameworks include those proposed by Rest (1984), Kitchener 
(1984), Steere (1984) and the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA, 2000). The 
foundational ethical principles of justice, autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and 
fidelity are described.  A brief critique is offered of the strengths and possible limitations of 
the frameworks concerned.  
 
Surprisingly few direct references appear in the psychoanalytic literature to the 
countertransference dimension of ethical decision-making. Addressing the “subjective” pole 
of ethical decision-making, the fourth section therefore also considers several valuable but 
rare contributions to contemporary psychoanalytic thinking about ethical decision-making 
and intervention. Contributions include an innovative hermeneutic model (Betan, 1997), the 
notion of an unconscious “team of players” undergirding decision-making (Meissner, 1994), 
the hypothesised role of projective identification and disavowed therapist affects in 
clinicians‟ end-of-life decisions with dying patients (Varghese & Kelly, 1999) and 
                                                 
2 Professional Board for Psychology (PBP). (2002, January). Ethical code of professional conduct.  
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elaboration of author-analysts‟ “multiply determined” decision-making in relation to ethical 
dilemmas surrounding publication of clinical material (Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 182).  
 
The summary at the end of this chapter identifies commonalities and differences between 
the foregoing contributions addressing the countertransference dimension of ethical 
decision-making. Further aspects of therapist subjectivity which have apparently not to date 
received adequate professional attention but which may influence the formulation of ethical 
judgments in the context of real-life ethical dilemmas are highlighted.  
6. TWO MODES OF MORAL THINKING: THE “VOICES” OF JUSTICE AND 
CARE 
Real-life ethical dilemmas appear to challenge the psychoanalytic psychotherapist to discern 
different moral “voices” and to engage with the presenting moral conflict from different 
theoretical and relational perspectives. Two recurring moral “voices” or orientations that 
may be distinguished in the professional literature are those of “justice” and “care” (Brown 
& Gilligan, 1991; Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller & Argyris, 1989; Gilligan, 1982; 
Kymlicka, 1990; Rachels, 2003). The two voices or modes of moral thinking each “orders 
human experience in terms of different priorities” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 22) and constructs a 
different emphasis on what is salient to the moral domain.  
 
Central to an objective justice perspective, which traditionally prevails over public life, are 
impartial utilitarian directives which seek to maximise the most benefits for the most people 
(Rachels, 2003). Core concerns include impersonal duty, individual rights, equal treatment 
and principles and standards of fairness (Brown et al., 1989; Rachels, 2003). The cognitive 
emphasis amplified in the dispassionate voice of justice results in its formally distancing 
itself from the affective dimension of ethical decision-making (Jordan & Meara, 1990).  
This cognitivist proclivity has historically characterised traditional ethical theory which 
accordingly views “emotions, feelings, passions, and inclinations as distracting impediments 
to moral judgment” (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 89). Thus Kohlberg‟s (1981) final 
levels of mature moral judgment subordinate personal relationships to universal principles 
of justice (Rachels, 2003) and are “geared to arriving at an objectively fair or just resolution 
to moral dilemmas upon which all rational persons could agree …” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 21).  
The ostensibly logical and self-transparent moral agent “listens to the voice of reason, 
figures out the right thing to do and does it” (Rachels, 2003, p. 172).  
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A care perspective, in contrast, emphasises intimate interpersonal relationships, emotional 
commitment, empathy and compassion (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). The voice of care 
speaks “about loving and being loved, listening and being listened to, and responding and 
being responded to …” (Brown & Gilligan, 1991, p. 47). Core concerns include people‟s 
vulnerability “to isolation and abandonment, and… the complexities of creating and 
sustaining human connection” (Brown et al., 1989, p. 148). The observation that moral 
deliberation is inevitably subjective, embodied and “always situated, dealing with concrete 
persons and problems” (Sevenhuijsen, 2003) arguably differentiates a care perspective from 
an objective justice or principle ethics approach. Noticeably underplayed, therefore, “are 
Kantian universal rules, impartial utilitarian calculations, and individual rights” (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 1994, p. 85). Ethical analysis is effected not by reasoned deliberation weighing 
objective higher order ethical principles but by reconciliation of conflicting responsibilities 
derived from personal attachments to particular others (Rachels, 2003). The quintessential 
concerns of justice and care may be summarised in the two moral injunctions “not to treat 
others unfairly and not to turn away from someone in need” (Brown et al., 1989, p. 142). 
 
Controversy surfaces in the literature as to which approach might be superior (Bersoff, 
2003), whether these two perspectives are essentially both elements of a complementary and 
unitary process (Betan, 1997; Brown et al., 1989; Cottone & Tarvydas, 1998; Kitchener, 
2007; Meara, Schmidt & Day, 1996) or whether they are irreconcilable and represent 
singularly different ways of thinking and acting ethically (MacIntyre, 1984, in Jordan & 
Meara, 1990). Jordan and Meara (1990) argue, for example, that effecting ethical judgment 
optimally demands a morally virtuous agent in addition to ethical principles and that 
exclusive reliance on the latter approach is “simply not enough” (p. 109). Excluding the 
moral agent‟s “character”, his/her motivation and distancing from the affective dimension of 
ethical decision-making raises the risk of ethical dilemmas “becoming primarily abstract 
thought puzzles to be analyzed according to specified rules … human pain, pathos, and 
historical particularity, tend to be underestimated or forgotten” (p. 108). In reply Bersoff 
(2003) highlights the problem of overly idiosyncratic and individualised responses to 
ethically problematic situations, commenting tersely that the “virtues” of “principle ethics”, 
including rationality, are precisely what secures benevolent, prudent and respectful action. 
He adds that “If being virtuous means acting paternalistically, irrationally and on the basis 
of faith, [he would] prefer principled iniquity” (p. 154).  
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Offering an integrationist position, Beauchamp and Childress (1994) acknowledge that the 
ethics of care comprise a needed antidote to two centuries of ethical theory building 
characterised by the overly rational bias of principle ethics. The ethics of care, Beauchamp 
and Childress (1994) continue, may additionally be “especially meaningful for roles … in 
which contextual response, attentiveness to subtle cues, and the deepening of special 
relationships are likely to be more momentous morally than impartial treatment” (p. 88). 
However, moral responsiveness cannot be reduced to emotional responsiveness. Beauchamp 
and Childress (1994) argue that ethical judgments that risk overly partial emotional 
involvement with intimate others may stand in need of the correction offered by cognitive 
understanding and by reference to impartial ethical principles.   
 
Tensions between a traditional justice orientation, with its emphasis on objective, rational 
analysis, and a contrasting care perspective, focusing on contextuality, subjectivity and 
emotional responsiveness, translate into distinctive methodologies of ethical decision-
making. The voices of justice and care thus appear to constellate and to inform the 
“objective” and “subjective” poles of the ethical decision-making process respectively. The 
following discussion takes up the objective and predominantly rational pole traditionally 
espoused by ethical codes, empirical survey research and principle-based ethical decision-
making models.   
7. PROFESSIONAL CODES OF ETHICS: USES AND LIMITATIONS 
Ethical issues have been described as comprising the core of every discipline3. In common 
with other helping professions, the codes of ethics developed by psychology constitute its 
collective “voice of conscience” (Bersoff, 2003, p. 1) which speaks of commitment to 
fundamental ethical values as well as of the practitioner‟s responsibilities to colleagues, 
consumers and the public. Allan (2001) and Gauthier (2004, in Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006) 
observe that four universal ethical principles informed by the Judeo-Christian tradition and 
by Kant‟s deontological philosophy undergird the professional ethics codes published by the 
American Psychological Association (APA, 2002), the Australian Psychological Society 
(APS, 1999), the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA, 2000) and the European 
Federation of Psychologists‟ Association (EFPA, 1995). These four superordinate ethical 
principles appear to reflect international commonalities across formal ethics codes for 
                                                 
3 Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists, International Union of Psychological Science 
(IUPsyS), Draft Proposal, 2005) 
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psychologists in the Western world and are also described in a draft Universal Declaration 
of Ethical Principles for Psychologists (IUPsyS, Draft Proposal, 2005). Although the 
nomenclature of the various codes differs, the principles essentially include respect for 
people‟s dignity and rights, responsible caring, integrity and professional and scientific 
responsibilities to society (Allen, 2001). 
 
Professional ethics codes accordingly offer a consensually derived moral framework which, 
as Pettifor (1998) observes, provides guidance in navigating the ethical decision-making 
process. Cottone and Tarvydas (1998) suggest that practitioners who adhere to a “principle 
ethics” approach emphasising the rational and objective use of the utilitarian-deontological 
continuum “tend to view the application of universal, impartial ethical principles, rules, 
codes and [the] law as the core elements of ethics” (p. 145). Going beyond rational analysis 
and compliance with codified rules of conduct, Kvale (1996) in contrast highlights the role 
that interpretation plays in the individual decision-maker‟s context-dependent ethical 
judgments. Arguing that professional codes seldom provide definitive answers to ethically 
troubling situations, Kvale (1996) contends that ethical codes, principles and philosophical 
ethical theories “are more like texts to be interpreted than rules to be followed: they provide 
guidelines that must be judged according to their relevance to specific situations” (p. 110).  
 
Professional ethical codes serve multiple purposes. Broad objectives are to promote optimal 
behaviour through the provision of aspirational principles and to regulate professional 
activities including disciplining violations of enforceable standards of conduct (Pettifor & 
Sawchuk, 2006). Frequently cited in the professional literature on ethics and psychology are 
the following five additional purposes; professional identity, socialisation, protection of the 
public, offering guidance and delineating minimalist as well as aspirational levels of 
practice. Codes of ethics thus, firstly, allow psychologists to establish their identity and 
status as a profession with a distinctive body of knowledge and expertise (Eberlein, 1987; 
Neukrug & Lovell, 1996; Sinclair, Poizner, Gilmour-Barrett, & Randall, 2001; Swartz, 
1988). A formal code therefore “serves as a vehicle for professional identity and [as] a mark 
of the maturity of the profession” (Mabe & Rollin, 1986, p. 294). 
 
Comprising an essential educational medium codes function, secondly, to socialise new 
members of the profession into the value system and accepted practices of the discipline 
concerned (Sinclair, 2001). Responding to the overriding need to protect the public from 
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harm and exploitation by professionals, codes aim, thirdly, to secure basic levels of training 
and professional expertise (Scherrer, Louw & Möller, 2002). This undertaking by the 
relevant professional psychological body to protect public interests by independently 
regulating its membership‟s activities also protects the discipline from excessive legislative 
interference from the state. Such extreme outside restrictiveness might arguably 
compromise the achievement of professional objectives (Scherrer et al., 2002; Steere, 1984; 
Welfel & Kitchener, 1992). Fourthly, ethics codes offer guidance on respectful and 
competent behaviour in relation to patients, colleagues and the community as well as 
assistance with the resolution of ethical dilemmas occurring across a range of research, 
teaching and practice settings (Bersoff, 2003; Cottone & Tarvydas, 1998; Fine & Ulrich, 
1988; Seitz & O‟Neill, 1996; Sinclair et al., 2001; Pettifor, 1998).  
 
The distinction in professional ethics codes between aspirational ethical principles and 
prescriptive standards of behaviour (Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006) comprises a fifth and final 
purpose which identifies contrasting reaches of professional practice. Hence the translation 
of guiding principles into enforceable ethical standards provides a means of adjudicating 
complaints and delineates minimal levels of acceptable behaviour or the “bottom line below 
which the psychologist‟s practice should not go” (Lindsay & Colley, 1995, p. 448). It is not 
sufficient, however, merely to secure minimalist standards of practice; what is required are 
optimal levels of service delivery that positively benefit the consumers concerned (Pettifor, 
2001). Thus professional codes may actively “seek to promote the highest standards of 
practice and [to foreground] guidelines encouraging psychologists to practice, not merely in 
an acceptable manner, but in an optimal manner” (Slack, 1997, p. 10). The “social contract” 
articulated in the CPA‟s “Preamble” (cf. Pettifor, 2001) captures the spirit of aspirational 
practice in its emphasis that “each member will place the welfare of the society and 
individual members of that society above the welfare of the discipline and its own members. 
By virtue of this social contract, psychologists have a higher duty of care to members of 
society than the general duty of care that all members of society have to each other” (p. 2). 
In short, Bersoff (2003) declares that a code of ethics should ideally be “a grand statement 
of overarching principles that earn the respect of [the] public by reflecting the profession‟s 
moral integrity” (p. 1).  
 
Ethical codes serve as a core “decision base” (Woody, 1990, p. 134) and their “necessity … 
cannot be denied” (Scherrer et al., 2002, p. 54). However, references to the limitations of 
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codes repeatedly punctuate the professional literature and include four recurring themes. 
Formal codes do not, firstly, pretend to be “encyclopaedic” (American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 2001, p. 1)4 and hence “cannot possibly anticipate every instance of concern 
about ethics in an entire country” (Swartz, 1988, p. 18). Although regularly revised, a 
second theme to emerge is that codes are essentially “reactive in nature” (Cottone & 
Tarvydas, 1998, p. 145), lagging behind “the cutting edge” (Mabe & Rollin, 1986, p. 294-
295) of rapidly emerging new and innovative areas of professional practice (Welfel & 
Kitchener, 1992). Cited instances of ethical concerns not yet satisfactorily addressed by the 
relevant codes include, for example, computer testing, groupwork, different aspects of 
marital and family therapy (Eberlein, 1987; Woody, 1990), issues pertaining to community 
psychology (Hadjistavropoulos, 1999; Sinclair et al., 1987), cultural diversity, recovered 
memories and the use of the Internet to conduct therapy (Pettifor, 1998). Whether a code 
fails to address a particular dilemma because it is uncommon, contentious or has only just 
recently emerged, the ensuing ethical vacuum highlights that “an ethical code is an evolving 
document and is, from the moment of its printing, out of date” (Wassenaar, 1998, p. 140).  
 
A third theme pertains to abstract, imprecise and “disembodied” (Burke, Harper, Rudnick & 
Kruger, 2007, p. 114) ethical principles and rules stated in formal codes, which may bear 
little relevance to complex ethical dilemmas encountered in clinical practice. Practitioners 
may experience difficulty in extrapolating imprecise guidelines to specific situations “in 
such a way that they could be confident that their behavioural choices reflected the spirit of 
these regulations” (Slack & Wassenaar, 1999, p. 184). Finally, recourse to ethics codes may 
generate multiple conflicts. Commenting on the latter, Neukrug and Lovell (1996) observe 
that conflicts may emerge “between two codes, between the practitioner‟s [personal] values 
and code requirements, between the code…and institutional [or legal] practice, and between 
requirements within a single code” (p. 3). Other identified conflicts derive from the political 
values endorsed by repressive or totalitarian governments which violate the aspirational 
ethical principles espoused by the disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis (Sebek, 
2002; Steere & Dowdall, 1990). Formal codes grounded in Western liberal ideology may, 
moreover, promote seemingly universalist notions of individual autonomy which are at 
variance with the values, collective group identity and decision-making practices 
                                                 
4 The American Psychoanalytic Association (APSA), The Principles and Standards of Ethics for 
Psychoanalysts, 2001. 
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characteristic of diverse populations such as, for example, the Aboriginal culture (Pettifor, 
1998, 2001; Swartz, 1988). Striking a pragmatic note, Bersoff (2003) writes that “a code of 
ethics is, inevitably, anachronistic, conservative, ethnocentric and the product of political 
compromise. But recognition of that reality should not inhibit the creation of a document 
that fully … expresses fundamental moral principles” (p. 1).  
7.1. The South African Code of Ethics 
 
The South African “Ethical Code of Professional Conduct” (2002) is currently situated in a 
two-tier system comprised by both the statutory Professional Board for Psychology as well 
as by the voluntary professional association of PsySSA5. The Professional Board‟s mandate 
is to protect public interests by regulating standards of training and practice whereas the 
primary aim of PsySSA is to support psychologists and to promote their professional 
interests (Wassenaar, 1998a, 1998b). Argumentation surrounding the merits and demerits of 
whether the foregoing functions are best addressed by a unitary or by a two-tier system lie 
beyond the scope of this study. For the purposes of broadly contextualising the statutorily 
binding South African ethics code, it is sufficient to note that a dual purpose unitary 
structure would arguably undermine the code‟s credibility in adjudicating complaints 
against psychologists by introducing competing professional priorities. Hence Wassenaar 
(1998a) writes that “the public is entitled to complain to an independent authority when 
dissatisfaction with services occurs. This authority should not be the same one which 
primarily promotes the interests of the profession itself” (p. 141).  
 
The Professional Board‟s ethics code (2002) states at the outset that “Psychologists shall… 
maintain... high standards of professional competence to ensure that the public is protected 
from professional practice that falls short of international and national best practice 
standards” (p. 4). Central to professional competence, however, is the issue of a code‟s 
provision of ethical decision-making guidelines which should optimally enhance the 
individual practitioner‟s capacity to make well-informed and consistent ethical judgments 
(Hadjistavropolous, 1999). Thus Sieghart (1982, in Steere, 1984) writes that “Professional 
codes, if they are to be worth anything, cannot merely confine themselves to asserting that 
there is [an ethical dilemma] and leaving it … to individual members … to solve the 
dilemma as best they can … At the least … a code must say something about how to 
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approach this kind of problem” (p. 31). Given the latter observations, the Professional 
Board‟s code of ethics arguably reveals the lacunae discussed below.  
 
The eleven sections of the Professional Board‟s formal code are heavily indebted to the 
APA‟s (2002) code of ethics but appear to lack an overarching conceptual cohesiveness. 
The rubric “Professional Relations” (Chapter 2), for example, heads a section which 
includes an apparently undifferentiated mix of unidentified superordinate ethical principles 
(Respect for Human Rights and Others; Avoiding Harm) as well as various ethical standards 
(Informed Consent to Professional Procedures; Unfair Discrimination; Sexual Harassment). 
Alternatively, the leading rubric may unpredictably be comprised of areas of practice 
(Assessment and Therapeutic Activities) (Chapters 5 and 6) or an ethical standard 
(Confidentiality, Privacy and Records) (Chapter 3) which are seemingly elevated to the 
status of a guiding ethical “principle”. Organisation of the ensuing document consequently 
appears to lack an explicit rationale. Unlike the five general principles clearly articulated by 
the APA‟s (2002) code or the four lexically ordered principles of the CPA (2000), the 
Professional Board‟s code of ethics fails to identify its “ethical foundation” (Welfel & 
Kitchener, 1992, p. 180) or the full range of philosophical ethical principles upon which it is 
presumably based. This in turn has direct consequences for the latter code‟s educative and 
pragmatic efforts to address the ethical decision-making process.  
 
The two prerequisites for an effective code of ethics are the provision of decision-
hierarchies or the ranking of ethical principles as well as direct consideration of the ethical 
decision-making process (Burke et al., 2007). Many familiar South African ethical 
dilemmas evoke competing ethical principles. In the context of suicide prevention, for 
example, Pillay, Wassenaar and Kramers (2004) depart from the CPA‟s (2002) generally 
recommended ranking of ethical principles, arguing that the ethical stance of beneficence 
(saving a patient‟s life) outweighs patient autonomy (gaining explicit informed consent prior 
to an in-patient psychological consultation). Despite such ethically defensible deviations, 
Hadjistavropolous (1999) nevertheless recommends that a code‟s ranking of ethical 
principles provides a much needed and practical guideline which facilitates moral decision-
making. The “vague and brief” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 114) ethical decision-making 
guidelines set out in the South African code under “Resolving Ethical Issues” (Chapter 11) 
appear to fail to meet the latter authors‟ stated criteria for an effective ethics code. No 
reference is made to widely cited ethical decision-making models and, as noted, core ethical 
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principles are neither identified nor ranked. South African practitioners facing real-life 
dilemmas must do so without the benefit of an ethical decision-making framework and 
without guidance as to which ethical principle among competing alternatives may 
legitimately be accorded precedence.  
 
The Professional Board‟s ethical decision-making guidelines may additionally be construed 
as ignoring the “complexity of lived experience” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 109). In failing to 
acknowledge the irrational and emotionally charged dimension of ethical decision-making, 
the latter guidelines seemingly demonstrate unwarranted confidence in “the lucidity of 
consciousness [and in the assumption] of a mind that is transparent to its own introspection 
... it can [however] no longer be maintained that the first step towards being moral is to 
think rationally and self-consciously in a way that … is abstracted from our internal and 
hidden motivators” (Van Hooft, 2006, p. 44). The Professional Board‟s current 
recommendations for “Resolving Ethical Issues” arguably presuppose a consistently rational 
moral agent whose cognitive evaluation of ethical dilemmas is deemed sufficient to 
determine ethical action. The present guidelines, couched in language which is 
“authoritarian and instills fear rather than offering guidance” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 114), 
thus apparently assume that ethical decision-making is non-problematic, logical and linear. 
This stance is convincingly challenged by numerous empirical research studies, discussed in 
the following section, which repeatedly demonstrate compromised ethical decision-making 
processes and the violation of professional ethical standards.  
 
In short, emotionally charged subjective responses and contextual pressures (Betan, 1997; 
Betan & Stanton, 1999), elements of “expediency and opportunism” (Blasi, 1980, p. 6), self-
deceptive behaviour and disavowed exploitiveness (Epstein & Simon, 1990), “ethical blind 
spots” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 118) and “internal and hidden motivators” (Van Hooft, 2006, 
p. 44) may all potentially contribute to and powerfully organise the ethical decision-making 
process. An optimally effective code of ethics may need to offer not only a decision-making 
model which includes the ranking of ethical principles but one which also explicitly 
addresses the emotional dimension of the ethical decision-making process. The absence of 
such a framework in the Professional Board‟s present code of ethics heightens the risk that 
South African clinicians looking to the code for thoughtful assistance in resolving everyday 
ethical dilemmas may find it disappointingly prescriptive or “unduly silent, dated [and] 
unrealistic” (Pope & Vetter, 1992, p. 411). 
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8. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTING KEY DIFFICULTIES IN 
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
Empirical research based on quantitative surveys suggests that ethical decision-making may 
be compromised by three primary difficulties. These include the failure to recognise the 
ethical dilemma, lack of consensus in decision-making and observed discrepancies between 
ethical ideals and ethical practice. The first area of difficulty resides in the clinician‟s failure 
to identify the ethical dimensions of clinical practice. The related concept of “ethical 
sensitivity” may be construed as the practitioner‟s ability “to recognize the ethical 
dimensions of a situation along with its clinical, scholarly, or pragmatic aspects” (Welfel & 
Kitchener, 1992, p. 179). Despite the likelihood that imperviousness to ethical problems 
heightens the possibility of unethical behaviour, little research has apparently been 
conducted in the area of ethical awareness (Welfel, 1992).  
 
One study designed by Volker (1983, in Welfel, 1992) and later refined by Lindsey (1985, 
in Welfel, 1992) involved graduate psychology students and licensed psychologists in 
listening to taped clinical interviews containing ethical problems. Subjects were not cued in 
advance to the ethical dilemmas implicit in the interviews. Results across both studies were 
consistent; almost 50% of respondents in each sample were unable to recognise the ethical 
issues embedded in the clinical interviews and 25% were unable to do so even when 
prompted. Baldick (1980) similarly found that although psychology interns who had 
completed a formal ethics course were significantly more able to identify ethical problems 
than were interns who had received no ethics instruction, the former group still identified 
less than 50% of the several ethical problems included in each of 12 hypothetical clinical 
scenarios. Mounting a critique of professional education for its seeming preoccupation with 
the technical aspects of practice, Rest (1984) argues that graduate psychology students are 
“professionally socialized” into not looking for moral problems. As a consequence, students 
“are usually ill-prepared to know how to approach a moral problem when one does smack 
them in the face” (Rest, 1984, p. 24). It thus remains questionable as to whether ethics 
education is attaining its goal of training ethically astute professionals who are able to 
discern ethical issues as they emerge in clinical practice (Welfel, 1992).  
 
Once an ethical dilemma is identified, moral reasoning processes help to distinguish ethical 
from unethical choices and to determine the ethically ideal course of action (Welfel & 
Kitchener, 1992). Studies based on hypothetical vignettes appear to demonstrate, however, 
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that psychologists generally disagree on what comprises the ideal or most appropriate 
ethical intervention (Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; Haas, Malouf & Mayerson, 1986, 1988; 
Slack, 1997; Tymchuk, Drapkin, Major-Kingsley, Ackerman, Coffman & Baum, 1982). 
Using a nationwide sample of clinical psychologists, Tymchuk et al. (1982) explored 
consensus in professional decision-making as well as the extent to which decisions were 
based on similar criteria. Respondents failed to agree in two thirds of the hypothetical 
scenarios concerned. Strong consensus existed in relation to only a minority of issues 
including confidentiality, sexualised dual relationships and duty to warn. The authors 
concluded that common “strategies for thinking about these issues” (p. 420) or consensus in 
professional decision-making appears to be related to topics which enjoy widespread 
professional and media attention and for which legal or professional guidelines exist.  
 
One related interpretation of the lack of consensus in ethical decision-making is that it 
comprises a useful index of those professional situations with which psychologists are 
struggling in the absence of clear ethical guidelines (Chevalier & Lyon, 1993). Of interest in 
this regard are the observations made by Tymchuk et al. (1982) that, for all vignettes, the 
most frequently chosen criterion was “concern with the interests of clients” and the least 
commonly chosen criterion was “financial concerns of the psychologist” (p. 419). Given the 
forced choice format of responses to pre-selected hypothetical vignettes, the latter 
consciously chosen criteria arguably demonstrate a social desirability bias and fail to 
capture the “multiply determined” (Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 182) nature of motivation, 
including self-interested or frankly unethical motives, characteristically elicited by real-life 
ethical dilemmas. Certainly, Smith, McGuire, Abbott and Blau (1991) appear to temper 
calls for the further escalation of ethical guidelines with the sobering comment that 
“widespread agreement [exists] that the development of additional guidelines, examples and 
casebooks will not solve the complex problems that ethical decision-making poses” (p. 
236).  
 
Extending the work of Tymchuk et al. (1982), Haas, Malouf and Mayerson (1986,1988) 
explored 294 psychologists‟ preferred resolutions to 10 hypothetical dilemmas and their 
primary reasons for these choices. Findings once again demonstrated that experienced 
psychologists failed to reach consensus on several areas of serious professional concern. 
Highest consensus was around conflict of interest, mandatory reporting of threatened 
violence and refusal to refer to a colleague considered incompetent. Low consensus 
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emerged in relation to collegial misconduct and confidentiality issues in the context of 
family treatment. The authors suggest that lack of consensus in professional decision-
making represents a troubling finding only if the task of ethics education is construed as 
providing instruction in the selection of “right behaviours” across a range of decision-
making situations. If the task of ethics education, alternatively, is to inculcate ethical 
reasoning processes, results potentially indicate that divergent but ethically acceptable 
choices of action may stem from the same reasoning processes grounded in recognised 
ethical principles. Using data from the earlier survey, Haas et al. (1988) in a second study 
investigated the effects of psychologists‟ personal and professional characteristics on their 
choices of action as well as their professed reasons. The authors concluded that a 
relationship appeared to exist between taking direct action (reporting, confronting) and 
external codified ethical guidelines (based on the law or formal codes of ethics). In contrast, 
ethically defensible but less direct forms of action (discussion of feelings, encouraging a 
victim to report) appeared to be more strongly associated with internalised noncodified 
ideals (for example, personal standards, the desire to safeguard the therapy process or the 
protection of society‟s interests).  
 
Recognition of an ethical dilemma and conceptual knowledge of the ethically most 
appropriate course of action do not necessarily translate into ethical behaviour. Highlighting 
a third difficulty which potentially compromises ethical decision-making, the following 
studies probe the apparent discrepancy between the ethical ideal and the actual 
implementation of ethical practice. Bernard and Jara (1986) presented a nationwide sample 
of clinical psychology students with two hypothetical ethical dilemmas depicting a 
peer/friend who had clearly violated professional ethical standards. Subjects received an 
update on the APA (1981) ethical principles pertinent to the hypothetical violations. 
Respondents were then asked to indicate what, according to the APA ethics code, they 
should do as well as what they thought they probably would do if confronted with the 
scenarios described. Findings indicated that approximately 50% of clinical graduate students 
would do less about ethical misconduct than they knew they should do. Hypothesising that 
the knowledge/action discrepancy is a function of personal values rather than a matter of 
demographic variables, Bernard and Jara (1986) argue that the problem of ethical 
misconduct does not apparently inhere in students‟ cognitive understanding of ethical 
principles but in “how to motivate them to implement principles that they apparently 
understand quite well” (p. 315).  
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Replicating the study with experienced clinical psychologists, Bernard, Murphy and Little 
(1987) found that the proportion of respondents who said they would do what they should 
do was substantially higher than earlier results obtained from graduate students. However, 
26 per cent to 37 per cent of the sample of clinical psychologists indicated they would do 
less than they knew they should. Congruent with the results of the earlier study, the authors 
speculate that compromised ethical decision-making pertaining to failure to report collegial 
misconduct apparently reflects motivational phenomena and personal values rather than 
deficits in respondents‟ cognitive understanding of how the relevant ethical principles 
should be applied.  
 
Smith, McGuire, Abott and Blau (1991) investigated clinicians‟ resolution of ethical 
dilemmas and the reasons for their choices of action. Responses to a questionnaire 
containing 10 hypothetical ethically conflictual vignettes were obtained from 102 mental 
health professionals. For each vignette, respondents were asked to distinguish what they 
believed they should do and then to select the action choice that best represented what they 
probably would do. For each should and would choice, subjects additionally selected a 
rationale that described the reasons for their elected choice of action. Findings consistently 
demonstrated that respondents thought they should ideally act more in accordance with 
existing APA ethical guidelines than they probably would do in real-life circumstances. 
Consistent with the results of Haas et al. (1986), the ethically ideal course of action (what 
should be done) was construed in terms of codified guidelines (based on the law and formal 
ethics codes). The authors suggested that conformity to the ethical ideal is most likely to 
occur when anticipated ethical violations involved breaches of legal statutes and 
professional standards (for example, duty to warn; prohibition against sexual involvement 
with clients). However, where an absence of clear rules of conduct exists, clinicians‟ 
behaviour was influenced by intuition, personal values, financial need and pragmatic 
considerations. In short, respondents tended to justify what they should do in terms of 
codified rationales but acknowledged that they were more likely to respond to noncodified 
rationales in determining what they would actually do in real-life circumstances. While the 
judgment/action discrepancy may be ameliorated by developing additional ethical principles 
pertinent to practice areas not specifically addressed by existing codes, the authors 
concluded that the discrepancies concerned may well reflect elements of expediency and 
deficits in personal integrity and honesty.  
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The foregoing discussion of quantitative survey research apparently reveals an untheorised 
gap between avowed ethical ideals and lived clinical practice (Bernard & Jara, 1986; 
Bernard et al., 1987; Smith et al., 1991). Empirical research as well as documentation of 
ethical violations by the Ethics Committees of statutory and voluntary professional bodies 
combine to suggest that compromised ethical decision-making may well arise when 
competing subjective feelings, values and contextual pressures interpose between the 
declared ideal and actual lived practice. This complexity of ethical decision-making, Betan 
(1997) remarks, is “often ignored, or at least rarely captured, in the professional literature” 
(p. 351). The following two studies suggest the need for significant but atheoretical 
quantitative findings to be supplemented with qualitative data that describe the emotional 
dimension of ethical decision-making. Such an account may contribute to a theoretically 
nuanced understanding of what potentially transpires in the often observed hiatus between 
the identified ethical ideal and the implementation of ethically compromised practice.  
 
Pope and Tabachnick (1993) explored the extent to which therapists experienced anger, 
hate, fear and sexual feelings as well as the contexts in which these affects typically 
occurred. The 285 psychologists involved in the national survey additionally rated their 
graduate training with regard to helping them address these feelings subsequently in 
professional practice. Recommending caution in generalising their findings, Pope and 
Tabachnick (1993) reported that over 80 per cent of psychologists surveyed experienced 
some degree of fear, anger and sexual feeling in the context of their therapeutic work. 
Strongest fears pertained to client suicide, with over half of the participants indicating that 
debilitating subjective anxieties had negatively affected their sleep, eating and 
concentration. Sexual attraction to clients was reported by 87 per cent and sexual arousal by 
57 per cent of participants. Compromised ethical decision-making may be inferred from the 
finding that over half of the respondents reported hugging patients and more than 1 in 10 
flirted with both female and male clients. Moreover, more than 11 per cent of participants 
reported that complaints had been filed against them, with three times as many male 
therapists than female therapists having incurred formal complaints. Of significance was the 
finding that the least frequently reported feelings involved the ego dystonic affects of hate 
and anger which were endorsed by less than half of the participants. 
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Pope and Tabachnick (1993) comment that intense countertransference affects, including 
hatred and sexual excitement, may be exceptionally difficult for caregivers to openly 
acknowledge. These difficulties are compounded by the possible failure of graduate training 
programmes to provide adequate learning opportunities for students to develop the 
confidence, knowledge and skills needed to address countertransference feelings effectively 
in subsequent professional practice. The authors surmise that such affects may, when 
acknowledged and accepted, reduce tension and guilt as well as serve as a valuable 
therapeutic resource. Neglected or denied countertransference feelings alternatively can 
incur “devastating consequences” (Pope & Tabachnick, 1993, p. 142), raising the risk that 
the unrecognised affects underpinning ethical decision-making may eventually translate into 
the implementation of frankly unethical action. 
 
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies were used by Betan and Stanton (1999) to 
explore how emotional responses and contextual concerns influenced psychologists‟ 
willingness to implement ethical interventions. Extending Bernard and Jara‟s (1986) work, 
the authors presented 258 clinical psychology students with a hypothetical case scenario 
depicting a friend/colleague‟s impaired professional functioning due to problem drinking. 
Participants were asked to indicate what, according to the APA ethical principles, they 
should and would do, the estimated frequency of pre-selected emotional responses and the 
extent to which contextual concerns had influenced their decisions. Open-ended questions 
additionally invited subjects to elaborate on both their rationales for choosing an 
intervention as well as on the perceived role played by emotions in the ethical decision-
making process. 
 
Findings showed that 95 per cent of participants correctly identified that the colleague‟s 
drinking problem should be reported to the supervisor or clinic director. Similar to Bernard 
and Jara‟s (1986) results, 50 per cent of participants reported that they would do less than 
they believed they should. Given that half of the participants involved were unwilling to 
intervene in the way they believed was ethically most appropriate, Betan and Stanton (1999) 
argue that, consistent with previous research, the latter finding suggests “that ethical 
knowledge is not sufficient for producing ethical behavior” (p. 297). Examination of 
participants‟ written responses to open-ended questions elicited challenging insights into the 
possible influence exerted by emotions in ethical decision-making. When pulled by anxiety, 
guilt and confusion, qualitative data suggested that ethical judgment appeared to be 
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compromised and inadequate ethical behavior was likely to be effected. Open-ended 
responses revealed, for example, that participants‟ emotional discomfort might lead to 
minimising collegial misconduct, to slowing intervention or to doing nothing and 
withdrawing from the ethically conflictual situation concerned. Alternatively, participants 
who experienced greater ethical willingness to do what they should do reported significantly 
greater concern and compassion for those involved and feelings of confidence that 
intervention would initiate constructive change.  
 
Betan and Stanton (1999) argue that emotions can powerfully facilitate as well as hinder 
ethical decision-making. These authors contend that “psychologists are making inadequate 
decisions about ethical dilemmas in part because they are not well attuned to the influential 
role of emotions, values and contextual concerns in ethical discourse” (p. 299). Whereas 
unaddressed anxiety, guilt or confusion may compromise the capacity for thoughtfulness 
and ethical intervention, Betan and Stanton (1999) concluded that awareness of emotions 
can alternatively be integrated with the rational analysis of ethical dilemmas to effect 
constructive ethical action. While the emotional dimension of ethical decision-making is 
emphasised, the issue of unconscious determinants potentially undergirding the ethical 
decision-making process was not specifically identified or theorised in this study. 
8.1. South African Empirical Research Studies 
Unlike the USA and Europe, relatively few publications have emerged in South Africa in 
the field of ethics and psychology (Slack & Wassenaar, 1999). This present lack appears to 
be “an indication that [the] area does not receive the research attention it deserves” 
(Scherrer et al., 2002, p. 63). Recent South African studies have, however, included 
psychologists‟ attitudes towards and practices regarding erotic and nonerotic physical 
contact with clients (Trent & Collings, 1997), the experience of sexual attraction in 
psychotherapy (Stevenson, 1999), unintentional breaches of confidentiality (Peel, 1998) and 
the principle-based resolution of an ethical dilemma involving non-fatal suicidal behaviour 
(Pillay et al., 2004). The following discussion considers local survey studies which helped 
to increasingly sharpen the particular research focus of the present work.  
 
Ethical decision-making practices of South African clinical psychologists were explored by 
Slack (1997). The sample involved 122 respondents (a 20 per cent response rate) who 
indicated their preferred resolution to 10 hypothetical ethical dilemmas as well as the 
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primary reasons for their choices. Consistent with previous research, central findings 
revealed wide variability in professional ethical decision-making; consensus was evident in 
relation to dilemmas subject to high levels of professional attention and regulated by legal 
guidelines. Slack (1997) speculated that the wide variability identified may partially derive 
from idiosyncratic interpretation of broad imprecise ethical guidelines which fail to offer 
assistance in personally encountered dilemmas. Based on the CPA approach, Slack (1997) 
advocates formulating a code of ethics which ranks ethical principles and which makes the 
ethical reasoning underpinning valued principles explicit. This would free practitioners to 
apply the reasoning in a consistent manner to novel situations not specifically addressed by 
ethical codes. Adherence to such a “conceptual approach to regulations may provide the 
interpretive criteria psychologists appeared to be calling for in their efforts to extrapolate 
from imprecise guidelines to specific situations” (Vasquez, 1994, in Slack, 1997, p. 118). 
Limitations of this study include the possibility that, as Slack (1997) acknowledged, the 
hypothetical vignettes used may not capture the affective complexity characteristic of real-
life ethical dilemmas. The questionnaire‟s forced choice format additionally may reveal the 
effects of a social desirability bias as respondents sought to sustain a positive professional 
self-image by consistently selecting ethically acceptable responses. Finally, the influence of 
emotional and interpersonal factors on ethical decision-making were not identified or 
theorised by this study.  
 
South African clinical psychologists appear to experience similar ethical concerns to those 
encountered by their international colleagues. Slack and Wassenaar (1999) invited 487 
South African clinical psychologists to describe in writing real-life ethical dilemmas which 
they had personally encountered in practice. The invitation formed part of Slack‟s (1997) 
foregoing larger study investigating psychologists‟ preferred resolution to hypothetical 
ethical vignettes. Apparently agreeing with Pope and Vetter (1992), Wassenaar (2002) 
suggests that eliciting data directly from psychologists‟ own experience might be more 
congruent with the complexities of actual practice, thus affording greater assistance with 
professional ethics training, ethical decision-making and guideline development. 
 
The four largest categories of ethical dilemmas to emerge from the study included 
confidentiality issues (29 per cent), nonsexual dual relationships (14 per cent), payment 
issues (12 per cent) and collegial misconduct (10 per cent). Examples of prominent 
confidentiality dilemmas included concerns regarding the need to respond to court orders to 
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release client records as well as difficulties establishing the parameters of confidentiality in 
relation to third parties threatened with harm, minor clients and multiperson therapy. 
Nonsexual dual relationships entailed familiar tensions pertaining to social contact with 
current clients and conflicting ethical obligations between the psychologist‟s role as an 
employee in an institution and the need to protect client confidentiality. Payment issues 
included concerns regarding client requests to abuse medical aid schemes and the effects of 
non-payment on the therapeutic relationship. The fourth category involving perceived 
collegial misconduct included misrepresentation of registration category, coercion of clients 
and “rushed” interventions. Although based on a small sample, the authors concluded that 
the data suggest that strong similarities prevail between the ethical concerns of South 
African clinical psychologists and their international counterparts.  
 
Of interest to the present research study is that in Slack and Wassenaar‟s (1999) original 
survey, the invitation soliciting real-life ethical dilemmas apparently emphasised 
descriptions of external events, cognitive analysis of the principles entailed in respondents‟ 
attempts at resolution and the reasons for, and consequences of, chosen actions. Elaboration 
of the impact of the individual decision-maker‟s subjective psychological processes and 
affective responses on ethical decision-making were apparently not investigated. Authorial 
comment on the emotional dimension of ethical decision-making is seemingly confined in 
the latter study to the observation that survey respondents perceived the confrontation of 
collegial misconduct to be “so aversive as to be consistently avoided” (p. 183).  
 
Information regarding the violation of professional ethical standards may be sourced from 
the ethics committees of national psychological associations, from formal complaints 
submitted to state or national registration boards and from surveys of psychologists‟ 
attitudes, practices and dilemmas (Wassenaar, 2002). Such information by implication 
serves to document instances of compromised professional ethical decision-making. One 
recent study of ethical violations by South African psychologists was conducted by 
Scherrer, Louw and Möller (2002) who examined records of complaints, occurring between 
1990 and 1999, which had been submitted to the Professional Board for Psychology. Most 
frequently reported public complaints pertained to accounts and fees (16 per cent), problems 
regarding reports (13 per cent), competence (13 per cent) and improper behavior, including 
sexual misconduct (12 per cent). The core finding highlighted the nominally low percentage 
of all complaints lodged against South African psychologists (between 1990 and 1999, only 
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1 per cent of all registered psychologists were charged with unethical conduct). The authors 
caution, however, that psychologists are often required to use their own ethical judgments in 
stressful circumstances which leave little time for reflection, fostering “a breeding ground 
for unethical behavior” (p. 54). The finding, moreover, that complaints concerning 
psychologists‟ competence took third place suggests that insufficient attention is being paid 
to the issue of professional ethics training. Involving considerably more than the uncritical 
consumption of ethical code items, Scherrer et al. (2002) concluded that compulsory ethics 
training at pre-professional and postqualifying levels necessarily entails “schooling in 
critical thinking, problem-solving and decision-making that will produce students … trained 
in an outcomes-based approach for the ethical dilemmas that they will be confronted with as 
therapists, theoreticians or researchers” (p. 63). While acknowledging that psychotherapy is 
often abused and that ethics training therefore comprises a vital component of quality 
university training, no mention is made by Scherrer et al. (2002) of the need for ethical 
decision-making skills to include not only “critical thinking” but also reflection on the 
potential influence wielded by therapist subjectivity.  
 
Wassenaar (2002) examined the ethical dimensions of South African professional 
psychology. The three different data sets used included a series of public complaints against 
psychologists, a study of real-life ethical dilemmas reported by psychologists and a survey 
of South African university based ethics training programmes. Comparison of public 
complaints with psychologists‟ own self-reported ethical concerns aimed at clarifying 
whether the dissatisfactions of service-receiving consumers corresponded with areas of 
professional difficulty described by psychologists themselves. The combined analysis was 
intended to inform future ethics training, regulatory bodies about prevalent patterns of 
public complaints and the revision of ethical codes. 
 
Major findings indicated the most frequently reported “Complaints” concerned fee issues, 
inappropriate practice and competence. Clinical psychologists were disproportionately more 
likely to attract public complaints of unethical behaviour than were other registration 
categories, a finding replicated by Scherrer et al. (2002). Most frequently described real-life 
“Dilemmas” included confidentiality, inappropriate practice and nonsexual dual 
relationships. General dissatisfaction was expressed by respondents regarding the quantity 
and quality of their university based ethics training.  Comparison of the “Complaints” and 
“Dilemmas” data suggested that essentially the public was concerned about ethical issues 
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which were different from the ethical preoccupations of psychologists themselves. 
Wassenaar (2002) accordingly comments that the different perspectives provided by the 
“Complaints” and “Dilemmas” data must each be integrated into professional ethics training 
so that “it embraces both the views of the complaining public and the anxieties of 
practitioners themselves” (p. 218). Given the research cited earlier emphasising 
motivational rather than cognitive factors alone (Bernard & Jara, 1986; Betan & Stanton, 
1999), Wassenaar (2002) comments further that ethics training should additionally explicitly 
recognise and integrate into the teaching of ethical decision-making skills emotional and 
contextual factors which influence ethical judgment and action. This observation appears 
congruent with the finding that adult therapy represented the second highest activity 
associated with public complaints (including sexual issues) and was reported by 
psychologists themselves as the activity in which most ethical dilemmas emerged. While 
acknowledging the significance of the emotional dimension of ethical decision-making, 
Wassenaar (2002) observes that this aspect was not a focus of his study. 
 
In short, the preceding review of international and local research investigating professional 
ethical decision-making repeatedly suggests that the hiatus between the ethical ideal and 
compromised ethical practice will not necessarily be resolved through conceptual 
knowledge alone, nor through the provision of additional guidelines. Wielding an important 
influence on the judgment/action discontinuity is the apparently little researched emotional 
dimension of ethical decision-making. The professional research literature seemingly lacks 
in-depth accounts, grounded in empirical data, of the individual decision-maker‟s thoughts, 
feelings, anxieties, desires, fantasies and values as these emerge, often forcefully, in the 
context of challenging ethical dilemmas. Construction of a theorised account of the 
influence exerted by therapist subjectivity might comprise a rational argument for 
professional ethics training to supplement its teaching of traditional ethical frameworks 
emphasising critical thinking with consideration of the potential impact wielded by 
countertransference phenomena on the ethical decision-making process. No interpretive 
study has apparently been conducted to date of the subjective and interpersonal 
psychological processes experienced by South African psychologists who have grappled to 
resolve real-life ethical dilemmas in the context of the therapeutic space.  
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9. ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING MODELS BASED ON A PRINCIPLE ETHICS 
APPROACH 
Seminal ethical decision-making models in the professional literature include Rest (1984), 
Kitchener (1984), Steere (1984) and the CPA (2000). These principle-dominated 
frameworks emphasise rational analysis and an objective problem-solving approach; they 
thus retain a broadly similar methodology to that deployed by numerous alternative ethical 
decision-making models (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Corey, Corey & Callanan, 1998; 
Eberlein, 1987; Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Forester-Miller & Davis, 1996; Knapp & van de 
Creek, 2007). Hierarchical levels or “contextual forces” (Tarvydas, 1998, p. 148) which 
affect the individual practitioner‟s daily ethical practices include interdependent contexts 
comprised by the practitioner-client relationship, the clinical multidisciplinary team, agency 
dynamics as well as public policy directives. The following discussion, however, focuses on 
ethical decision-making processes which transpire primarily at the clinical or “micro-level” 
(Tarvydas, 1998, p. 148) wherein the traditional practitioner-patient relationship remains the 
central focus.   
9.1. Rest‟s (1984) Four Components of Moral Reasoning 
Rest‟s (1984) model comprises the first principle-based framework that is considered in this 
chapter. Providing a clear outline for the ethical decision-making process (Dove, 1995), 
Rest‟s model proposes that moral behaviour consists of four component processes. These 
processes may be conceptualised as “major units of analysis” and include “Moral 
Sensitivity”, “Moral Judgment”, “Moral Motivation” and “Moral Character” (Rest, 1994, 
pp. 23-24). Moral development involves becoming proficient in all four areas. Moral failure 
can result from a deficiency in any one component (Rest, 1984). Betan (1997) critiques the 
latter model as constrained by “a linear, logical-reductionistic approach to ethics” (p. 356) 
but Rest (1984) evidently rebuts the notion that “the four components depict a linear 
sequence in real time” (p. 20). All four mutually influential components are presented, Rest 
(1984) argues, not in a linear but in a logical sequence that offers a theoretical framework 
for analysing psychological processes inherent to the production of moral behaviour.  
Thoroughly empirically grounded, the model remains influenced by cognitive theory and by 
Kohlberg‟s stages of moral development (Cottone & Claus, 2000).   
9.1.1. Component I: Moral Sensitivity 
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This component requires that the practitioner has the capacity to discern that a moral 
problem exists, can imagine possible courses of action and additionally envisages the 
consequences of each course of action on the welfare of others (Rest, 1984). Clearly, 
unethical behaviour may have its genesis in the fundamental failure to perceive the moral 
dimension of ethically problematic situations (Neukrug & Lovell, 1996). Unexpectedly 
sharing with psychoanalytic psychotherapy an interest in the meanings of prereflective 
responses in the context of ethical conflict, Rest (1984) endorses the need to interpret “gut 
feelings” (p. 21) or the strong affective arousal which potentially accompanies “primitive 
cognitions” (p. 21) and which together may precipitate premature action. These comments 
suggest the unavoidable intertwining of cognitions and emotions (Tarvydas, 1998) and that, 
from Rest‟s (1984) perspective, “there are no cognitions completely devoid of affect, no 
affects completely devoid of cognitions, and no moral behaviour that is independent of 
cognitions and affects” (p. 19). 
9.1.2. Component II: Moral Judgment 
 
This component involves deciding which course of action, among competing alternatives, is 
morally right, fair and closest to one‟s ideal of justice (Rest, 1984). When an individual has 
to formulate a moral course of action, Rest argues, he/she generally calls upon “basic 
underlying conceptions of cooperation” (p. 24) that bind progressively wider social 
networks together and that are essentially derived from one of Kohlberg‟s six 
developmental stages of moral judgment. Each of the latter stages is characterised by 
distinctive moral reasoning processes and by an intuitive notion of rightness, justness and 
fairness. The six-stage sequence culminates in the most mature moral reasoning comprised 
by ideal principles of justice that govern equal, fair and co-operative interaction between 
people in society (Rest, 1984).  
 
Coherent, logical and persuasive, Component II processes are nevertheless arguably 
experience-distant and may not capture fully the way ethics is “done” in real life (Betan, 
1997, p. 350). The highly theorised and apparently objective nature of Component II 
processes appear to presuppose “epistemological truth unaffected by context, person or 
both” (Betan, 1997, p. 352). Thus from the several perspectives of virtue ethics, a care 
orientation and psychoanalysis, Rest‟s (1984) Component II processes arguably stop short 
of considering the influence on ethical decision-making of the individual clinician‟s 
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subjectivity and embeddedness in “contextual forces” (Tarvydas, 1998, p. 148) that may 
impact on the resolution of the particular dilemma concerned.  
9.1.3. Component III: Moral Motivation 
 
This component acknowledges that an individual may distinguish which among available 
courses of action is the morally appropriate alternative (Component II processes) but may 
yet be dissuaded from pursuing the latter because of the attraction exerted by competing 
“nonmoral values” (Rest, 1984, p. 25). Espoused moral ideals may well be compromised by 
“strong needs for acceptance by peers or supervisors, prestige, influence, to avoid 
controversy, or to be financially successful” (Tarvydas, 1998, p. 153).  
 
Rest‟s distinction between the ethically ideal course of action and competing “nonmoral 
values” partially informs the conceptual framework used later in this study to analyse how 
countertransference pressures appeared to influence research participants‟ avowed ethical 
values in the context of emotionally charged real-life dilemmas. Relevant to the hiatus 
between participants‟ aspirational ethical principles and their lived ethical values are the 
findings of empirical studies discussed in the previous section indicating, for example, that 
avoidance of collegial misconduct may stem from fears of retaliation, of damage to 
reputation or friendships as well as from loyalty factors. Component III processes move 
Rest‟s model beyond merely cognitively identifying the optimal ethical course of action to 
explicitly acknowledging that the pull of competing nonmoral motives may dislodge the 
clinician‟s adherence to avowed ethical ideals.  
9.1.4. Component IV: Moral Character 
 
The final component involves the actual implementation and execution of the chosen moral 
course of action. In the face of alluring distractions and situational pressures, Rest (1984) 
avers that this is no simple matter, requiring as it does “Perseverance, resoluteness, 
competence, and „character‟ ” (p. 26). As Eberlein (1987) observes, the fourth component 
reveals the extent to which “the ethical ideal can or will actually be implemented” (p. 355). 
The action in Component IV, Eberlein (1987) continues, indicates “the ability or willingness 
of a person to put his or her words into practice” (p. 355).  
 
Rest‟s (1984) four-component model clearly privileges moral reasoning processes. 
However, the model also refers to the need to interpret the possible meanings of the 
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prereflective emotional arousal that potentially accompanies ethical conflict and that may 
precipitate the implementation of premature action (Component I processes). Rest‟s 
theoretical framework additionally frankly acknowledges the competing attractions of 
unethical and consciously self-interested motivations (Component III processes). Betan 
(1997) argues that while Rest recognises that subjective influences may impact on moral 
reasoning, this latter aspect of the ethical decision-making process requires greater 
elaboration in his model.  
9.2. Kitchener‟s (1984) Model of Ethical Justification 
The second ethical decision-making framework to be considered involves Kitchener‟s 
(1984) two levels of ethical justification. The primarily linear progression inherent in the 
different levels of ethical justification proposed by Kitchener (1984) and by Steere (1984) 
are illustrated below in Figures 1 and 2. Steere‟s (1984) formulation of an ethical decision-
making model, the third framework foregrounded, is apparently the only example to emerge 
in South African psychological literature. As Peel (1998) observes, Steere‟s (1984) 
publication on professional psychological ethics is widely acknowledged as one of the most 
significant to appear to date in South Africa.   
 
Kitchener (1984) proposed an ethical decision-making model (see Figure 1 below) which 
provides helpful “thinking tools” (Kitchener, 1986, p. 309) to aid analysis and the resolution 
of ethical dilemmas. Two basic levels of ethical justification are distinguished. For 
Kitchener (1984) ethical reasoning begins, firstly, at an “Intuitive” (p. 44) or prereflective 
level. When this level fails and more stringent analytical thinking is required, ethical 
reasoning progresses, secondly, to a “Critical Evaluative” (p. 45) level encompassing ethical 
rules, principles and theories. These differing levels of ethical analysis, Kitchener (1986) 
argues, facilitate “deeper understanding of the basis for ethical decision-making” (p. 44) and 
provide a coherent framework which can be consistently applied across ethically 
problematic situations.  
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C. Ethical Theory
B. Principles – Autonomy
     Nonmalificence
     Benificence
     Justice, Fidelity
A. Rules – Professional Ethics
    Codes, Laws, etc
Critical-Evaluative Level:
Reasoned judgements &
evaluation
Intuitive Level: Immediate 
judgements & actions
Facts of the 
Situation
Ordinary Moral
Sense
Figure 1: Two levels of ethical justification 
(Kitchener, 1984, p. 45)
 
9.2.1. The Intuitive Level 
 
This level represents “an immediate, prereflective response to most ethical situations based 
on the sum of [an individual‟s] prior ethical knowledge and experience” (Kitchener, 1984, 
p. 44).  Apparently similar to Rest‟s first component of ethical decision-making, Kitchener 
suggests that ethical awareness may originate in strong prereflective responses or “gut 
feelings” (Rest, 1984, p. 21).  Kitchener‟s (1984) “Intuitive” level (see Figure 1 above) 
additionally encompasses “ordinary moral sense” (p. 45) or “a firm set of ethical beliefs” (p. 
44), assumptions and professional knowledge. In the absence of relevant professional rules 
or when time constraints mitigate against conscious reflection, Kitchener (1984) avers that 
the prereflective accessing of these immediate moral feelings remains critical to informing 
pressing everyday ethical judgments and actions.   
 
Intuitive ethical decision-making is associated with what “ought and ought not” (Kitchener, 
1984, p. 44) to be done or with a deontological perspective which directs that morally right 
behaviour upholds absolute ethical principles (such as honesty, justice or respect for the 
dignity of all persons) independently of any consequences (Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Kvale, 
1996).  Intuitive judgments arise “when we automatically rely on a sense of personal 
morality and deeply ingrained ethical rules and principles pertaining to professional duty 
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and conduct” (Woody, 1990, p. 136). The central role occupied by “ordinary moral sense” 
in responding immediately to ethically conflictual situations apparently reinforces virtue 
ethics proponents‟ insistence that ethically responsible practice remains contingent on 
cultivating the moral excellence of the individual practitioner‟s character (Tarvydas, 1998). 
 
Moral intuition alone, however, may fail to provide adequate ethical guidance (Kitchener, 
1984). Unusual or ethically highly taxing situations may demand progression to a more 
intellectually rigorous “critical-evaluative level of moral reasoning [which] is necessary to 
guide, refine, and evaluate our ordinary moral judgment” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 44).  
9.2.2. The Critical-Evaluative Level 
 
Moral reasoning at this level progresses through “three tiers of increasingly general and 
abstract forms of justification” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 45). Ethical rules, principles, and 
theories comprise the three hierarchical tiers concerned (see Figure 1 above). When the first 
tier of ethical rules fails to provide the requisite ethical guidance, movement to the 
subsequent tiers comprised by ethical principles and theories is justified.  Ethical rules or 
standards are generally stated in professional ethics codes; often statutorily binding, formal 
codes are informed by fundamental ethical principles which are themselves derived from 
deontological and utilitarian ethical theories (Allan, 2001; Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Kitchener, 
1984; Steere, 1984).  
9.2.2.1.The First Tier: Ethical Rules 
 
The practitioner‟s initial intuitive response to an ethically difficult situation may be 
evaluated by appealing to ethical rules or “a set of standards to which all members of the 
profession are presumed to agree” (Kitchener, 1986, p. 309). When a single applicable rule 
prevails, the practitioner acts in accordance with the dictates of the ethical standard 
concerned. When competing ethical rules present opposing courses of action, the 
practitioner moves to the second tier comprised by ethical principles and assigns priority to 
the rule and course of action which best exemplifies the dictates of the relevant ethical 
principle (Steere, 1984).  
 
Ostensibly formulated with the best interests of the public in mind, Kitchener (1984) 
nevertheless cautions that professional ethical codes are typically conservative, often 
functioning to protect the membership rather than the rights of consumers. Ethical rules may 
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moreover offer contradictory or ambiguous directives and, as a member of different 
professional associations, the practitioner may well be confounded by conflicting ethical 
standards espoused by different ethical codes. While formal codes, standards and principles 
may provide valuable ethical guidelines, their inherent limitations suggest that the 
conscientious practitioner cannot divest him/herself of “the burden of decision-making in 
ethical dilemmas” (Kitchener, 1984 p. 53).  
 
In contrast Steere‟s (1984) comments reveal an apparent optimism that the provision of 
ethical rules or “instant guidelines” (p. 10) will ease the conflict and ambiguity integral to 
ethical decision-making, reducing the need for any independent interpretation of ethical 
priorities. The value of objective ethical rules, Steere (1984) argues, lies precisely in their 
capacity to relieve the individual practitioner of the “time consuming task of making 
independent ethical judgments … the profession and public … need [not] … rely upon 
every … practitioner‟s willingness [or] … ability … to view ethically complex conditions 
objectively and free of self-interest” (p. 10). Difficulties presented by Steere‟s (1984) linear 
model may arguably include the foregoing assumption that the provision of formal ethical 
standards releases the moral agent from the obligation to actively evaluate the 
appropriateness of prevailing ethical standards and to confront the impact of his/her 
subjectivity on the ethical decision-making process.   
9.2.2.2. The Second Tier: Ethical Principles 
 
The second tier consists of five core ethical principles which are cited by Kitchener (1984) 
as “the most critical for the evaluation of ethical concerns in psychology” (p. 46).  The 
ethical principles include autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and fidelity. In 
contrast to the CPA‟s (2000) lexical ordering, Kitchener (1984) argues that no single ethical 
principle or fixed ordering of ethical principles can be established as absolutely binding 
without exception. Prevailing circumstances determine which ethical principle is most 
relevant and should take precedence. While not absolute, ethical principles are nevertheless 
always ethically relevant and provide “consistent advice about what moral issues need to be 
considered” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 52). Briefly outlined below, particular features of the 
principles are highlighted for their relevance to the later discussion of data pertaining to 
research participants‟ real-life ethical dilemmas.  
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Autonomy 
This principle encompasses the right to act as a free agent and to make one‟s own decisions 
as well as the need to respect others‟ autonomous rights to make independent choices of 
their own (Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Forrester-Miller & Davis, 1996; Kitchener, 1984; 1986). 
Even when considered foolish, mistaken or as involving risk, the principle of autonomy 
dictates that, provided others‟ rights are not infringed upon, the patient concerned should be 
able to pursue autonomous choices in a context “free of compulsion or coercion by any 
external agent” (Steere, 1984, p. 7). The conscientious practice of “informed consent” 
apparently best safeguards the patient‟s autonomy. As far as possible the patient is provided 
with necessary information pertaining to the likely outcome, nature of involvement required 
and alternative options available before voluntarily deciding to enter into or to persist with 
psychological treatment (Steere, 1984).  
Nonmaleficence 
The concept of nonmaleficence can best be understood as “Above all do no harm” 
(Kitchener, 1984, p. 47). The intentional infliction of physical or emotional harm is 
expressly forbidden and the maxim additionally directs that the professional desist from 
activities which carry a high risk of harm (Kitchener, 1986).  Nonmaleficence is generally 
held to be a stronger ethical obligation than beneficence; when choices have to be made 
between positively benefiting or harming an individual, other persons or society, “our 
stronger obligation … would be to avoid harm” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 47).  
 
In Steere‟s (1984) linear ethical decision-making model (see Figure 2 below), assigning 
relative weighting to potential harms and benefits appears to present a principally 
intellectual task. Apparently screening out contextual considerations, the moral agent‟s 
subjectivity and irrational responses, the balancing of “competing moral goods” (Betan, 
1997, p. 35) pertaining to psychological distress and wellbeing transpires in a seemingly 
impersonal process of computation termed the “detriment-benefit” analysis. This possibly 
overly rational approach to ethical analysis appears reminiscent of modernist thinking and 
of Freud‟s contested and now defunct metaphor of the detached surgeon/analyst who 
necessarily “puts aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrates his 
mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skilfully as possible” (Freud, 
1958, p. 115).  
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The noninfliction of harm has been posited as the “bedrock” (Bersoff, 2003, p. 44) or 
governing principle of applied psychology and analytic practice (Brown, 1982; Solomon, 
2003; Stokoe, 2000).  Defining the notion of “harm”, Halpern (2003, in Kantrowitz, 2006) 
writes that “given that the goal of psychotherapy is psychological healing, harm is that 
which interferes with this goal” (p. 217). Pain and discomfort endured in the course of 
therapy, Halpern continues, is not invariably anti-therapeutic and should not be confused 
with harm. While supportive of these sentiments, Kitchener (1984) additionally cautions 
that client discomfort aroused in the context of unorthodox or high risk treatments which 
have not yet been empirically validated is unlikely ever to be ethically justifiable. Thus 
Kitchener (1984) comments that “as the risk and magnitude of potential harm increases, 
ethical prohibitions and limits on the treatment also increase” (p. 48).  
Beneficence 
This principle requires engagement in actions which positively benefit others, proactively 
contributing to their health and welfare (Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Forrester-Miller & Davis, 
1996; Kitchener, 1984; 1986). The inherent commitment of the “helping professions” to 
beneficence entails promoting patients‟ positive growth and securing professional standards 
of competence that are likely to increase practitioners‟ beneficent practices (Kitchener, 
1986). When ethical principles dictate competing courses of action, the principle of 
beneficence directs that the final action chosen should, in accordance with a “cost-benefit” 
analysis, garner the most benefits for the lowest costs where costs are calculated in terms of 
exposure of the patient to harm or loss (Steere, 1984).  
 
Disembodied quantifying methods, implied by the preceding “detriment-benefit” and “cost-
benefit” analyses, are arguably congruent with positivist conceptions of knowledge, 
privileging rationality and objectivity at the expense of acknowledging the influence exerted 
on ethical decision-making by the clinician‟s interpersonal context, biases, values and 
desires. The individual moral agent may alternatively be envisaged as “an experiencing 
individual, situated personally and historically … [whose] quest for knowledge is 
accordingly subject to the influence of all those historical, personal and circumstantial 
factors that come into play in every human action” (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 3).  
 
Of relevance to the later discussion of a real-life ethical dilemma involving an apparently 
competent patient‟s wish to terminate therapy are the perennial tensions evoked between the 
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principles of beneficence and autonomy and the corresponding need to minimise infringing 
upon “the offended ethical principle” (Knapp & van der Creek, 2007, p. 401). The exercise 
of “paternalism”, Kitchener (1984) remarks, presupposes “that an authority has knowledge 
of what is good for an individual and … [regulates] … that person‟s behaviour according to 
what the authority believes to be good” (p. 49). Failure to heed a patient‟s growing 
disillusionment and the therapist‟s own bias or belief in the positive benefits of continued 
treatment may well “entice” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 49) the paternalistically inclined clinician 
to override the client‟s autonomy and repeated requests to terminate the therapeutic 
relationship. Avoiding standardisation, however, and demonstrating the need for a flexible 
case-by-case approach, Pillay, Wassenaar and Kramers (2004) provide a contrasting 
dilemma, discussed later in this chapter, wherein they propose that the authority‟s stance of 
beneficence trumps informed consent and the patient‟s right to exercise autonomous choice.  
Justice 
Justice concerns were noted previously as comprising a recurring moral voice or 
predominant mode of moral thinking. Central to this principle, Kitchener (1986) observes, is 
the concept of “fairness” and the directive that others should be treated impartially and 
equally. Additionally, however, the formal meaning of justice suggests that “equal persons 
have the right to be treated equally and nonequal persons have a right to be treated 
differently if the inequality is relevant to the issue in question.” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 49). It 
can therefore be argued that, for example, in addressing the issue of how scarce mental 
health services should be fairly distributed we should consider to what extent such services 
“ought to be distributed equally in regard to [fundamental] need [but] unequally to those 
who are less needy” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 50).  
Fidelity 
The principle of fidelity encompasses the notions of faithfulness, truthfulness, promise 
keeping and loyalty (Kitchener, 1984). The establishment of trust is perceived to be pivotal 
to sustaining consultative, research or therapeutic relationships. Since trust is contingent 
upon fidelity, Kitchener (1984) contends that adherence to this principle is vital for the 
practice of psychology. Conversely, deception and the neglect of fidelity potentially erodes 
trust in the meaningfulness and credibility of professional relationships and in the benefits 
that can be obtained from psychology in particular (Kitchener, 1984).  
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9.2.2.3. The Third Tier: Ethical Theory 
 
The preceding core ethical principles are grounded in ethical theories which comprise 
Kitchener‟s (1984) third and final tier of ethical justification.  The model does not, however, 
elaborate on the relevant theories. Kitchener (1984) apparently concludes that the resolution 
of ethical dilemmas can be effected by appeal to the foregoing five “prima facie” (p. 52) or 
always relevant principles. When ethics codes are silent or contradictory, reference to the 
five core principles facilitates a more general level of ethical reasoning than do ethical rules; 
the principles can accordingly be systematically applied to a wide range of ethically 
problematic situations.   
 
In contrast Steere (1984) contends that when “practical” (p. 12) ethical dilemmas generate 
conflict between ethical rules as well as principles, consulting underlying ethical theories 
carries significant implications for the resolution of the dilemma concerned (See Figure 2 
below). Arguing that the endless hierarchical re-ordering of principles and rules for each 
ethically conflictual situation dictated by the rule-deontological approach is untenable, 
Steere (1984) proposes that rule-utilitarianism provides the most realistic alternative for 
guiding ethical decision-making in clinical practice. This version of utilitarianism proposes 
that “the general good is most likely to be maximised by [routinely] adhering to sets of pre-
agreed rules, rather than by attempting to compute a calculus of benefits for each separate 
action” (Hare, 1977, in Peel, 1998, p. 56). Since the basic directive of rule-utilitarianism is 
to „maximise the good‟, producing the most benefits for the largest number of people, the 
principle, rule and course of action finally assigned priority are those which best exemplify 
this approach. Notwithstanding the difficulties of application, Steere (1984) concludes that 
rule-utilitarianism ensures “that the practitioner‟s conduct is guided, not by self-interest … 
but by a genuine attempt to act in an ethically acceptable manner” (p. 13).  
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Figure 2: Representation of the underlying structure of an 
ethically conflictual situation
(Steere, 1984, p.12) 
 
 
9.3. The Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists (CPA, 2000) 
The Canadian Code, adopted in 1986, was originally developed with the express intention of 
capturing “the collective wisdom” (Sinclair, 2001, p. 17) of Canadian psychologists 
regarding ethical issues and the ethical decision-making process. The Canadian 
Psychological Association‟s (CPA) Code of Ethics thus “reflects, in content … as well as in 
practice … the will of the membership” (Malloy & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998, p. 5). The 
following unique features of the CPA‟s Code include its stated objectives, use of an 
empirical methodology to determine its four foundational ethical principles, organisation of 
the Code around each of the principles concerned, differential weighting of the principles 
and an ethical decision-making model based on a problem-solving approach (Sinclair, 
2001). The CPA‟s model comprises the fourth principle-based framework that is considered 
in this study (see Figure 3 below) and completes examination of the “objective” pole of the 
ethical decision-making process.   
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The Ethical Decision-Making Process 
 
1. Identification of  … individuals and groups potentially affected by the decision. 
2. Identification of ethically relevant issues and practices, including the interests, rights, and … 
relevant characteristics of the individuals and groups involved and of the system … in which the 
ethical problem arose.  
3. Consideration of how personal biases, stresses, or self-interest might influence the development 
of or choice between courses of action. 
4. Development of alternative courses of action. 
5. Analysis of … short-term, ongoing, and long-term risks and benefits of each course of action on 
the individual(s) / group(s) involved … . 
6. Choice of course of action after conscientious application of … principles, values, and 
standards.  
7. Action, with a commitment to assume responsibility for the consequences of the action. 
8. Evaluation of the results of the … action.  
9. Assumption of responsibility for consequences of action, including correction of negative 
consequences … or re-engaging in the decision-making process if the ethical issue is not 
resolved.  
10. Appropriate action … to prevent future occurrences of the dilemma … . 
 
 
Figure 3: CPA’s Code of Ethics (2000, Preamble) 
 
9.3.1. Stated Objectives of the CPA‟s Code 
Stated objectives originally set for the Canadian Code of Ethics were, firstly, that all its 
parts should be conceptually cohesive and that the document produced should constitute an 
effective educational tool. Secondly, recent or innovative areas of practice should be 
accommodated. Thirdly, guidelines for action should be given when ethical principles 
conflict and, finally, the most useful decision rules (i.e. ethical principles) for ethical 
decision-making rules should be explicitly reflected (Eberlein, 1987; Seitz & O‟Neill, 1996; 
Sinclair, 2001; Sinclair et al., 1987).  
9.3.2. Use of Empirical Methodology to Ascertain Principles 
Attempting to meet these objectives, 37 hypothetical ethical dilemmas were sent to the 
CPA‟s membership in the late 1970‟s. The latter vignettes represented the applied, teaching 
and research functions of Canadian psychologists and included competing principles, 
pressures and responsibilities (Sinclair, 2001). Analysis of the ethical reasoning underlying 
respondents‟ choice of action resulted in the identification and organisation of the most 
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consistently used principles into a coherent set of four superordinate ethical principles. As 
Sinclair (2001) observes, the ethical principles finally adopted “seemed to flow through the 
decision-making of the respondents” (pp. 17-18). In descending order of importance, the 
hierarchical principles are ranked as follows: Respect for the Dignity of Persons; 
Responsible Caring; Integrity in Relationships and Responsibility to Society (CPA, 2000). 
These superordinate principles appear later in this research study as an organising 
theoretical framework which is used to analyse the impact of countertransference pressures 
on research participants‟ avowed ethical values (see Chapter 5).  
9.3.3. Organisation of CPA‟s Code around Four Superordinate Principles 
Each of the CPA Code‟s four sections elaborates one of the identified superordinate ethical 
principles. Every principle is followed by a specific “Values Statement” which gives 
definition to the particular principle concerned. Following every “Value Statement” are 
several related ethical standards which illustrate the behavioural application of the relevant 
principle and values to the practitioner‟s daily activities (CPA, 2000, Preamble). This 
organisation meets the original objectives of producing a conceptually cohesive code that 
explicitly articulates the principles, values and standards upon which it is based and which 
guides decision-making by rank-ordering ethical principles and by providing a coherent 
decision-making model (Sinclair et al., 1987). Eberlein (1987) concludes that the Canadian 
Code offers a more effective educational tool than do other codes since “The Canadian 
Code is better organized, more coherent, and more directly related to the underlying 
principles that [practitioners] need to consider” (p. 354). 
9.3.4. Differential Weighting of Principles 
Differential weighting of ethical principles for the purpose of ethical decision-making 
apparently distinguishes the CPA‟s Code as unique among available professional codes of 
ethics (Sinclair, 2001).  Conceptual and empirical support for the CPA‟s lexical ordering of 
principles is evident in the professional literature.  Seitz and O‟Neill (1996) comment, for 
example, that the CPA‟s hierarchy was empirically validated by a study demonstrating that 
a sample of pre-professional psychology students consistently endorsed solutions to ethical 
dilemmas involving competing principles that were congruent with the CPA‟s own 
recommended ranking of ethical principles.  
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In the context of ethically conflictual situations, the CPA‟s Code directs that all four 
principles should be equally considered and balanced in the process of ethical decision-
making (CPA, 2000, Preamble). In the event of competing principles, however, the Code‟s 
differential weighting directs that the “principle highest in the hierarchy takes precedence” 
(Hadjistavropoulos, 1999, p. 3). While “Respect for the Dignity of Persons” is accordingly 
assigned the greatest weighting, the Code acknowledges that exceptions may arise when 
“there is a clear and imminent danger to the physical safety of any person” (CPA, 2000, 
Preamble). One such exception arising in a South African hospital context involved non-
fatal suicidal behaviour. Hence Pillay et al (2004) contend that, in the case of elevated risk 
for suicidal behaviour, the benefits of offering an initial in-patient psychological 
consultation without securing explicit informed consent apparently outweigh potential 
harms. The latter authors argue that referral for consultation comprises an instance of 
“Responsible Caring” wherein “the ethical stance of beneficence [overrides] the valuing of 
the patient‟s right to autonomy” (Pillay et al., 2004, p. 352). Despite professional objections 
that the lexical ordering of principles might encourage an unduly formulaic response to the 
ambiguities inherent in ethical decision-making, Sinclair (2001) observes, on the contrary, 
that this unique feature of the CPA Code has proved useful to educative efforts aimed at 
helping practitioners to determine the ethically appropriate course of action.  
9.3.5. CPA‟s Ethical Decision-Making Model 
The emphasis on ethical decision-making which permeates the CPA‟s (2000) Code includes 
the formulation of a principle-based problem-solving model. Use of this model encourages 
rigorous thinking through of ethically complex situations and the careful deployment of a 
coherent set of principles in the ethical decision-making process. As Seitz and O‟Neill 
(1996) note, ethical decision-making is viewed, in the context of the CPA Code, as 
involving considerably more than the simple citation and application of codified rules.   
 
The CPA‟s ten clearly delineated decision-making steps reveal common as well as 
contrasting characteristics in relation to alternative practice-based ethical decision-making 
frameworks. Common patterns evident across models include, for example, review of the 
ethical problem, identification of the individuals or groups involved in the ethically 
conflictual situation, clarification of competing rights and responsibilities, consultation of 
available legal and ethical guidelines, consideration of the consequences of alternative 
courses of action and, finally, the implementation and evaluation of the chosen action 
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(Corey, Corey & Callanan, 1998; Eberlein, 1987; Forester-Miller & Davis, 1996; Keith-
Spiegel & Koocher, 1985; Tarvydas, 1998; Tymchuk, 1986). 
 
Contrasts with the preceding frameworks are provided, not only by the CPA Code‟s 
differential weighting of ethical principles, but also by its penultimate step. As Eberlein 
(1987) observes, most available problem-solving frameworks conclude with evaluation of 
the action taken. The Code‟s ethical decision-making model, however, emphasises that the 
practitioner continues to assume responsibility even after evaluation “for consequences of 
action, including correction of negative consequences … [and] re-engaging in the decision-
making process if the ethical issue is not resolved” (CPA, 2000, Preamble).  Added 
emphasis on the individual decision-maker‟s personal responsibility appears evident in the 
Code‟s acknowledgement that “personal conscience” (CPA, 2000, Preamble) may play a 
legitimate role in ethical decision-making but that it must necessarily be “based on a 
reasonably coherent set of ethical principles … that can bear public scrutiny” (CPA, 2000, 
Preamble). 
9.3.6. Critique of CPA‟s Ethical Decision-Making Model 
The CPA‟s empirically well grounded ten step model offers a flexible and proactive ethical 
decision-making framework which is applicable to resolving both current as well as 
anticipated ethical dilemmas (Sinclair, 2001). However, the CPA‟s (2000) approach to 
ethical decision-making appears once again to privilege rational analysis and a primarily 
linear progression through succeeding steps of ethical analysis. The third step alone is 
devoted to consideration of how therapist subjectivity may potentially skew the ethical 
decision-making process; this step appears limited to conscious self-reflection and 
dispassionate “Consideration of how personal biases, stresses, or self-interest might 
influence the development of or choice between courses of action” (CPA, 2000, Preamble).  
 
Thus one possible limitation of the four ethical decision-making frameworks reviewed in 
this chapter (Rest, 1984; Kitchener, 1984; Steere, 1984; CPA, 2000) is that the latter models 
largely appear to presuppose an emotionally unobtrusive and rational moral agent who is 
guided in the course of ethical analysis principally by the dictates of reason alone. This view 
of the individual decision-maker stands in contrast to contemporary perceptions of the 
clinician as susceptible to unwittingly initiating actions motivated by the irrational and 
emotionally charged interpersonal pressures generated by the therapeutic dyad. The CPA‟s 
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(2000) Code explicitly acknowledges the Association‟s overriding responsibility to help 
establish “a moral community” (CPA, 2000, Preamble) which is externally and internally 
accountable for the ethical behaviour of the discipline and its membership. This 
responsibility extends to “developing and implementing methods to help [members] monitor 
the ethics of their behaviour and attitudes” (CPA 2000, Preamble). Not only is conscious 
consideration of the ethically relevant issues, principal stakeholders and contexts advocated 
by the Code‟s ten step model warranted but the methodology of responsible ethical 
decision-making arguably includes sustained reflection of the influence exerted on decision-
making by competing “unconscious determinants” (Meissner, 1994). Betan and Stanton 
(1999) argue that what is currently needed in the burgeoning field of ethical decision-
making models are contemporary approaches which integrate “rational analysis with 
attention to the contextual and subjective underpinnings of ethical decision-making” (p. 
299). Elaboration of the CPA‟s third step accordingly comprises the central focus of later 
chapters (see chapters 5 to 8) which explore the potential influence of unconscious 
determinants on the ethical decision-making process.  
10. THE COUNTERTRANSFERENCE DIMENSION OF ETHICAL DECISION-
MAKING 
The preceding principle-based models‟ (CPA, 2000; Kitchener, 1984; Rest, 1984; Steere, 
1984) reliance upon the rational application of ethical principles foregrounds the “objective” 
pole of ethical decision-making. In turning to the less familiar “subjective” pole, Betan 
(1997) offers an innovative hermeneutic model which is envisaged as supplementary to 
models of ethical justification. Betan and Stanton (1999) submit that hermeneutics as a 
postmodern philosophy “views knowledge not as an objective „truth‟ but rather as 
interpretation that occurs in the context of human relationships” (p. 299). Accordingly Betan 
(1997) construes ethical decision-making as an interpretive endeavour involving a 
“dialectic” (p. 356) between universal ethical principles and the specifics of the therapist‟s 
subjective experience, in which each pole is interdependent and informs the other. The 
central thesis of the hermeneutic model, Betan (1997) continues, is that “in addition to 
moral reasoning, the context of the therapeutic relationship and the therapist‟s subjective 
responses are fundamental considerations in the interpretation and application of ethical 
interventions” (p. 348). Betan (1997) therefore argues that in addition to considering the 
components of moral reasoning (Rest, 1984) and core ethical principles (Kitchener, 1984), 
the hermeneutic approach to ethical decision-making encourages interpretation of the 
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meanings of the interpersonal pressures generated in the context of the therapeutic dyad and 
of the therapist‟s subjective feelings, beliefs, values, narcissistic needs and desires.   
 
Despite its significance as a trailblazing theoretical framework, application of Betan‟s 
(1997) proposed hermeneutic model transpires in the context of a single apparently 
hypothetical ethical dilemma. Lack of supportive clinical data leaves the pragmatic value of 
Betan‟s theoretical model empirically unsubstantiated. Betan‟s reflections regarding the 
interactional nature of the countertransference phenomena driving the ethical decision-
making process arguably lack detailed elaboration, exclude consideration of 
countertransference enactments and are only briefly presented. In short, neither principle-
based frameworks, virtue ethics proponents nor Betan‟s hermeneutic model seem to 
interrogate in detail the impact of the individual therapist‟s “dumb … hard … [and] blind 
spots” (McLaughlin, 1991, p. 600) on the ethical decision-making process and on 
commonly espoused professional virtues such as trustworthiness, courage, respect or 
compassion (van Hooft, 2006). In shedding light on the nature of countertransference 
phenomena, contemporary psychoanalytic thinking promises a more precise understanding 
of how and why the individual decision-maker‟s “unresolved and disavowed issues” 
(Zeddies, 1999, p. 232) may seek expression in the ethical decision-making process.  
 
Solomon (2004) observes that the analyst may feel “as if thinking about ethical issues is an 
unwelcome disruption or intrusion into the real analytic task” (p. 250). A recent spate of 
professional interest in the countertransference dimension of ethical dilemmas seemingly 
belies Solomon‟s statement (Abramovitch, 2007; Allphin, 2005; Anonymous, 2005; 
Gabbard, 1996; Wakefield, in Ross & Roy, 1995; Wiener, 2001). When the focus of interest 
narrows, however, to consideration of the countertransference dimension of the ethical 
decision-making process, a phenomenon which has been extensively investigated and 
described in the field of psychology, the psychoanalytic literature appears to offer only 
scattered references or to subsume the subject implicitly under general considerations of the 
countertransference dimension of ethical dilemmas or, even more broadly, the ethical 
dimension of analytic practice. Research data-bases (PsychINFO, PsychLit, EbscoHost, 
Google, Google Scholar, PubMed) as well as personal contact in 2006 with the Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics6 and with Dr Jean Pettifor, who has published extensively in ethics and 
psychology, accordingly yielded little evidence of real-life clinical illustrations or of 
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theoretical accounts which probed possible linkages between countertransference factors 
and the widely documented ethical decision-making process. The risks of professional 
exposure, Woody (1990) suggests, remain high since “to disclose an ethical problem in 
clinical work is to reveal much about one‟s own thinking process, sense of morality and 
ethics, theoretical biases and pragmatic concerns; this … probably accounts for the dearth of 
such examples in the literature” (p. 145). Collation of apparently sparse references in the 
psychoanalytic literature regarding the countertransference dimension of ethical decision-
making revealed the four contributions discussed below.  
 
The professional literature in psychology is replete with multiple examples of ethical 
decision-making frameworks (Cottone, 2001; Cottone & Claus, 2000). Researchers and 
practitioners are consequently well positioned to begin to “weigh the relative merits of one 
approach against another, providing an empirical foundation that is sorely needed in this 
area of study” (Cottone, 2001, p. 40). In the context of psychotherapy, Betan‟s (1997) 
hermeneutic decision-making framework in contrast currently appears to provide a first 
template, standing virtually alone in theorising the influence exerted on ethical decision-
making by the interplay of ethical principles, unconscious interpersonal pressures and 
“deeply rooted [countertransference] fears, needs, desires, meanings, and values” (p. 361).   
 
In considering the potential role of unconscious determinants on ethical judgment, Meissner 
(1994) offers a second contribution to the psychoanalytic oeuvre. Meissner (1994) invokes 
the forceful image of a continuously active “unconscious team of players” (p. 465) who, 
side by side with conscious calculations of consequences and risk-benefit analyses, 
decisively influence ethical decision-making and intervention. Potentially implicated in the 
“team”, Meissner suggests, are aggressive and libidinal derivatives, defences such as 
projection or denial, superego lacunae and pathological narcissism. Reflecting on the 
intersection between ethics and psychoanalysis, Meissner (1994) concludes that not only is 
there an ethical core to psychoanalysis but there is also “an inherent psychoanalytic 
dimension to the deeper understanding of ethical decision-making processes” (p. 470).  
 
A third contribution is presented by Varghese and Kelly (in Gabbard, 1999) who situate the 
controversy of euthanasia and end-of-life decisions in the interpersonal context of the 
transference-countertransference relationship which exists between dying patients and their 
physicians. Ostensibly rational and humane clinical decisions to participate in physician-
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assisted suicide, formulated in the intersubjective context comprised by the doctor-patient 
dyad, may in fact be fuelled by the patient‟s projective identifications or by the doctor‟s 
unacknowledged aggression, hatred and unconscious wish to kill. Hence Varghese et al. (in 
Gabbard, 1999) emphasise “the importance of addressing countertransference issues before 
concluding that what one experiences with the dying patient is indeed empathy rather than 
countertransference enactment” (p. 92). Kelly, Varghese and Pelusi (2003) add that new 
tools, models and frameworks are needed to help conceptualise the meaning of 
unacknowledged countertransference anxieties elicited by engagement with dying patients, 
since such seemingly irrational affects may powerfully influence the medical professional‟s 
attempts to negotiate end-of-life decisions and interventions.  
 
Author-analysts who confront complex decisions pertaining to the publication of clinical 
material comprise a fourth context for considering the unconscious dimension of the ethical 
decision-making process. Kantrowitz (2006) observes that author-analysts face conflicting 
loyalties when weighing competing demands to preserve patient privacy, to advance 
psychoanalytic knowledge, to satisfy professional ambition and to consider whether the 
material should be published at all. The decisions which govern the foregoing choices are 
optimally guided by ethical principles including nonmaleficence and “truth telling” 
(Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 265) whereby many analysts seek to eschew “deception” and gain 
patients‟ informed consent. Given the limitations of broad ethical principles in offering 
guidance across widely varying clinical situations, the analyst‟s proposed decision may 
additionally be usefully subjected to Clifford‟s “ethics of belief” (in Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 
274). Before the implementation of any action, the “ethics of belief” demand an 
examination of alternative evidence or opposing points of view potentially contradicting 
one‟s own strongly held subjective beliefs as to the desirability of preserving confidentiality 
only using disguise or always asking consent or never writing about patients at all.   
 
“Proper ethics” (Stoller, 1988, in Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 269) may see the analyst‟s formal 
adherence to codified ethical guidelines regarding confidentiality which require „thick‟ 
disguise or informed consent. The latter seemingly beneficent courses of action may, 
however, veil countertransference “blind spots”, including the gratification of narcissistic 
and exhibitionistic needs as well as unconscious guilt about the self-interested use of patient 
material. Reflecting on the following instance of an apparently unproblematic ethical 
decision to request permission to publish, for example, Kantrowitz (2006) comments that 
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the analyst concerned retrospectively wondered “whether his professional ambition had 
unwittingly led him to exploit his patient in order … to have a publication. He also 
questioned whether unconsciously he had avoided showing the patient the paper in advance 
for fear that he might then have withdrawn his permission to have it published” (p. 272).   
 
While cautioning that author-analysts are likely to enlist like-minded colleagues, Kantrowitz 
(2006) nevertheless recommends that the scrutiny of an external observer may help to 
identify self-serving decisions. No neat formulation exists which invariably provides 
guidance as to whether to use disguise or to ask consent. Eschewing standardisation, 
Kantrowitz (2006) concludes that ethical decision-making which foregrounds the need to 
protect the patient must necessarily be made on an individual case-by-case basis and must 
include sensitive evaluation of the possible clinical consequences for the particular patient, 
the analyst and the therapeutic process.   
11. SUMMARY 
A review of professional literature on formal codes of ethics, survey research and ethical 
decision-making frameworks shows that the resolution of ethical dilemmas has traditionally 
been effected by recourse to an impartial “principle ethics” perspective. International 
surveys and studies of ethical violations suggest, however, that cognitive analysis of ethical 
dilemmas and the rational comprehension of codes, principles and rules are necessary but 
often insufficient to secure ethical action. Greater understanding of the widely observed 
judgment/action discontinuity may perhaps be achieved by considering both the “objective” 
and “subjective” poles of ethical decision-making, thus integrating the distinctive ethical 
concerns articulated by the voices of “justice” and “care” respectively. Ethical decision-
making, as it transpires in analytic space, may be served best by psychoanalytically 
informed training curricula, ethics codes and models which value rational analysis and rank-
ordered ethical principles but which additionally address, on a case-by-case basis, the 
influence exerted on ethical judgment by countertransference phenomena and the 
interpersonal pressures generated by the therapeutic dyad.  
 
Meissner (1994), Betan (1997), Varghese and Kelly (in Gabbard, 1999) and Kantrowitz 
(2006) clearly foreground the countertransference dimension of ethical decision-making and 
the manifold nature of ethical intervention. Comparisons between the latter contributions 
appear to reveal differences in their emphasis (or lack of it) on empirical research, 
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countertransference enactments and foreseeable as opposed to unanticipated ethical 
dilemmas. In the only study based on real-life interviews investigating actual ethical 
quandaries, Kantrowitz (2006) asserts that unconscious factors, including counter-
transference enactments, may potentially determine ethical decision-making. The remaining 
contributions were based on hypothetical vignettes which, as a review of survey studies 
suggests, failed to adequately capture the ambiguities, tensions and emotionally charged 
complexities inherent in real-life dilemmas. Reflecting growing psychoanalytic interest in 
countertransference enactments, Varghese and Kelly (in Gabbard, 1999) propose an 
intersubjective decision-making model, arguing that apparently rational instances of ethical 
decision-making by medical practitioners may alternatively be construed as expressions of 
maleficent countertransference enactments. Reference to enactment phenomena are absent 
in related works by Meissner (1994) and Betan (1997) or could arguably be elaborated in 
greater detail.  
 
The present study, unlike the foregoing contributions, is based on in-depth interviews with 
individual psychologists, practising as psychoanalytic psychotherapists, who confronted 
unanticipated ethical dilemmas which suddenly emerged in the therapeutic space. An 
analysis of professional literature pertinent to countertransference enactments and ethical 
decision-making forms an essential part of the theoretical framework for examining such 
work and this is presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENTS 
 
12. INTRODUCTION 
 
Real-life ethical dilemmas may transcend the pragmatic capabilities of professional ethics 
codes to effect resolution since their standards do not necessarily reflect the moral 
ambiguities, contextual tensions and subjective complexities inherent in the ethical decision-
making process (Betan & Stanton, 1999; Burke, Harper, Rudnick & Kruger, 2007). Broadly 
based on a logical problem-solving approach, contemporary models of ethical decision-
making may similarly reveal a problematic gap or “divide between abstract ethical 
principles… and specific ethical dilemmas faced by practitioners within heterogeneous 
contexts” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 110). Despite privileging reasoned deliberation, ethics 
codes, current models and professional publications nevertheless frequently allude to the 
potentially decisive impact of irrational and prereflective phenomena on the ethical 
decision-making process. 
 
Widespread agreement thus implicitly prevails that ethical dilemmas routinely evoke 
interpersonal contextual tensions as well as subjective and unconscious countertransference 
responses in the therapist. Examination of professional literature in the previous chapter 
reveals, for example, that in the course of ethical decision-making, the practitioner is 
envisaged as struggling with primitive “gut feelings” (Rest, 1984, p. 21), “nonmoral values” 
(Rest, 1984, p. 25), intuitive judgments or “immediate, prereflective responses” (Kitchener, 
1984, p. 44), subjective “biases, stresses or self-interests” (CPA, 2000, Preamble) and 
“potential ethical blind spots” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 118). While briefly acknowledging the 
influence of prereflective phenomena, the literature reviewed seemingly fails to offer 
theoretically grounded accounts which persuasively address the influence exerted by 
unconscious determinants on the ethical decision-making process. Stokoe (2000) observes 
that psychoanalysis is by contrast not only a form of treatment but it also provides a theory 
about unconscious processes which cannot be directly apprehended but which continue to 
affect the feelings, thoughts, perceptions and behaviour of the moral subject concerned. 
Professional literature, ethics codes, current models and training curricula clearly encourage 
increased practitioner awareness of ethical principles and standards. A psychoanalytic 
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perspective, however, may usefully supplement this awareness by directing that the 
understanding of any human behaviour, including ethical decision-making, must necessarily 
account for the unconscious as well as the conscious determinants of that behaviour 
(Meissner, 1994; Mills, 2005; Stokoe, 2000).  
 
This chapter offers a preliminary theoretical account of how and why, in the interpersonal 
context of the therapeutic space, the therapist‟s subjectivity is harnessed in the ethical 
decision-making process. Comprising a valuable pathway to the patient‟s internal object 
world, the “double helix” (Epstein & Feiner, 1988, p. 282) of countertransference 
alternatively constitutes iatrogenic ground for the unethical “transformation of the intensity 
[of] the transference from its service as a means of deeper consciousness into an instrument 
of egoistic gratification for the analyst” (Zoja, 2007, p. 58). A burgeoning psychoanalytic 
literature attests to growing contemporary interest in the impact on the analytic process of 
countertransference enactments. Rich in theoretical understanding and clinical vignettes, 
this latter terrain facilitates the following exploration of the unconscious determinants which 
potentially animate the therapist‟s countertransference roles in beneficent as well as 
maleficent ethical decision-making enactments.  
 
The chapter opens, firstly, with a discussion of Kleinian, classical and intersubjective 
definitions of countertransference enactments. These competing theoretical perspectives 
offer different emphases on the relative unconscious contributions of the analyst and the 
patient to the phenomenon of enactments. In addition to differences in conceptual outlook, 
points of consensus between schools of psychoanalytic thought regarding the nature of 
countertransference enactments are clarified. Mills‟ (2005) critique of the relational notion 
of “analytic mutuality” is outlined.   
 
This chapter continues, secondly, with the identification of several subcategories of 
countertransference enactment. These include interpretive enactments (Steiner, 2006), 
nonsexual boundary violations (Gabbard & Lester, 1995) and the analyst‟s “secret 
delinquencies” (Slochower, 2003). Examination of the professional literature apparently 
reveals a further implicit subcategory comprised by “ethical decision-making enactments” 
which specifically addresses the influence of unconscious determinants on the ethical 
decision-making process.   
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It is argued, thirdly, that the resolution of ethical dilemmas reveals at least three implicit 
ethical decision-making pathways. Central to a psychoanalytic approach to ethical decision-
making is the third pathway, characterised by the creation or post-enactment restoration of 
reflective space. The analyst‟s capacity for thoughtfulness and containment of emotionally 
charged countertransference affects is seen as the pivot which determines whether an 
“ethical decision-making enactment” emerges as an analytically useable or potentially 
exploitative process.  
 
The chapter turns, fourthly, to the classification of countertransference enactments along a 
continuum. Gradients or classification systems discussed include those proposed by Louw 
and Pitman (2001), Gabbard and Lester (1995), Cassorla (2001) and Ivey (in press).  
Discernible in the preceding classifications are concerns regarding malignant 
countertransference enactments involving the exploitation of the patient. The fourth section 
draws out these concerns and, unambiguously highlighting the ethical dimension of clinical 
practice, proposes that countertransference enactments may alternatively be situated along 
“a beneficence-maleficence” gradient.   
 
The chapter concludes with two apparently rare accounts of real-life ethical dilemmas which 
arguably involve “ethical decision-making enactments” (Da Silva, 2003; Kantrowitz, 2006). 
The vignettes address current controversies pertaining to the issues of objectivity and 
analyst self-disclosure. Illustrating the theoretical framework constructed in this chapter, the 
vignettes are situated along the “beneficence-maleficence” gradient and are used to 
highlight emotionally charged linkages forged between enactment phenomena and the 
ethical decision-making process.   
13. KLEINIAN, CLASSICAL AND INTERSUBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS OF 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENTS: CONTROVERSIES AND 
CONSENSUS 
 
No common agreement exists as to any precise definition of the term “countertransference 
enactment” (Cassorla, 2001; Gabbard 1994; 1995; McLaughlin, 1991; Panel, 1992). 
Reflecting Mills‟ (2005) observation that the diversity and complexity of human knowledge 
“radically resist being reduced to a common denominator” (p. 164), contemporary 
psychoanalytic schools reveal sharply contested perspectives regarding the issue of 
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definition and the relative unconscious contributions of the analyst and the patient to 
countertransference enactments. 
Varying definitions suggest that the phenomenon of countertransference enactment may 
alternatively be initiated by the patient‟s projective identifications, by the analyst‟s personal 
countertransference or by equal unconscious contributions from both participants. Gabbard 
(1994) writes that Kleinians tend towards the viewing of countertransference experience “as 
reflections of what the patient has deposited in the analyst via projective identification” (p. 
1085). The American Psychoanalytic Association‟s Panel (1992, in Hirsch, 1998) 
accordingly reveals a Kleinian emphasis in its definition of countertransference enactment 
“as an actualisation of the transference, unwittingly engaged in by the analyst. It is viewed 
as the patient‟s unconscious efforts to persuade or to force the analyst into a reciprocal 
action: a two-party playing out of the patient‟s most fundamental internalised 
configurations” (p. 78).  
 
Retaining a similar emphasis on the initiation of the enactment by the patient‟s unconscious 
contribution, Chused‟s (1991) definition underscores that “Enactments occur when an 
attempt to actualise a transference fantasy elicits a countertransference reaction” (p. 629). 
Conceptual links are established by both preceding definitions between the phenomenon of 
countertransference enactment and contemporary formulations of both projective 
identification (Bion, 1959; Feldman, 1992; Ogden, 1979; 1986; Spillius, 1992) as well as 
Sandler‟s (1976) closely aligned notion of role-responsiveness. Countertransference 
enactments accordingly arise when a “good-enough” fit occurs between the patient‟s 
coercive projections and the therapist‟s own repressed but predisposing self and object 
representations. Drawn out of the analytic attitude, the analyst is galvanised by verbal and 
nonverbal interpersonal pressures unconsciously exerted by the patient into accepting and 
unwittingly actualising complementary roles derived from the patient‟s internal object world 
(Gabbard, 1995; Ivey, in press; Meissner, 2002).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum lies the traditional classical or Freudian construal of 
countertransference enactments as occurring only periodically and as organised chiefly by 
“narrow” countertransference (Gabbard, 1994; Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 125). While the 
patient‟s habitual mode of object relations is implicated, the analyst‟s unresolved and latent 
conflicts from the past are revived anew in the current interaction with the patient (Gabbard, 
1995). Enactments stirred primarily by the therapist‟s “blind spots” (McLaughlin, 1991, p. 
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600) or florid transference to the patient raise the risk of “malignant” boundary 
transgressions (Cassorla, 2005, p. 709) and of avoiding confrontation with “unpleasant 
realities … discrepant with our self-image as caring and committed analysts” (Slochower, 
2003; p. 457). Expressing similar reservations about assumptions that the clinician‟s 
motivations and feelings are invariably benign, Kelly, Varghese and Pelusi (2003) define 
countertransference enactment as “a term used to describe actions that arise from the 
emotional responses of clinicians … [these countertransference] emotions motivate 
clinicians‟ behaviour towards a patient … . Such enactments have potentially detrimental 
effects for the patient ... but also for the clinician, because they distract from responding 
appropriately to the patient‟s needs as they address the emotional needs of the clinician for 
the relief of tension and distress” (p. 369).  
 
In contrast with preceding definitions highlighting either the patient or the analyst as the 
principal initiator, are definitions of countertransference enactment which derive from 
relational and intersubjective psychoanalysis. From the relational perspective, the evolving 
analytic encounter is construed as jointly created and as emerging from the mutual 
transferences or unconscious influence the two subjectivities of analyst and patient exert 
upon one another (Gabbard, 1999; Kantrowitz, 2006). Dispensing with the positivist “blank 
screen” analyst and one-person psychology of classical psychoanalysis, the contrasting two-
person psychology embraced by the intersubjective approach holds that “whatever takes 
place between analyst and patient will be co-determined by the unconscious desires and 
defensive needs of both participants in the analytic process…the analytic relationship and 
process [is] mutually constructed out of the reverberating influence and interaction of the 
conscious and unconscious wishful and defensive needs and desires of the analyst and the 
analysand, each upon the other” (Levine & Friedman, 2000; pp. 65-66).  
 
Productive analytic engagement from the relational perspective calls for analytic mutuality 
and reciprocal revelations, stresses the analyst‟s actual behaviours or ineliminable 
subjectivity in partially co-determining the patient‟s transference and solicits the latter‟s 
plausible or undistorted perceptions of the analyst. Such an approach places the analysis of 
dyadic interaction at the centre of analytic inquiry as opposed to the purportedly classical 
stance of maintaining an exclusive focus on the patient‟s mind alone (Hirsch, 1998; Levine 
& Friedman, 2000; Mills 2005). Transference and countertransference are, from the 
perspective of relational theory, jointly constructed and their inextricable “intertwining is 
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the starting point of interpretation and analysis” (Kantrowitz, 2006, p.78). Correspondingly 
jettisoned are orthodox conceptions of dual drive theory, the analyst‟s presumed authority or 
capacity for access to “objective” truth and any pretensions to maintaining analytic 
anonymity, neutrality and abstinence (Mills, 2005; Levine & Friedman, 2000; Renik, 1993; 
1996; Treurniet, 1997).   
 
The preceding core concepts of the relational model establish a fresh vantage point from 
which to consider additional definitions of countertransference enactments. Central to 
intersubjective and relational approaches is the notion that enactments are inevitable, 
continuous, bidirectional and potentially useful (Gabbard, 1994; 1999). Either member of 
the therapeutic dyad may initiate the enactment concerned and the analyst as much as the 
patient is unwittingly embroiled in the ongoing “mutual re-enactment of core transference 
themes” (Hirsch, 1998, p. 95). Similarly highlighting their characteristic co-creation, Levine 
and Friedman (2000) define countertransference enactments as “the continuous, mutual 
living out of important, mostly unconscious, conflicts and fantasies of both parties in the 
analytic relationship … the term „enactment‟ refers to the ways in which the analytic 
encounter may be viewed as a complex, overlapping, embedded series of … unconscious, 
interactive, mutually constructed dramas that are jointly lived out rather than only spoken 
of.” (p. 73). Relational and intersubjective definitions, Ivey (in press) contends, appear to 
portray the analyst not as merely responding to the patient‟s transference pressures but as an 
equal co-participant who actively and continuously shapes the enactment at hand according 
to his or her own unconscious anxieties and conflicts.  
 
Critiquing the notion of “analytic mutuality” as erroneously suggestive of equality, Mills 
(2005) argues that relational and intersubjectivist positions seemingly ignore the original 
purpose of forming an analytic relationship, the issued role asymmetry and the substantial 
power differentials that inexorably remain between the analyst and the patient. As Mills 
(2005) retorts “There is nothing equal about it: I‟m not the one being analyzed” (p. 179). 
Relational techniques seemingly in the service of “analytic mutuality” may on the contrary 
generate “therapeutic excess” (Mills, 2005, p. 179). Citing several published instances, 
Mills (2005) cautions that relational practices involving, for example, the undisciplined 
disclosure of erotic countertransference heightens the risk of gross boundary violations. 
When the analyst, moreover, elicits the patient‟s perceptions and fantasies about internal 
conflicts occurring in the therapist, countertransference enactments may arise which blur the 
  61 
boundary between who is analysing whom and open the question of whether the patient‟s 
articulation of such fantasies is in service to, not the analytic task, but the analyst‟s 
narcissism (Mills, 2005).  
 
In the context of the analytic relationship, the respective roles of care-giver and care-
receiver determine the open examination of the patient‟s subjective world, payment for 
professional services rendered, the analyst‟s comparative silence and the latter‟s formal 
registration with a professional organisation which enforces ethical standards. The fee 
entailed is presumably warranted by the analyst having mastered a particular body of 
knowledge and by his/her facilitation of the patient‟s search for self-understanding 
(Gabbard, 1997). While the latter features of the analytic relationship do not imply that the 
analyst‟s interpretations are invariably correct or superior to the patient‟s perceptions, they 
do arguably structure a therapeutic relationship which remains unequivocally unequal and 
asymmetrical (Gabbard, 1999; Louw & Pitman, 2001). The latter observations appear to 
csat some doubt on the relational claim that analyst and patient may be viewed as equal and 
mutual co-participants in the construction of enactment phenomena. Analytic mutuality, 
remarks Mills (2005), may in fact be confined to the sharing between analyst and patient of 
“collective values that define us all as human beings but they are far from being equal” (p. 
179). Despite its considerable contribution to acknowledging the impact of the analyst‟s 
phenomenology on analytic work and to creating a warmer, emotionally more satisfying 
therapeutic climate, Mills (2005) concludes that the relational framework may 
simultaneously stimulate “the undisciplined use of self-disclosure … uninhibited risk taking, 
and flagrant boundary violations” (p. 177). It therefore remains incumbent upon the analytic 
community to identify questionable or excessively experimental practices in order to 
encourage frank discussion in professional space of “exactly what constitutes a legitimate 
execution of analytic method” (Mills, p. 178).   
 
The foregoing discussion appears to confirm that Kleinian, classical and relational 
definitions offer markedly different perspectives on the nature of the unconscious 
determinants driving countertransference enactments. Despite the latter differences, the 
question remains as to whether commonalities can be established between the several 
definitions and portrayals of enactment phenomena offered in the literature. Compounding 
current debates as to what exactly comprises an enactment are arguments proposing that the 
analytic process in its entirety may be construed as a continually occurring continuum of 
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normal and pathological enactments (Cassorla, 2005). Enactments may span, additionally, 
the analyst‟s forgetting, altered tone of voice, subtle shifts in body posture (Frayn, 1996; 
Gabbard, 1995; McLaughlin, 1991) and his/her subjective experience of “inhibited 
responsiveness” (Ivey, in press) to the patient.  
 
What arguably distinguishes countertransference enactments from multiple alternative 
therapeutic activities is the analyst‟s seemingly overwhelming subjective experience of 
being stripped of any autonomous choice as to whether to participate or to resist and 
“desperately … [try] to stand outside the patient‟s system and play no role at all” (Mitchell, 
1988, p. 292). Thus apparently common to the various definitions discussed is the affective 
kernel or “evocative power” (Chused, 1991, p. 617) of countertransference enactments to 
unconsciously coerce the therapist into inadvertently crossing the boundary between thought 
and action. This regressive impulse may be subjectively experienced as particularly acute 
when “action … is motivated by [the urgent need] for tension relief on the part of the 
analyst” (Steiner, 2006, p. 316). Writing of erotic countertransference enactments, Gabbard 
(1999) similarly observes that the countertransference affects evoked “are powerful, 
immediate, and compelling in their tendency to override the steady reflectiveness of the 
analyst” (p. 1085).   
 
Consensus moreover prevails among Kleinian, classical and relational theorists that 
countertransference represents “a joint creation” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 481) wherein the 
analyst is widely construed as vulnerable to succumbing to the irrational sway exerted by 
the co-created transference-countertransference matrix (Hirsch, 1998). Hence the analyst is 
perceived as being invariably drawn into playing a designated role derived from the 
patient‟s internal object world. The “final shape” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 480) of the analyst‟s 
countertransference response is, however, determined by his/her own subjectivity and the 
“fit” between the patient‟s projections and the “hooks” provided by the therapist‟s own 
conflicts or internal self and object representations. Capturing this sense of susceptibility, 
McLaughlin (1991) observes “the old truth … that the [analyst‟s] transference ghosts are 
never entirely laid to rest … . In the intensity of new work … they return in fresh shape to 
revive shades of significance I had long forgotten I knew. Enactments are my expectable 
lot.” (p. 613).  
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14. THREE SUBCATEGORIES OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENT 
 
The professional literature reveals apparently discrete subcategories of countertransference 
enactments. “Interpretative enactments”, firstly, are envisaged by Steiner (2006, p. 317) to 
be composed of ostensibly beneficent verbal communications directed at clarifying an 
aspect of the patient-analyst relationship. When provoked by transference pressures, Steiner 
(2006) observes, the analyst‟s verbal communications can constitute verbal enactments 
“disguised as interpretations” (p. 317) which subtly function to convey the therapist‟s 
unacknowledged values, preferences, disavowed feelings and critical judgments. Similarly, 
Gutheil and Gabbard (1993) comment on the potential for the therapist‟s verbal comments 
to comprise the forum for sadomasochistic enactments. Although ostensibly rationalised as 
beneficent therapeutic confrontation, Gutheil and Gabbard (1993) suggest that the 
therapist‟s cruel verbal comments may in fact be tantamount to an aggressive enactment 
which derives from unresolved countertransference sadism.   
 
“Nonsexual boundary violations” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 122) represent a second 
subcategory of countertransference enactments encompassing both innocuous possibly 
useful “boundary crossings” (p. 123) as well as egregious “boundary violations” (p. 123). 
Gabbard and Lester (1995) describe as an instance of the former type of countertransference 
enactment an analyst‟s unsolicited urging of a female patient to enter into a new relationship 
with a male colleague. The attenuated countertransference impulse or “crossing” was 
retrospectively subjected to analytic scrutiny and no irreparable damage to the patient was 
evident. Even when eschewing overt sexual relations, “the lovesick analyst” (Gabbard & 
Lester, 1995, p. 142), seeking solace from the patient for an unfulfilled personal life, 
provides an example of a contrasting countertransference enactment. The latter enactments 
are characterised by role reversal, increasing exploitation of the patient‟s transference 
vulnerability, loss of the critical “as-if” or symbolic dimension of the therapeutic 
relationship and the analyst‟s resistance to subjecting escalating boundary violations to post-
enactment scrutiny.  
 
In contrast to unconscious countertransference enactments saturated with emotionally 
charged affects, Slochower (2003) identifies a third distinct subcategory of 
countertransference misdemeanours or enactments which she terms the analyst‟s “secret 
delinquencies” (p. 455). These analytic lapses, Slochower argues, are intentionally 
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concealed from the patient who may be lying on the couch or talking to the analyst on the 
phone. They are committed with greater deliberation than unconsciously motivated 
enactments and comprise relatively minor breaches wherein the analyst deliberately 
disengages affectively or cognitively in order to pursue some personal desire or need. 
Rather than frank abuse of the patient, this enactment subcategory entails the solipsistic 
withdrawal of the analyst into activities that include, for example, “… adding to a grocery 
list … painting one‟s nails … checking email … buying airline tickets online …” (p. 453).   
 
The latter shameful and guilty transgressions of professional standards may evoke 
perceptions of colleagues as censorious “moral police” (Slochower, 2003, p. 456) and 
“therapist delinquencies” accordingly seldom enter into peer discussion or supervision. The 
“stealing” of these “small pleasures” (Slochower, 2003, p. 462) is understood as revelatory 
not only of possible relational treatment configurations but also of the very human 
impossibility of cleaving to an analytic ideal which demands that the analyst should remain 
consistently fully present for the patient. Given the sensory deprivation inherent in spending 
long hours in a single consulting room and the intense emotional demands of “this 
impossible profession”, Slochower (2003) argues that “unless we own and consistently 
struggle with our greed, sense of deprivation, or selfishness – with our very unideal 
humanity - it is almost inevitable that [such] feelings will ultimately become sequestered 
and thus expressed illicitly” (p. 468).  
15. THE FOURTH SUBCATEGORY: ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
PATHWAYS AND RELATED COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENTS 
 
In addition to the preceding three subcategories of countertransference enactment, an 
implicit fourth subcategory pertaining to the ethical decision-making process may 
apparently be discerned in the professional literature. Inherent in the practice of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy is a seemingly inescapable ethical dimension. Capturing this 
aspect, Solomon (Solomon & Twyman, 2003) observes that “ethics is with us professionally 
all the time in the consulting room, day by day, hour by hour … we are, as professionals, 
constantly living within an ethical dimension” (p. 22).  
 
Clinical decisions which transpire in the analytic space cannot, however, invariably be 
relegated to the ethical decision-making process. The currently highlighted category of 
decisions brings into focus the analytic task, setting and attitude. Contemporary theory 
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defines the principal task of psychoanalytic psychotherapy as the ongoing analysis and 
insightful resolution of the patient‟s unconscious conflicts (Ivey, 1999; Stokoe, 2000). The 
analytic setting or frame is construed as the reliable provision of boundaried space wherein 
the patient‟s unconscious conflicts may safely be explored (Langs, 1982; Siegelman, 1990; 
Tylim, 2004). The analytic attitude is characterised as the therapist‟s dual capacity for both 
immersion in and understanding of the analytic process (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). The class 
of decisions under consideration may accordingly be narrowed to those called forth by real-
life ethical dilemmas defined objectively by professional ethics codes and categorisation 
systems (Pope & Vetter, 1992; Slack & Wassenaar, 1999) or subjectively construed by the 
analyst as comprising an ethically conflictual situation wherein the analytic task, setting and 
attitude are rendered conspicuously vulnerable to compromise.  
15.1. The First Ethical Decision-Making Pathway 
 
Assuming that the therapist‟s capacity for identifying ethical dilemmas has been well 
established (Baldick, 1980), the professional literature on ethical decision-making 
apparently implicitly acknowledges three variants or pathways of ethical deliberation7. The 
linear models reviewed earlier for the most part emphasise an ethical decision-making 
pathway that is apparently determined by reasoned deliberation, that occurs without 
enactment and is in accord with nonmaleficence foregrounded as the governing principle of 
therapeutic engagement (Stokoe, 2000). Thus the CPA (2000, Preamble) surmises that “The 
ethical decision-making process might occur very rapidly, leading to an easy resolution of 
an ethical issue.  This is particularly true of issues for which clear-cut guidelines or 
standards exist and for which there is no conflict between principles”.  
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the linear and “easy resolution” of ethical dilemmas 
suggests that the therapist‟s pre-existing “self - object - affect constellations” (Gabbard, 
1995, p. 477) and intrapsychic conflicts may not have been strongly mobilised. In such 
                                                 
7      The three ethical decision-making pathways may be summarised as: 
1. the therapist‟s thoughtful emotionally appropriate resolution of the dilemma incurs no 
countertransference enactment and has negligible or no harmful consequences to the patient; 
2. the therapist‟s apparently unresolved countertransference anxieties find repeated behavioural 
expression in ethical decision-making enactments which are not subjected to post-enactment scrutiny, 
raising the risk of harmful consequences to the patient; 
3. the therapist‟s resolution of the dilemma entails ethical decision-making enactments which are 
retrospectively thoughtfully reviewed and openly addressed with the patient. Possible re-engagement 
with the decision-making process and the therapist‟s reparative efforts hopefully mitigate any harmful 
consequences for the patient. 
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relatively emotionally uncomplicated situations, the therapist‟s reflective capacity remains 
apparently undisturbed and capable of robustly metabolising the transference-
countertransference affects, moral ambiguities and interpersonal pressures generated by the 
ethical dilemma concerned. Seemingly in accord with either or both the analytic attitude and 
the therapist‟s professional ethics code, this first ethical decision-making pathway is 
apparently ethically and technically sound, with negligible or no harmful consequences 
suffered by the patient.  
15.2. The Second Ethical Decision-Making Pathway 
 
The process of ethical decision-making may alternatively comprise fertile ground for the 
evocation of irrational and disorienting affects in the therapist. The CPA (2000, Preamble) 
implicitly introduces a second ethical decision-making pathway with the statement that 
“some ethical issues … are not easily resolved, might be emotionally distressful and might 
require time-consuming deliberation”. This second pathway arguably encompasses the 
contrasting possibility of incurring emotionally charged and unresolved countertransference 
enactments.   
 
Common therapeutic “sites” (Guthiel & Gabbard, 1993, p. 190) which remain susceptible to 
chronic countertransference enactments and harmful boundary transgressions include 
analyst self-disclosure, unpaid bills and repeated departures from the boundaries of the 
analytic frame. Implicit in the following descriptions of the different therapeutic “sites” is 
the notion that the analyst‟s idiosyncratic or “narrow countertransference” may compromise 
the ethical decision making process leading to the behavioural expression of an “ethical 
decision-making enactment”. In the context of therapist self-disclosure, for example, the 
latter authors argue that the repeated, and presumably unexamined, self-revelation of 
fantasies, dreams and personal information may be experienced as burdensome to the 
patient. Potential revelation of “the real relationship” (Guthiel & Gabbard, 1993, p. 194) 
may accordingly constitute an “ethical decision-making enactment” which derives from 
self-interest and unfulfilled personal needs in the therapist‟s private life rather than from any 
objective appraisal of its usefulness for the patient‟s therapeutic journey. Mounting anger 
occasioned by the therapist‟s inability to confront the patient‟s unpaid bills may similarly 
signal a therapeutic impasse and an enactment structured principally by the former‟s 
apparently unresolved conflicts around the multiple and dynamic meanings of money. 
Seemingly impulsive decisions to give gifts or physical hugs to the patient and repeated 
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therapist transgressions of temporal or spatial boundaries comprise additional examples of 
“ethical decision-making enactments”. As Guthiel and Gabbard (1993) comment “The 
obvious exploitive nature of these boundary violations destroys even the semblance of 
therapy for the patient‟s benefit.” (p. 193).  
 
In common with the three preceding subcategories of countertransference enactments, 
“ethical decision-making enactments” arguably reveal the therapist‟s continuing 
susceptibility to succumbing to the influence of unconscious determinants often driving the 
decision-making process. The ostensibly rational ethical decision-making process may often 
be disconcertingly congruent with Steiner‟s (2006) formulation of the unconscious 
dynamics structuring enactments in general. Rebutting Levenson‟s (2006) argument that 
countertransference enactments comprise “the behavioural component of what is being 
talked about” (p. 322), Steiner (2006) objects that, on the contrary, enactments more 
commonly represent “what is not … talked about, what is repressed or split off and 
projected because it is too disturbing to be talked about” (p. 327).  
 
In short, the second ethical decision-making pathway is apparently characterised by the 
presence of unretrieved countertransference enactments wherein the therapist‟s analytic 
capacity is chronically impaired or “clouded” (Chused, 1991, p. 634). This suggests that 
“ethical decision-making enactments” may arise when the ethical decision-making process 
is repeatedly compromised by the analyst‟s personal countertransference, by the patient‟s 
unexamined projective identifications or by intersubjective admixtures derived from the 
sustained unconscious collusion of both members of the analytic dyad. The second pathway 
appears unlikely to accord with either the analytic attitude or professional ethics codes, thus 
raising the risk of harmful consequences to the patient.   
15.3. The Third Ethical Decision-Making Pathway 
 
The value for the analytic process lies not in the enactment itself but in retrospectively 
understanding its possible unconscious meanings and working through these interpretively 
with the patient (Chused, 1991; McLaughlin, 1990; Renik, 1993). Central to whether an 
ethical decision-making enactment comprises a possibly valuable “boundary crossing” as 
opposed to an egregious “boundary violation” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 123) appears to 
be the submission of the therapist‟s countertransference responses to post-enactment 
scrutiny.   
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The CPA‟s (2000) familiar ethical decision-making model clearly states the importance of 
the practitioner‟s evaluation of, and taking personal responsibility for, the consequences of 
the course of action finally adopted. From the perspective of psychoanalytic ethics, the third 
ethical decision-making pathway is similarly distinguished by thoughtfulness and the post-
enactment restoration of reflective space. Given that the therapist is not a self-transparent 
moral agent, the third pathway invites empathic collegial assistance to help “parse” 
(Slochower, 2003, p. 457), or distinguish between, unconscious contributions deriving 
principally from the clinician‟s subjectivity as opposed to those arising primarily from the 
patient‟s expulsion of intolerable internal contents. Solipsistic self-analytic efforts to 
identify retrospectively which of the therapist‟s internal representations are likely to act as 
“hooks” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 477) for the patient‟s projections often appear to be markedly 
unsuccessful (Ivey, in press). As Stokoe (2000) succinctly observes “The container of 
therapy itself needs to be contained.” (p. 29). 
 
The therapist‟s renewed reflective functioning is directed, in the optimal context of an 
empathic other, to apprehending the possible unconscious meanings of the ethical decision-
making enactment. The third pathway may further involve openly addressing with the 
patient any negative consequences that have ensued in the wake of the enactment, re-
engaging with the ethical decision-making process and the thoughtful implementation of 
alternative courses of action. Frank and open discussion by the therapeutic dyad of the 
impact of possible boundary transgressions often defuses their capacity for harm and may 
serve to prevent a boundary crossing from becoming an entrenched boundary violation 
(Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Gutheil & Gabbard, 1993). 
 
In short, the third pathway is characterised by the thoughtful retrieval of ethical decision-
making enactments and, as the CPA (2000) suggests, possible re-engagement with the 
ethical decision-making process. Identification of negative consequences and open 
discussion with empathic colleagues and with the patient may generate ethically and 
technically sound alternative courses of action. These reparative efforts by the analyst may 
be construed as congruent with both the analytic attitude and professional ethics codes and 
hopefully mitigate any harmful consequences for the patient.  
 
The preceding three variants of ethical deliberation represent a preliminary effort to 
delineate more clearly key ethical decision-making pathways that are implicit in the 
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professional literature. These pathways invite further refinement but inevitable exceptions 
render the precise identification and definition of all possible ethical decision-making 
pathways an elusive prospect. As Zoja (2007) comments, when ethical judgments are called 
for, the analyst is invariably situated in an intermediate “gray zone” or psychological 
territory replete with contradictions and ambiguities. Of ethics and ethical deliberation, Zoja 
(2007) writes that “In that [gray] zone we will never be able to claim that we have found the 
final truth, yet we shall always find ourselves standing in [a] landscape that is most apt for 
ethical elaboration.” (p. 66). Despite problems of definition, retaining the notion of 
pathways and the subcategory of “ethical decision-making enactments” may help to 
highlight the need for tolerating and elaborating the meaning of the irrational affects that so 
frequently appear to characterise the ostensibly linear ethical decision-making process.   
16. CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENTS: THE 
BENEFICENCE-MALEFICENCE GRADIENT 
 
Different attempts have been made to classify countertransference enactments using a range 
of diverse criteria. Countertransference enactments have been conceptualised, for example, 
as occurring along a continuum determined at one end primarily by the patient‟s projective 
identifications and at the other by the analyst‟s “narrow countertransference” with 
considerable overlap or interaction in between (Gabbard, 1995; Varghese & Kelly, 1999). A 
second continuum envisaged by Louw and Pitman (2001) similarly presents 
countertransference enactments as determined by the relative contributions of the patient 
and the analyst, with the added qualification that enactments may range in time from acute 
to chronic. Acute, time-limited “analysand-centred actualisations” (Louw & Pitman, 2001, 
p. 757) are likely to be benign, allowing the analyst to utilise his/her role-responsiveness to 
deepen an empathic understanding of the patient‟s intrapsychic world. In contrast, chronic 
“analyst-centred actualisations” (Louw & Pitman, 2001, p. 757) at the other of the 
continuum derive from the latter‟s idiosyncratic responses or transference to the patient. 
These enactments are likely to be malignant “as the analyst‟s personal motivation is 
foregrounded at the expense of exploring the analysand‟s transference” (Louw & Pitman, 
2001, p. 757). The foregoing distinctions between acute, potentially benign and chronic, 
probably malignant countertransference enactments, bear some resemblance to the 
subcategory of nonsexual boundary transgressions which appear to be marked either by 
discussable, relatively innocuous “boundary crossings” or by severe, repetitive and usually 
unacknowledged “boundary violations” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 122).  
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In setting out the analytic process as a succession of constantly occurring enactments, 
Cassorla (2005) proposes a third classification which encompasses benign actualisations at 
one end and prolonged or acute pathological enactments derived from massive “crossed 
projective identifications” at the other (Cassorla, 2001, p. 1158). In contrast to Louw and 
Pitman (2001) and Gabbard and Lester (1995), however, Cassorla (2001) argues that 
prolonged, chronic enactments are not necessarily malign and can, when understood, be 
productively used. Thus Cassorla hypothesises that prolonged countertransference 
enactments may over time permit trust in the analytic relationship to evolve, delaying the 
premature exposure of the patient‟s deeper narcissistic or destructive conflicts. A symbiotic 
phase or “necessary collusion” (Cassorla, 2001, p. 1166) arises wherein experiences of the 
analyst as a new object emerge and the patient‟s first developmental phases are re-lived.  An 
acute enactment may subsequently violently disrupt this symbiosis. The disruption 
intuitively signals the analytic dyad‟s readiness to dismantle the prolonged enactment and to 
risk engagement with triangular relationships wherein the analyst as a third party no longer 
functions as a narcissistic extension of the patient.   
 
A fourth classification proposed by Ivey (in press) conceives of countertransference 
enactments as occurring along “a reflective-expressive gradient”. Calibrating the degree of 
action involved, Ivey suggests that countertransference enactments may range from a point 
where the analyst‟s emotional arousal is subjectively experienced and introspectively 
observed without significant behavioural expression to one where charged affects manifest 
in overtly disruptive verbal or non-verbal action before being „caught‟ and retrospectively 
examined. Occupying the middle ground are milder transference actualisations which find 
attenuated but still detectable expression. Distancing from Steiner‟s (2006) claim that the 
analyst‟s capacity for containment necessarily precludes action, Ivey offers the alternative 
perspective that “Containment is not antithetical to enactment, rather, enactment is part of a 
containing process whereby unmanageable feeling is first induced in and expressed by the 
analyst before becoming thoughtfully managed, understood and refined into something 
useable by the analytic pair”.  
 
The different criteria used in the preceding classifications include consideration of the 
relative contributions of the analytic dyad, the question of whether enactments are 
continuous, periodic, chronic or acute, the nature of “boundary crossings” and “boundary 
violations” as well as the “reflective-expressive” dimension of enactment phenomena. 
  71 
Earlier discussion of ethical principles foregrounded nonmaleficence as arguably 
comprising the superordinate or governing principle of therapeutic engagement (Brown, 
1982; Kitchener, 1984; Solomon, 2003b; Stokoe, 2000). This suggests that concerns implied 
by previous classification criteria regarding the exploitation of the patient may alternatively 
be reconvened under a specifically ethical rubric regarding the potential countertransference 
enactments carry for beneficence as well as for maleficence.  
 
Distinctions between innocuous potentially useful analytic breaches and more serious 
boundary violations are inevitably “subjective, contextual, and open to interpretation. The 
gravity of a given breach is always colored by the particulars of the patient‟s experience … 
and the sociocultural context in which treatment takes place” (Slochower, 2003, p. 456). 
Given the latter difficulties in making absolute distinctions, a classification of 
countertransference enactments which highlights an ethical dimension may be roughly 
envisaged as comprised of a beneficence-maleficence gradient.  
 
At the beneficence end lie those countertransference enactments which transpire in the 
context of the third ethical decision-making pathway described earlier. Characterised by the 
creation or recovery of reflective space, such enactments may be retrospectively construed 
as having probably evoked no lasting harms and as additionally carrying potential for 
beneficence or for positively contributing to the patient‟s psychological growth and well-
being. The latter countertransference enactments may see the analyst‟s subjectivity or inner 
experiences as beneficently harnessed in the service of forging “a valuable pathway to 
understanding the unconscious of the patient” (Jacobs, 1999, p. 579). In these 
circumstances, Lacovics (1983) and Racker (1957) suggest, the analyst‟s counter-
transference responses may, on examination, yield useful evidence of concordant 
identifications (identification with a patient‟s internal self-representation) or complementary 
identifications (identification with an object-representation). Thus, foregrounded at this end 
of the gradient, is the analyst‟s capacity for thoughtfulness, containment and for submitting 
the charged affects generated by ethical dilemmas to post-enactment scrutiny.  
 
Malign countertransference enactments appearing at the contrasting end appear to be 
characterised by the second ethical decision-making pathway. The latter enactments may 
effectively destroy the core goal of the patient‟s psychological healing which lies at the 
heart of the psychotherapeutic enterprise (Halpern, 2003, in Kantrowitz, 2006). Often 
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emerging in the emotionally or erotically charged heat of the clinical moment, malign 
enactments may involve sexual and nonsexual boundary violations, are usually unretrieved, 
and are seemingly organised either by the patient‟s unexamined projections or by the 
clinician‟s unresolved countertransference needs and anxieties (Gabbard & Lester, 1995; 
Kelly, Varghese & Pelusi, 2003; Varghese & Kelly, 1999). In between these outer poles lie 
apparently milder countertransference enactments which may be initiated by either member 
of the analytic dyad. Attenuated in nature, apparently characterised by relatively innocuous 
boundary crossings and retrospective scrutiny, no significant harms would appear to accrue 
to the patient.  
 
The following two vignettes (Da Silva, 2003; Kantrowitz, 2006) provide different 
illustrations of “ethical decision-making enactments”, their respective pathways and their 
placement along the beneficence-maleficence gradient. The discussion below includes 
consideration of two core controversies evoked by enactment phenomena; these pertain to 
the issues of objectivity and therapist self-disclosure.  
17. ILLUSTRATING THE BENEFICENCE-MALEFICENCE GRADIENT: A 
PATIENT-INDUCED ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING ENACTMENT 
 
Da Silva (2003) presents a confidentiality dilemma involving prospective legal proceedings 
which threatened to derail the analysis of “Pandora”, a patient with a propensity to invite 
personal disaster. Pandora was convinced that her previous analyst had “failed” her by 
unilaterally terminating her prior analysis with minimal explanation. It was crucial, Pandora 
felt, “to denounce” this failure; the alternative “was … to kill herself or to go mad” (p. 152). 
The patient complained to her ex-analyst‟s professional association and then sued him in 
civil court. She expressed the wish that Da Silva, now her current analyst, should testify on 
her behalf. With the impending threat of receiving a subpoena from Pandora‟s lawyer, Da 
Silva vacillated for weeks between conflicting moral obligations. He felt torn between 
trying to decide whether he would comply with the law and with his patient‟s expressed 
wishes by testifying in court or whether he would refuse, thus safeguarding confidentiality 
and the privacy of the analytic process.  
 
The patient‟s relevant history concerned her psychotic father and melancholy mother who 
had failed “to denounce” her spouse‟s crazy behaviour towards their daughter. As a child, 
Pandora had been adjured by her mother to silently collude, turning “a blind eye” as if 
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nothing untoward ever happened. On accepting Pandora as a patient, Da Silva surmised that 
these early familial dramas had been recreated in the patient‟s transference perceptions of 
the “failures” of her ex-analyst and of the ethics committee “to denounce” him. The 
emergence in the analysis of an unanticipated confidentiality dilemma induced in Da Silva 
unexpectedly painful countertransference affects of anxiety, anger and guilt towards the 
patient, fears of going to jail and overwhelming confusion. Extensive collegial consultation 
afforded little relief; most colleagues concurred that no reasonable alternative existed other 
than that of guardedly testifying in court. Sucked into these disquieting affects, Da Silva 
observes that only after many weeks was he able to formulate the understanding that the 
patient‟s threats to draw him into her extra-analytic battles dramatised the intolerable 
circumstances she had once suffered as a child. Accordingly, Da Silva comments that “… I 
knew that I was in the midst of a confusion similar to the one my patient had been unable to 
resolve. It fell to me, and to … analysis, to contain and to tolerate her impossible demands 
and accusations … in the hope of doing the [analytic] work … needed to resolve this 
confusion” (p. 154). 
 
This growing understanding of his subjective experiences appeared to afford Da Silva 
sufficient relief from countertransference pressures to decide against testifying and instead 
to offer Pandora an interpretation. He informed his patient that, as he would explain to any 
prospective judge, further analytic work would be impossible if he were to play any role in 
her external life. If he served as a witness, Da Silva continued, he would destroy his ethos as 
a psychoanalyst and he would “fail” Pandora by breaking his original pledge to her of 
ensuring confidentiality. Alternatively, if he went to court but refused to testify, he would 
again be “failing” her by his silence and refusal “to denounce” her ex-analyst. In order to 
maintain his original commitment of confidentiality and his professional ethical standards, 
he had decided not to testify but to risk being in contempt of court and going to jail. 
Analysis in these circumstances would, however, cease. Pandora responded to this 
intervention with anger and threatened to leave.  “It was as if ”, Da Silva writes, “I were 
telling her to stop the legal suit, just as in the past her mother had refused to protect her by 
denouncing the craziness of her father ... . So now I, too, was failing her deeply.” (p. 155).  
 
The case was finally settled out of court. A more trusting analytic relationship arose 
alongside the mutual recognition by both analyst and patient that the threat of third party 
intervention had acted as a resistance against exploring Pandora‟s painful internal conflicts. 
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Da Silva reports that the patient realised that her projected wish for perfection functioned as 
a cruel persecutor who tolerated no failings in herself or in others. This led to the changed 
perception that no analysis is “perfect” and a measure of compassion appeared to emerge in 
the patient for herself, her parents and her analysts.  
17.1. Discussion of the First Case Vignette 
 
International comparisons suggest that confidentiality ranks as the most troubling category 
of ethical dilemmas for psychologists (Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006; Slack & Wassenaar, 
1999). As discussed, the highlighted class of decisions pertains to ethical dilemmas defined 
objectively by categorisation systems and professional ethics codes or subjectively by the 
analyst‟s identification of an ethically conflictual situation. Both criteria prevail in Da 
Silva‟s (2003) resolution of a confidentiality dilemma which thus implicitly involves the 
ethical decision-making process under consideration.  
 
The confidentiality dilemma posed two sharply conflicting courses of action. Not testifying 
would allow Da Silva to maintain confidentiality and his professional ethos but incurred the 
risk of jail. Obeying the law and testifying raised the alternative spectre of subverting the 
therapeutic alliance through engagement with “the real relation” (Meissner, 2002, p. 846), 
those extra-analytic factors that apparently serve no analytic end but increasingly endanger 
“the combined freedom of thought in the analyst and freedom of speech in the analysand” 
(Furlong, 2005, p. 380). Such external factors would include third party demands from 
lawyers, courts and judges for the disclosure of sensitive confidential material “as private as 
our own dreams at night” (Da Silva, 2003, p. 162). Da Silva‟s subjective feelings of anxiety 
and confusion, his vascillation and eventual offering of an interpretation raise queries as to 
whether any ethical decision-making pathways are implicit in his account and what 
implications these carry for the classification of countertransference enactments along the 
beneficence-maleficence gradient.  
 
The clinical fragment reveals that Da Silva was inadvertently embroiled in emotionally 
charged countertransference affects that overwhelmed, immobilised and disoriented him for 
weeks. Leaving him “unsure what to do or say” (Da Silva, 2003, p. 154), Da Silva‟s 
subjective countertransference experiences effectively exclude the first ethical decision-
making pathway or the resolution of ethical dilemmas through reasoned deliberation alone. 
Using Bion‟s (1962) container-contained model, Da Silva contends that the gradual 
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restoration of his reflective capacity enabled him to detect in his seemingly irrational 
countertransference reactions the presence of the patient‟s projected internal objects and 
selves. This renewed thoughtfulness likewise excludes the second ethical decision-making 
pathway characterised by the chronic collapse of the analyst‟s reflective space and by the 
“unforgivable analytic mistake” (Lipton, 1977, in Hirsch, 1998, p. 83) of failure to analyse 
the impact of the latter‟s participation in the enactment concerned. In short, Da Silva‟s 
account emphasises the third ethical decision-making pathway characterised by the recovery 
of a reflective space and by the therapist‟s capacity for containment of countertransference 
anxieties and unconscious motives. Action, in the context of the third pathway, accordingly 
appeared to be contingent on Da Silva‟s efforts to think about, to process and to make sense 
of the patient‟s projected and charged effects which consistently permeated the unfolding 
dilemma.  
 
The interpersonal pressures generated by the confidentiality dilemma arguably appear to 
conform to a fundamentally Kleinian definition of countertransference enactment. Rather 
than any mysterious or mystical transportation of mental contents, Ivey (2004) argues that 
projective identification remains a superordinate concept which encompasses Sandler‟s 
(1976) notion of role responsiveness and which states that intrapsychic phantasy always 
involves identifiable intersubjective pressures or “precise interpersonal behaviors that 
induce the therapist to feel and act in a manner consistent with the projected [and 
disavowed] parts of the patient‟s self…” (p. 6). In her actual recruitment of lawyers, threats 
of subpoena and hectoring demands that Da Silva should testify, Pandora appeared to 
successfully provoke in her current analyst disavowed alien feeling states congruent with 
her internal object relational world.  
 
Early phases of the ethical decision-making process may thus be conceptualised as the 
analyst‟s unwitting immersion in the transference-countertransference interaction generated 
by the analytic dyad. Impulsive implementation of either immediate course of action 
available, to testify or to desist, would have seen Da Silva immersed in a florid ethical 
decision-making enactment, ostensibly resolving the confidentiality dilemma by taking up a 
designated and highly compromised maternal transference role. From this perspective, 
testifying might additionally be construed as the patient‟s unconscious efforts to stampede 
her analyst into the further enactment of a punitive archaic superego role, “ganging up” 
(Steiner, 2006, p. 317) against and publicly “denouncing” her ex-analyst in court. By 
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contrast with these potential scenarios, Da Silva was clearly not impelled into overtly 
disruptive or harmful behaviour. However, enactment phenomena may by inferred from Da 
Silva‟s descriptions of his prolonged subjective feelings of confusion, emotional struggle 
and virtual immobilisation. Data from the vignette suggest that the latter countertransference 
responses arguably derive from the analyst‟s sustained concordant identification with his 
patient‟s projected anxious and confused self-representation as well as from a 
complementary identification based on a profoundly “failing” maternal part-object 
representation.   
 
The clinical vignette suggests that the third ethical decision-making pathway encompassed 
not only the foregoing immersion in the patient‟s internal object world but also later phases, 
relatively free of countertransference pressures, wherein the confidentiality dilemma was 
contained, “digested” and retrospectively thought about. Accordingly, Da Silva writes that 
“The essential thing is to hold the projections long enough to allow … the “unthinkable” in 
the patient‟s mind…. to be thought about and contained in the mind of the analyst. This is 
an important part of the process [whereby] meaning emerges in the analytic space.” (p. 159). 
Growing understanding that his overwhelming countertransference reactions reflected in 
part his patient‟s habitual object relational patterns apparently led to Da Silva feeling less 
gripped by the dyad‟s emotional field, helping to secure thoughtful decision-making and the 
eventual resolution of the confidentiality dilemma. Thus Da Silva lucidly describes the 
implementation of his final decisions to safeguard his original pledge of confidentiality and 
his professional ethos by not testifying, to accept the “repugnant” possibility of jail and to 
attempt to collaboratively work through with his patient the possible meanings of the 
preceding countertransference enactments.  
 
Da Silva‟s protracted experience of confused states, of feeling alternatively pulled towards 
testifying and of immobilisation suggests a primarily patient-induced “ethical decision-
making enactment” which might arguably be situated at the beneficent and “reflective” 
(Ivey, in press) ends of the classification gradients concerned. The attenuated expression of 
Pandora‟s internal object world through a series of concordant and complementary 
countertransferences (Lakovics, 1983; Racker, 1957) incurred no significant harms to the 
patient. Da Silva moreover contends that his subjective countertransference responses were 
beneficently deployed in providing “a valuable pathway to understanding the inner 
experiences of the patient …” (Jacobs, 1993, p. 7). Hence empathic understanding of the 
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patient‟s unconscious childhood dynamics appeared critical to engagement with the later 
phases of the ethical decision-making process which sought to secure the analytic process 
and the patient‟s continued emotional growth.  
17.2. The Controversy of Objectivity 
 
Da Silva‟s (2003) apparently successful negotiation of the third ethical decision-making 
pathway opens a window onto acrimonious debates pertaining to the notion of objectivity. 
Since the analyst‟s capacity for retrospective thoughtfulness presupposes a measure of 
objectivity and comprises the distinguishing feature of the third pathway, current 
controversies concerning the possibility and nature of objectivity carry relevance for the 
ethical decision-making process. The following quotations demonstrate that different 
psychoanalytic schools of thought embrace strongly opposing theoretical positions:  
… objective reality is unknowable by the psychoanalytic method, which 
investigates only subjective reality … there are no neutral or objective 
analysts, no immaculate perceptions, no G-d‟s-eye views of anything 
(Stolorow, 1998, p. 425).  
… I think that it is possible for the analyst to be subjectively involved in the 
analytic interaction but to take at least a partly outside view of it … there is 
usually a fluctuation in the session between being „in‟ and being somewhat 
„outside‟ the interaction…sometimes [in very heated moments] it is not 
until the session is over that the analyst may have another additional view 
to set alongside the feelings and thoughts he experienced in the session 
(Bott Spillius, 2004, p. 1059).  
… it is impossible for an analyst to [objectively focus on a patient‟s inner 
reality] even for an instant … our technique, listening included, is 
inescapably subjective (Renik, 1993, p. 560).  
… I disagree with Renik‟s dictum that „even an implicit pretence of 
objectivity on the analyst‟s part is to be avoided‟ (1993, p. 566).  The 
presence of the analyst‟s subjectivity does not automatically eliminate the 
validity of that analyst‟s outside or object-based perception (Gabbard, 
1997, p. 23).  
Relational and intersubjective arguments appear to mount an unrelenting assault on the 
analyst‟s authoritative access to objective knowledge (Mills, 2005). The latter approaches 
seemingly insist that the influence of the analyst‟s subjectivity on the analytic interaction is 
irreducible, ever present and cannot be transcended. This vantage point eschews the 
traditional classical or modernist view that the analyst potentially retains the capacity to 
observe reality in an objective or nondistorting manner and to exercise privileged access to 
pre-existing hidden “truth” (Levine & Friedman, 2000). Post-modernist thinking 
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accordingly refutes the notion that any objective reality exists “out there” (Gabbard, 1997, 
p. 16) and scepticism is duly expressed about the possibility of ever obtaining objective 
knowledge about the patient‟s psyche. Summarising the relational and intersubjective 
approaches, Meissner (2002) observes that the latter seemingly cast the analyst and the 
analysis “adrift on a sea of uncertainty” (p. 834). When any objectivity regarding the 
analyst‟s understanding of his patient is rendered suspect or nonexistent, when his capacity 
to form reasonably objective judgments is considered dubious, then, Meissner (2002) 
comments, the very grounds for undertaking meaningful analytic work must 
correspondingly be undermined.  
 
Apparently underpinning relational and intersubjective argumentation lies the philosophical 
claim that the individual human being is limited by and cannot entirely transcend his/her 
own point of view (Louw & Pitman, 2001). Accepting that the analyst‟s subjectivity is 
ineliminable, a more subtle notion of objectivity singularly appropriate to the analytic space 
might be construed as, not the absolute transcendence of subjectivity, but rather as the 
gathering and entertaining of additional or “multiple points of view” (Louw & Pitman, 
2001, p. 749). These progressive changes in perspective, Louw and Pitman (2001) write, “in 
so far as they involve the addition of different points of view, seem best understood as gains 
in objectivity” (p. 751). Thus the analyst‟s subsequent reflection and self-analysis of the 
influence of his/her individual psychology on the analytic interaction may succeed in 
creating an additional and changed perspective on the nature of both his/her participation as 
well as of the patient‟s internal world.  
 
An integrative position proposed by Gabbard (1997) suggests that relative objectivity may 
be forged through creating a dialectic between modern and post-modern thinking or 
between a one-person and a two-person perspective. Similar to Bott Spillius‟ (2004) view, 
Gabbard (1997) suggests that the analyst vacillates between a two-person intersubjective 
focus and a one-person relatively objective intrapsychic focus. From the latter vantage 
point, the analyst, as an „object‟ separate from and external to the patient‟s subjectivity, 
offers a different perspective from that of the patient‟s internal experience. This new 
perspective, Gabbard (1997) argues, is potentially helpful in that it may enlarge the patient‟s 
understanding of his/her habitual mode of object relatedness and contribute to the creation 
and negotiation of new meanings generated in the discussion between the analytic pair.  
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In struggling to resolve a confidentiality dilemma, Da Silva‟s account presents evidence of 
an ethical decision-making process which similarly partakes of a “state of double 
consciousness” (Gabbard, 1999, p. 18). In the earlier phases of ethical decision-making, Da 
Silva recounts being unwittingly thrust into the patient‟s internal world or into a painful 
two-person intersubjective interaction. Later phases of ethical decision-making were, 
however, characterised by the recovery of the analyst‟s reflective stance and contrasting 
status as a separate individual. This pole of the dialectic was comprised by establishing a 
one-person or relatively objective intrapsychic focus which helped Da Silva to clarify the 
possible meanings of the sustained ethical decision-making enactments which had earlier 
gripped the analytic dyad. Refuting the relational and intersubjective approaches, Meissner 
(2002) concludes that “It has taken us considerable … debate to find our way back to more 
reasonable middle ground in which we can come to terms with the pervasive fact of our 
subjectivity and find room within it for forms and degrees of objectivity” (p. 835). 
18. AN ANALYST-INDUCED ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING ENACTMENT 
 
Kantrowitz (2006) discusses the attitudes and practices of relational and classically oriented 
analysts who were confronted with complex ethical decisions pertaining to using disguise 
and/or obtaining patient consent when publishing clinical material. Commenting on the 
following brief research interview with a relational analyst, Kantrowitz (2006) observes that 
the latter‟s decision to show his written paper to his patient was apparently consciously 
motivated by the wish to secure the latter‟s informed consent for publication. Deliberate 
introduction of his paper into the therapeutic context was additionally viewed by the analyst 
concerned as a benign relational innovation or “tool for … treatment” (Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 
167), stimulating open discussion of the co-constructed meaning of the dyad‟s analytic 
work. The research fragment described below invites consideration of the controversial 
issue of analyst self-disclosure; more particularly, it focuses on the revelation of erotic 
countertransference.  
 
In the context of the brief interview, the relational analyst recounted that his patient‟s father 
had kissed his daughter good-night, an action which was experienced by her as eroticised. In 
his written paper, the analyst had included his countertransference reaction to the patient, 
material which had not previously emerged in the treatment situation. Although no details 
are provided, Kantrowitz (2006) surmises that the analyst‟s written material served as an 
inadvertent self-disclosure of his “attraction” (p. 169) or erotic countertransference to the 
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patient. While the analyst was apparently aware of his original countertransference 
reactions, Kantrowitz (2006) concludes that he did not apparently perceive that “by giving 
the patient the paper to read, he bypassed a prohibition, communicating his [erotic] feelings 
without consciously deciding that he was going to do so” (p. 169). 
18.1. Discussion of Second Case Vignette: The Controversy of Self-Disclosure 
 
Prior to discussing the research vignette, and in anticipation of qualitative data generated by 
this study, the controversy in the professional literature pertaining to the issue of analyst 
self-disclosure is addressed. Analytic self-disclosure may be considered from the several 
vantage points of inadvertent self-revelations, deliberate self-disclosure and disclosure as 
arguably comprising an ethical dilemma. Inadvertent self-revelations comprise “an 
ineradicable constant” (Meissner, 2002, p. 833) encompassing, for example, the clinician‟s 
dress, manner of speech, office décor and nonverbal communications (Gabbard, 1999; 
Gutheil, 2005; Gutheil & Gabbard, 1998). These self-revelations may be distinguished from 
the specific technical interventions comprised by intentional self-disclosures which refer to 
“what an analyst actively chooses to make explicit to a patient in a deliberate and conscious 
way” (Miletic, 1998, p. 594, in Meissner, 2002, p. 833). Deliberate self-disclosures span, for 
example, the clinician‟s decision to discuss other patients with their analysands, to answer 
patients‟ questions regarding the analyst‟s subjective thoughts or feelings, to disclose erotic 
affects or sexualised dreams and to reveal personal data pertaining to the analyst‟s private 
life (Davies, 1994; Mills, 2005; Norris, Gutheil & Strasburger, 2003). 
 
The current relational emphasis on analytic mutuality has apparently facilitated wider 
acceptance of deliberate analyst self-disclosure as a specific psychotherapeutic technique 
(Allphin, 2005; Davies, 1994; Gabbard, 1999; Jacobs, 1999). Although Levine and 
Friedman (2000) concur that intersubjectivity does not necessarily translate into the 
technical use of intentional self-disclosure, Meissner (2002) contends that relational and 
intersubjective approaches are generally distinguished by their advocacy of open 
communication which seemingly “not only allows, but calls for, deliberate self-disclosure 
by the analyst” (p. 828).  Proponents of self-revelatory approaches argue that free 
communication of the analyst‟s thoughts and feelings facilitates the demystification and de-
idealisation of the therapist, thereby contributing to authentic affective engagement and 
greater egalitarianism in the therapeutic relationship (Gutheil, 2005). Any heightened 
transference-countertransference interaction which results from deliberate 
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countertransference disclosure is apparently welcomed by relational analysts since “it 
approximates the way real relationships are naturally formed in patient‟s external lives, 
including the rawness, tension and negotiability of the lived encounter, with the exception 
that the process falls under analytic sensibility” (Mills, 2005, p. 180). Several relational 
analyst-authors in Kantrowitz‟s (2006) research tended to construe the effect on patients of 
reading about themselves and of increased exposure to the analyst‟s intentional disclosure of 
countertransference responses as having positively benefited the analytic work. Not only 
was analysts‟ sharing and reviewing of their written material perceived by them as having 
promoted a new consciousness of previously unrecognised aspects of themselves at work, 
but their writing was also understood to have effected the relevant patient‟s psychological 
change by validating the latter‟s perceptions about his/her analyst and by boosting 
awareness of central conflicts and defences.  
 
Opposing mainstream self-revelatory trends are contrasting arguments cautioning that the 
long-term effects of deliberate self-disclosure are as yet unknown. The technique, moreover, 
risks burdening patients with unsolicited information regarding personal struggles (Gabbard, 
1999; Norris, Gutheil and Strasburger, 2003), precipitating unhelpful role reversal (Gutheil 
& Gabbard, 1998) or a “two-patient paradigm” (Meissner, 2002, p. 843) and curtailing 
patients‟ freedom to explore “the analytic space of „as if‟ and play” (Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 
180). In deploying the seemingly plausible rationale of promoting openness and “honesty”, 
the technique of deliberate self-disclosure may on the contrary hasten descent down “the 
slippery slope” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 88), fostering countertransference-based 
interventions such as “When you say that, I became sexually aroused; how can we 
understand that?” (Norris, Gutheil & Strasburger, 2003, p. 517).  
 
The fundamental issue, argues Meissner (2002), is whether self-disclosure, under the 
guiding principle of neutrality, serves the best interests of the patient and the analytic 
process. Deliberate self-disclosure, Meissner (2002) cautions, may tilt the therapeutic 
process towards personal affective investment by the analyst in “the real relation” (p. 846) 
and away from exploration of the transference in the context of the therapeutic alliance. Any 
proposed self-disclosure accordingly needs careful sifting for countertransference 
implications and for ascertaining the degree to which it is consistent with “neutrality”. The 
latter guiding principle, Meissner (2002) suggests, is defined, not in behavioural terms, but 
as an aspect of the analyst‟s mental stance which strives to hold itself equidistant from the 
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demands exerted by ego, id and superego. Whether any particular self-disclosure is 
“neutral” thus depends “on the degree to which it is consistent with the norms for 
understanding and facilitating the analytic process” (Meissner, 2002, p. 831). Apparently 
shared by Meissner (2002), Miletic (1998) and Mills (2005) are concerns that relational and 
intersubjective proclivities towards deliberate self-disclosure may on occasion service 
situationally inappropriate unfulfilled personal needs, impeding the analyst‟s capacity to 
move freely between states of affective engagement and reflective observation. Expressing 
in a series of disquieting questions, Miletic (1998) asks “What of the analyst‟s thoughts, 
feelings, reactions and personal details are to be consciously and deliberately disclosed in 
order to be helpful to the patient and to the unfolding of the analytic process? How much do 
we say about ourselves, and how far do we go? ... How do we know which motives are 
being served when we talk about ourselves? Our own, or those of the patients?” (p. 515).   
 
In addition to inadvertent self-revelations and deliberate self-disclosure, the professional 
literature refers to a third usually implicit vantage point. While the decision to disclose or 
not has been envisaged as one which primarily involves “analytic technique” (Levine & 
Friedman, 2000; Meissner, 2002; Renik, 1993a; 1993b), Allphin (2005) suggests that 
analyst self-disclosure additionally presents an unambiguous ethical dilemma. The analyst‟s 
narcissism, Allphin (2005) comments, may unconsciously motivate unethical “self-
disclosures that come from our own need to talk and [to] be seen” (p. 464). Similarly, Bott 
Spillius (2004) highlights the inherent ethical dimension intertwined in clinical practice 
when she observes that the problem incurred by self-disclosure revolves around the 
analyst‟s capacity to discriminate “between analytically useful disclosures and self-serving 
disclosures” (p. 1060).  
 
Given that deliberate self-disclosure may be construed as an ethical dilemma, rather than as 
compromising a principally technical intervention, its resolution may not be immediately 
apparent and gives rise to the recurring recommendation to effect decision-making on an 
individualised, case-by-case basis (Allphin, 2005; Gutheil, 2005; Jacobs, 1999). One caveat, 
however, is the enactment of erotic countertransference where the following arguments 
uniformly appear to recommend constraint on the analyst‟s part.  
 
Countertransference awareness has been viewed as contingent on countertransference 
enactment (Renik, 1993a; 1998). Since consciousness of countertransference is always 
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retrospective, only emerging subsequent to enactment, Renik (1993b) contends that 
“elimination of countertransference enactment is not only unattainable as a practical 
technical goal, but it is misconceived even as a technical ideal toward which the analyst 
should strive” (p. 139). The accrual of benefits from any given countertransference 
enactment is apparently twofold. Commenting on Renik‟s (1993a) view of enactments, Ivey 
(2008) observes that, from this perspective, countertransference enactments are, firstly, 
perceived as a necessary prerequisite for the analyst‟s retrospective self-insight into the 
personal and interpersonal unconsciously organising the relevant transference–
countertransference configurations. Secondly, the patient‟s positive psychological change is 
wrought through corrective emotional experiences or through the provision, via 
countertransference enactments, of spontaneous, emotionally alive, authentic therapeutic 
encounters. Since enactments or “unconscious personal motivations expressed in action by 
the analyst” (Renik, 1993a, p. 564) are perceived to be indispensable to successful analysis, 
Louw and Pitman (2001) conclude that the core technical consequence of Renik‟s stance 
appears to be that it “implores the analyst to abandon the ideal of minimising 
countertransference enactment” (p. 756). 
 
Tempering the latter portrayal of countertransference enactments as invariably benign 
phenomena are contrasting arguments suggesting that deliberate disclosure of erotic 
countertransference may signal failed containment and comprise a likely forerunner to 
sexual boundary violations (Gabbard, 1999; 1996; Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Norris, Gutheil 
& Strasburger, 2003). In the wake of eroticised countertransference, the “as-if” nature of the 
analytic space potentially collapses as “symbolisation is dismissed” (Tylim, 2004, p. 612) 
and the analytic dyad lurches towards “the real relation” (Meissner, 2002, p. 846) or 
“perilously close to feeling like an incest taboo has been broken” (Gabbard, 1999, p. 15). 
Acknowledging the innovative method relational analyst-authors have developed, 
Kantrowitz (2006) nevertheless observes that decision-making is always “multiply 
determined” (p. 182) and that the relational technique of sharing written material risks 
ignoring the analyst‟s unconscious motivations. Self-disclosure of erotic countertransference 
may hypothetically enhance a patient‟s self-esteem, freeing the latter to love and be loved, 
but it may equally generate iatrogenic difficulties in developing loving relationships with 
significant others. Capturing Bott Spillius‟ (2004) earlier distinction between useful and 
self-serving disclosures, Kantrowitz (2006) similarly cautions that “It is not always clear 
when the analyst is revealing these feelings for the sake of the patient and when it is for 
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himself or herself. Unconscious factors push these decisions. How can we be sure?” (p. 
181).  
 
Review of professional opinion regarding self-disclosure suggests that it ranges from the 
reticent approach characteristic of early analytic writings to proponents of deliberate self-
revelations (Gutheil, 2005). The middle ground appears to be occupied by advocates of 
selective self-disclosure recommending restraint because unconscious self-interested 
agendas often underpin decisions to pursue self-disclosure. Given the likely exception of 
erotic countertransference, resolution of the ethical dilemma posed by deliberate self-
disclosure cannot be effected by reference to a “neat code of do‟s and don‟ts” (Maguire & 
Fargnoli, 1991, p. 47) but apparently rests upon individual assessment of each case and an 
interpretive act. As Jacobs (1999) succinctly words it “each instance of self-disclosure must 
be evaluated on its own terms in the light of the clinical situation in which it occurs and its 
effect on the analytic process” (p. 159). 
 
Discussion of the merits and demerits of analyst self-disclosure informs the following 
analysis of the second ethical decision-making enactment presented in this chapter. 
Professional codes, including psychoanalytic ethics codes (American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 2001; British Psychoanalytic Society, 1991; Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, 
1993), do not specifically address the ethical dilemma posed by deliberate self-disclosure. 
Concerns expressed in the professional literature regarding the rationalisation of self-
interested and unconscious motivations suggest, however, that intentional analyst self-
disclosure may be included in the highlighted class of ethical decisions under consideration. 
As in Da Silva‟s (2003) account, the research vignette raises queries as to whether any 
implicit ethical decision-making pathways are discernible and what implications these carry 
for the placement of the enactment entailed along the beneficence–maleficence gradient.  
 
The analyst correctly identified the ethical dilemma pertaining to confidentiality and the 
need to secure informed patient consent for publication (American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 2001; APA, 2003; CPA, 2000). Resolution of the presenting dilemma was 
ostensibly effected by implementing the decision to show the patient the relevant paper. The 
research vignette at first sight apparently offers a straightforward instance of the first ethical 
decision-making pathway wherein the ethical dilemma is recognised and resolved without 
enactment and through reasoned deliberation. However, the presenting dilemma appears to 
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mask a second and seemingly significantly more emotionally conflicted ethical dilemma 
pertaining to the disclosure of erotic countertransference. As Kantrowitz (2006) observes, 
the analyst‟s conscious decision to show the written material may have functioned as an 
unacknowledged “meta-communication” (p. 168) through which sexual attraction to the 
patient was “successfully” conveyed. Although apparently conflicted about direct 
disclosure, it remains unclear from the brief excerpt whether the relational analyst, even 
retrospectively, clearly identified the disclosure of erotic countertransference as comprising 
not principally a matter of compromised technique but rather an instance of an unambiguous 
ethical dilemma. As Steiner (2006) observes, words do more than merely communicate 
information. Potentially experienced by patients as seductions or attacks, verbal 
communications may comprise verbal boundary violations which have their counterpart in 
more easily recognisable gross behavioural boundary violations (Steiner, 2006).  
 
In the context of the ethical decision-making process (and despite the relational analyst‟s 
apparently positive evaluation of the ensuing therapeutic benefits) the sharing of the 
relevant written material may alternatively be construed as expediting a rapid transition 
from the initial identification of the presenting dilemma to the premature implementation of 
action. This precipitous development suggests the possible evocation of the second ethical 
decision-making pathway. The latter pathway is typically characterised by premature or 
thoughtless action and by the collapse of a reflective space wherein the origin and 
interpersonal meaning of the charged countertransference affects undergirding ethical 
decisions are retrospectively apprehended and thought about. It is not clear from the 
research vignette whether the relational analyst did indeed explicitly identify the nature of 
his unconscious contribution to the erotic countertransference enactment concerned (in 
which case the excerpt would illustrate an instance of the third ethical decision-making 
pathway) but, as Kantrowitz (2006) remarks, the analyst was presumably “in a state of 
denial not to anticipate the impact of the paper on the patient” (p. 169).  
 
The brief research report contains little evidence to suggest that the countertransference 
enactment derived principally from the patient‟s projective identifications or that it was 
equally and mutually co-constructed by unconscious contributions from both members of 
the analytic dyad. The analyst was apparently aware of his original erotic feelings but 
remained seemingly unconscious of “using his request for permission to publish to reveal 
these feelings to the patient” (Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 169). The excerpt thus apparently 
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provides a possible instance of an unretrieved analyst-induced “ethical decision-making 
enactment”. In the tradition of the classical construal of countertransference, the enactment 
concerned may be defined as one that was driven primarily by “narrow” countertransference 
or the analyst‟s idiosyncratic and unresolved anxieties, wishes and conflicts that were 
revived in interaction with the patient.  
 
Perhaps lacking in this exchange of professional debate and evaluation regarding the 
benefits and harms of erotic self-disclosure are first person accounts which foreground the 
patient‟s own voice. One seemingly rare anecdotal exception is provided anonymously by 
an analysand who, in the midst of her analyst‟s escalating professions of love, wonders if 
she “was laying [her] psyche bare to an ill man … It would be like suddenly realising in the 
middle of undergoing brain surgery that the person operating was a charlatan who had 
falsely represented himself as a qualified surgeon” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 137).  
 
Since the immediate and long-term consequences of the analyst‟s countertransference 
enactment are not available, possible harms or positive benefits to the patient and to the 
analytic process remain difficult to evaluate. No supportive evidence suggests that the 
enactment was repeated and, in agreeing to participate in the research process, the analyst 
may have sought a reflective space wherein to understand his own countertransference 
reactions. Balancing the latter‟s claims of therapeutic benefits against the current state of 
professional knowledge widely emphasising the heightened risks of erotic self-disclosure 
for the analytic process, the analyst-induced ethical decision-making enactment may 
tentatively be situated towards the maleficent and “expressive” (Ivey, in press) ends of the 
classification gradients concerned.   
 
Far from comprising a rational and sequential series of clearly defined steps, the research 
vignette clearly illustrates that on the contrary the ethical decision-making process is likely 
to be ambiguous and suffused with disquieting countertransference affects which disrupt 
and challenge the analyst‟s judgment and professional self-image as a benevolent care-
giver. As Kantrowitz (2006) cautions “The motives for writing and showing patients what is 
written are always multiply determined. Revelation … that a patient is special or loved may 
have to do with the analyst‟s need to bind the patient to the analyst … [The danger may be 
not] so much … that the patient knows what the analyst feels as that analyst may begin to 
lose his or her own sense of being the analyst ...” (p. 182).  
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19. SUMMARY 
 
Emotionally charged ethical dilemmas routinely appear to arise in the daily context of 
analytic practice. Ethical codes and contemporary models of ethical decision-making 
provide essential normative guidelines for identifying and resolving ethical dilemmas 
through the rational use of hierarchical ethical principles and standards. Review of the 
relevant professional literature suggests, however, that supplementary frameworks are 
needed which address not only the conscious but also the irrational and unconscious 
determinants of the ethical decision-making process. Current interest in countertransference 
enactments has stimulated theoretically informed accounts describing how transference-
countertransference configurations arising in analytic space are co-created by the 
unconscious dynamics of both the analyst and the patient.   
 
This chapter has sought to establish a preliminary psychoanalytic understanding of the 
nature of unconscious linkages potentially forged between the ethical decision-making 
process and the analyst‟s subjectivity as it is harnessed in unfolding countertransference 
enactments.   
 
Definitions, subcategories, the delineation of ethical decision-making pathways and the 
classification of countertransference enactments accordingly provided four initial and 
experimental units of analysis in formulating a psychoanalytically oriented understanding of 
the ethical decision-making process. An overview of Kleinian, classical and intersubjective 
definitions reveals, firstly, contested views of the relative unconscious contributions of the 
analyst and the patient to the phenomenon of countertransference enactments. Consensus 
prevails, however, that the analyst is not a consistently rational agent but one who remains 
unwittingly susceptible to the regressive sway exerted by enactment phenomena, including 
the patient‟s often forceful efforts to transform him/her into a desired transference object. 
Further agreement is reached by theorists from competing persuasions that the affective 
kernel or compelling emotional power of enactments may well dispel the analyst‟s 
customary reflective attitude, stripping the latter of autonomous choice as to whether to 
refrain from, or to participate in, the countertransference enactment concerned.   
 
Identified subcategories of countertransference enactments included, secondly, interpretive 
enactments (Steiner), nonsexual boundary violations (Gabbard & Lester, 1995), the 
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analyst‟s “secret delinquencies” (Slochower, 2003) and the implicit notion of “ethical 
decision-making enactments”. Examination of professional literature suggests, thirdly, that 
inherent to the resolution of ethical dilemmas are several discrete ethical decision-making 
pathways distinguished from one another by the fate of the analyst‟s reflective space. The 
first pathway includes the therapist‟s rational and appropriate resolution of the ethical 
dilemma at hand; ethical decision-making occurs without enactment and with few if any 
harmful consequences to the patient. The second pathway is characterised by the therapist‟s 
failure to create or to restore a reflective space. Unexamined countertransference anxieties 
may find disruptive and repeated behavioural expression in ethical decision-making 
enactments driven variously by the patient‟s projective identifications, by the therapist‟s 
unresolved personal countertransference or by unconscious collusion co-created by the 
analytic pair. The ethical decision-making enactment concerned is not subjected to post-
enactment scrutiny, raising the risk of harmful consequences to the patient. The third 
pathway is distinguished by the recovery of the therapist‟s reflective space and by his/her 
willingness to retrospectively submit disorientating countertransference affects and 
interventions to post-enactment scrutiny. Re-engaging with the ethical decision-making 
process and the therapist‟s reparative efforts hopefully allow for the transformation of the 
raw ethical decision-making enactment into a potentially beneficent and useable analytic 
process, thereby mitigating the possibility of harmful consequences for the patient.  
 
The classification of countertransference enactments included consideration of the different 
gradients offered by Louw and Pitman (2001), Gabbard and Lester (1995), Cassorla (2001) 
and Ivey (in press). The fourth and final unit of analysis highlighted the ethical dimension of 
clinical practice and proposed that countertransference enactments may accordingly be 
situated along a beneficence-maleficence gradient. 
 
The two vignettes presented in this chapter provided contrasting instances of a primarily 
patient-induced as well as a therapist-induced ethical decision-making enactment. The 
vignettes concerned functioned as a preliminary forum wherein to rehearse the utility of the 
foregoing theoretical units of analysis in examining the resolution of ethical dilemmas. The 
subcategory and key notion of “ethical decision-making enactments” provided a potentially 
useful conceptual vantage point from which to grasp how even well qualified and 
experienced analysts, confronted with disorienting and often distressing ethical dilemmas, 
may be dislodged from his/her familiar reflective stance, adherence to ethical values and 
  89 
carefully nurtured professional image as a benevolent caregiver. Rather than the equal and 
mutual co-creation of countertransference enactments advocated by intersubjective and 
relational models, of interest was that the real-life dilemmas presented in the two vignettes 
appeared to offer supportive data for investigating, in the future context of ethical dilemmas 
described by the research participants of this study, the viability of Kleinian and classical 
formulations of countertransference enactments. It is hoped that the various units of analysis 
described in this chapter will be of value in the understanding and later interpretation of 
qualitative data generated by the present study. 
 
The next chapter sets out the specific aims of the research study, followed by a detailed 
account of the methodology used in gathering and analysing the data. Guiding ethical 
principles and challenges which arose in the course of conducting the research process are 
discussed.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH AIMS AND METHOD 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The review in previous chapters of professional ethics codes, ethical decision-making 
models and survey studies of decision-making suggests that traditional approaches appear to 
present the resolution of ethical dilemmas as a fundamentally conscious and rational 
process. The latter frameworks may minimise the role played by emotions in resolving 
ethical conflict and arguably fail to accommodate the intrapsychic and interpersonal 
dimension of the ethical decision-making process. As Packer (1989) maintains, emotions 
“provide the grist which any moral deliberation must have to grind upon if it is to lead to 
action of any consequence. Correlative to this are the limitations inherent in reason as a tool 
with which to resolve conflict” (p. 115). One possible consequence of the emphasis by 
quantitative research procedures on hypothetical dilemmas and moral reasoning processes is 
the relative dearth of first-hand, in-depth accounts of the subjective feelings, struggles, and 
preoccupations that potentially beset the clinician‟s lived encounter with real-life ethical 
dilemmas. 
 
Quantitative research is concerned mainly with formulating general laws of human 
behaviour while qualitative research by contrast “seeks to understand and articulate the 
meanings of people‟s experiences” (Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001, p. 163). Since I 
was principally interested in understanding and making sense of participants‟ lived 
experiences, I situated this research study within a qualitative research paradigm and a 
related set of research practices. Out of my original engagement with existing literature as 
well as personal experiences as a psychotherapist, as a patient and as an Ethics Committee 
member of a local society, four preliminary research questions arose: 
 What subjective feelings, thoughts, fantasies, concerns or actions initially announce 
the psychoanalytic psychotherapist‟s identification of an ethical dilemma? How 
might these psychological processes potentially evolve in the course of struggling 
with the dilemma concerned? 
 How does the psychoanalytic psychotherapist‟s subjectivity potentially affect the 
well-documented phenomenon of ethical decision-making and intervention? 
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 What professional resources does the psychoanalytic psychotherapist call upon to 
help him/her resolve the ethical dilemma at hand? 
These questions would help to elicit “simple descriptions” (Packer, 1989, p. 112) of what 
happened when participants encountered an ethical dilemma and what they did to resolve it. 
Interpretive research, however, requires “thinking on one‟s feet” (Kelly, 1999b, p. 417) and 
“no pre-packaged designs exist” (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, xvi) which offer straightforward 
instructions or immediate access to understanding the phenomenon of interest. The fledgling 
researcher is confronted with the demanding task of choosing from “multiple … sampling, 
data collection … and data analysis options … Almost any mix and match is possible and 
depends on the aims, objectives, and research question” (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, xvi). 
Hence careful selection of different research strategies is required in order to create a 
question-specific design that is uniquely suited to the qualitative researcher‟s particular 
project (Miller & Crabtree, 1999a; O‟Leary, 2004). 
 
Informed by the initial research questions, the original aim of this study was to provide an 
inductively grounded understanding and interpretation of psychoanalytic psychotherapists‟ 
subjective psychological experiences in the presence of unanticipated ethical dilemmas. As 
my engagement with the data and related theory intensified, this broad research objective 
gave way and was replaced by a new and narrower aim, that of providing a 
psychoanalytically orientated interpretive account of the phenomenon of ethical decision-
making as it transpires in the everyday context of analytic space. Kelly (1999b) proposes a 
generic approach to the interpretation of qualitative data which he terms “interpretive 
research” or “hermeneutics in action” (p. 398). This “fundamental interpretive continuum” 
(Kelly, 1999b, p. 399) incorporates, on the one hand, empathic understanding of 
contextually derived self-accounts and, on the other, a more distanciated, sceptical, 
theoretically led perspective. Setting off rather naively on an exploratory quest for answers, 
I used the latter paradigm to negotiate research territory which often elicited anxiety but 
which also held the lure of clinically relevant findings, as well as a more complete 
theoretical understanding of the ethical decision-making process. 
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2. LEAPING INTO THE CIRCLE: A HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO 
RESEARCH 
Hermeneutics traditionally comprises the study of the interpretation of written texts8 (Kvale, 
1996). Central to the hermeneutic task or to “the business of interpretation” (Addison, 1992, 
p. 110) is “the process of bringing a thing or situation from unintelligibility to 
understanding” (Palmer, 1969, p. 13). This striving after understanding and the attribution 
of meaning is not confined to hermeneutic research efforts but may be construed more 
fundamentally as ontological, structuring “our way of being in the world, our living, our 
actions and interactions before it characterizes our knowledge and our sciences” (Packer & 
Addison, 1989, p. 34). Accordingly Palmer (1969) maintains that “Hermeneutics as a 
methodology of interpretation for the humanities is a derivative form … growing out of the 
primary ontological function of interpreting” (p. 130). 
 
Interpretive research strategies distilled from the philosophy of interpretation may be 
applied to the reading and analysing of transcribed interview texts. Dilthey (in Terre 
Blanche & Kelly, 1999) argues that “Verstehen” or “empathy” is the only model of 
understanding appropriate to the human sciences and entails imaginatively grasping the 
context of a text‟s creation as well as the author‟s intended meaning.  
 
Rebutting Dilthey‟s argument, Ricoeur‟s “model of the text” (Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, 
Miller & Argyris, 1989, p. 145; Kelly, 1999b, p. 399) asserts that the acquisition of 
knowledge about complex human phenomena subsumes a dialectic between “Verstehen” 
(empathy) and “Erklaren” (explanation) or the more distantiated understanding deployed by 
the natural sciences. Thus Ricoeur proposes that “understanding of a situation needs to be 
developed both from the perspective of being in the context (empathy) and from the 
perspective of distantiation, using interpretation” (Kelly, 1999b, p. 400-401). Reading and 
analysing a text in an attitude of open inquiry optimally incorporates both the “experience-
near” and “experience-distant” perspectives of “Verstehen” and “Erklaring” respectively 
and ideally maintains a balance between them (Kelly, 1999b).  
 
The ongoing cyclical movement evident in this research study between “experience-near” 
and “experience-distant” perspectives hopefully provides a pragmatic illustration of Kelly‟s 
                                                 
8  Encompassing discourse, action and human creations, the greatly expanded contemporary notion of “text” 
includes “any record of life held over after the moment of its production for later comprehension and 
interpretation” (Kelly, 1999a, p. 379).  
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(1999b) “fundamental interpretive continuum” (p. 399) as well as of the concept of the 
hermeneutic circle. Interpretive inquiry holds that “establishing a point of view, a 
perspective, is the forward arc [of the hermeneutic circle], and evaluation forms the reverse 
arc” (Packer & Addison, 1989a, p. 33). “Thrown forward” into an ambiguous new 
phenomenon, the researcher‟s preliminary and projected everyday understanding inevitably 
shapes the phenomenon concerned to fit his/her preconceptions, expectations, subjective 
opinions or “fore-structure of interpretation” (Addison, 1989, p. 52). Thus “leaping into the 
hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger, in Packer, 1989, p. 103) or endeavouring to secure 
legitimate access to the phenomenon of interest entails recognising and critically examining 
the potential influence exerted on the research process by the researcher‟s personal 
prejudices, biases and misconceptions. The developing account otherwise stands “in danger 
of becoming [the researcher‟s] own preunderstandings projected onto the process [he/she is] 
investigating” (Addison, 1989, p. 53). The latter activity may not secure irreproachable 
access to the circle of understanding and interpretation but it does enhance the chances that 
the researcher‟s “starting point in the hermeneutic circle [will] be an informed and aware 
one” (Packer, 1989, p. 103). The process of reflecting on my own taken-for-granted 
assumptions will be considered later in this chapter. 
 
Once entry into the hermeneutic circle has been effected, a continuous back and forth 
movement between the whole text and its constituent parts is initiated (Addison, 1992; 
Kelly, 1999; Kvale, 1996; Packer, 1989). Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller and Argyris 
(1989) write that “the interpretive procedure is a fundamentally circular one, because while 
the whole can only be understood in terms of its parts, by the same token the parts only 
acquire their proper meaning within the context of the whole” (p. 144). Reading and 
analysing field notes, memos, diagrams and transcribed interview texts regarding 
participants‟ subjective engagement with real-life ethical dilemmas mobilised both the 
“experience-near” and “experience-distant” poles of “the interpretive continuum”, inducing 
the repeated experience of “spiralling around the hermeneutic circle” (Addison, 1992, p. 
118). Each time I completed a research interview, I immersed myself for prolonged periods 
in listening to the audiotape, in studying the transcribed text and in reading my detailed field 
notes. The latter immersion generated an empathic understanding of the many subjective 
meanings the lived encounter with an ethical dilemma had held for the particular participant 
as well as a heightened appreciation of what it had been like for the clinician concerned to 
struggle, often alone, with its resolution. Over time this “experience-near” empathic 
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understanding shifted as discussions with supervisors, close examination of the transcribed 
texts and continued theoretical reading created a “change in the mode of engagement” 
(Packer, 1989, p. 56) from understanding into more distanciated and theoretically led 
interpretation. A reflective space opened out wherein I could stand back and think more 
freely about the possible and previously unrecognised meanings of the intense, 
disorientating affects coursing through both the original dilemma as well as through the 
interview process. I began to formulate tentative interpretations about how and why the 
struggle to resolve common ethical dilemmas appeared to have mobilised charged 
countertransference responses. 
 
Fed by the iterative, back and forth movement between empathic understanding and 
interpretation for each of the eleven research interviews, a rich interpretive account began to 
take shape, “thick” (Geertz, 1973) with contextual detail regarding the emotional, somatic, 
cognitive and unconscious processes evoked in the course of individual participants‟ 
struggle with real-life dilemmas. At the same time, inconsistencies and discontinuities 
appearing in the developing account, including vivid descriptions of compromised ethical 
reasoning, suggested that reanalysis in each interview of data pertaining to the possible 
impact of countertransference responses on ethical decision-making appeared warranted. 
This return from global account back to individual interviews sparked fresh bouts of reading 
contemporary psychoanalytic literature and new questions arose concerning the possible 
unconscious and interpersonal determinants of ethical decision-making. Thus in the course 
of slowly “spiralling around the hermeneutic circle” (Addison, 1992, p. 118), each discrete 
interview played its part in contributing to the meaning of the overarching interpretive 
account which in turn conferred fresh significance on contextually-bound individual 
descriptions of grappling to resolve disturbing real-life ethical dilemmas.  
 
The hermeneutic circle is not inevitably “a vicious one” (Packer, 1989, p. 103) where 
interpretations simply function to confirm the opinions, speculations and personal prejudices 
of the interpreter. Not only does the forward arc of projection entail scrutiny of the 
researcher‟s “fore-structure of interpretation” (Addison, 1989, p. 52) but the backward arc 
involves ongoing evaluation of answers being “uncovered” (Packer & Addison, 1989b, p. 
278) to the research questions which prompted the inquiry in the first place. Rather than 
neatly marking the beginning and ending of the research process, the two arcs are conceived 
of as existing on the circumference of the circle and in constant dialogue (Packer & 
  96 
Addison, 1989a). This suggests that this research inquiry included from the start regular 
efforts to evaluate the validity of the emerging interpretive account.  
3. THE RESEARCH PROCESS BEGINS: REFLEXIVITY, POWER AND 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 
3.1. Clarifying the research topic 
I came to this research process aware that my interest, concern and choice of topic had been 
stimulated by four principal sources. As a psychotherapist, firstly, involved in a 
psychoanalytically oriented doctoral programme, I had over the years confronted ethical 
dilemmas in the context of the therapeutic space. In common with other colleagues, for 
example, I had struggled with the legal threat of an impending subpoena and the prospect of 
releasing confidential case notes as well as with the ethicality of charging for scheduled 
appointments when patients had clarified in advance that they would not on these occasions 
be present9. 
 
As a patient, secondly, I had had the seemingly not unusual experience in South Africa of a 
long-term personal therapy being terminated at very short notice as the clinician concerned 
sought employment overseas. As an Ethics Committee member of a local psychoanalytic 
society, I had, thirdly, participated in organising post-qualifying ethics training and in the 
challenging task of constructing a psychoanalytically based ethics code. Conversely, I had 
experienced the Ethics Committee concerned being riven by decisions as to whether it was 
ethical to initiate dual role relationships by including into its structure highly competent 
individuals who worked, however, with existing Committee members in an alternative 
professional capacity. And, fourthly, disquieting stories continued to circulate of colleagues 
who had purportedly become sexually involved with their patients or whose own analysis or 
training had allegedly been marred by eroticised transference involvement with personal 
therapists and supervisors. 
 
These and other experiences created a lively impression that, on the one hand, there 
appeared to be a local need and a willingness to explore the ethical dimension of clinical 
practice. On the other hand, anxiety and resistance apparently prevailed around, for 
                                                 
9  The apparently widely accepted practice in Cape Town among psychologists practising as psychodynamic 
psychotherapists of charging for missed but scheduled appointments appears to contravene the South African 
statutory “Ethical Code of Professional Conduct” (2002) which states that “Psychologists shall not…bill for 
services partially or not delivered” (p. 11).  
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instance, how to recognise an ethical dilemma, about “whistle blowing” (Pope & Vetter, 
1992, p. 12) in relation to unethical colleagues and about whether it was “safe” to risk 
revealing to the public gaze of peers ethically controversial, ambiguous or compromised 
clinical practices which had arisen in the privacy of the therapeutic space. 
 
As I pursued the possibility of researching real-life ethical dilemmas, I reviewed the 
proposed study with recognised academics and peers and submitted a research proposal to 
both the University and Departmental Research Ethics Committees. In the course of this 
initial process, I became aware not only of others‟ interest and curiosity but also once again 
of a diffuse sense of anxiety and threat that seemingly hovered over the potential research 
project. It was difficult to discern in these early phases whether the anxiety derived 
principally from myself as I prepared to undertake a challenging research endeavour or 
whether it was inherent to a topic that might be subsumed under the notion of “sensitive 
research” (Kelly, 1999a, p. 385). Such research arguably includes exploration of deeply 
personal and/or professional experiences which may evoke narcissistic wounding 
(Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001) as well as fantasies and fears regarding punitive action 
by statutory organisations. 
 
Questions and comments, sometimes generous but occasionally hostile in tenor, began to 
accumulate. Did I think anyone would volunteer to talk truthfully about real-life ethical 
dilemmas which might entail possible evidence of poor professional practices? Would 
feelings of guilt, shame and professional embarrassment not deter prospective research 
participants? Wouldn‟t it be wiser (and easier) to investigate participants‟ subjective 
responses to pre-selected hypothetical ethical vignettes? How would I cope with my limited 
knowledge regarding the extensive field of philosophical ethical theories? Wasn‟t it likely 
that the onerous burden of protecting the confidentiality of participants‟ material and the 
need for documentation to counter the vagaries of interviewees‟ fallible memories be likely 
to scupper the project at a later stage? Wasn‟t countertransference a technical rather than an 
ethical issue? In short, wouldn‟t it be better to focus on research participants‟ experiences of 
and attitudes towards using the South African statutory “Ethical Code of Professional 
Conduct” (2002) when faced with ethical dilemmas in clinical practice? 
 
Out of this confusing turmoil greater clarity emerged about what this research study was and 
was not about. It was not, for example, principally about clinicians‟ knowledge or use of 
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either statutory ethics codes or philosophical ethical theories. Neither did the proposed 
research aim at identifying the type or frequency of ethical dilemmas encountered in 
professional practice as had previously been done in South Africa (Slack & Wassenaar, 
1999), Sweden (Colnerud, 1997), the United Kingdom (Lindsay & Clarkson, 1999; Lindsay 
& Colley, 1995) and America (Pope & Vetter, 1992). As discussed earlier, my initial 
engagement with anonymous quantitative survey studies in professional decision-making 
suggested that the latter were descriptive and had also largely neglected the subjective 
embodied experiences and voices of individual practitioners who had confronted real-life 
ethical dilemmas. The few psychoanalytic accounts or studies of ethical decision-making 
that I discovered later either lacked clinical data, were not adequately theorised or did not 
take up directly the issue of resolving unanticipated ethical dilemmas arising in the context 
of the therapeutic space.  
 
The foregoing impressions and reflections helped to refine my preliminary choice of topic. I 
thought that it might be theoretically and clinically useful to investigate in an open-ended, 
exploratory manner the in-depth countertransference experiences of psychologists, 
practising as psychoanalytic psychotherapists, who had encountered real-life ethical 
dilemmas in the ordinary course of their daily work. My primary interest thus lay in 
exploring the potentially multiple ways in which prospective participants had engaged with 
the subjective and emotional dimension of resolving everyday ethical dilemmas. 
Signposting the general direction forward, Pope and Bajt (1988) ask “How can 
psychologists … ensure that their actions are based on sound professional judgment rather 
than on self-interest, prejudice, rationalisation and the sense that one is „above the law?‟” (p. 
829). Clarifying the research topic gave rise to the tentative hope that, in some as yet 
unforeseen way, the proposed interpretive study might prove to be of pragmatic value, 
helping to uncover clinically relevant answers to practical difficulties that aided the 
implementation of sound professional judgment in the context of the analytic space.  
3.2. The fore-structure of interpretation: examining three taken-for-granted 
assumptions 
Engagement with a hermeneutic framework is never as an objective observer nor as a “true 
tabula rasa” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 137). As previously discussed, unless the 
researcher‟s subjectivity and taken-for-granted assumptions are reflexively examined, the 
danger exists that these will be unthinkingly projected onto the research process, 
compromising the devising of the research question, the interview encounter, thematic 
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construction and the developing account (Addison, 1999; Burman, 1994; Kvale, 1996, 
O‟Leary, 2004). Before embarking on the data gathering process, I attempted to clarify the 
following three taken-for-granted assumptions. These included, firstly, my beliefs around 
power dynamics and the negotiation of meaning and, secondly, the critical need to establish 
a reflective space to examine my ongoing countertransference responses. A third taken-for-
granted assumption, which I was not initially aware of, was my conviction that participants‟ 
engagement with real-life ethical dilemmas would eventually reveal, despite the inevitable 
vicissitudes involved, their thoughtful resolution through the use of, for example, 
professional ethics codes, consultation or supervision and collegial guidance.  
3.2.1. First taken-for-granted assumption: Power dynamics in the research 
relationship 
Throughout this research study, the term “participant” or “interviewee” reflects, as Berman 
(1994) suggests, attempts to do research “with” rather than “on” people. Instead of 
perceiving interviewees “as a data source … [or] as a locus of variables to be observed and 
manipulated” (Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001, p. 164), I assumed a fundamentally 
egalitarian research relationship. Since structural disparities in terms of age, class and 
education were likely to be minimal, I anticipated the emergence of only relatively small 
power differentials. The research process would accordingly be essentially characterised by 
a process Shrijvers (1991, in Kelly, 1999a) terms “studying sideways” as opposed to 
“studying down” or “studying up” (p. 386). I took for granted that researcher and researched 
alike would be actively involved in negotiating and constructing the possible meanings of 
events and processes occurring in both the research encounter as well as in the context of 
the original ethical dilemma. While efforts to establish open dialogue and to grasp the 
elusive meanings of interviewees‟ subjective experiences often appeared to be a successful, 
mutually negotiated process, my subsequent interpretations of participants‟ professional 
practices were independent of the latter‟s self-accounts. Raising the question of who 
exercises power and control over the interpretation of research participants‟ stories, the 
experiencing subject or the interpreter of the subject‟s subjective understanding, the latter 
issue is addressed later in considering the ethics of qualitative research. 
 
Further power differentials which unexpectedly emerged included gender relations and the 
researcher‟s status as a purported “expert” on ethical issues. Burman (1994) comments, for 
example, “that where traditional power relations are departed from, where men are 
positioned as subordinate within the researcher-researched relation….this structural power 
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relationship [may become] evident through their attempts to subvert it” (p. 68). Thus power 
dynamics apparently played out in my resistance on occasion to challenging the 
authoritative but seemingly intellectualised stance of highly articulate male interviewees and 
in participants‟ apparent transference perceptions of myself as a powerful yet threatening 
“expert interpreter” of ethical material. These latter perceptions provided a stark contrast 
with interviewees‟ often painful “confessions” pertaining to, for example, a lack of 
information or lapses of professional judgment.  
3.2.2. Second taken-for-granted assumption: Countertransference and 
creating a reflective research space 
The concept of countertransference is congruent with the contemporary emphasis on 
“reflexivity” or the need for reflection on the researcher‟s “own experience and role within 
the conduct of the research” (Berman, 1994, p. 52). Additionally, however, the notion of 
countertransference underscores the unconscious dynamics that shape the researcher‟s 
interests and activities and that are “at once the source of our insight and our folly” (Berg & 
Smith, 1988, in Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 33). Central to my approach to research was 
the taken-for-granted assumption that both the researcher and the researched are defended 
subjects who deploy unconscious defences against anxiety (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). 
From the start of the research project, I therefore contrived to establish a reflective space 
which would assist with interrogating both participants‟ countertransference responses as 
well as with questioning my own countertransference “blind spots” mobilised by the 
interactive process of gathering and analysing the data. 
 
The promotion of critical, analytical thinking in this research inquiry was fostered by the 
creation of a “research team”. This consisted of auditing semester courses at a local 
university on moral philosophy and applied ethics, continued theoretical reading, dialogue 
with interested peers and the regular presentation of the developing account to two 
supervisors who held very different theoretical orientations and professional interests. On 
the one hand, the supervisor concerned described his theoretical orientation as strongly 
psychoanalytic in approach, expressed a preference for qualitative research and had been 
deeply involved in the development of psychoanalytic thinking and training in South 
African clinical practice. The second supervisor, by contrast, observed an “eclectic” 
theoretical orientation, had been pivotal in developing the field of ethics in South African 
psychological practice and, holding a clear preference for quantitative research, expressed 
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the disconcerting reservation that qualitative research studies invariably result in “finding 
what you are looking for”.  
 
Packer and Addison (1989b) argue that testing the validity of an interpretation necessarily 
involves trying to persuasively convince others who hold a different perspective from one‟s 
own that the interpretive account concerned improves on understanding the phenomenon of 
interest by offering a better account of it than do those given by rival interpretations. The 
sharp divergence of supervisory interests created a challenging reflective context which 
supported scepticism, open theoretical disagreement and rival interpretations regarding 
alternative meanings of the data. Discussions with both supervisors were directly based, not 
on the researcher‟s private inferences, but on the “public data” (Spence, 1989, p. 24) 
comprised by the actual transcribed texts. As Spence (1989) argues, reading the original raw 
data allowed the sceptical reader direct access to research participants‟ abundant detailed 
descriptions of the ethical dilemmas in question and the option of reaching independent 
conclusions from the evidence supplied. The credibility and veracity, for example, of my 
evolving interpretations regarding the unconscious determinants of ethical decision-making 
were consistently challenged by supervisory demands to return to the data, to search for 
disconfirming evidence and to ensure that qualitative research “findings” were scrupulously 
supported by textual evidence rather than swayed by personal bias or by attempts at 
persuasion through appeal to standard psychoanalytic rhetoric (Spence, 1989). 
 
Reflecting on my own countertransference responses in the context of supervision helped to 
restore and to deepen a more distanciated, theoretical or “etic” perspective (Kelly, 1999b; 
Spence, 1989) which was often lost under the impact of the emotionally charged 
interactions between myself and defensive research participants or, later, between myself 
and the transcribed interview texts. Dual supervision thus helped to safeguard the 
developing account from being skewed by “going native” (Kvale, 1996, p. 118), that is, by 
my unconscious identification with research participants‟ emotionally laden subjective 
experiences and “emic” everyday understandings (Kelly, 1999b; Spence, 1989) of the 
ethical dilemmas at hand. Over-identification with patients, by contrast, in the form of 
unduly critical interpretations levelled at participants‟ professional practices were likewise 
checked and subjected to thoughtful review. This sustained experience of supervisory 
empathy and thoughtfulness was to play a key but wholly unanticipated role in the later 
construction of a pragmatic, psychoanalytically orientated ethical decision-making model.  
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3.2.3. Third taken-for-granted or unconscious assumption 
In contrast to conscious, taken-for-granted understandings, a third assumption apparently 
operating out of my initial awareness included the conviction that participants‟ descriptions 
would reveal evidence of ethical quandaries that had been thought about and largely 
resolved in the several contexts of professional codes of ethics, supervision, personal 
therapy, collegial networks and legal frameworks. Addison (1999) remarks that what the 
researcher initially “discovers” is coloured by his/her preliminary “conscious, 
acknowledged, or foreground assumptions” (p. 147). As the research evolves, the interpreter 
learns more about “unconscious, unacknowledged, or background assumptions” (p. 147).  
 
Despite earlier experiences of apparent collegial anxiety, what was not immediately evident 
to me was the emotionally saturated and seemingly unprocessed character of research 
participants‟ engagement with real-life ethical dilemmas. Prospective interviewees were not 
“naive subjects” but were on the contrary highly qualified, psychologically sophisticated 
clinicians well versed in regularly presenting and discussing their work in the context of 
local psychoanalytic societies. Lulled by my taken-for-granted expectation that the 
forthcoming research interviews would somehow conform to the structured nature and 
reasonable affect characteristic of monthly psychoanalytic meetings, I anticipated only that 
the research encounter would provide an opportunity for discussing in a coherent, preferably 
theoretically informed way, troubling ethical dilemmas that had been safely relegated to the 
past. This suggests, retrospectively, possible countertransference anxieties fuelled by the 
researcher‟s unacknowledged desire for the overly swift translation of participants‟ 
inconsistent “emic” or everyday understandings into the familiar esoteric rhetoric or “etic” 
formulations characteristic of standard psychoanalytic theory (Spence, 1989, p. 219). What I 
expected, however, was not what I got! Taken-for-granted assumptions of “narrative 
smoothing” (Spence, 1989, p. 214) were rudely and decisively dispelled in the course of 
successive research interviews and are discussed in the following sections.  
4. THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
Ethical considerations arose throughout the entire research process and were integral to the 
planning, implementation and writing up of the research study. Durrheim and Wassenaar 
(1999) observe that “the essential purpose of ethical research planning is to protect the 
welfare and the rights of research participants” (p. 65). While critical objections to this 
research project had originally included the ethical problem of confidentiality, the approach 
  103 
I adopted was that “The difficulty of doing something ethically is not a sound reason for not 
persisting in finding a way of doing it. Researchers should address ethical issues … with the 
same intellectual and creative vigour that they use to develop methodologies and analytical 
methods” (Wassenaar & Mamotte, 2008, p. 6). Based on the ethical principles of autonomy, 
nonmaleficence and beneficence, the following discussion addresses the major ethical issues 
of informed consent, confidentiality, expected benefits to participants and the notion of 
harm in qualitative research.  
 
Autonomous informed consent procedures were implemented by giving each potential 
participant a detailed letter of information (see Appendix 1) well before the proposed 
research interview. The letter functioned as a written contract and marked the start of the 
research project‟s “audit trail”10 (Kelly, 1999c; Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001). The contract 
stated the overall purpose of the research study, clarifying that the central aim was to 
explore how psychoanalytic psychotherapists engage with and attempt to resolve real-life 
ethical dilemmas. Drawing attention to anticipated risks, I noted the sensitive nature of the 
research and that participants would “be involved in talking about their personal experiences 
of ethical dilemmas, and any related conflicts, in the context of their work as 
psychotherapists”. While the probability of serious harms accruing to prospective 
participants appeared relatively low, the letter noted that expected benefits included a 
valuable opportunity to share and to reflect on individual experiences of working with real-
life ethical dilemmas and to make a contribution to professional debate in South Africa 
regarding the ethical dimension of psychoanalytic practice. 
 
A clear description of the research procedure and participants‟ expected time commitment 
were included in the letter, as was a simple statement that raw data would be kept under 
secure conditions and that participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Couched in an open, deliberately non-technical manner, the letter attempted to avoid 
prejudicing the study by “signalling” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 86) to prospective 
participants my theoretical interests or any professional responses interviewees might 
erroneously assume were desirable to display in resolving ethical dilemmas. The only 
“inducement” provided was my offer in the initial telephone contact to secure a plentiful 
                                                 
10 The raw materials contained in the appendices hopefully provide a clear “trail” or record of the research 
process, allowing prospective readers to trace the original research path and to replicate, support or refute the 
research findings and conclusions. 
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supply of tea and chocolate biscuits to sustain both researcher and researched through the 
interview process! 
 
Central to establishing and maintaining trust with prospective participants were the issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity. The letter of information outlined the following measures 
that would be taken to safeguard confidentiality. Firstly, all identifying data including 
names, places and demographic details, would be deliberately disguised or removed from 
the transcribed interview texts and from the final research report. In the event, each 
transcribed text was thoroughly and repeatedly “swept” for any material that could 
inadvertently reveal the identities of not only research participants but also of any third 
parties involved. The major ethical problem in the latter case derives from the fact that third 
party individuals have not given consent to being presented or discussed in publicly 
available documents (Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001). When subsequently I became 
aware, in the context of the research interviews, of the actual identities of personal analysts, 
supervisors and training universities, I responded with increased vigilance and the use of 
generic descriptions to ensure that no identifying information appeared in either the 
transcribed texts nor in any of the many anonymous quotations later used for discussion 
purposes in the body of the research report itself. Careful use of generic descriptions 
rendered it highly unlikely that any third party would be recognised by others, although 
supervisors and personal analysts familiar with the details of particular real-life ethical 
dilemmas might presumably recognise themselves. The latter strategies of altering or 
removing identifying details did not apparently detract from either the scholarly or 
pragmatic value of challenging questions raised by the data analysis regarding ethical 
decision-making practices, supervisory competence and the content and quality of South 
African pre-professional and post-qualifying ethics training. 
 
A second measure that ensured confidentiality involved the shredding of transcribed 
interview texts on completion of the research project and the assurance that audio cassettes 
would be similarly erased or returned to participants at their request. An unanticipated 
analytical device used in the data analysis process requiring confidentiality and informed 
consent, but not covered in the original letter, concerned the writing up of clear and detailed 
descriptions of each real-life ethical dilemma (see beginning of Chapter 5). I decided on 
reflection that, before the final interpretive account was officially lodged in the public 
domain, each participant would be approached and asked for his/her permission for the 
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relevant description to remain as an integral part of the research report. Should former 
interviewees be unavailable or decline to give consent, prospective readers would be 
informed that the pages concerned had, for confidentiality reasons, intentionally been left 
blank. On further reflection, and using consultation, I finally decided that the most 
beneficent course of action was to offer participants a synopsis of the main findings on 
completion of the study. The third measure protecting confidentiality ensured that the final 
research study appearing in public would not contain the transcribed interviews. Access to 
the fully transcribed interviews would be restricted to supervisors and examiners alone. 
Acknowledging the researcher‟s responsibility to make the research findings known to 
participants (Wassenaar & Mamotte, 2008), the letter concluded by offering interested 
interviewees a copy of the research report on completion of the project. Formalisation of the 
informed consent procedure was completed when research participants signed the letter, 
indicating that they had read the information concerned and had agreed to participate on a 
voluntary basis. The written contract attempted to address in a clear, unambiguous manner 
key ethical issues. The problem with “the ethics of consent” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 
86) is that the interviewer and the interviewed cannot predict in advance of the research 
interview exactly what is being consented to or what personal topics and emotional affects 
may be provoked by an open-ended interview process which allows for free association and 
the following up of participants‟ unanticipated leads. In place of a once-off signed consent 
procedure, future research investigating ethical dilemmas might by contrast anticipate an 
on-going process of consent that runs throughout the research study (Hadjistavropoulos & 
Smythe, 2001; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Implementation of the newly emerging “ethics 
as process” model in qualitative research (Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001, p. 363) would 
allow for ongoing monitoring of harms and benefits, actively encouraging participants to 
periodically re-evaluate their original decision to participate in the research study. 
 
Nonmaleficence or the obligation to avoid harm to research participants and other persons is 
cited as a central ethical principle guiding the research process (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 
1999). However, the question is raised by Ramcharan and Cutcliffe (2001) as to “what 
exactly constitutes „harm‟ ‟‟? (p. 359). Of central concern to this research study were the 
potential risks of inflicting emotional harm on interviewees as a result, firstly, of inducing 
subjective distress in the context of open-ended research interviews and, secondly, as a 
consequence of participants subsequently reading my interpretations of their accounts of 
ethical dilemmas.  
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The relatively unstructured nature of the qualitative research interview may unexpectedly 
re-stimulate unresolved conflicts, feelings and „traumatic‟ memories. This highlights the 
first area of concern in this study regarding possible harmful consequences to participants 
both during and after the research interview. Thus Hadjistavropoulos and Smythe (2001) 
observe that risk factors in qualitative research include the evocation of “negative mood 
states” (p. 167), potentially undermining of research participants‟ needed defensive 
strategies. The likely intimacy of the interview can, additionally, be seductive (Kvale, 
1996), swiftly transforming the research encounter into a quasi “psychotherapy session 
where the respondent discloses thoughts and feelings that she or he may not have previously 
admitted having, even to her- or himself” (Kelly, 1999a, p. 387). 
 
From a psychoanalytic research perspective, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) by contrast 
argue that harm needs to be evaluated independently of subjective distress. The latter 
authors contend that from the perspective of psychoanalysis “it is not necessarily harmful if 
research raises painful and distressing experience, though it may be discomforting” (p. 98). 
Central to obviating harm in qualitative research, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) continue, is 
the research participant‟s subjective experience of a relational research context characterised 
by honesty, sympathy and respect. As the beneficiary of a competent qualitative 
researcher‟s capacity to tolerate emotional distress and to offer “true recognition” (Hollway 
& Jefferson, 2000, p. 102), including an honest and realistic appraisal of anxiety provoking 
events, the participant may be assisted in coming to terms with painful experience. While 
the foregoing characteristics are integral to a good therapeutic relationship, “they are also 
very effective in eliciting … [research] information which goes beyond rationalisation ... 
and which conveys emotional significance and [which] does not avoid potentially 
distressing issues” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 87). 
 
Participants in this research study represented a group of highly qualified individuals who 
did not overtly comprise a “vulnerable population”. None of the quantitative research 
literature I had read suggested that researching real-life ethical dilemmas was likely to 
evoke subjective distress and intense affect. Wassenaar and Mamotte (2008) comment that, 
by foreseeing likely harms and by remaining abreast of current developments in research 
ethics, competent Ethics Review Committees can add considerably to the value of proposed 
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research studies, effectively reducing or preventing harm to both the researcher and the 
researched. While university and departmental research ethics committees, before approving 
this research project, addressed relevant aspects of the proposed research methodology, the 
ethical issue of responding to participants‟ potential stress and distress in the context of 
challenging research interviews was not raised nor apparently foreseen. 
 
The eleven research interviews consistently elicited anxiety and, on occasion, marked 
distress. Where participants‟ vulnerability and emotional pain were evident, I attempted to 
respond with compassion and respect. As outlined earlier, recourse to supervision helped to 
maintain my focus as a researcher and to avoid collapsing into a quasi therapeutic or 
supervisory role. When participants‟ self disclosures seemed to indicate that unresolved and 
private childhood experiences of abuse or loss might be re-stimulated, I acknowledged the 
material, but consciously refrained from further questioning, allowed the conversation to 
shift and to assume a changed focus. The pursuit of knowledge regarding the identification 
and resolution of ethical dilemmas was consequently temporarily set aside in favour of a 
spontaneous decision to safeguard the individual participant‟s dignity and right to privacy. 
On completion of the research interviews, I followed up expressions of distress, suggesting 
to individual research participants that it might be helpful to address their emotional 
responses in the context of personal therapy or supervision. By contrast I confronted in a 
hopefully respectful, but unambiguous manner, different instances of participants‟ current 
participation in ethically compromised professional practices, foregrounding the latter 
practitioners‟ apparent need to seek expert consultation. 
 
While confusion and emotional pain were often evident in the research interviews, 
participants‟ subsequent comments challenged the notion that unsettling affects are 
invariably experienced as “wrongs” or “harms” (Wassenaar & Mamotte, 2008, p. 8). 
Breaking the silence of professional isolation, participants‟ remarks suggested that on the 
contrary the interview process had apparently offered the unanticipated benefit of relief 
incurred by sharing with an empathic listener details of emotionally troubling ethical 
dilemmas. The issue remains, however, that qualitative research interviews apparently retain 
far more potential than do quantitative methods for eliciting subjective distress (Wassenaar 
& Mamotte, 2008) Congruent with the approach advocated by the “ethics as process” model 
(Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001, p. 363), future research into real-life ethical dilemmas might 
anticipate the possible evocation of profound emotional affects and unresolved traumatic 
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material in even experienced and well qualified research participants. Informed consent 
procedures might allow for this eventuality by routinely including the offer of appropriate 
debriefing facilities conducted by a competent counsellor.  
 
The second area of concern regarding harmful consequences pertained to participants‟ 
possible reading of the research study and, more particularly, to what I had written about 
them. Smythe and Murray (2000, in Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001), for example, 
express concern that “the emotional impact of having one‟s story reinterpreted and filtered 
through the [authoritative] lenses of social scientific categories” (p. 321) can significantly 
impair the research participant‟s capacity to interpret his/her own subjective experience in 
his/her own way. Hollway and Jefferson (2000) argue by contrast that if the notion of harm 
and participant distress are consistently conflated, this effectively precludes the publication 
of “any interpretive work which assigns motives other than those admitted to by the parties 
themselves, since the impact of such revelations can never be wholly predicted….The idea 
of a critical social science could hardly survive such an ethical strait-jacket” (p. 99).  
 
The many anonymous quotations presented in this research study attempt to ensure that 
research participants‟ individual voices, perspectives and self-understandings were not 
overridden but were on the contrary articulated and clearly represented. However, my 
subsequent interpretations of participants‟ self-accounts may have raised disquieting 
questions and highlighted apparently unreflective aspects of professional practice. Active 
interpretation of interviewees‟ self-understandings found me struggling to manage the 
ethical strains generated between what Kelly (1999b) terms “insider and outsider 
perspectives” or between “trying to be true to the voices of the researched, but yet trying to 
answer [my] research questions” (p. 403). Thus in the course of writing up the research 
study, I wondered often and hard about the possible negative emotional consequences of my 
interpretations on individual colleagues who had courageously and generously entrusted 
their subjective experiences to me. Unexpectedly confronted with an unforeseen real-life 
dilemma in research ethics, I reluctantly conceded that no guarantee could be given that my 
interpretations would not occasion further participant distress or anger.  
 
The position I finally adopted after reflection was devoid of neither ongoing ethical conflict 
nor of self-serving motivation.  Although my interpretations held the potential for further 
narcissistic wounding, I considered that participants had given their written informed 
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consent and were fully aware that I would be using and discussing their stories of 
professional ethical dilemmas in the context of this research. Moreover, I considered that I 
“owned” (Goldberg, in Kantrowitz, 2006, p. 277) my intuitive “hunches”, perceptions, 
thoughts and tentative formulations regarding the potential role of countertransference 
phenomena in the resolution of ethical dilemmas.  I thus argued that I retained the right to 
present these in public and in detail independently of obtaining participants‟ further consent. 
On the other hand, I have attempted to craft my interpretations with deep respect and to 
avoid writing that is patronising, shaming or pathologising in tone (Kantrowitz, 2006).  I 
have also tried, throughout the discussion of research results, to acknowledge multiple 
examples of participants‟ thoughtful concern for their patients as well as their courage in 
openly discussing and sharing their subjective experiences of real-life dilemmas with me.  
 
The final interpretive account hopefully extends the current professional knowledge base. 
As Kelly (1999b) avers, any research account which is comprehensive, rigorous and generic 
in character thereby succeeds in surpassing the subjective understanding of the individual 
participant‟s single voice or lone self-account. This suggests that this study, focusing as it 
does on the countertransference dimension of ethical dilemmas, may potentially extend 
interviewees‟ self-understandings. The final interpretive account might arguably be 
construed as helpful rather than as harmful to individual practitioners prone to translating 
temporarily compromised and reparable ethical judgments into “evidence” of personal 
failings. The sheer volume of data and expense incurred by approximately 16 hours of 
interviewing precluded initiating a fresh round of research interviews. Future research, 
possibly burdened by less data, may be better positioned to provide additional opportunities 
for research participants to check and, if necessary, to change not the researcher‟s 
independent interpretations but the latter‟s detailed descriptions of interviewees‟ subjective 
experiences and self-understandings (Kelly, 1999b; Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001). This in 
turn may contribute to building a respectful qualitative research process wherein the quest 
for professional knowledge and personal advancement remains subordinate to the 
researcher‟s paramount ethical concern for the care and well-being of the researched.  
5. GAINING MOMENTUM: RECRUITING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS  
5.1. Clarifying selection criteria 
Efforts to recruit research participants were guided by two considerations. Potential 
interviewees were assessed, firstly, according to particular selection criteria. Evaluation of 
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the suitability for the purposes of this research study of ethically problematic situations 
required, secondly, establishing a pragmatic definition of what arguably constitutes an 
“ethical dilemma”. Participant characteristics and different definitions of “ethical dilemmas” 
are discussed below.  
 
In order for participants to convey vivid, detailed, “thick” descriptions (Geertz, 1973), it 
appeared essential to identify interviewees who were articulate, well experienced and 
willing to participate in a research study they perceived to be professionally relevant. The 
main selection criterion was based on the individual participant having personally 
encountered and engaged with a real-life ethical dilemma in the context of the therapeutic 
space. Sampling was purposive as I sought currently practising psychologists who had 
encountered troubling or challenging ethical dilemmas within the past twenty-four months 
and who had at least five, but not more than twenty, years of professional clinical 
experience. Recency of experience and written documentation, including possible case 
records and supervision notes, enhanced the likelihood that recall of the ethical dilemma 
would be emotionally alive, rich in detail and credible in tenor.  
 
The planned sample size was limited to 6-8 research participants. In determining the number 
of subjects needed for an interpretive study, Kelly (1999a) observes that “it is necessary to 
have enough material to begin to develop generalisations on the basis of the specific 
instances we look at” (p. 381). The proposed number of subjects appeared to be small 
enough to be practically manageable but arguably remained large enough to develop generic 
understanding of the phenomenon at hand. Since object relations comprised my primary 
theoretical orientation, I decided to recruit participants who worked within a broadly similar 
approach. This homogeneity would hopefully provide the researcher and the researched 
with a common language and shared understanding of the nature of the patient-therapist 
dyad as well as of the significance of the therapeutic boundaries framing the ethical 
dilemma concerned. Within the selected sample, some degree of diversity or sampling for 
heterogeneity seemed achievable. Research subjects could include both male and female 
participants of different ages and population groups; primary work contexts might 
encompass private practice, academic institutions and medical/hospital or psychiatric 
settings. Diversity could further be promoted by accepting a range of real-life ethical 
dilemmas reflecting prospective participants‟ different experiences, feelings, thoughts, 
attitudes, choices and efforts at resolution.  
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5.2. Definition of an “ethical dilemma” 
Selection criteria included consideration not only of prospective participants‟ characteristics 
but also of clarifying which professionally problematic situations would be accorded the 
status of comprising an “ethical dilemma”. The following descriptions of “ethical decision-
making” and “ethical dilemmas” appeared pertinent; Colnerud‟s (1995, in Lindén & 
Rådeström, 2008) observations were discovered later in the research process but appeared 
congruent with the ideas set out below. 
 
Slack (1997) argues that the notion of ethical decision-making is invariably “an abstract 
summary for an innumerable set of cognitive, affective and interpersonal attitudes and 
behaviours” (p. 115). More particularly, Steere (1984) suggests that ethical decision-making 
is characterised by constant choices between alternative courses of action. These include 
self-interested actions or those behaviours “one desires, or would like to choose” (Steere, 
1984, xi) and contrasting conduct which is guided by moral conscience or by considerations 
of which actions “one should choose, or….would be the right thing to do” (Steere, 1984, xi) 
in a given situation. Commenting that ethical dilemmas are inherently imbued with 
ambiguity, Packer (1989) writes that “from a researcher‟s perspective there is never an 
unequivocal indication of who acted properly, or an obvious choice of who gave a correct 
account of events. We talk of moral dilemmas with good reason: they have two facets, each 
of which has a claim to validity” (p. 115). Pope and Vetter (1992) apparently construe 
ethical dilemmas as “actual situations which required ethical decisions” (p. 2). In 
distinguishing between ethical problems, ethical conflicts and ethical dilemmas, Colnerud 
(1995, in Lindén & Rådeström, 2008) contends that “The common denominator….is that 
the situation always includes a decision-making process for the psychologist contemplating 
how to solve the situation” (p. 2). Integral to an ethical dilemma, Colnerud (1995) 
continues, is a complex process of ethical decision-making “”where the appropriate course 
of action is not given or obvious and does not include one solution only” (p. 2). The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary (1982) defines the word “dilemma” as “a position that leaves only a 
choice between equally unwelcome possibilities” (p. 268); this gives rise to the common 
expression “on the horns of the dilemma” (p. 268). 
 
The foregoing observations suggest that at the core of any lived “ethical dilemma” lies a 
“multiply determined” (Kantrowitz, 2006) ethical decision-making process where both self-
interested as well as more beneficent motivations vie for behavioural expression. Central to 
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the preceding arguments is the notion that real-life “ethical dilemmas” subsume the 
subjective experience of conflict or of emotional tension aroused by having to make a 
decision from among apparently competing alternatives. For the purposes of this research 
study, I decided to accept real-life ethical dilemmas as defined objectively by professional 
ethics codes (APA, 2002; CPA, 2000; South African “Ethical Code of Conduct”, 2002), 
accepted categorisation systems (Pope & Vetter, 1992; Slack & Wassenaar, 1999; 
Wassenaar, 2002) or as subjectively construed by the therapist concerned as comprising an 
ethically problematic situation wherein the analytic task, attitude and setting (previously 
discussed in Chapter 3) were rendered vulnerable to compromise. This research study 
posited, however, that an additional criterion to be satisfied was that prospective research 
participants‟ subjective experience should reflect a sense of having been “on the horns of 
the dilemma” or of having felt torn between conflicting courses of action. Excluded from 
this research study, therefore, would be professionally problematic situations requiring an 
ethical decision where the therapist concerned had apparently experienced minimal 
psychological conflict and was evidently able to effect resolution in a reflective and 
emotionally appropriate manner.  
5.3. Searching for participants 
The search for suitable participants was arduous and time consuming. At the start of the 
research, the four local professional groups which focused on adult psychotherapy included 
the Self-Psychology Group, the South African Association of Jungian Analysts (SAAJA), 
the Cape Town Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (CTSPP) and the South African 
Institute for Psychotherapy (SAIP). Since I was a member of the latter two groups, I decided 
to begin my search by approaching the CTSPP and the SAIP; the membership consisted 
largely of clinical psychologists and object relations was firmly established as a primary 
theoretical orientation. 
 
To stimulate awareness and interest, I addressed several meetings of the different branches 
of the CTSPP and SAIP. I outlined the aims of the study, the research procedure, expected 
benefits and risks, time commitments and how confidentiality would be safeguarded. Polite 
interest was expressed but the general response seemed muted and yielded no volunteers. 
These early efforts were then followed up by posting letters to each of the combined 
membership (112 psychologists) of the two groups concerned. This was done to remind 
interested practitioners that the possibility of participating in the research study still existed 
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and to cover any psychologists who may have been absent at the initial meetings. Twelve 
psychologists working in local psychiatric facilities were additionally emailed with details 
of the proposed project. Several weeks passed in silence. This was broken at last by a single 
volunteer who, after outlining a troubling ethical dilemma in a preliminary phone call, 
agreed to become the first research participant. 
 
By this stage I was considering broadening my inquiry to psychoanalytic groups based in 
cities other than Cape Town. Exploring my predicament informally with a supportive 
colleague resulted in her suggesting that I should directly approach local clinicians reputed 
to be helpful and ask whether they were prepared to become involved in the study. To my 
relief, the strategy of “snowballing” (Strydom & Delport, 2002) or “the friend of a friend 
approach” (Kelly, 1989a, p. 384) finally broke the impasse and a network of potential 
interviewees began to emerge. 
 
Each time I spoke to a possible participant, I also asked whether they were aware of anyone 
else who might be willing to be interviewed. A demanding process of evaluating the 
suitability of potential participants and ethical dilemmas now arose. Twenty-five local 
psychologists were personally contacted by phone or by email. Some did not return my calls 
or emails. Others declined, saying that they were too busy, were eclectic in theoretical 
orientation or had had no experience of encountering ethical dilemmas in their clinical 
practice in recent years. Several dilemmas had occurred more than five years ago, thus 
contravening an inclusion criterion. Three participants volunteered suitable ethical 
dilemmas including collegial misconduct or eroticised countertransference involvement 
only to withdraw later, citing ambivalence or concerns about the possible negative impact of 
the research interviews on ongoing therapeutic relationships. Still other dilemmas proffered, 
but deemed unsuitable, included two practitioners‟ subjective experiences as former patients 
who had become sexually embroiled with local analysts; a third practitioner perceived 
himself as having broken the boundaries of the analytic frame by visiting an ill patient in 
hospital but considered that the decision was motivated by ethical and thoughtful regard for 
the best interests of the patient. Striking reactions that retrospectively again signalled that I 
was treading on sensitive research terrain included one clinician‟s refusal to participate on 
the grounds that I might “report” him. He then refused to refer me to other colleagues on the 
grounds that I might be equally inclined to “report” them! The stories of the six participants 
who were eventually selected encompassed a range of real-life ethical dilemmas. I felt 
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excited and hopeful that, after months of preparatory work and setbacks, the “real” research 
was about to begin! I started setting up the research interviews and concurrently worked on 
creating a semi-structured interviewing guide. 
5.4. Characteristics of selected research participants 
The six research participants consisted of three men and three women. Five agreed to 
participate after I had personally approached them and one was self-selected. All were 
white, middle-class and English speaking except for one whose first language was 
Afrikaans. Ages ranged from the late twenties to early fifties. Five participants were 
registered as clinical psychologists and one was an educational psychologist11. Object 
relations was described as practitioners‟ primary theoretical orientation; four participants 
additionally cited Self-Psychology and/or Jungian thinking as exerting a strong influence on 
their clinical practices. 
 
Work settings included private practice and hospital or clinic contexts. Two participants 
were in full-time and three worked part-time in private practice. One was employed in an 
educational institution. Post-qualifying clinical experience ranged from four to twelve years; 
four participants had six or more years experience in working within a broadly 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy framework. While most participants focused primarily on 
adult long-term psychotherapy, some work with couples and adolescents was also evident. 
Prior to the research interviews, I was slightly acquainted with all six research participants 
on a collegial basis.  
 
The use of professional resources is discussed later (See Chapter 7). The following 
summary outlines salient features of participants‟ ethics education, supervision and personal 
analysis as well as the type of ethical dilemma that was encountered in the context of the 
therapeutic space. All participants held a Masters degree and had trained between 1991 and 
1999 at local universities. Four participants‟ postgraduate training had included a formal 
coursework component on professional ethics while, in the remaining two Masters degrees, 
ethics education was described as either entirely absent or as having been taught on an 
informal basis only and as an adjunct to another taught course. The research participants had 
thus all trained before 2002. This is the date when the mandatory Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) system administered by the South African Professional Board for 
                                                 
11 All psychologists in South Africa are required to register in one of five registration categories; these include 
clinical, counselling, educational, industrial or research psychology.   
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Psychology stipulated that every practitioner is annually required to collect a specific 
number of points in professional ethics in order to maintain his or her registration (HPCSA, 
CPD Guidelines for Psychologists and Registered Counsellors, 2001). In general, 
participants expressed dissatisfaction with their postgraduate ethics training. Given that 
participants‟ evaluation of their graduate ethics coursework was largely negative and that 
continuing mandatory education had only recently been instituted, interviewees‟ formal 
ethics training prior to the research interviews in 2003 appeared to be relatively sparse and 
potentially lacking in relevance. 
 
When the ethical dilemmas arose, all six participants were in regular supervision and/or 
personal therapy. Four participants consulted five different supervisors whose theoretical 
orientation (barring one who adopted a principally problem-solving case management style) 
included Jungian, Self-Psychology and object relations approaches. The sample included 
two participants who received no supervision, of whom one remained apparently entirely 
professionally isolated throughout the duration of the dilemma concerned. Three 
interviewees were in Jungian analysis and three were not in personal therapy at the time of 
the dilemmas. A combined total of eight supervisors and personal analysts were consulted 
by five participants with regard to resolving the relevant dilemmas. 
 
Ethical dilemmas in this research study were assigned to categories based on the South 
African categorisation system developed by Wassenaar (2002) as well as Pope and Vetter‟s 
(1992) earlier design. Primary dilemmas described included confidentiality issues, non-
sexual dual role relationships, collegial misconduct and child abuse interventions. 
Participants‟ struggle to resolve the various dilemmas ranged in duration from 
approximately two weeks to three years. At the time of the research, four dilemmas (two of 
which were still current) remained unresolved after one year. While day-to-day case records 
regarding patients‟ therapeutic process were available, no corresponding documentation 
apparently existed which detailed research participants‟ subjective and countertransference 
responses to the core ethical dilemma. 
 
All participants expressed an interest in participating in the research interviews. Preliminary 
reservations included anxiety about the perceived “messiness” of professional interventions. 
Prospective interviews were generally, however, viewed as a valuable opportunity for 
further reflection on participants‟ individual engagement with real-life ethical dilemmas as 
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well as providing a chance to contribute more generally to professional knowledge 
regarding ethics in psychoanalytic practice. 
6. GATHERING DATA: THE INTERVIEWING PROCESS 
Open-ended interviews comprise an interpretive research approach which is used to access 
participants‟ lived experiences and feelings about their everyday world.  The interviewer 
accordingly “creates an environment of openness and trust within which the interviewee is 
able to authentically express her or himself” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 153). 
Since researcher and researched are regarded as co-inquirers, the meanings that are “created 
in the interview are treated as co-constructed between the interviewer and interviewee” 
(Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 153). This implies that the emergent interview text is 
not simply a reflection of the lone participant‟s “reality” but remains “always a product of 
the relationship between interviewer and interviewee” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 45). 
Reciprocal ways in which the research pair simultaneously influence one another may in 
addition be “initially … out of the awareness of the parties involved, [hence] scrutiny is an 
absolutely necessary part of social science research” (Berg & Smith, 1988, in Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000, p. 33). 
 
I have previously discussed the need to set up a reflective research space wherein to 
scrutinise subjective or countertransference responses. I was aware that my taken-for-
granted assumptions would be implicated not only in the interpretation of the research 
material but also in the very questions I elected to ask in the interviews and in the answers 
and participant responses I chose to pursue.  Planning for the interviewing process 
foregrounded a new aspect of the iterative cycle of “reflective reflexivity” (Addison, 1999, 
p. 152). This involved preparing a research journal in which to enter free-form “jottings” or 
“memos” (Charmaz, in Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 44) after every research interview. 
These eventual scribblings were to prove descriptive rather than analytical in character, 
drawing my attention back to fleeting feelings, embodied responses, awkward moments, 
off-the-record opening and closing remarks and seeming inconsistencies arising in the 
research encounter as well as in participants‟ stories of real-life dilemmas. 
 
Preparations for interviewing also included developing several drafts of a semi-structured 
“Interview Guide”. The final version (see Appendix B) was broadly based on professional 
literature pertaining to ethical decision-making, the three preliminary research questions and 
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a helpful series of interview questions designed by Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller and 
Argyris (1989) to elicit stories of real-life moral conflict and choice. The Interview Guide 
allowed freedom to follow up unexpected events (for example, when speaking of feeling 
overwhelmed by trauma cases at work, one participant held his throat) but it also provided 
the structure needed to ensure in-depth steady coverage of key topics. This combination of 
flexibility and structure was aided by my thoroughly memorising the Guide prior to the 
research interviews. Whatever digressions occurred, I felt reasonably confident that I would 
remember the interview format and would retain the overall focus and direction of the 
interview concerned.  
 
Participants were offered the choice as to where the interviews should be conducted. 
Peaceful every-day settings chosen included clinicians‟ consulting rooms and my own 
consulting room. The testing of the Interview Guide in two pilot interviews introduced 
structural changes to the interviewing process. The first pilot interview was completed in a 
single session. Originally discussed in a preliminary phone call, the presenting dilemma 
reflected the therapist‟s concerns about social contact with an ex-patient‟s significant other. 
In the pilot interview, however, the therapist‟s attention switched unpredictably to focus 
instead on an entirely new and painful dual role relationship. This unanticipated 
development in a first-time situation left me, as the following “jotting” indicates, unsure of 
how to respond. Thus in my research journal I wrote that “there seemed to be a lot of 
involvement between us at times … at others, I felt „flat‟, as though I were missing 
important clues associated with this dual relationship….its broken boundaries and sense of 
threat … am left with feeling that [the participant] did not find the thoughts she was perhaps 
looking for … we didn‟t get to the heart of things ...”.  
 
The researcher and the researched may be construed “as anxious, defended subjects ... both 
will be subject to projections and introjections of ideas and feelings coming from the other 
person” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 45). The seemingly unaccountable confusion and 
anxiety evident in the first pilot interview left me dissatisfied. A different interviewing 
strategy appeared to be needed, one that would allow for the notion of a defended research 
pair and that would afford an opportunity for interim reflection, discussion, replaying the 
tape and the formulation of specific questions directed at following up and clarifying new, 
ambiguous or contradictory material. Renegotiating the research contract with the next 
participant, I experimented in the second pilot interview with two sessions, each of one-and-
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a-half hours, which were separated by an interval of approximately one week. This structure 
was adopted for the remainder of the research interviews. The extended period of 
interviewing seemed to foster a greater sense of familiarity and trust, often providing a basis 
in the second session for deepened interaction and the emergence of new and significant 
research material.  
 
Every interview commenced with informal chatting, setting up the tape recorder and 
organising tea. These apparently simple tasks helped both the researcher and the researched 
to relax and to establish some preliminary sense of rapport. The Interview Guide similarly 
opened with relatively non-threatening, introductory questions eliciting information about 
participants‟ registration category, work setting, supervision, personal therapy and prior 
ethics education. The foregoing prelude provided an essential relational context for the later 
elaboration of troubling dilemmas and helped to build up mutual interest in one another and 
in the topic at hand. This was then succeeded by the first open-ended “grand tour question” 
(Miller & Crabtree, 1999b, p. 97) which was derived from Pope and Vetter‟s (1992) original 
study (See Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1. “Grand Tour” questions from an interpretive study on psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists‟ ethical decision-making practices (adapted from Crabtree & Miller, 
1999b). 
 
The Interview Guide thus essentially consisted of three main “grand tour” and associated, 
follow-up questions inviting participants to tell extended stories about their feelings, 
thoughts and efforts to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas. A relatively consistent 
interviewing pattern gradually evolved wherein the use of prompts and probes (Miller & 
Crabtree, 1999b, p. 98) seemed to encourage the flow and articulation of as yet largely 
unspoken narratives. The first interview focused primarily on eliciting in-depth, first-hand 
accounts of ethical dilemmas encountered in the therapeutic space and of participants‟ 
subjective responses to these. The second interview, often more challenging and 
emotionally demanding in tenor, included following up “tailor-made” questions (Hollway & 
1. Can you describe as fully as possible an ethically challenging or troubling dilemma that 
you‟ve encountered in practice over the past 24 months where you weren‟t sure what you 
should do? 
2. Can you describe in as much detail as possible how you processed this dilemma and what 
professional resources you used to help you? 
3. Can you describe what your final decision was and how you implemented it? 
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Jefferson, 2000, p. 43) and tentative interpretations of emerging research material. 
Interviewees‟ everyday ethical decision-making practices and their use of professional 
resources were also explored.  
 
Research participants are not expected to be fully aware of the meanings of their 
motivations, feelings and actions (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Of interest, therefore, were 
not only interviewees‟ conscious, rational thoughts and explanations but also unfamiliar 
descriptions of their embodied responses to real-life dilemmas. This feature of the 
interviewing process aimed at accessing “that [unsanitized] aspect of the person‟s 
experience and understanding that was lived before it was reflected upon” (Kelly, 1999a, p. 
392). However, earlier taken-for-granted assumptions that interviews would additionally 
yield data demonstrating the thoughtful transformation of initially confused and disjointed 
subjective experiences began to unravel. Kelly (1994) observes that narrative smoothing 
refers to that “process whereby the inchoate and fragmented moments of life….are 
transformed into sequential, coherent, unambiguous accounts of experience” (p. 56). 
Welling up by contrast in the context of the research interviews were thickly textured stories 
still dense with participants‟ descriptions of apparently unthought feelings, fantasies, 
memories, discordant inner moral “voices” and experiences of disappointment, disillusion 
and professional isolation. This spontaneous countertransference saturation of myself 
generated by participants‟ recounting of their lived struggles and often primitive affects was 
eventually to act as a principal source of information concerning my theoretical 
understanding of the unconscious irrational dimension of ethical decision-making as it 
transpires in analytic space.  
 
Post-interview contact consisted of five to ten minutes which were mostly spent in sharing 
mutual impressions of the foregoing interview. In contrast to the intensity of the research 
interviews, closure to some extent ushered in a “cooling off” period and permitted me to 
express gratitude for participants‟ very considerable expenditure of time and effort.  
7. TRANSCRIBING THE RESEARCH INTERVIEWS 
The eleven recorded research interviews were transcribed over six months with the help of a 
trustworthy and reliable assistant with whom I had worked for several years. I was 
confronted at the outset as to whether to transcribe the entire interview verbatim or only 
selected aspects of the conversation. Using the concept of the hermeneutic circle, I 
considered that the multiple meanings of the different parts of the conversation were only 
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explicable in the context of the global meaning of the entire interview and, reciprocally, that 
interpretation of the whole transcript was contingent on a deepening understanding of its 
parts. As Kvale (1996) argues, when psychological interpretations are to be made, even 
seemingly insignificant “hm‟s”, pauses or digressions may well be relevant for later 
analysis. Despite costs and the length of time entailed, I decided to transcribe the interviews 
in their entirety rather than prematurely to attempt to discern which parts of the recorded 
interviews were significant and which superfluous.  
 
The translation of oral discussion into written text remains, however, fraught with 
difficulties; not least of these is the tendency to regard the transcript as a rock-solid, reliable 
representation of the “reality” of the original research encounter. Kvale (1996) contends that 
on the contrary taped interview transcripts are frozen “decontextualised conversations” (p. 
167), stripped of the temporal, spatial, visual and social dimensions which confer immediate 
meaning to face-to-face conversations. Although not exhaustive, I have attempted to restore 
a sense of the flow, the contextual detail and emotional nuances of the lived research 
encounter by indicating in the text repetitions, broken sentences, emphases in intonations, 
non-linguistic expressions including pauses, silences, pointing and the use of fillers such as 
“ja‟s” and “hm‟s”. 
 
Repeated playing of the taped conversations facilitated checking the reliability of the 
transcribed texts. Re-reading my rough “jottings”, listening to the recorded conversations 
and scrutinising the transcripts also helped to re-immerse me back into the intimate 
atmosphere of the original research interviews. The “emotional topography” of the 
numerous transcripts became ever more familiar. I began to understand more about what 
interviewees‟ engagement with real-world ethical quandaries had individually meant to 
them. At the same time, I increasingly used psychoanalytic theory to help construct a 
generic account of participants‟ engagement with real-life dilemmas. In interpretive 
research, there exists “no clear point when data collection stops and analysis begins” (Terre 
Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 139). In effect, data analysis in this research study was instilled at 
the very start of the ongoing iterative process of conducting, transcribing and interpreting 
the research interviews. 
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8. DEVELOPING AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT: DATA ANALYSIS 
Interpretive analytic styles may be located on a continuum ranging from quasi-statistical 
styles to immersion/crystallisation styles (Miller & Crabtree, 1999a). Situated at the latter 
end of the continuum, the “editing organising” style (Miller & Crabtree, 1999a, p. 21) and 
aspects of an “immersion/crystallization” style (Borkan, 1999, p. 179) were used in this 
research inquiry for entering and analysing the data. The latter “organizing styles” of data 
analysis are congruent with hermeneutics as well as with the assumptions and practices of 
grounded theory (Addison, 1999; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), a 
qualitative research tradition which is summarised by Kelly (1999b) “as a system for 
developing theoretical accounts whilst keeping close to the phenomenological „ground‟” (p. 
405). Beginning with the particulars of participants‟ lived experiences and building slowly 
up towards theoretically informed generalisations, the adoption of an “idiographic” (Smith, 
1995) stance towards the data helped to maintain a circular relationship between “ground” 
and theory in which each perspective informed the other. Kelly (1999b) maintains that 
“theory which is not grounded, and description which is not theorised stand in danger of 
being alienated from the advantages of the opposite perspective” (p. 406). This suggests, as 
argued earlier, that a satisfactory interpretive account embraces both experience-near, 
contextually-derived as well as experience-distant, theoretically led perspectives.  
 
Integral to the data analysis process were two broad movements comprised of “vertical” and 
“horizontal” passes (Borkan, 1999, p. 186) of the data. The six interview texts were initially 
individually analysed “vertically” and in detail from beginning to end. “Horizontal” passes 
of the data increasingly shifted the focus away from local descriptions towards comparing 
similarities and differences within, between and across emerging codes, themes and 
categories of experience. Contextually derived individual transcripts were thus gradually 
transformed into a trans-situational, theoretically informed account of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists‟ efforts to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas in the therapeutic space. 
While the latter account remains arguably well grounded in the data and draws extensively 
from grounded theory methodology, it offers a limited conceptual analysis of research 
participants‟ lived experiences rather than the provision of formal grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 1995). For the purposes of discussion, analysis of the data is presented in the 
form of the following five steps. Rather than a formulaic procedure, the recursive process 
involved may be likened more to “a multileveled roller-coaster than [to] a [linear] staircase” 
(Borkan, 1999, p. 183). 
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8.1. Step 1: Reflexivity and Countertransference 
The most critical tool in interpretive research is arguably the researcher‟s self which 
comprises “the primary instrument for both collecting and analysing the data” (Terre 
Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 126). The need for a reflective research space has previously 
been discussed. Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) likewise observe that it is logically 
impossible for the researcher to approach the work of data analysis as a “true tabula rasa” 
(p. 137) without reference to prior conceptual frameworks and existing literature. From a 
constructivist grounded theory perspective, the latter authors accordingly assert that the 
generating of theoretical accounts presupposes “a constant two-way dialectical process or 
“flip-flop” between data and the researcher‟s [own] conceptualizations” (p. 135). 
 
The data in this study were consistently filtered through the lens of psychoanalytic theories 
and models. The latter thus acted as pre-existing “sensitizing concepts” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 
515) or “points of departure to look at….and to think analytically about the data” (Charmaz, 
1995, p. 32). Theoretical sensitivities may, however, be “vision-blinkering” as well as 
“vision-creating”, telling “us where to look at the same time as, potentially, keeping us from 
seeing” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 135). Construction of an ongoing reflective research 
space appeared to help safeguard the emerging account from being skewed by researcher 
bias or from “taking off on theoretical flights of fancy” (Charmaz, 1995, p. 37). Theoretical 
sensitivities in the form of psychoanalytic concepts and models were by contrast carefully 
evaluated in the context of the reflective space for their “fit” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 
139) with the data and, if appropriate, were integrated into the evolving account. Brenner‟s 
(1985) notion of “countertransference as compromise formation”, for example, was 
examined and set aside as its apparently exclusive focus on the individual analyst‟s 
intrapsychic dynamics failed “to fit” the data. Hence Brenner‟s theoretical formulations 
appeared unable to accommodate the interpersonal dimension critical to understanding the 
unconscious interaction between the original therapeutic dyads and research participants‟ 
ensuing charged and seemingly irrational responses to lived ethical dilemmas. 
8.2. Step 2: Immersion and Open Coding 
This entailed gathering preliminary fieldwork observations, theoretical and supervision 
notes as well as the transcribed interview texts. Implementing a line-by-line reading and 
coding process, I immersed myself in the raw data and in studying participants‟ stories or 
lived worlds once again. Charmaz (1995) writes that “unlike quantitative coding that 
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[involves] applying preconceived codes….qualitative grounded theory coding means 
creating the codes as you study….interact with….and ask questions of [the data]” (p. 37).  
 
Using an “editing organizing style” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999a, p. 23), I entered the data of 
the first transcript, subsequently completing serial readings of the entire body of text. I 
underlined everything that appeared pertinent to the research objective of exploring and 
understanding participants‟ subjective and countertransference responses to real-life ethical 
dilemmas. This “open coding” (Charmaz, 1995, 2000) resulted in fourteen flexible 
preliminary codes. “Pre-reflective feelings”, for example, consisted of multiple underscored 
text segments which collectively began to suggest that ethical dilemmas may often be 
apprehended not by ethical reasoning processes but by the practitioner‟s predominantly 
physical sensations of shock, excitement, anxiety, “sickness”, “sinking”, “blankness” or 
sleeplessness. Behavioural interactions evident in the transcripts were likewise treated “as a 
type of text” (Addison, 1999a, p. 153) to be analysed and interpreted. Hence I marked and 
coded unexpected nonverbal events such as prolonged silences, tearfulness or an 
interviewee‟s holding of his throat as instances of a provisional open code termed “The 
slippery slide of countertransference”. Of particular interest were “Contradictions, gaps and 
anomalies”, an open code pertaining to “fractures” in the data (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, 
p. 70) where participants‟ manifest ethical stance appeared to be unexpectedly dislodged by 
the appearance of discordant verbal expressions or behaviour. Stated aspirational ethical 
principles, for example, were often seemingly unconsciously contradicted by research 
participants‟ sustained engagement with apparently self-serving therapeutic interventions.  
 
Charmaz (2000) observes that “memo-writing” serves as an “intermediate step between 
coding and the first draft of the completed analysis” (p.517). Unconstrained by the demand 
of having “to fit” the data, “memoing” may be likened to “free writing” (Charmaz, 1995, 
p.44). This mode of expression, without thought for the public, frees the researcher to 
explore processes, patterns, assumptions or concepts subsumed under codes and “to start 
digging into implicit, unstated and condensed meanings” (Charmaz, 1995, p. 43). The open 
code “Professional consultations and contacts”, for example, sparked scribbled memos 
noting my own reluctance to expose my not understanding the many implicit meanings 
inherent to participants‟ descriptions of wrestling with everyday ethical dilemmas. This 
spurred reflection on whether participants‟ similar avoidance on occasion of available 
professional resources was an unconscious strategy designed to shield the professional self 
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from narcissistic wounding incurred by exposing “messy dilemmas” to the fantasied 
judgmental or punitive gaze of colleagues and professional organisations. 
 
These early phases of open coding and initial memoing have been likened by Henwood and 
Pidgeon (2000) “to stepping deeper into a maze, a confusing place that may generate 
considerable uncertainty and anxiety. During the later phases of analysis, suitable routes out 
of this maze have to be found” (p. 140). 
8.3. Step 3: Description of Dilemmas and Construction of Reading Guide 
This step involved generating a clear description of each of the six real-life dilemmas as 
well as establishing a “Reading Guide” (Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller & Agyris, 1989) 
through which the data was read. Detailed raw data provided by personal interviews may be 
further enriched by contextualising the phenomenon of interest, “adding a description of the 
situation, the interaction, the [interviewee‟s] affect and [the researcher‟s] perception of how 
the interview went” (Charmaz, 1995, p. 33). The six vignettes (See beginning of Chapter 5) 
were intended to make the participants and the interview process “come alive” (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000, p. 70), orienting the reader to the drama of the individual stories and 
providing an overview of the main relationships, conflicts, chronological developments and 
professional as well as legal and organisational structures within which the dilemmas were 
embedded. No attempt was made in crafting the vignettes “to iron out inconsistencies, 
contradictions and puzzles” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 70). Rather participants‟ 
constructions of the evolution and resolution of ethical dilemmas raised challenging 
questions about the potential role played by unrecognised emotional pressures on the 
processes of ethical judgment and intervention. Using the typologies proposed by 
Wassenaar (2002) and Pope and Vetter (1992), formal coding of the presenting ethical 
dilemmas was also completed at this stage. 
 
The generating of fourteen flexible open codes and six vignettes represented initial ways of 
thinking about, reorganising and “fracturing the data” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 521). An 
analytical device was now required that would help shift the research endeavour further 
along the interpretive continuum, away from individual anecdotes and towards the 
identification of common features, key patterns, themes and conceptual categories. 
Implementation in this study of the Reading Guide method appeared to comprise a useful 
analytical strategy that aided thematic and theoretical development both within as well as 
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trans-situationally across contexts. Kelly (1994) writes that “It is an important principle of 
phenomenological as well as hermeneutic research that the data does not speak without 
being asked questions” (p. 78). Reading and listening guides hence offer to guide the reader-
listener through the text, extracting specific text segments that appear salient to the 
provision of “answers” that are central to the research endeavour (Brown & Gilligan, 1991; 
Brown, Debold, Tappan & Gilligan, 1991; Brown et al., 1989; Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg 
& Bertsch, 2003). In a series of multiple readings, the reading or listening guide questions 
are put to the text one by one. Each question acts as a “different interpretive lens” designed 
“to amplify”(Brown & Gilligan, 1991, p. 32) salient moral “voices”, beliefs, processes, 
events and relationships that sound in the story told by the participant.  
 
The Reading Guide questions constructed for this study (See Figure 2 below) “crystallized” 
(Borkan, 1999, p. 182) after repeatedly delving into the interview transcripts, struggling to 
make sense of participants‟ subjective experiences and sifting though the original research 
questions, new questions that had arisen in the course of data collection and unanticipated 
questions suggested by the newly created open codes. Over twelve preliminary Reading 
Guide questions were initially generated; these were revised to ascertain which were 
redundant and which could be subsumed under others. The emergent list of seven Reading 
Guide questions reflected an interplay between deductive and inductive approaches to the 
analysis of the data. Some questions accordingly reflected the influence of theoretical 
sensitivities whereas others were principally derived from the data themselves and were 
closer to the phenomenological ground of participants‟ lived experience. The Reading 
Guide thus continued to deploy both arcs of the hermeneutic circle “[from] particular to 
general and general to particular … [fostering] … an interpretation that accounts both for 
contexts and across contexts” (Kelly, 1999b, p. 413). 
8.4. Step 4: Application of Reading Guide and Construction of Master Themes 
The Reading Guide questions were written up on sheets of paper as seven provisional 
headings. Photocopies were then made of all transcripts. Applying the Reading Guide to the 
first transcript, the text was read and searched for meaningful “answers” in the form of 
processes, conflicts, contradictions, relationships, stated values, events and moral “voices”. 
The first Reading Guide question (see Figure 2 below), for example, asking what ethical 
principles the participant considered central to his/her everyday practices, was addressed to 
the initial interview transcript. Textual segments deemed to hold a common thread and to 
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constitute possible “answers” were marked in colour, cut out from the photocopied pages, 
grouped together and pasted in a “cluster” under the provisional heading concerned.  
 
Each cut out segment of text was carefully marked, indicating from which interview the 
excerpt had been extracted and including the relevant page and line number. A segment 
might be labelled, for instance, as Interv. 1, p. 20, 43-45. This labelling ensured that any 
particular segment of raw text could easily be accessed, compared with other segments and 
replaced back into the context of the original transcript. The latter labelling system was 
retained for all interview quotes and verbatim material appearing in chapters 5-8.  
 
Regarding the first interview transcript, the grouping and labelling process generated 
“clusters” of colour coded text fragments. Each “cluster”, comprised of many text segments 
and containing a range of responses or possible “answers”, pertained to one of the seven 
Reading Guide questions. Where the same text segment appeared to be pertinent to more 
than one Reading Guide question, it was marked accordingly and allocated to the additional 
“clusters” concerned. The cut-and-pasted text fragments under each overarching question 
were then read, compared with one another and explored for connections, patterns, 
processes, similarities and differences. Out of this predominantly “vertical” pass of the data, 
a rough and tentative list of themes and sub-themes emerged for the first interview.  
 
The seven Reading Guide questions were subsequently systematically applied to the 
remaining interview transcripts. For each Reading Guide question, therefore, six clusters of 
answers were derived from each of the six interview transcripts. The emphasis shifted from 
analysing single interview transcripts, one by one, to exploring more broadly between and 
across clusters of text fragments for superordinate or master themes that subsumed both 
preliminary open codes as well as tentative lists of themes that had emerged in the earlier 
course of “vertical passes” (Borkan, 1999, p.186) of the data.  
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READING GUIDE QUESTIONS MASTER THEMES CATEGORIES FINAL INDEX OF FOUR CORE 
CATEGORIES 
1 What does the participant consider his/her core 
ethical principles and values to be and how does 
s/he describe living these out in the context of 
the real-life ethical dilemma? 
 
Guiding principles … I walk 
with…(Interv.5, p.166, 40-43) 
 
Avowed vs lived values 
Avowed vs lived values 
2 What does the participant perceive the core 
ethical dilemma to be and how was its presence 
first identified? 
Shock….definitely “shock” is the word 
(Interv.2, p.44, 28-39) 
Pre-reflective identification of core 
ethical dilemma 
The countertransference dimension of real-life 
ethical dilemmas 
3 
 
 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
 
d) 
In the context of the participant‟s lived dilemma, 
what salient: 
 
feelings, somatic responses, observations and 
subjective concerns are described? 
 
images, metaphors, fantasies and childhood 
memories are generated? 
 
inner ethical “voices” does the participant “hear” 
and what are they “saying”? 
 
images, metaphors and processes pertaining to 
thinking or reflective experiences are described? 
Who are we in relationship together? 
(Interv.4, p.124, 5) 
 
Feelings, somatic responses, observations 
and subjective concerns 
 
Images, metaphors, fantasies and childhood 
memories 
 
A multiplicity of “voices” 
 
 
Like a pressure cooker with no 
outlet….things just accumulate (Interv.6, 
p.229, 23-24) 
Transference- countertransference 
processes generated in the presence of 
real-life ethical dilemmas 
4 What descriptions were offered by the 
participant of the relationships that existed 
between him/herself and the professional 
resources that were available to him/her? 
 
It‟s….difficult to reach out…(Interv.1, p.14, 
46) 
Absolution, penance or 
excommunication: therapist 
perceptions of professional resources 
Absolution, penance or excommunication: therapist 
perceptions of professional resources 
5 What subjective experiences does the participant 
describe in relation to the ethical decision-
making process? 
Putting [conflict] out of….mind (Interv.1, 
p.10, 23) 
 
 
 
Ethical decision-making in the context 
of the therapeutic space 
Ethical decision-making in the therapeutic space: 
Towards a Psychoanalytic model 
6 With reference to the paranoid-schizoid (PS) and 
depressive (D) positions1, how does the 
participant‟s countertransference responses and 
descriptions of ethical thinking and decision-
making reflect the dialectical interplay between 
them? 
 
Oscillating between the PS and D positions 
7 How did the participant appear to perceive me 
and how did I in turn experience him/her? 
Transference-countertransference 
experiences in the research encounter 
Transference- countertransference 
processes generated in the context of 
the research encounter 
 
Figure 2: Development of Reading Guide questions into master themes and core categories. 
1
Steiner (1992) observes that a dynamic relationship and continuous fluctuation exists between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions which Bion (1963) captures by the notation PS  D
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Inducing codes, clusters, themes and sub-themes had the effect of allowing familiar text fragments 
which were originally viewed in a linear, chronological sequence to suddenly be brought together 
in unexpected ways. This “winnowing process” (Seidman, 1991, p. 89) potentially opens up “a 
fresh view on the data”, fostering the identification of “finer nuances of meaning not captured by 
[the] original…possibly crude, coding system” (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 144). Thematic 
development now entailed repeatedly implementing “horizontal passes” (Borkan, 1999, p. 186) of 
the data. Using grounded theory‟s “constant comparative method” (Addison, 1999; Charmaz, 
1995, 2000; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003), all six clusters of answers pertaining to each Reading 
Guide question were systematically read, scrutinised and compared in detail with one another. This 
process entailed comparing one participant‟s experiences, thoughts, values and actions with 
another; comparing the same participant‟s experiences but at different points in time and 
comparing themes and sub-themes that had already been identified in the initial analysis of the 
interview transcripts. 
 
At this stage, I sought to establish a clear list of “master themes” (Smith, 1995, p.19) or “focused 
codes” which captured and synthesised earlier codes but were “less open-ended and more 
directed” (Charmaz, 1995, p.40). I discovered that “in vivo coding” (Addison, 1999; Charmaz, 
1995; Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999) or using a participant‟s actual words was often successful in 
succinctly naming the essential quality of themes emerging between and across the different 
clusters. Repeated “horizontal passes” of the data pertaining to the use of professional resources, 
for example, suggested that one participant‟s sentence, “It‟s difficult to reach out”, apparently 
reflected not only an experience particular to a single interviewee but identified a superordinate 
theme cutting across the various clusters and discrete interview texts. Actively highlighting what 
was happening in the data, further in vivo codes or master themes followed including, for instance, 
“Guiding principles…I walk with”, “Shock…shock is the word” and “Who are we in relationship 
together?” (See “Master Themes”, Figure 2 above).  
 
I was particularly interested in “amplifying” (Brown & Gilligan, 1991, p. 45) participants‟ several 
voices regarding reflective experiences and the relational contexts (or absence of these) in which 
that thinking had occurred. Listening Guides systematically “guide the listener in tuning into the 
story being told on multiple levels … [hence this method] is distinctly different from traditional 
methods….in that one listens to, rather than categorizes or quantifies, the text of the interview” 
(Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg & Bertsch, 2003, p. 159). In addition to breaking the text down into 
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colour coded clusters, I therefore experimented with creating “I-poems”12 (Gilligan et al., 2003) 
which “press the researcher to listen to the participant‟s first-person voice … to hear how this 
person speaks about him-or herself” (p. 162). Rather than constructing formal “poetry”, creation of 
the “I-Poems” was used as a supplementary analytical device and represented an instance of what 
Terre Blanche and Kelly (1999) describe as “playing around with ways of structuring [the research 
material] until you feel that you can give a good account of what is going on in [the] data” (p. 
144). 
 
Central to the six “I-poems” constructed (see Appendix C for examples) were striking images and 
metaphors which vividly conveyed research participants‟ struggle to think about disturbing and 
emotionally saturated ethical dilemmas. Examination of each “I-poem” and comparing one 
“poem” with another helped to distil the “in vivo” codes “Like a pressure cooker with no outlet” 
and “Putting [conflict] out of…mind”. The latter phrases apparently reflected a common 
dimension of participants‟ individual experiences pertaining to thinking and to ethical decision-
making respectively, emerging as recurring themes within, between and across the pertinent 
“clusters” of text.  
 
Construction of the “I-poems” raised sharply contested debates regarding the role of theoretical 
literature in grounded theory studies. Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) comment, for example, that 
classical grounded theorists perceive the use of professional literature at the start of a project as 
potentially inhibiting “open-ended, exploratory research activities” (p. 138) and as compromising 
the researcher‟s capacity “to maintain sensitivity to relevance in the data” (p. 138). The latter 
authors argue, however, that this absolutist stance could be helpfully modified by adopting “a 
more discriminating strategy” (p. 138). The early use of literature may arguably be employed “to 
promote clarity in thinking about concepts” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 138) and, as Cutliffe 
(2000) remarks, to help the researcher “reach conceptual density, enhance the richness of concept 
development, and subsequently the process of theory development” (p. 138). 
 
The literature review conducted in the early phases of this research project covered key studies and 
seminal articles on ethical codes, ethical dilemmas and decision-making models. Construction of 
the “I-poems” in the course of an intensive data analysis phase initiated a fresh round of reading 
and thinking about the phenomenon of countertransference enactments and about the role of 
                                                 
12 Construction of an “I-Poem” involves underlining the “I” pronoun within the selected text, the associated verb and 
significant accompanying words. These phrases are then sequentially arranged on separate lines in the same order as 
they appear in the original text, hopefully providing “the listener with the opportunity to attend….to the sounds, 
rhythms and shifts [of meaning] in [the participant‟s] usages of “I” in his or her narrative” (Gilligan et al., 2003, p. 
163). 
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containment in the creation and recovery of a reflective space. New links to relevant theoretical 
literature were generated, including, for example, Bion‟s (1962a, 1962b) theory of thinking and his 
container/contained model as well as Britton‟s (1998) notion of “triangular psychic space” (p. 45). 
Similarly, only in the process of writing up the final interpretive account did the scattered 
descriptions participants offered of experiencing themselves as “wounded healers” impress 
themselves upon my attention, leading to renewed engagement with, and reconfiguring of, the 
traditional Jungian “wounded-healer” paradigm from an object relations perspective. Congruent 
with the iterative, cyclical nature of data collection and data analysis, I likewise adopted a similar 
stance with regard to the use of the professional literature. Hence I implemented throughout the 
overlapping phases of the research endeavour “repeated cycles wherein the researcher goes to 
theory, looks at the data, [then again] goes to theory” (Borkan, 1999, p. 191). 
 
Breaking the whole body of text down into multiple “clusters” of colour coded textual fragments 
and repeatedly implementing “vertical” and “horizontal” passes of the data laid the basis for the 
establishment of a clear and coherent list of “in vivo” codes or master themes. The transition from 
“Reading Guide” questions to selected master themes is illustrated in Figure 2 above. 
8.5. Step 5: Construction of an Index of Core Conceptual Categories 
Immersion in the interview transcripts, open coding, the systematic application of “Reading” and 
“Listening” guides and the identification of “clusters” of text segments comprised the groundwork 
necessary for the further transformation of master themes into a single index of core categories. 
Considered by Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) to fully tax the imagination and interpretive skills of 
the researcher, the latter process is “nevertheless disciplined by the requirement that … [the] 
categories generated should fit (provide a recognizable description of) the data” (p. 139). 
Subsuming subordinate categories, the final index of four categories (See Figure 2 above) included 
“Avowed vs lived values”; “The countertransference dimension of real-life ethical dilemmas”; 
“Absolution, penance or excommunication: therapist perceptions of professional resources” and 
“On the horns of a dilemma: ethical decision-making in the therapeutic space”. 
 
Intuitive “crystallization” (Borkan, 1999) of the latter four core categories marked the decisive 
point of exit from the earlier “maze” of memos, codes, questions, “clusters” and constant 
comparisons. Hence it was at this stage that “in vivo” codes or master themes were raised from 
descriptive higher-order labels to the level of comprising “theoretically meaningful resources” 
(Henwood & Pidgoen, 2003, p. 148) or conceptual categories that appeared to have particular 
significance for explicating the data concerned. This study did not reach the grounded theory stage 
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of “theoretical sampling” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2000; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003) 
which entails returning to the field to collect additional but increasingly selective data “for the 
purpose of developing [and refining] the researcher‟s emerging theory” (Charmaz, 1995, p. 45). 
However, the final index of core categories, from which are derived the titles for the following 
four chapters, hopefully constitutes a substantive framework for organising and developing a 
conceptually rich account of participants‟ discovery of and efforts to resolve lived ethical 
dilemmas. 
9. RETROSPECTIVE THOUGHTS ON THE DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS  
The foregoing five steps of data analysis appeared to reveal a “darker” aspect of the research 
process. In this respect, Miller and Crabtree‟s (1999c) portrayal of qualitative analysis as a 
creative, exciting, “exhilarating big dance of interpretation” (p. 138) between interpreters and texts 
may be too sanguine a metaphor. By contrast, Seidman (1991) refers to a “dark side” of 
interpreting and assigning meaning to interview texts wherein the researcher may “lose confidence 
in….[sorting] out what is important….and [may] feel considerable doubt about what [s/he] is 
doing” (p. 90). 
 
Rather than participating in “a big dance”, I experienced myself as unexpectedly and unwillingly 
pulled into a turbulent relationship with texts that were suffused with participants‟ repeated 
expressions of anger, anxiety, disillusion, distress and confusion. Kvale (1996) observes that, from 
a hermeneutic perspective, the particular text under consideration asserts its own autonomous 
meaning. In this study the data, pertaining to individuals who were both professional peers and 
trusting interviewees, unambiguously appeared to insist on the “darker” or less edifying aspects of 
countertransference phenomena which were apparently revived in the charged atmosphere of 
emotionally saturated ethical dilemmas. Since successive readings of the interview transcripts and 
multiple clusters of text fragments failed to persuade the latter to assume a more conciliatory or 
genial aspect, I felt submerged for considerable lengths of time beneath a mass of seemingly 
unprocessed and hostile data.  
 
When the researcher allows the text to affect her, Brown, Debold, Tappan and Gilligan (1991) 
suggest that “a process of connection begins between [the participant‟s] feelings and thoughts and 
the feelings and thoughts of the reader ... so that … [the latter] ... begins to learn … about [the 
participant], about herself, and about the world they share … thus relationship or connection, 
rather than blurring perspective or diminishing judgment, signifies an opening of self to other, 
creating a channel for information, an avenue to knowledge” (p. 41). The initially conflicted 
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relationship between myself and the interview texts was gradually modified through the mediation 
and assistance offered by collegial discussion, supervision and the professional literature. A 
calmer, more reflective stance ensued wherein I found myself freer to think about participants‟ 
intense reactions to ethical dilemmas and my corresponding reactions to the related interview 
texts. Using the medium of my own responses, “like a clinician who identifies her 
countertransference….to her client” (Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg & Bertsch, p. 161), I slowly 
began to formulate the possible origins and interpersonal dimension of participants‟ powerful 
affects and to apprehend the roles these potentially played in ethical decision-making practices. 
The latter formulations represent an elaboration of the final four core categories identified and are 
central to the following discussion (See Chapter 5-8) on the psychoanalytic understanding of 
ethical decision-making as it transpires in analytic space.  
10. EVALUATING THE INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT 
This chapter opened by posing four preliminary research questions. Efforts to discover and to 
create satisfying answers continued throughout the writing up of this study. Traditional standards 
of validity (“the degree to which the research conclusions are sound”) and reliability (“the degree 
to which the results are repeatable”) (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 1999, p. 61-63) were eschewed. 
Hence efforts to assess the “correctness” of the answers generated to the research questions posed 
raised the issue of what comprises credible evaluative criteria in qualitative research. Kelly 
(1999c), for example, suggests that interpretive research has entailed “a rejection of positivist 
notions of reliability and validity, without much agreement about what standards of proof should 
replace these” (p. 423). The following section outlines various ways in which I have nevertheless 
endeavoured to ensure that the emergent interpretive account was comprehensive and credible and 
that its evaluation was rigorous and integral to the research process.  
 
In building an interpretation of the transcribed interview texts, I have attempted to write an 
account that is grounded in the data and that leaves behind a clear “trail of evidence” (Brown, 
Debold, Tappan & Gilligan, 1991, p. 33). Raw materials presented in this chapter and in the 
appendices accordingly include, for example, field notes or “jottings”, the Interview Guide, Grand 
Tour questions, vignettes of real-life dilemmas, I-poems and the translation of the Reading Guide 
into master themes and core categories of experience. I have also accounted for the personal 
motivations and different experiences that originally prompted the research undertaking as well as 
for the different decisions I took in collecting and analysing the data. Included in this recounting of 
the research process are several descriptions which convey some sense of my personal struggle to 
remain open to, and to make sense of, the often conflicted interchanges between myself and the 
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data concerned. In these and other ways, “the audit trail” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 427) generated 
illuminates the route I followed as I entered “the uninterpreted field” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 427) of the 
original research interviews and slowly made my way through to the transcribed texts, the Reading 
Guide, the core categories and on to the writing up of findings in the final interpretive account. 
Rather than presenting a “smooth and seamless” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 426) record, the “audit trail” is 
by contrast an account of a halting and flawed journey which portrays transparently and in detail 
how I arrived at a deeper but still partial and provisional understanding of the subjective and 
unconscious dimension of professional ethical decision-making.  
 
Earlier discussion of the “vicious circularity of understanding” suggested that the unreflective 
“discovery” of “findings” may alternatively be construed as tantamount to dropping “into a swamp 
of mere opinion and speculation” (Packer & Addison, 1989b, p. 275). As Kelly (1999c) maintains 
“it is all too easy to embark on a self-fulfilling quest….to find what you set out to find and find 
convincing reasons to convince others of the veracity….of these findings” (p. 424). Potentially 
vicious cycles of understanding in this research inquiry were disrupted by invoking “the return or 
evaluative arc” (Packer & Addison, 1989b, p. 275) of the hermeneutic circle. Central to “the return 
arc” was the concept of “uncovering” or examining whether the evolving interpretive account 
“uncovered….a solution to the problem, the confusion, the question, the concern and the 
breakdown in understanding that motivated [the] inquiry in the first place” (Packer & Addison, 
1989b, p. 279). 
 
Evaluation of whether the emergent account was indeed “uncovering” plausible “answers” to the 
relevant research questions involved efforts to keep alive my own reflective attitude and to engage 
in debate with critical and interested others. Thus I interrogated the possible impact of 
idiosyncratic defences, taken-for-granted assumptions and my own affective responses on the 
research process. I also questioned inconsistencies and limitations appearing in the account, the 
appropriateness of the chosen research methodology and the sense of “fit” between the data and 
the psychoanalytic theories and models chosen to explicate them. “Interpretive validity” (Brown et 
al., 1989, p. 160) or evaluating the veracity of a particular interpretation of the data was furthered 
in the context of repeated discussions with both “sympathetic and sceptical” (Packer & Addison, 
1989b, p. 288) supervisors and colleagues. As previously discussed, competing arguments for and 
against different interpretations of the same texts were openly debated, critiqued, adopted or 
discounted. This was not done, as Packer and Addison (1989b) observe, to secure inter-observer or 
inter-rater reliability but in order to generate diverse and multiple points of view. The latter “gains 
in objectivity” (Louw & Pitman, 1989, p. 751) apparently helped to uncover a seemingly better 
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and more comprehensive understanding of the disturbing affects evoked by charged ethical 
dilemmas than did rival explanations. It is thus argued that the following interpretive account, 
which addresses the therapeutic context and unconscious determinants of ethical decision-making, 
stands a better chance of uncovering a more credible response or answer to the problem of 
unethical or compromised decision-making than do rival explanations that draw upon 
philosophical ethical theories (Benatar, 2002; Rachels, 1999) or the notion of universal stages of 
moral development (Kohlberg, 1981).  
 
Approaches to evaluation included not only establishing an “audit trail”, self-reflection and 
engaged debate but also an appraisal of the interpretive account‟s capacity for opening up new 
possibilities for changed practices (Addison, 1999). No single methodology or “model of ethical 
decision-making holds all the answers” (Barnett, 2007, p. 9). The interpretive account elaborated 
in the remainder of this study similarly does not contain “all the answers” and inevitably “falls 
[far] short of the “perfection” I had hoped for” (Wharton, 1998, p. 222). As noted, however, what 
provided the original impetus for this research inquiry was a practical concern with how 
psychoanalytic psychotherapists grappled with everyday ethical dilemmas and “what is uncovered 
when things go well is an answer to this concern. This answer should have direct implications for 
practice… ” (Packer & Addison, 1989b, p. 287). This suggests that any evaluation of an 
interpretive account necessarily includes consideration of its power to produce pragmatic, 
problem-solving strategies and to change practices. Although unintentional, the findings 
uncovered and discussed in the following chapters may have clinical relevance. Providing an 
additional and comprehensive theoretical perspective on countertransference phenomena, the 
interpretive account hopefully offers a potentially new and credible point of view that supports 
changed ethical decision-making practices in the everyday context of the analytic space.  
 
Based on the final core categories, the next four chapters identify the aspirational ethical principles 
espoused by research participants and follow the initial discovery of the presenting dilemmas 
through to their attempted resolution. These results chapters are first introduced by the following 
descriptions of the six real-life ethical dilemmas.  
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DESCRIPTIONS AND CODING OF SIX REAL-LIFE 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST PILOT INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
 
This research interview was completed in a single two-hour session. The participant, Cathy, 
an experienced psychotherapist, offered her consulting room which provided a peaceful 
setting. At the outset, Cathy commented that she should have thought more about the ethical 
dilemma concerned but had instead found herself preoccupied with a case where the parent 
was threatening legal action against her. She described how, in this latter instance, her 
supervision and case notes had been particularly thorough and detailed. 
 
In my field notes, written immediately afterwards, I recorded my different impressions, 
feelings and thoughts. This description would later provide a meaningful and emotionally 
nuanced context for the transcribed conversation. I was also aware that I would attempt to use 
my countertransference responses as a point of entry into understanding the participant and 
the multiple meanings of her story (Gilligan et al., 2003). I had found Cathy open and willing 
to share despite her pre-interview acknowledgement that the dilemma concerned had been 
“messy” and unresolved. As a novice researcher, I had experienced a sense of uncertainty as 
to the ethical legitimacy of pursuing for research purposes an unexpected angle which had 
emerged pertaining to the private possibly conflictual history of the triangular relationship 
between Cathy, her current partner and the latter‟s ex-wife (Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001). 
This was the only interview to be completed in a single session. The alternative structure 
followed in subsequent interviews, of two sessions separated by an interval, might have 
afforded me the opportunity of reflecting on my own confusion and whether I was 
unconsciously colluding by not opening Oedipal dynamics suggested by the triangular 
relationships concerned.   
 
Bearing in mind Cathy‟s apparent preoccupation with a threatening parental figure, I reflected 
on future participants‟ unconscious perceptions of me. I wondered whether Cathy had 
experienced me as a therapist/confessor or as somehow a threatening legal figure who might 
take her to task for having breached therapeutic boundaries relating to confidentiality and dual 
role relationships. Finally, I noted that in this first pilot interview, I had felt anxious as to 
whether I would remember the „flow‟ of the “Interview Guide” and about managing the tape 
recorder.  
 
PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
 
In the pre-interview telephone contact, Cathy outlined the following ethical dilemma. Earlier 
in the year, Heather, the ex-wife of Cathy‟s partner, had phoned eager to initiate social 
contact. When Cathy responded by inviting her to dinner, Heather had asked whether she 
might also bring a male friend. During this conversation Cathy realised that the male friend 
mentioned, Pete, was both an old contact of her own partner as well as the father of an ex-
patient who had indicated that she would resume therapy in the near future. Despite this 
complication, Cathy initially yielded to Heather‟s request. Over the following days, however, 
Cathy grappled with whether she should disguise her professional identity and host Heather 
and Pete (potentially compromising the safety of any future therapeutic relationship) or 
whether she should avoid all social contact with her ex-patient‟s father. Struggling with these 
alternative courses of action eventually resulted in Cathy deciding to inform Heather that 
boundary difficulties precluded her altogether from having dinner with Pete.  
 
During the research interview a second ethical dilemma unexpectedly emerged. Cathy 
disclosed that she had confided in her own partner regarding the boundary difficulties raised 
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by seeing Pete socially. In a later telephone call, she again breached confidentiality by 
informing Heather that she did not feel able to host Pete because she had seen his adult child 
in therapy. Heather had immediately recognised the ex-patient and had shared that the latter 
had also confided in her as a long-standing family friend. What eventually transpired was that 
Heather came alone. Neither she nor Cathy referred to the various telephone conversations 
nor to the ensuing breaches of therapeutic boundaries. Disclosing confidential information 
pertaining to her ex-patient had had the effect, Cathy said, of “loading” a difficult and 
awkward situation onto Heather, entrusting someone who “was not even a psychologist” to 
safeguard the boundaries of the therapeutic relationship, including the fact of the ex-patient‟s 
treatment.  
 
Cathy‟s feelings of confusion and blankness were accompanied by painful remorse that by 
remaining “too unconscious” and by not allowing herself to think about the ethical dilemma, 
she had inadvertently breached confidentiality, “betraying” both the ex-patient and her father. 
As the research interview progressed, the therapist‟s anxiety shifted from the presenting 
dilemma and appeared to devolve increasingly on Heather, an ambiguous figure who evoked 
in Cathy apparently contradictory feelings of liking but also of mistrust. While recognizing 
the ethical problems attendant on dual relationships and breaches of confidentiality, Cathy‟s 
professional capacity to protect the boundaries of the therapeutic frame appeared in this 
situation to have been temporarily overwhelmed by the need to respond graciously to the 
social demands exerted by the relationship between herself, her partner and his ex-wife. 
Neither supervision nor peer consultation was sought and Cathy remained professionally 
isolated throughout.  
 
The primary significance of this case arguably inheres in the therapist‟s strong feeling 
reactions and subjective construal of relatively innocuous “boundary crossings” (Gabbard & 
Lester, 1995, p. 123) as an emotionally loaded ethical dilemma. Unprocessed 
countertransference responses appeared to have resulted in decision-making organised by an 
apparently unconscious need to both express and to conceal feelings of hostility towards the 
ex-wife through breaching confidentiality and subsequent engagement with a social dual role 
relationship.  
 
CODING 
 
I have coded this situation as a breach of confidentiality (primary ethical issue), non-sexual 
dual relationship (secondary ethical issue), adult psychotherapy context (Wassenaar, 2002). 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND PILOT INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
This interview consisted of two sessions, each lasting one-and-a-half hours and separated by a 
fortnight‟s interval. David, an experienced psychoanalytic psychotherapist, was under 
pressure from work and family demands but agreed to meet in the evening at his home. 
Several cups of tea and interruptions by children and dogs created an informal atmosphere 
between us. I used field notes to record and to reflect on significant processes which are not 
necessarily obvious in the interview text but which manifested rather in the interactions 
between us.  
I wrote, for example, that David‟s unexpected cancellations of interviews might indicate some 
ambivalence around disclosure of the ethical dilemma concerned. This theme of therapist 
ambivalence was echoed in David‟s own pre-interview remark that he thought local 
psychologists were feeling anxious about the potential professional exposure involved in this 
research. Rather than talking truthfully about what they were actually experiencing and doing 
in their daily practice, David said, therapists showed instead “tremendous investment in 
presenting the perfect case”.  
Gender and power relations between researcher-researched emerged.  As a female researcher, 
I felt intimidated by David‟s intellectual status; at times I desisted from probing the relevant 
patient‟s homoerotic transference relationship, feeling apprehensive of engaging with 
theoretical debates or of provoking rationalisation in relation to sensitive material. During the 
course of conversation, I was struck by David‟s unusual request to switch off the tape 
recorder just prior to his showing me photographs of the patient‟s previous therapist. 
Although I did not pursue this episode, I recorded the event and reflected on the possible 
meanings of my countertransference unease at having participated in behaviour which felt, 
somehow, illicit and off the record. Retrospectively, I realised that I could have explored in 
greater depth David‟s contradictory countertransference responses towards the patient‟s 
former gay therapist and how these may have influenced his decision to desist from collegial 
confrontation. Finally I noted my increased ease with the “Interview Guide” and tape 
recorder, compared with the first interview.  
 
PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
 
David described a young male patient who had presented with difficulties concerning his 
sexual identity. This therapy, which saw the emergence of a homoerotic transference, was 
conducted over a period of several years. Although it had been formally terminated, the 
patient continued to maintain sporadic telephonic contact. A number of months passed before 
the patient disclosed that his previous therapist, a gay male mental health practitioner, had 
initiated ongoing sexual relations and had persuaded him to sign a document to the effect that 
the therapeutic relationship had been terminated and that no legal action should be instituted 
for breach of professional conduct. 
 
David had felt angry and uncertain as to what he was legally or ethically obliged to do in 
relation to these disclosures of collegial misconduct. He recognised the practitioner as an 
older colleague he had once worked with and whom he continued to regard as a respected 
mentor figure who had professionally “fathered” him well. In the interview, fantasy material 
emerged regarding confronting the practitioner which was not, however, translated into 
action. While perceiving that this patient (and possibly others) had been sexually abused and 
needed protection, David expressed deep uncertainty as to what course of action should be 
adopted. Different options identified included informing the patient‟s parents, exploring the 
possibility of either the patient or David himself laying a formal complaint or initiating an 
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informal confrontation with the practitioner concerned. Despite securing patient permission to 
implement this last option, David desisted on the grounds that the patient‟s distress and 
confusion precluded his thinking rationally and giving informed consent. This perception was 
seemingly contradicted when David later presented his own apparent avoidance of informal 
confrontation as an instance of promoting patient autonomy, thereby facilitating the latter‟s 
capacity to decide for himself whether or not to press charges. In the course of the evolving 
therapy the question of how to respond to the re-emergence of homoerotic material again 
demanded further engagement with an ethical decision-making process. Contradictory 
responses appeared as David described both his apparent emotional ease with this 
development while also acknowledging that feared sexual “entrapment” had impelled him “to 
kill” the erotic transference early in the therapeutic relationship.  
 
Supervision, discussion with professional peers and contact with the Ethics Committee of the 
statutory body concerned proved to be disappointing and unhelpful. Eventual closure of the 
dilemma was reached for David when the patient‟s former therapist advised colleagues that he 
would be out of the country for an indeterminate period. In his closing comments, David 
reflected that this ethical dilemma had left him feeling very much alone. No-one, he said, had 
really helped him to construct a thinking or reflective space; he had had "to continually try 
and inflate this space himself ".  
 
CODING 
 
The system of coding used by Wassenaar (2002) does not allow for a category pertaining to 
collegial behaviour. I therefore decided to retain an earlier, well-known classification system 
and have categorised this situation as pertaining to the „Conduct of colleagues‟ (Pope & 
Vetter; 1992), adult psychotherapy context.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD RESEARCH INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
 
The third interview was conducted over two sessions separated by a week‟s interval. Gillian, 
an experienced psychologist and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, explained in the preliminary 
phone call that she had been working with a female patient and that “a double connection” 
existed between them. She was not only the patient‟s therapist but was also her cousin. Gillian 
expressed doubt as to whether this was a “real” ethical dilemma but acknowledged that it 
sometimes provoked disturbing feelings and a concern that the “double connection” had 
adversely affected the nature and progress of the therapeutic relationship. In order to clarify 
the complex family background, I requested a genogram prior to the initial interview. We 
agreed to meet in my living room which was quiet and free of interruptions.  
 
When she arrived, Gillian immediately remarked that my home looked old and as if it “had 
been lived in for generations”. This sensitivity to the past was again apparently reflected in 
her comments regarding the “beautiful old cups” used during tea-breaks. At the end of the 
first research interview, Gillian was tearful and said she felt saddened by past separations, old 
memories and the dispersal and loss of her family. In field notes written afterwards, I 
wondered whether the participant‟s fragmented personal history had led to her projecting onto 
me, an unfamiliar colleague, an idealised sense of linkages and connectedness that was 
missing between generational figures of her own. I recorded my impression that regular 
contact with her patient/cousin could thus provide Gillian with potentially gratifying 
opportunities to reconnect with early childhood experiences and significant family figures 
who had been lost through death and family dispersal. I noted points of mutual uncertainty 
that occurred during the interviews as a result of Gillian confusing how a significant female 
figure, now dead, had been related to her and to her patient respectively. This apparent 
diffusion of boundaries and over-identification between the therapeutic dyad had perhaps, I 
thought, affected Gillian‟s decision to continue seeing the patient.   
 
Gillian‟s professional environment included receiving individual supervision from an 
experienced clinician.  Initial feelings of shock gradually gave way to deference to the 
authority and status of the supervisor who did not appear to view the dual role relationship as 
an obstacle to the initiation and maintenance of a therapeutic relationship. Exploration of the 
supervisee‟s strong countertransference responses were thus seemingly neglected in 
supervision as was consideration of the ethicality of conducting an in-depth dual relationship 
with the patient concerned. I commented in my field notes that the follow-up interview 
seemed more stressful as we attempted to explore the possible subjective meanings that the 
ethical dilemma might hold for Gillian as well as how she had tried to process and resolve it.  
 
This was the first interview that directly confronted me, as a researcher, with an unanticipated 
dual role relationship pertaining to a therapist working with an individual who was 
simultaneously both a patient and a relative. Aware that this research probed unreflective and 
potentially humiliating aspects of professional practice, I was tempted not to make any direct 
intervention that might evoke further conflict. Supervision helped clarify that, in the course of 
the research endeavour, I continued to carry an obligation to address actively ethical issues 
that might affect the well-being of either patients or therapists. At the conclusion of our 
interviews, therefore, I commented that I had been struck by Gillian‟s distress and tearfulness. 
I suggested that additional consultation with her new supervisor and reading the South 
African Professional Board of Psychology‟s code of ethics (2002) might be helpful in 
furthering reflection on the countertransference difficulties that appeared to have arisen in the 
context of conducting this dual role relationship.   
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PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
 
Gillian described a female patient who was referred two years prior to the research interviews 
for help with relationship difficulties. While taking a history, Gillian suddenly realised from 
family details disclosed by the patient that they were in fact cousins and she experienced at 
the same time vivid childhood memories of several of the patient‟s deceased significant 
others. The unexpected discovery of a cousin elicited excitement but also unease as to 
whether and how the familial link to the patient might impact on the therapeutic relationship. 
Thus Gillian was troubled by the possibility that the “double connection” might cause her to 
depart from empathic and reflective service delivery to include in her response a qualitatively 
different “extra dimension of caring”. She raised, too, in a straightforward manner the fact 
that financial need had played a role in overriding her doubts and uncertainties in this case.  
 
Consultation with her supervisor appeared to encourage rather than to challenge Gillian in the 
belief that the latter‟s countertransference could be contained. Early resolution of the ethical 
dilemma seemed to have been reached when Gillian made a final decision to inform her 
cousin openly of their shared family background while, at the same time, also offering to see 
her as a patient in regular psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In the context of the research 
interviews, two years later, Gillian acknowledged that there had been no substantial change in 
the patient‟s presenting difficulties. A few days after my intervention, made at the close of the 
second interview, Gillian initiated contact to say that her decision to continue seeing this 
patient remained unaltered and that therapeutic contact had in fact increased from fortnightly 
to weekly sessions.  
 
CODING 
 
I have coded this situation as a non-sexual dual relationship, adult psychotherapy context 
(Wassenaar, 2002).  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH RESEARCH INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
 
The fourth interview was conducted over two sessions separated by a fortnight‟s interval. 
Patrick, a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, offered his consulting room as a pleasant meeting 
place. In the preliminary phone call, he outlined an ethical dilemma which involved the 
establishment of non-sexual dual role relationships with several male patients in the recent 
past. These “double relationships” had, Patrick said, entailed a rethinking of the traditional 
structures of the psychoanalytic frame. In contrast with other research participants, Patrick 
commented that anticipated disclosure of the ethical dilemma evoked no anxiety. However, I 
reflected in my field notes that ambivalence may have been expressed by the cancellations 
and delays in setting up the interviews. 
 
The two research interviews differed in affect. In the first interview, Patrick initiated a 
vigorous critique of psychotherapy and of the local psychoanalytic establishment, including 
legitimate observations about the restricted global impact psychotherapy has had on 
community mental health. He additionally described several dual relationships which he had 
initiated in the course of professional practice. In particular, he spoke of a dual role 
relationship which had arisen in the context of both he and a patient belonging to 
Organisation B which was dedicated to the personal growth of men. Pivotal issues addressed 
included the search for advanced spiritual consciousness and the provision of “living 
mentorship” for men seeking to redefine their sense of masculinity and male identity. 
Membership entailed progression to closed groups where the disclosure of intimate material 
occurred on a regular basis. After the first interview, I recorded Patrick‟s closing comments 
that he had felt vulnerable and conflicted in the earlier stages of this dilemma but currently 
remained convinced of the therapeutic efficacy of working simultaneously with his patients in 
Organisation B as well as in individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  
 
The second interview by contrast appeared to be marked by anxiety as we attempted to 
explore what professional resources Patrick had used to help process the transference-
countertransference implications of conducting an ongoing dual role relationship. Contentious 
issues arose regarding patient autonomy, informed consent and the power differential inherent 
to the therapeutic relationship. Patrick reiterated his conviction that the dual relationships had 
not been self-serving but had been conducted solely in the best interests of his patients‟ 
healing. At the same time he appeared concerned that his actions may have endangered his 
registration and might be construed as a violation of the South African Professional Board of 
Psychology‟s code of ethics (2002) which he had not to date consulted. 
 
Once again these interviews confronted me as a researcher with an unanticipated active 
ethical dilemma. What was unexpected was to encounter apparently unexamined 
countertransference reactions and to attempt to understand how personal countertransference 
may potentially have informed the participant‟s ethical decision-making. At the conclusion of 
the research interviews, I commented that formal supervision and perusal of the relevant 
ethics code might be helpful in assisting Patrick to reconsider the appropriateness of engaging 
in dual role relationships where circumstances did not deem this strictly necessary.  
 
PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
Patrick described a recent male patient, Rod, who had been in psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
for over a year. At the start of the therapy, Rod informed his therapist of his intention to 
attend a relaxation group, unaware that Patrick was the facilitator for the group concerned. 
Anticipated contact with a new patient outside the therapeutic space initially evoked strong 
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anxiety for Patrick; however, he considered that the relaxation therapy offered unique healing 
opportunities and that no other realistic option presented itself. Extra-therapeutic contact 
deepened into a situation where Patrick continued to see his patient in intensive 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy but they also pursued their relationship in the context of 
Organisation B. Thus therapist and patient “muddled their way through [the] years”. After 
terminating individual therapy, Rod joined Patrick‟s closed group in Organisation B where, in 
a role reversal, he saw his former therapist “being processed as a patient and in the most 
vulnerable of spaces”. The relationship evolved into a personal friendship where Patrick 
considered his ex-patient to be “his buddy and mate”. 
 
Patrick originally experienced carrying these two contrasting roles as “incestuous”. 
Intercourse between the different contexts, he said, resulted in blurring the different 
psychologies of the therapeutic space and Organisation B. He worried that the extra-
therapeutic contact might impair the patient‟s sense of safety and his capacity to establish a 
viable transference relationship. Exposure of the therapist‟s “real me” while the patient was in 
the midst of a “thick” transference compromised the symbolic experience of who the therapist 
potentially represented for the patient. Simultaneously, Patrick perceived himself to be an 
innovative pioneer “in the Wild West”, reformulating the ground rules and boundaries 
inherent to Lang‟s (1982) notion of the therapeutic frame. Since Patrick anticipated that his 
unorthodox practices were unlikely to gain professional support, no formal supervision was 
sought. Similarly, the Professional Board for Psychology and PsySSA were regarded with 
mistrust rather than as helpful organisational resources that might offer useful consultation. In 
the course of the research interviews, Patrick described a fantasy that, if the dual relationships 
were discovered, he would be sent to Coventry by punitive “psychoanalytic police”. The latter 
image referred to professional colleagues who despite their adjudicating powers were 
portrayed as apparently lacking in theoretical understanding of the psychoanalytic paradigm.  
 
In my field notes, I reflected that Patrick appeared to have progressed down a “slippery slope” 
(Gabbard & Lester, 1995, p. 88). While initially experiencing doubt, anxiety and conflict, he 
had nevertheless continued to engage in dual role relationships. Avoidance of formal 
supervision appeared to have sealed off examination of the possibility that repeated decisions 
to engage with dual relationships had resulted in seemingly inappropriate therapist 
gratifications rather than servicing the best interests of the patients concerned. I was 
cognisant, however, that Patrick had taken a courageous risk in exposing and entrusting his 
practice to a colleague known to him to be working within the paradigm of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy.  
 
CODING 
I have coded this situation as a non-sexual dual relationship, adult psychotherapy context 
(Wassenaar, 2002). 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH RESEARCH INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
 
Riaan is an experienced psychotherapist who works in a community health centre situated in a 
black township. In his quiet suburban garden, he described the community centre as servicing 
an area where daily shootings, gang attacks and domestic abuse “are more the norm than the 
exception”. Riaan‟s role is the provision of psychotherapy for patients suffering from the 
effects of violence. Literally hundreds of women, Riaan said, had over the years disclosed 
personal histories of extreme abuse to him. 
 
Daily exposure to trauma had left Riaan wondering whether he should continue working in 
the township. In field jottings, I noted that a sense of feeling endangered seemed to pervade 
Riaan‟s experience of himself professionally and personally and to have been present even in 
childhood. Describing an ethical dilemma which had involved a young rape survivor, Riaan 
appeared to have experienced an unexplored identification with the latter patient; as a child, 
Riaan had similarly experienced the law as an ineffectual force and his own story of chronic 
abuse had likewise gone unheard and unheeded.  
 
These disclosures raised a tension between my roles as a researcher as opposed to that of a 
therapist or trauma debriefer. When speaking about the emotional pain suffered by trauma 
survivors, for example, Riaan appeared to struggle with intense but unprocessed affect. While 
his experience of childhood abuse may have been pertinent to researching how 
countertransference could potentially affect ethical decision-making, I made a clinical 
decision not to conflate these roles and hence not to pursue Riaan‟s memories in any detail. 
Had I done so, I was concerned that we might cross the boundary between a research 
interview and a therapeutic session; the former project might then have been difficult to 
retrieve. I acknowledged his distress but retrospectively thought I could have made the 
additional observation at the close of our work that the research interviews appeared to have 
reactivated childhood trauma, a subject which might be helpful to pursue in supervision as an 
issue of personal countertransference that possibly continued to influence his work.  
 
PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
 
Two years prior to the research interviews, a 12 year old in-patient, Laeticia, was assessed as 
suffering from depression and referred for supportive psychotherapy. On first seeing Laeticia, 
Riaan was struck by her appearance of vulnerability and neediness. During the initial contact, 
Laeticia disclosed for the first time that she had been raped by a 15 year old male who was 
affiliated to a gang and that she had been too scared to tell her parents. Fearing gang reprisal 
and acutely aware that he had not secured his young patient‟s permission to breach 
confidentiality, Riaan desisted from parental contact as well as from his statutory obligation to 
report the rape. Following discharge, Laeticia did not return to therapy. Riaan acknowledged 
that he remained confused and uncertain as to whether he had tried to initiate further patient 
contact. The referring doctor, apparently perturbed by this lack of follow-up, had 
subsequently on his own initiative seen the patient and had informed both the parents and the 
police.  
 
Riaan experienced this ethical dilemma as an ambiguous and contradictory triangle where 
statutory obligations, self-interest and the welfare and well-being of his patient conflicted, 
leaving him deeply insecure as to which course of action he should pursue. Thus Riaan felt 
torn between his knowledge that, as a minor, Laeticia had suffered statutory rape and that he 
was legally obliged to report the case. Reluctance to breach confidentiality and fears for his 
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own safety as well as that of his patient translated into inaction and apparent avoidance of the 
patient‟s parents and the police. Bereft of parental and statutory protection left Laeticia 
exposed, Riaan said, to the future risk of repeated violation and rape. Thus the trust Laeticia 
had originally placed in her “parent-like” therapist was seemingly betrayed by his failure “to 
hold her hand right through” the therapeutic and court process. These “decisions” had in turn 
left him feeling inadequate, guilty and derelict in his performance as a psychologist and 
psychotherapist.  
 
Vicarious traumatisation (McCann & Pearlman, 1990) and Riaan‟s strong countertransference 
anxieties appeared to have “wiped out” (Hill, 2007, p. 2) the therapist‟s reflective capacity. 
Rather than being regarded as potentially helpful professional resources, Riaan‟s transference 
to the law and to the statutory Code of Ethics was characterised by mistrust as was his attitude 
to key professional organisations. Supervision offered emotional support and role clarification 
but apparently failed to engage with the specific Acts governing child abuse reporting (the 
Child Care Amendment Act 74 of 1983 and relevant sections of the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act, of 1993). The impact of personal countertransference on ethical decision-
making was likewise deflected by the constantly changing focus on new trauma cases. 
Supervision appeared to leave unexamined the central contradiction informing Riaan‟s 
therapeutic engagement with his patient; the therapist‟s apparent need to dissociate from 
abusive childhood memories was directly at variance with his young patient‟s need to disclose 
and to work through her traumatic experience of rape. At the conclusion of the research 
interviews, Riaan wondered whether his desire “to walk away from stuff that‟s extremely 
emotionally complicated” had unconsciously been communicated to new patients, 
discouraging any further disclosures of violence.  
 
In the face of feeling overwhelmed, Riaan acknowledged avoiding his work briefcase, 
frequently leaving “all its stuff safely buckled up”. With regard to the presenting ethical 
dilemma, strong countertransference reactions appeared to have similarly generated an 
emotionally saturated or “buckled up” psychological space. Rather than thoughtful evaluation 
of the costs and benefits of the different options available, the ethical decision-making process 
appeared by contrast to be compromised by anxiety and inaction. At a more hopeful level, 
Riaan‟s participation in this research may arguably be construed not only as a substantial 
contribution to exploring therapists‟ subjective experiences of real-life ethical dilemmas but 
also as a significant attempt to voice his own struggle to survive a personal history of abuse 
and marginalisation. 
  
CODING 
 
I have coded this situation as a confidentiality dilemma, child abuse intervention (Wassenaar, 
2002).   
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH INTERVIEW 
 
CONTEXT 
 
Theresa is a member of a counselling team which provides therapeutic support for students in 
an educational organisation. She was the only participant to volunteer to be interviewed. In 
the preliminary phone call she commented that the difficulties she had encountered continued 
to be of concern and that further reflection might help her to integrate more fully the process 
and outcome of this particular ethical dilemma. We met over two consecutive weeks in my 
consulting room. 
 
Theresa described the organisation as exerting pressure on staff and students to achieve high 
academic standards. By contrast the counselling team provided a nurturing environment with 
regular access to case conferences and individual supervision. While staff members from the 
educational institution were also seen by the team, the primary focus remained the provision 
of supportive counselling for students. Working in a system where multiple relationships were 
considered normative resulted in Theresa juggling different “hats” or the role conflicts 
inherent to dual relationships. Ethically problematic aspects of engaging with dual role 
relationships and alternative therapy arrangements, such as outsourcing, did not appear to 
have been identified as options either by the supervisor or by members of the counselling 
team concerned.  
 
The ethical dilemma pertained to the therapy of a gay staff member, Karen, whose repeated 
decision to terminate had finally been implemented several months prior to the research 
interviews. In discussion, Theresa identified herself to me as a member of the gay community. 
Recurring boundary difficulties encountered in the course of therapy had appeared to Theresa 
to derive principally from the patient‟s apparent borderline personality structure but had been 
compounded by dual role relationships. Ambivalence had emerged in Theresa as to whether 
discontinuation of the therapy would have been the “right” thing to do. She wavered between 
agreeing with inner “analytic voices” who counselled that the wearing of multiple “hats” had 
compromised the therapeutic relationship and alternative ethical “voices” who suggested that 
Theresa had been “brave” to persevere and that the patient had greatly benefited from the 
therapy. What did not appear to have been addressed in Theresa‟s supervision or personal 
analysis was the ethical dilemma inherent in conducting a dual role relationship and the 
therapist‟s countertransference feelings underpinning her insistence that the therapy should 
continue.  
 
In field notes I recorded Theresa‟s comments that she felt she was “in dangerous waters” and 
that she wondered how she would be perceived as a professional if she “participated in 
making a mess like this”. I was struck, however, with Theresa‟s courage in being the sole 
participant to volunteer to explore her subjective experience of struggling with a real-life 
ethical dilemma. I was struck also by her commitment to protect the identity of her patient as 
well as by the effort she made to grapple with challenging issues raised in the research 
interviews. Reviewing the transcript, I reflected that I had seemed able to explore several 
pertinent aspects of the conflict pertaining to the continuation or termination of the dual role 
relationship concerned. What I had desisted from exploring were possible homoerotic 
countertransference responses and their influence on the ethical decision-making process. 
This may have stemmed from anxiety about confronting in a research interview potentially 
uncomfortable sexual and power dynamics between “straights” and “gays”.  
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PRESENTING ETHICAL DILEMMA 
 
Theresa described the patient, who was referred by a colleague, as presenting with strong 
conflicts around her sexual identity. The therapeutic endeavour entailed two major ethical 
decisions; firstly, whether to provide psychoanalytic psychotherapy for a fellow staff member 
in an educational setting and, secondly, whether to continue with the relationship concerned. 
Despite “alarm bells ringing” around potential boundary conflicts generated by seeing an 
individual who was also a colleague working for the same establishment, Theresa followed 
what seemed to be the institutional norm and offered the patient weekly psychotherapy 
sessions.  
 
As the therapy unfolded, so too did the inherent frame violations manifest themselves. 
Running a workshop, Theresa had found herself wearing three “hats” belonging to her roles as 
therapist to the patient, group facilitator to the patient‟s adolescents and staff member/group 
facilitator to Karen and her partner in giving parental feedback. Given the financial 
constraints involved, the core dilemma, Theresa said, was between termination (which would 
probably leave the patient without adequate access to therapeutic support) or continuing with 
an imperfect therapeutic situation involving multiple relationships. Conviction that 
considerable therapeutic progress had been made, professional pride, the determination not to 
abandon the patient, as well as possibly unprocessed homoerotic countertransference 
responses, appeared to combine into a second major ethical decision to persevere with the 
therapeutic relationship.  
 
Contradictory descriptions emerged. Theresa remarked that she perceived herself to be a 
therapist who felt great clarity with regard to her role and that she had offered the patient a 
consistent relational context “where things could be processed and thought about together”. 
On the other hand, a compromised therapeutic space was depicted, one which had been 
assailed by “imploding” boundaries, doubts as to whether she had acted in her patient‟s best 
interests and organisational demands that militated against individual psychotherapy. Theresa 
also expressed guilt about whether the emotional costs to the patient had outweighed the 
benefits, whether something that had originally been intended as supportive had become so 
contaminated as to act as a formidable deterrent to the patient ever seeking future therapy. 
Following a final incident in which Karen saw her therapist in what she construed to be an 
“intimate moment” with a significant other, the patient implemented an abrupt termination.  
 
Despite the professional resources available, Theresa had experienced herself as isolated and 
alone with the ethical dilemma concerned. Theoretical formulations cast in terms of the 
patient‟s projective identifications contrasted with more homely descriptions of the 
therapeutic space as “a pressure cooker” that had itself been devoid of an empathic and 
reflective supervisory container where ethical considerations and countertransference 
responses could have been explored and rendered meaningful. At the close of the interviews, 
Theresa commented that she did not intend to pursue psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the 
organisational setting concerned. She remained uncertain as to whether the frame deviations 
had derived from the dual role relationships generated or whether these had primarily been a 
consequence of the patient‟s apparent borderline personality structure.  
 
CODING 
 
I have coded this situation as a non-sexual dual relationship, adult psychotherapy, 
organisational context (Wassenaar, 2002).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
AVOWED VS LIVED VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF REAL-LIFE 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses research participants‟ avowed ethical principles and how these fare in 
the context of the therapeutic relationship and countertransference pressures generated by 
real-life ethical dilemmas.  The six participants identified an array of 12 aspirational ethical 
principles and standards that guided and informed their daily professional practices. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, the CPA‟s (2000) code of ethics is widely regarded as 
comprising a well organised and conceptually rich document which provides comprehensive 
guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas encountered in psychological practice. The 
distinguishing features of the first three principles and related standards presented in the 
CPA‟s code were therefore summarised and used to structure participants‟ descriptive 
accounts of their primary ethical concerns and values. The CPA‟s relevant ethical principles 
include Principle I: Respect for the Dignity of Persons; Principle II: Responsible Caring; 
and Principle III: Integrity in Relationships. Data were also related to Gilligan‟s (1982) ethic 
of care concept and to the familiar ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, justice and fidelity (Beauchamp & Childress, 1993; Kitchener, 1984).  
 
Participants‟ avowed values pertaining to therapeutic boundaries and the analytic frame 
were considered under Principle II, Responsible Caring, where the emphasis lies on actively 
promoting the welfare of vulnerable others in the context of an intimate but asymmetrical 
relationship. From the perspective of psychoanalytic ethics, research participants‟ avowed 
principles and standards appeared to  represent “a continuum of ethical functioning” 
(Solomon, 2003, p. 10), ranging from concerns about adherence to the “ground-rules” 
(Langs, 1982) or structural features of the analytic frame to attempts to restore the optimal 
participative yet reflective stance characteristic of the analytic attitude (Gabbard & Lester, 
1995). 
 
Clarkson (2000) distinguishes between avowed and lived values, commenting on the 
potential gap between publicly espoused ethical principles and contrasting incongruent 
private behaviour. Initial discussion in this chapter of participants‟ avowed ethical principles 
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is followed next by detailed examination of how the latter fare in the context of real-life 
ethical dilemmas. While some congruence was found to exist between participants‟ avowed 
and lived values, the results of this section appear to lend weight to previous research 
studies which revealed significant discontinuities between aspirational ethical ideals and 
compromised professional practices (Bernard & Jara, 1986; Bernard et al., 1987; Smith et 
al., 1991). The latter studies utilise hypothetical ethical dilemmas. By contrast this section 
considers the potential impact of unconscious determinants on participants‟ avowed values 
in the context of real-life ethical dilemmas.  
 
Analysis of the interview texts facilitated both the identification of participants‟ avowed 
principles as well as how frequently these were spontaneously endorsed by interviewees. 
This procedure arguably clarified the perceived significance of the different principles for 
participants‟ daily professional practices. Frequency of reference to avowed ethical 
principles and standards is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
2. THE CPA‟S (2000) CODE AND PARTICIPANT DESCRIPTIONS OF AVOWED 
PRINCIPLES 
 
 
Figure 1: Frequency of reference to the four avowed ethical 
principles & related standards
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. INTEGRITY IN RELATIONSHIPS
b) Countertransference Management
3. a) NONMALEFICENCE
e) Boundary Maintenance
d) Impaired Collegial Performance
c) Power Differential
b) Competence & Self-knowledge
2. a) RESPONSIBLE CARING
d) Confidentiality
c) Informed Consent
b) Distributive Justice
1. a) RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF PERSONS
Number of participants
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2.1. Principle I: Respect for the Dignity of Persons 
The CPA‟s first ethical principle asserts the primacy of the need to respect the dignity of all 
persons and to appreciate their innate worth as human beings. The code thus states “that 
each person should be treated primarily as a person or an end in him/herself, not as an object 
or a means to an end” (CPA, 2000, p. 8). Promotion and protection of moral rights is pivotal 
to respect for the dignity of persons and subsumes both the concept of distributive justice 
as well as the ethical standards of general respect, informed consent and confidentiality. 
2.1.1. Distributive Justice 
The CPA‟s first principle is firmly embedded in the Kantian-based universal principle of 
individual justice (Malloy & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998). With its emphasis on an impartial 
ethic of individual rights, it retains a “masculine” cast and may be aligned with Gilligan‟s 
(1982) “justice voice” which upholds as a relational ideal a vision of respect and “equality, 
reciprocity, and fairness between persons” (Brown et al., 1991, p. 28).  In the multiplicity of 
different moral voices that surrounded participants at work, the “justice voice”, while not the 
predominant avowed principle, was clearly evident and was lucidly expressed by David in 
the following fragment: 
… when things do become locked up in rules and regulations, … there‟s a 
blip on my screen … and I want to know why and if the rule is justified and 
I need to understand the justice or the fairness in the rule … (Interv. 2, p. 
58, 44-47) 1. 
The CPA (2000) states that all individuals have the right to benefit equally from 
contributions made by the profession and to access equal quality in the procedures and 
services offered by psychologists.  Discriminatory practices that are directed only to 
particular groups such as the white middle class, Kitchener (1984) remarks, are 
incommensurate with the broader concerns of the profession which pertain to justice and to 
fair and equal treatment for all individuals.  
 
Three participants described how their awareness of historical injustice and inequities of 
access to, and quality of, mental health resources under Apartheid had shaped their current 
professional practices in reaching out to previously disadvantaged groups. Despite the 
emergence in 1994 of a democratic South Africa, Riaan‟s decision to work with a 
                                                 
1 For each excerpt from the interview transcripts, the reference abbreviations are as follows: Interv. 
(Interview), p. (page number), followed by the line numbers.  
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marginalised sector of the black population demonstrated his altruistic commitment to 
redressing continuing disparities in the distribution of psychological services: 
… not everybody wants to work there. If you look at the population figures 
for that area, the … black population is about … twice as big as the white 
population and if you look at the percentage of psychologists working there 
… it‟s disproportionate … stuff needs to happen there … research needs to 
be done there … there are more and more and more African patients 
coming to us and there are two psychologists … and a million people 
(Interv. 5, p. 65, 39-47; p. 166, 2-14). 
2.1.2. General Respect 
Four participants described respect for persons as comprising a core ethical principle (See 
Figure 1 above). The following excerpts highlight that Theresa and Gillian, for example, 
saw the principle of respect as integral to their professional identity and daily practices as a 
therapist: 
…one of the first things that comes to mind is the way that I work, I come 
with … a spirit of respect, I don‟t know if that‟s the right word … but 
despite the dynamic, maybe the age difference or the … power difference, I 
feel very sensitive to respecting people and their experience and where 
they‟re at … and the fact that they‟ve sought help and that they‟re placing 
themselves in a vulnerable position (Interv. 6, p. 204, 4-10). 
 I suppose the core belief is the respect towards the client in terms of where 
they coming from … the sense that … they‟re coming for some kind of help 
from me and I really need to respect who they are (Interv.3, p.77, 39-42).  
In a similar vein, helping patients to rediscover their dignity comprises an aspirational and 
constant guiding principle that informed Riaan‟s everyday professional practice:  
I think … that some of my work isn‟t just about working with the presenting 
problem, it‟s about helping people rediscover their own dignity … that‟s 
one of my … constant guiding principles … that I … walk with when I walk 
down the passage to my office every morning (Interv.5, p.166, 34-43). 
2.1.3. Informed Consent 
The CPA‟s (2000) ethical standard of informed consent directs the psychologist to secure 
the active collaboration of those affected by the anticipated decision under conditions that 
are free from undue pressure or coercion. Prospective clients should be provided with full 
information regarding the proposed activity, including any likely harms and benefits, the 
availability of alternatives and the right to refuse or withdraw from treatment at any time. 
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The patient‟s self-determination and autonomous right to make informed decisions free from 
paternalism (Kitchener, 1984; Steere, 1984) or the imposition of therapist beliefs and values 
constitute one of nine central ethical values guiding the clinical practice of master therapists 
(Jennings, Sovereign, Bottorff, Mussell & Vye, 2005). While the importance of informed 
consent and patient autonomy was briefly acknowledged by three participants, these 
standards do not by contrast appear to emerge in the present study as core avowed values. 
During the initial consultation process, however, Gillian described her efforts to impart to 
patients considering entry into therapy needed information pertaining to the structural 
features of the analytic frame as well as to the nature of the therapeutic endeavour as a 
collaborative but uncertain enterprise: 
I really need to … try and … convey to them, let‟s say, both the limitations 
and the possibilities of the help they can get, so not kind of saying, well, … I 
can sort out your problem and in six months you‟ll be fine, but really trying 
to communicate to them that what we‟re doing is a shared enterprise and 
that it doesn‟t … always have a fixed outcome (Interv. 3, p. 77, 42-47). 
Confidentiality 
The CPA‟s (2000) ethics code states that the psychologist has an obligation to safeguard and 
to hold confidential all information gained in the course of professional activities. 
Confidential information is accordingly released only in the event of informed consent, or in 
a manner that ensures that those involved cannot be identified, as required by the law or 
when the possibility arises of serious harm or death. 
 
The CPA‟s (2000) code and APsaA2 (2001) appear to situate the issue of confidentiality in 
medico-legal discourses pertaining to patient rights and the protection of privacy. An 
alternative perspective is proposed whereby strict confidentiality in psychoanalytic 
treatment is regarded not as an inalienable patient right but rather “as a technical means” 
(Furlong, 2005, p. 377) that is used to shield the intensely private analytic process from 
reality claims exerted by nonanalytic third parties. Confidentiality is thus envisaged as 
promoting a “free space of mind” (Da Silva, symbolic, 2003, p. 161) wherein “creative 
illusion” (Siegelman, 1990, p. 186) or the symbolic properties of the therapeutic relationship 
can flourish. 
 
                                                 
2 The American Psychoanalytic Association (2001): Principles and Standards of Ethics for Psychoanalysts 
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Four participants referred to the avowed ethical standard of confidentiality. No references 
were made explicitly linking confidentiality with either the issue of patient rights or the 
furtherance of analytic treatment but research participants‟ descriptions seemed to contain 
elements of both discourses concerned. The following research fragment suggests, for 
example, that breaching confidentiality evoked a sense of betrayal and guilt in the therapist 
since the patient‟s autonomous right to choose to whom information should be revealed was 
forfeited: 
… I thought I‟ve got to keep this boundary at all costs … I shouldn‟t be 
seeing the [patient‟s significant other] socially … I didn‟t actually think of 
the other boundaries that I was violating … [breaching confidentiality 
involved] exposing … my patient to being discussed by people who I don‟t 
even know (Interv. 1, p.15, 39-43). 
In one of the comparatively few instances of congruence between avowed and lived values 
in the context of a real-life ethical dilemma, Theresa described her successful attempts to 
maintain confidentiality, protecting her patient‟s rights as well as the integrity of the 
therapeutic space from nonanalytic third party contamination: 
I‟ve been very careful about … this particular case and I haven‟t taken it to 
… team meetings, I mean, I‟ve discussed a whole lot of spaces that are 
available for, for this kind of thing to be discussed … but in this particular 
case, I felt quite careful not to „spil‟ … ja, I felt … protective over this 
person because this person works within the system and … has working 
relationships with my colleagues (Interv. 6, p. 203, 36-41). 
2.2. Principle II: Responsible Caring 
The CPA‟s (2000) second ethical principle directs the psychologist to maximise benefits 
whilst minimising the exposure of vulnerable others to the risks of harm.  Benefits and 
harms include both psychological and physical dimensions and entail careful consideration 
of current, medium and long term effects.  The code states that care must be taken “to 
proceed only if the potential benefits outweigh the potential harms, to develop and use 
methods that will minimise harms and maximise benefits, and to take responsibility for 
correcting … harmful effects that have occurred as a direct result of [the psychologist‟s] … 
activities” (CPA, 2000, p. 14).  
 
Responsible Caring subsumes the ethical standards of general caring, competence and self-
knowledge, minimising harm and offsetting or correcting harm. The two latter standards 
include consideration of the power differential inherent to the therapeutic relationship and 
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confronting impaired collegial performance respectively. Given the emphasis in this second 
ethical principle on the promotion of the psychological and emotional well-being of the 
other, research participants‟ avowed values pertaining to therapeutic boundaries and to the 
psychoanalytic frame are included in the following discussion.   
 
Adopting a utilitarian-consequence position, the second principle enjoins the psychologist to 
consider the pragmatic effects of any proposed activity and to ensure that the activity is 
likely to benefit and not harm either the individual or society (Malloy & Hadjistavropoulos, 
1998).  With the foregrounding of active caring and concern for the other, this principle 
retains a “feminine” cast and may be related to Gilligan‟s (1982) “care voice” or moral 
orientation which upholds as a relational ideal a vision of “loving and being loved, listening 
and being listened to, and responding and being responded to …” (Brown et al., 1991, p. 
28). Central to accounts of the ethic of care, Beauchamp and Childress (1994) write, lies an 
emphasis on intimacy, interpersonal relationships, emotional commitment and the core 
notion of “taking care of others … modelled on relationships such as those between parent 
and child” (p. 86). 
 
The different moral voices and relational perspectives of justice and care were discussed in 
earlier chapters. At this point, it may be noted additionally that the two moral voices are 
conceived of as gender-related – the justice voice is articulated more frequently by males 
and the care voice by females – but that they are neither gender-specific nor mutually 
exclusive (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). All human relationships, including those involved in 
real-life ethical conflicts and choices, may be spoken and conceived of both in terms of 
equality and inequality as well as in terms of attachment and detachment (Brown et al., 
1989; Brown et al., 1991). In summary, the first two ethical principles of the CPA‟s (2000) 
code appear to correspond with Gilligan‟s (1982) moral voices of justice and care. With 
regard to the process of ethical decision-making, Malloy and Hadjistavropoulos (1998) 
caution that the CPA‟s (2000) hierarchical ranking of the Kantian-based impartial principle 
of universal justice, a supposedly masculine orientation, above care, sensitivity and concern 
for personal relationships, a supposedly feminine orientation, remains controversial.  
 
While some research participants‟ descriptions of avowed values showed evidence of a 
justice voice or orientation, the data in the following sections revealed that beneficence and 
the relational mode as elaborated by the ethic of care emerged as a dominant avowed ethical 
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principle. Beneficence or Responsible Caring accordingly appeared to represent the ethical 
principle that interviewees considered most closely directed their everyday practices and 
that most clearly defined their identities as professional caregivers.  
2.2.1. General Caring 
All six participants described their daily striving to care for others and to act in what they 
perceived to be the best interests of the patient and the process of therapy (See Figure 1 
above). Beneficence or the promotion and protection of the patient‟s psychological and 
emotional well-being arguably comprised the first “rule” or principle of therapeutic 
engagement:  
What‟s best for the patient? Above all … that‟s … the first rule … I need to 
always ask myself what is best for this patient? What [are] this patient‟s 
needs? And what‟s going to help this patient? (Interv. 5, p. 166, 18-22). 
… there‟s a … commitment to take care of the person I‟m working with … 
[my work‟s about] honouring my agreement to look after them and their 
psychology (Interv. 4, p. 139, 16-18). 
… in a way you‟re always … thinking and reflecting on what you‟re doing 
… whether what you‟re doing is in their best interests and in the best 
interests of the process of the therapy … which is … the central enterprise 
(Interv. 3, p. 103, 21-24). 
The following description foregrounds Riaan‟s disillusion with the impersonal justice 
system and the perceived corruption of the law. The excerpt provides an example of the 
valuing of the contrasting ethic of care and of concern for the intimate relational connection 
with the patient: 
The law was unjust ... the law doesn‟t protect (pauses) the person who has 
been raped, the law doesn‟t protect me as a professional person … the law 
will protect the rapist, the law will protect the person who gets put in jail … 
It felt better for me to look after the person because the law‟s not going to 
look after this child. So I can look after [the patient] emotionally as a 
therapist … the law thing, I don‟t even try and go there because it‟s just so 
big and messy … (Interv. 5, p. 186, 1-18). 
While professional dedication to benefiting and to caring for vulnerable others was accorded 
prominence, the counterpoint of the noninfliction of harm, or the ethical principle of 
nonmaleficence, was granted only brief recognition. This may suggest participants‟ 
resistance and distancing from the issues of therapist self-interest (Steere, 1984), capacity 
for exploitiveness (Gabbard, 1989; Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Epstein et al., 1990; Pope & 
Bouhoutsos, 1986) and the need to confront unethical impulses or “the tremendous potential 
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to do damage in the therapeutic relationship” (Jennings et al., 2005, p. 39). Nonmaleficence 
was accordingly referred to as an explicit avowed principle only twice (See Figure 1 above) 
in the entire body of data:  
… one of the things that I do before I see … a person is I kind of … say a 
prayer, if you like, very briefly … which is just a few seconds, … and I just 
ask for … enough consciousness not to harm the person, enough courage 
not to flinch in the face of what I see and enough wisdom to embrace 
human phenomena (Interv. 2, p. 33, 11-17).  
I suppose I was very concerned with doing the right thing, I wasn‟t quite 
sure what the right thing was but the thing that would be in the patient‟s 
best interests … you know … the Hippocratic Oath, firstly, do no harm … 
and beyond that … if possible, help improve the life of or help to facilitate a 
positive experience for.  So, I know … that‟s where the feeling was coming 
from but … I felt quite thrown because … I wasn‟t quite sure which … route 
was ultimately … of benefit to her … (Interv. 6, p. 227, 23-34). 
2.2.2. Competence and Self-Knowledge 
The CPA‟s (2000) code directs that competence and self-knowledge necessitate acquiring 
and maintaining theoretical and clinical proficiency through keeping abreast with 
professional literature, peer consultation and continuing education. Competence additionally 
demands self-reflection and evaluation regarding how life experiences, stresses, values, 
individual beliefs, needs and social context influence psychologists‟ current choices and 
interactions with others. 
 
All research participants appeared highly motivated to sustain and to enhance professional 
competence, actively seeking out new opportunities to increase theoretical knowledge, 
clinical skills and psychological growth. The six psychoanalytic psychotherapists were thus 
involved with professional reading groups and regularly received either personal therapy 
and/or formal supervision. Two participants were involved with both activities while a 
further two indicated that financial considerations alone constrained their re-entry into 
personal analysis. Exposure of one‟s work to professional peers was deemed to be highly 
anxiety-provoking but was acknowledged as a potentially valuable learning experience. The 
following quotations suggest, for example, that participants‟ continued desire to learn at least 
partially motivated their decision to participate in this research: 
I‟m interested in the topic (pauses) and maybe in some way I thought … I‟d 
um learn … I would learn maybe as much as I would share, if that makes 
sense? But … I feel maybe with this particular case … that I‟m gonna talk 
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about, that it, it felt like it needed further processing (Interv. 6, p. 203, 27-
31). 
I found [the society‟s workshops on professional ethics] fascinating, the 
readings that we were given … made me think about things that I hadn‟t 
actually thought about before … in fact, I then … took the same readings to 
[a self psychology reading] group and we read them through together 
(Interv. 1, p. 6, 6-9). 
So, that would really be my … main push … is to offer something … just 
let‟s work together … that‟s how we look after each other best, by exposing 
our work, letting other people see what we‟re doing, that‟s the best learning 
curve (Interv. 2, p. 30, 31-34). 
The CPA‟s ethical standard is recast from a psychoanalytic perspective by Jennings et al. 
(2005) who suggest that key to professional competence is self-awareness of personal 
conflicts, defenses and vulnerabilities. Management and resolution of countertransference 
issues are thus considered by “the master therapists” examined in their research to be 
fundamental to the provision of optimal care and to reducing the risks of harm to their 
patients.  
 
Self-awareness, self-reflectiveness, thoughtfulness, consciousness or deepened psychological 
understanding similarly appeared as a pervasive avowed value throughout the research 
interviews. While the value of a thoughtful, reflective attitude was intellectually 
acknowledged and theoretically privileged by all six participants, the data paradoxically 
revealed that, in contrast to the foregoing “master therapists”, the processing of personal 
countertransference and the need for “the disciplined avoidance of those behaviours that may 
inappropriately skew or compromise the transference” (Ivey, 1999, p. 2) did not appear in 
the present study as specific avowed values.  
 
One exception to the latter finding emerged in relation to a research participant‟s clear 
awareness that unprocessed countertransference issues might negatively impact upon the 
therapeutic work at hand. As the “master therapists” reviewed in Jenning‟s et al. (2005) 
study observe, when the therapist‟s self-care is insufficient, the risk of the latter‟s personal 
needs intruding upon the therapeutic session are heightened. The following extract suggests 
that self-knowledge or awareness of his own psychological “scar” alerted Riaan to the 
potential for personal countertransference to compromise therapeutic efficacy, often 
inducing the therapist to turn to the patient for solace or for gratification of unmet emotional 
needs:  
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I bumped into a [patient] ... who said “Ah, you‟re the person who helped 
me, you‟ll never know what you did for me!” And I kind of, I know it kind of 
feeds the sort of narcissistic self but sometimes I just need that kind of 
feeding when there is just so much sucking that happens, sort of draining 
of one‟s emotional resources … (Interv. 5, p. 179, 45-46; p. 180, 1-2).  
Contemporary psychoanalytic theory situates the transference–countertransference 
relationship within “a bipersonal field” (Baranger & Baranger, 1966) of therapeutic 
interaction. Whilst appearing erroneously to imply that the therapist‟s personal 
countertransference responses can somehow be removed from the therapeutic context, the 
following comments are, nevertheless, anomalous and unique in the body of data, suggesting 
as they do that striving to manage personal countertransference constituted a core avowed 
value that underpinned Riaan‟s daily professional practices:  
… I think that‟s, that‟s my own stuff and (pauses) and I think that‟s what I 
have to keep out of there, all the time (Interv. 5, p. 181, 9-10). 
I grew up in a home where there was … violence and … the scar, in the end 
hasn‟t gone away. (Long pause, then speaks very softly) And, as always, I 
have to be ready for the next person, kind of have to clear this [feeling] 
completely if I‟m going to be clinically fair for the next person I‟m seeing 
(Interv. 5, p. 177, 34-39).  
2.2.3. Minimize Harm: the power relationship in therapy 
The CPA‟s ethical standard “Minimize harm”, directs that sexual relations with clients are 
unethical both during therapy and after termination for that period of time during which the 
power relationship could reasonably be expected to continue to influence the client‟s 
decision-making. The CPA‟s code further cautions that the client‟s trust or dependency 
should not be exploited for the psychologist‟s personal, professional, political or business 
gain. The following discussion identifies different examples of research participants‟ efforts 
to respect the power differential inherent to the therapeutic relationship. Contrasting 
instances also emerged in the context of posttermination contact wherein the declared ideal 
of respect for the asymmetrical power differential was arguably compromised.  
 
The potential for erotic transference-countertransference treatment configurations to escalate 
into sexual misconduct and frank abuse has not only been well documented (Feldman-
Summers & Jones, 1984; Norris et al., 2003; Pope & Bouhoutsos, 1986) but also constitutes 
the ethical issue responsible for generating the most publications in professional ethics 
(Wassenaar, 2002). In the following fragment, David eloquently highlighted the 
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asymmetrical power relations and lack of reciprocity involved in therapist-patient sexual 
contact; he holds up as avowed values the virtues of constraint and abstinence: 
I believe that a therapist who is treating a patient cannot engage in an 
intimate sexual relationship with that patient for no other reason other than 
there is … a fundamental disequilibrium of psychological position, which 
can never be taken care of … if there is [an]in-depth therapy process going 
on, there is no way that that is an equal relationship … it‟s really up to the 
therapist to understand that, no matter how powerful the erotic 
transference dynamics, if you enter into that relationship, it‟s unfair to the 
other person. They‟re at a major psychological disadvantage … in fact, I 
don‟t believe that they‟re entering into that relationship with informed 
consent (Interv. 2, p. 57, 38-49).  
Power dynamics inherent to class, race, gender and age were acknowledged by research 
participants to be inescapable features of the broader South African landscape and were 
integral also to the therapeutic space situated within it. Congruent with the CPA‟s ethical 
principles of Respect for the Dignity of Person and Responsible Caring, respecting the power 
differential was described as an aspirational ethical value that broadly informed the 
professional practices of four participants. The following fragments, for example, illustrated 
interviewees‟ respectful efforts in the context of the therapeutic space to redress the skewed 
power differential originally effected by the Apartheid system:  
A lot of the time people have been broken down by social (pauses) 
circumstances … race, class, gender all … push people along a continuum 
of marginalisation and I can‟t … begin to work without thinking about 
those things and, for me, … I need to bring the person back to here where 
we are, where we‟re two people encountering each other in this room … 
(Interv. 5, p. 167, 4-10). 
What I like about the short-term work is that it‟s often people … who‟re not 
… psychologised … so-called coloured or darker skinned people ... and I 
feel that it‟s really important to reach those people as well … because I 
don‟t want to have just kind of a middle class practice where people come 
and they‟ve got money and they pay (Interv. 3, p. 73, 45-50). 
Betan (1997) comments that the therapeutic relationship by its very nature involves “ethical 
dimensions of dependency, power, influence and will” (p. 347). Since treatment may be 
compromised, constraint is urged with respect to therapist behaviour that is likely to misuse 
the power differential inherent to the transference – countertransference relationship (ApsaA, 
2005). While respecting the power differential was consciously acknowledged by four 
participants as an avowed ethical value, the data apparently reveal the precariousness of the 
differential concerned. In the following description, for example, the research participant 
extended an invitation to several current patients to join an extra-therapeutic organisation in 
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which he maintained a personal interest. The ensuing dual role relationships foreground the 
sway of the transference relationship and the fundamental disequilibrium of power relations 
that pervades the notion of “informed consent” in psychoanalytic psychotherapy:  
… I wouldn‟t call it informed consent in the normal sense of the term, I 
think the power relation is huge there … if you want to … say that the 
patient was influenced by me because I was in a powerful position, I agree 
that‟s true … (Interv. 4, p. 150, 46-49). 
… but it wasn‟t like, you know, equal dialogue in which like, let‟s make an 
agreement that we‟ve both fifty – fifty power base here, absolutely not 
(Interv. 4, p. 151, 40-47). 
One striking anomaly appeared to emerge from the data with regard to the asymmetrical 
power relations integral to the therapeutic dyad. Norris, Gutheil and Strasburger (2003) 
comment on the contemporary backlash against boundary theory wherein its proponents are 
chided for stifling creative innovation and for advocating “procrustean prescriptions of 
proper performance” (p. 517). Congruent with this latter critique, in the following excerpt 
the research participant in the following excerpt advanced a persuasive theoretical argument 
(seemingly in the patient‟s best interests) that advocated the equalisation of therapist-patient 
power relations and the assumption of a “normal” posttermination relationship: 
And if that termination process has been worked through … well toward the 
aim of having a … relationship outside of the therapeutic space, then 
there‟s a third space that comes into play … first space is the therapeutic 
space, second space is the death where there‟s no contact but there‟s a 
third place which is there‟s the death … of the therapeutic relationship and 
the birth of a new, in inverted commas, “normal” relationship out, out in 
the world (Interv. 4, p. 120, 10-16).  
Implementation of self-revelatory and egalitarian relations with ex-patients in the context of 
posttermination social contact was construed by the participant concerned as facilitating de-
idealisation of the therapist as well as the healthy resolution of the transference relationship 
through the reintegration of previously split off and projected aspects of the self. In the 
following extract, the therapist accordingly presented the asymmetrical power relations 
involved in posttermination “business dealings” as a seemingly beneficent forum wherein the 
ex-patient brought to a constructive closure his former transference relationship: 
[the patient has to] come to terms with the fact that you‟re a normal other 
person in the world. And that learning … can be huge ... .I was just 
yesterday speaking to this chap who … is still in a kind of transference with 
me but he‟s working it through because we have contact … we had some, 
oh, I suppose one can call it business dealings um just on a sort of once off 
thing but … a lot of stuff came up for him and we were able to talk about it 
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just in the normal passing … about his … desire to please me and so forth 
and so on. And really … it‟s been incredibly powerful for him to um 
(pauses) experience me as not … his therapist but as a real person and 
have a retrospective sense of the kind of projections he … had on me during 
the therapy and how … some of them weren‟t really true at all … Ah, 
obviously each case has to be very carefully considered in terms of its own 
unique merits … certain patients you would definitely not get any value 
from having contact post therapy but I guess … there are cases in which 
(sighs) one, one would get tremendous value out of seeing the person 
afterwards (Interv. 4, p. 120, 16-31; p. 121, 9-12). 
Gabbard and Lester (1995) contend that “Studies demonstrating the obliteration of the 
transference following termination of analysis do not exist” (p. 152). No professional 
consensus prevails as to what boundaries are optimal in the posttermination period but 
research over the past three decades reported by Gabbard and Lester suggests that not only 
does transference persist for years following closure but that it may well intensify. Collusive 
denial coupled with the promise of posttermination contact may be mobilised by the 
therapeutic pair in order to usher in for patient and therapist alike not a definitive ending but 
merely a new beginning. Defensive avoidance of grief associated with the decisive closure of 
a significant relationship potentially applies, Gabbard and Lester observe, to both the 
therapist as well as to the patient.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress (1994) comment that the ethical principles of nonmaleficence and 
beneficence are conceptually distinct and do not necessarily retain hierarchical significance. 
Knapp and VandeCreek (2007) point out that different codes, including the ethics code of the 
APA (2002), combine beneficence and nonmaleficence into one overarching ethical 
principle. Other authors (Colnerud, 1977; Kitchener, 1984) contend that nonmaleficence is 
the overriding obligation and the most critical in applied psychology and psychotherapy 
(Brown, 1982; Stokoe, 2000). From the perspective of psychoanalytic ethics, the therapist‟s 
subjective construal of posttermination contact as singularly beneficent does not apparently 
address the ethical obligation to interrogate the intervention concerned from the counterpoles 
of nonmaleficence and personal countertransference. The establishment of posttermination 
nonsexual dual role relationships may on the contrary suggest the evocation of boundary 
violations and unresolved countertransference enactments. Patient efforts to effect the 
resolution of loss, mourning and the permanent giving up of the therapist as an idealised 
part-object appeared in the process to have been compromised.  
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2.2.4. Offset/Correct Harm: impaired collegial performance 
The CPA‟s ethical standard “Offset/correct harm” prescribes formal and/or informal 
intervention when collegial performance, whether that of a psychologist or member of 
another discipline, results in harmful activities. Openness to the concerns of others and a 
nonretaliatory attitude are recommended with respect to perceptions of harms that have been 
incurred as the direct result of one‟s own professional practice.  
 
Key to clinicians‟ ethical conduct is not only the provision of ethical standards but also the 
acknowledgement of “situational pulls” (Betan, 1977, p. 356) exerted by the context of the 
therapeutic relationship as well as by the therapist‟s own subjective needs and dynamics. 
Intellectual comprehension of the regulating ethical standard may well be overridden by 
loyalty to the colleague concerned, guilt, fear of collegial reprisal as well as anxiety 
pertaining to personal reputation or financial security (Betan, 1977). Research participants‟ 
“indirect countertransference” or acute feelings of being endangered, menaced and 
professionally castrated by third parties (Racker, 1957) were often in evidence when talking 
about how their work might be perceived by peers, supervisors, other therapists or 
professional organisations. Perhaps not surprisingly the avowed ethical ideal of active 
intervention in the case of collegial impairment emerged only once in the body of data. In 
contrast with pervasive collective anxiety, an alternative image of aspirational practice was 
portrayed by David who argued that dubious or “borderline” collegial behaviour needed to 
be directly addressed in an empathic and nonjudgmental manner: 
… there are things that people might do that are kind of borderline … and 
we should talk to each other … you‟re discussing a matter with a colleague 
who gets very hot under the collar and very charged emotionally … does 
one say, at a different time to that colleague, … when we were talking about 
the case of X, my perception was that you were drawn in, in a very powerful 
way and you need to think about … about what the charge is for you … and 
that can be done in a very … generous and giving way (Interv. 2, p. 63, 37-
45). 
I think … I do a disservice … to not inform the colleague who‟s not 
functioning or practising at least adequately … they don‟t get the feed-back 
… [and] we don‟t gather together as a group supporting each other in an 
open and honest manner (Interv. 2, p. 63, 13-18). 
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2.2.5. Boundaries & the Maintenance of the Analytic Frame as Avowed Values 
Transferences may be established not only with other people but also with ideas, 
psychoanalytic institutions, belief systems and ideologies (Frosh, 1997; Ivey, 1999). 
Whether experienced as benign and protective or as prohibitive and oppressive, boundaries 
and the analytic frame consistently emerged from the data as a pervasive influence that 
informed research participants‟ everyday professional practices: 
Boundaries for me are extremely important … [the] frame and adherence 
to the frame, in my experience, has definitely helped people to feel safe in 
the work and I think it also serves a protective function for the therapist, 
that there‟s a beginning and an end to each session and that experience is 
contained in that time (Interv. 6, p. 204, 11; 32-36). 
… I  pick up a very strong oppressive … superego voice that‟s alive in the 
culture of the [Psychoanalytic Society] which is about … saying something 
like you‟re wrong, you‟re breaking the rules, you shouldn‟t have extra-
therapeutic contact with your patients … . My feeling now is … I don‟t 
really care about that voice and actually would be … open to publicly 
challenging that kind of rhetoric (Interv. 4, p. 132, 16-25). 
I suppose the core thing that I have is … respecting [patients‟] boundaries 
… to communicate that I will … not overstep their boundaries … I‟m also 
thinking of those people who overstep your boundaries … and that I need to 
let them know that I‟m not going to just be uncontained and, you know, 
anything goes (Interv. 3, p. 78, 5-15). 
It‟s about keeping boundaries and, for me, the whole concept of boundaries 
has been um (sighs) the guiding principle (Interv. 1, p. 6, 28-30) 
Just yesterday I worked with a couple … the [one partner] had been a 
victim of torture … and they told their story and when it was over the [other 
partner] asked if she could hug me, (pauses) that‟s not analytical, to hug 
your therapist but she needed to ... immediately when she posed the 
question to me, I thought, is this right?  Do I push her away?  Do I reject 
her?  What do I do here? (Interv. 5, p. 166, 24-32). 
Boundaries and the maintenance of the psychoanalytic frame emerged as the core or central 
“guiding principle” for three research participants. All interviewees, however, described their 
struggles with common boundary difficulties which have previously been identified in the 
professional literature. These included, for example, timekeeping, money, place, physical 
contact, self-disclosure or making exceptions for special patients (Epstein & Simon, 1990; 
Gutheil, 1999; Gutheil & Gabbard, 1993; Norris et al., 2003). Integral to the aspirational 
standard of boundary maintenance and to the securing of a benign therapeutic space lay an 
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apparent emphasis on the disciplined maintenance of the structural features of the analytic 
frame:  
... the frame ... creates a sense of safety, in terms of knowing, understanding 
… the kind of patient/therapist relationship and … the parameters of that 
relationship … The fact that the time is consistent, predictable … There are 
certain boundaries, there‟s the word again, to the amount of time spent in a 
session … (Interv. 6, p. 204, 24-32). 
… I will be there for them when I say I‟m going to be there and if … I can‟t 
be there, I‟ll let them know timeously … that I‟m very committed to the 
frame of being there … of fulfilling all my obligations in terms of, say, their 
accounts, that they get their accounts on time … (Interv. 3, p. 78, 1-5). 
Writing of the analytic attitude as quintessentially an ethical attitude, Solomon (2003a) 
comments that the analyst‟s reflective capacity or analytic function “represents the third 
element which both structures and limits the pre-oedipal tendency towards fusional states” 
(p. 9). Gabbard and Lester (1995) similarly suggest that the analytic attitude entails both 
therapist participation in, as well as efforts to reflect upon, the unconscious meanings of 
countertransference enactments arsing in the context of the therapeutic space. In general, 
research participants‟ foregoing descriptions appear to reflect their deep concern and 
conviction that protecting the boundaries of the analytic frame enhanced their capacity for 
effective therapeutic work. In the context of real-life dilemmas, however, failure to 
implement retrospective analysis of countertransference phenomena apparently often led to 
repeated boundary transgressions, arguably compromising the avowed commitment to 
beneficence and to the ethical ideal of boundary maintenance. Later discussion in this 
chapter returns to the issue of the impact of countertransference enactments on avowed 
ethical principles and standards.  
2.3. Principle III: Integrity in Relationships 
The third ethical principle of the CPA‟s (2000) code emphasises that public confidence and 
trust are contingent upon the latter‟s expectations that the psychologist‟s professional 
relationships will be honest, open, objective and will avoid conflicts of interest. Self-
knowledge is once again considered fundamental and includes the capacity to evaluate the 
potential influence on current professional activities of personal backgrounds, experiences, 
stresses, attitudes, needs and values. Dual relationships constellate potential conflict-of-
interest situations and are to be avoided as they “can motivate psychologists to act in ways 
that meet their own personal, political, financial, or business interests at the expense of the 
best interests of members of the public” (CPA, 2000, p. 21). When dual role relationships 
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are unavoidable, ongoing supervision or consultation are recommended in order to 
safeguard public interests. 
 
Malloy and Hadjistavropoulos (1998) comment that the consequentialist emphasis evident 
in the CPA‟s code widens from consideration of the well-being of the individual to 
consideration, in the third ethical principle, of the well-being and greatest good of the 
profession specifically and science more generally. The allied ethical principle of fidelity 
was discussed in earlier chapters and similarly involves truthfulness, promise keeping and 
open communication, all of which are basic to the issue of trust in professional practice. 
Failure to be trustworthy potentially destroys faith in the viability not only of the therapeutic 
relationship but also in the benefits to be obtained from the profession of psychology in 
general (Kitchener, 1984). The CPA‟s third ethical principle subsumes the ethical standards 
of accuracy and honesty, straightforwardness and openness as well as avoidance of 
conflict of interest.  
2.3.1. Professional Integrity, Truthfulness and Openness 
The values of honesty and openness emerged in all six interviews in the form of vivid 
descriptions of aspirational as well as lived practices (See Figure 1 above). Integrity in 
relationships was not articulated by participants as an avowed value in relation to 
maintaining public trust; it appeared, however, to emerge in contrasting ways with respect to 
collegial relationships and the individual therapeutic dyad. Research participants referred 
extensively to the visible and invisible “networks” (Brookes & Hodson, 2000) of 
professional relationships which surrounded them at work. The latter “networks” of 
collegial relationships optimally generate hope that creative work can be collectively 
achieved and that the professional matrix concerned “can contain depressive pain rather than 
emanating persecutory anxiety” (Harris & Meltzer, 1986, in Brookes & Hodson, 2000, p. 
19). Congruent with the previous finding that direct confrontation of impaired collegial 
performance found only limited expression as an avowed value the following excerpts 
suggest that truthful self-disclosure to professional peers elicited equally strong anxiety. 
Apparent fear of collegial censure may impede the authentic exposure of work to peers, thus 
heightening professional isolation and the potential for unethical behaviour:  
… there is an incredible sense in this city of how … private people are 
inclined to be about how they work, truthfully, how they actually work.  
And there seems to be a fear for people to say this is what being a therapist 
actually means for me  … people don‟t often feel safe enough, or have the 
courage enough, to … stand up and speak their truth in groups because 
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there is no ethos in the group encouraging … and supporting that (Interv. 
2, p. 30, 20-22; 44-46). 
… if I think about … a psychoanalytic society … very few real 
conversations … happen in our meetings. Most of the conversations are 
theoretical … and when people do talk about the patient, they talk only 
about the patient. They don‟t talk about themselves … when there‟s case 
presentations, … if I step back … and say what is my sense of that 
presentation, my sense is that I can only see the patient, I can‟t see the 
therapist … there‟s nothing about the therapist that‟s in there (Interv. 4, p. 
124, 8-19). 
In relation to the individual therapeutic dyad, all six research participants provided by 
contrast moving examples of openness, integrity and truthfulness as an avowed as well as a 
lived value (See Figure 1 above). Ivey (1999) writes that the analytic task “is to think the 
unthinkable and speak the unspeakable in the hope that this will assist our patients in 
thinking and conversing more freely” (p. 4). Avowed commitment to confronting the 
emotional truth of the analytic situation accordingly emerges in the following extracts: 
… there was something about learning not to flinch … people sometimes 
come … with very deep, difficult wounds, or their own sense of shame and 
unhappiness and, if I can‟t go there, I‟m useless to them (Interv. 2, p. 34, 2-
5). 
Ethics for me is about lying or covering up or hiding because of fear or 
desire for something that isn‟t agreed upon … the agreement really 
between us is that I will spend my time … getting to the heart and truth of 
things … (Interv. 4, p. 123, 1-4; 36-37; p. 124, 3-5). 
This declared commitment to the truthful discovery of who the therapeutic dyad might 
symbolically represent and to examination of “the countertransference piece … that gets 
skipped” (Interv. 4, p. 123, 26-27) foreshadows discussion in the following chapter of 
countertransference enactments. 
 
In the context of lived practice, adherence to the ethical values of honesty, integrity and 
truthfulness appeared to waver, sometimes lost under the emotional impact of real-life 
ethical dilemmas but regained with the support of the research interviews. Hence subjective 
experiences of exploitiveness, defensiveness and troubling feelings of therapeutic doubt and 
failure were courageously and frankly shared in the interview situation. Reflecting on his 
reluctance to confront impaired collegial conduct, the participant in the following excerpt, 
for example, openly acknowledged his defensive avoidance. Similarly, in the second extract, 
the interviewee recalled her need to inform her patient truthfully at the earliest possible 
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opportunity that they were in fact relatives. A note of guilt entered her frank admission in the 
third extract that financial self-interest may at least partially have informed her decision to 
continue to work with a dual role relationship:  
I think there might‟ve been a part of me that … decided, in a defensive way, 
that the [ the patient‟s] parents knew, that it was their responsibility … but 
[perhaps] there was a part of me that avoided the confrontation, by … 
saying, well, it doesn‟t matter now because I‟ve done everything I need to 
do and I don‟t need to pursue this … it might be that I just thought fuck this 
… I don‟t need this business in my life actually. So I‟m just playing with the 
thoughts in my head, you know, this is a new thought to me as I am 
speaking (Interv. 2, p. 51, 46-49; p. 52, 7-10). 
I mean I needed to talk about it … I didn‟t want to sit there having her kind 
of engaging with me … [And so] I went back to therapy and I said to her … 
this is the situation, I‟ve realised that we are in fact … cousins (Interv. 3, p. 
94, 45; p. 95, 33-35). 
I also want to add that if I had a very, very full practice I‟m not sure what I 
would‟ve done, because I didn‟t have a very full practice so I needed 
patients, I mean I just wanted to say that as part of the ethical dilemma … I 
can‟t say I‟ve ever seen anybody for longer than I ought to have but 
sometimes, you know, there is that sense of, oh, you know, I need the 
referral so … (Interv. 3, p. 87, 3-10). 
In the following excerpts, Riaan and Theresa likewise steadily confronted feelings of guilt 
and inadequacy, expressing concern that therapeutic failure may carry future iatrogenic 
consequences:  
… she shared something very private, very scary, very traumatic and maybe 
I should have held her hand right through it but I didn‟t and…for that, I 
feel guilty, I feel … inadequate … I think [the patient] needed a strong 
parent to be there for her and I think she might have felt the potential for 
that with me but didn‟t get it (Interv. 5, p. 173, 33-41). 
I‟m hoping that … this experience has given [my patient] a taste, enough to 
pursue … another experience which would be hopefully…much safer 
without this kind of dual [relationship], but … at the … same time I fear … 
this very experience has done the opposite, it‟s … decreased the chances of 
her ever pursuing … good [therapy] experiences … which I‟m afraid, ja, 
will mean that she … won‟t get the support and … the therapy that she 
might need … (Interv. 6, p. 218, 40-49). 
2.3.2. Avoidance of Conflict Of Interest: Nonsexual dual role relationships 
Steere (1984) comments that ethical code injunctions against dual role relationships appear 
to derive from the principle of nonmaleficence. The relative absence in the present study of 
recognition accorded to nonmaleficence as an avowed ethical principle has already been 
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noted. The following examples suggest that the derived ethical standard of avoiding dual role 
relationships, with their latent potential for exploitiveness, arguably followed suit and failed 
to emerge clearly as an avowed standard of practice:  
I felt at the time that my patient would‟ve been very uncomfortable to have 
had her [parent] visit me socially … now I think that she might have been 
… pleased that I could have witnessed … he was so out of his tree (Interv. 
1, p. 15, 39-40; p. 19, 29-30). 
I don‟t know, I don‟t remember, learning about that, I can‟t say that there‟s 
a specific “voice” when it comes to that … I can‟t say that I have any 
“voice” around multiple roles (Interv. 6, p. 225, 39-46). 
If they‟ve made a code, the Professional Board, that says that you can‟t do 
[dual relationships], then my judgment is that they are … highly limited in 
their … awareness because … I absolutely guarantee that … all the patients 
I work with found this incredibly valuable and that the risks involved are 
very limited (Interv. 4, p. 153, 37-42).  
3. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTING DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ETHICAL 
IDEALS AND LIVED BEHAVIOUR 
Previous research discussed in earlier chapters (See Chapter 2) has identified the discrepancy 
which frequently mars the relationship between ethical ideal and action choice. The 
discrepancy concerned has been traced to multiple factors. These include, for example, the 
consideration that clinicians may struggle to identify the ethical dimension of clinical 
situations (Baldick, 1980), that widespread professional disagreement prevails regarding the 
most appropriate intervention for hypothetical ethical dilemmas (Haas et al., 1986; Slack 
1997; Tymchuk et al., 1982) and that clear conceptual knowledge of ethical codes and 
principles does not necessarily secure the ethically preferred course of action (Bernard et al., 
1987; Bernard & Jara, 1986). Empirical research further suggests that ethical ideals or what 
‟should‟ be done are formulated according to relevant principles or legal guidelines; in 
situations where anticipated ethical infractions do not violate ethical codes or legal 
precedents, practitioners are less likely to act as they should, giving greater weight to 
personal or pragmatic considerations (Smith et al., 1991). This suggests that deficits in 
integrity and honesty may at least partially account for the observed discrepancy between 
what should be done and the implementation of contrasting compromised ethical behaviour 
(Smith et al., 1991). Failure by ethical codes to elaborate the reasoning process underpinning 
broad imprecise ethical principles may additionally confound the therapist‟s ability to apply 
the latter guidelines to specific ethical dilemmas encountered in professional practice (Slack 
& Wassenaar, 1999; Wassenaar, 2002).  
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Given the substantial research evidence available that moral reasoning and cognitive 
knowledge of ethical code items are necessary but are not apparently sufficient to secure 
ethical practice, Betan (1997) points out that competing contextual and subjective 
considerations may interfere with therapists‟ commitment to implementing ethical 
behaviour. This complexity of ethical decision-making, Betan (1997) observes, is “often 
ignored, or at least rarely captured, in the professional literature” (p. 351). While the 
quantitative studies reported provide valuable insights into the nature of potential 
“judgement-action” (Day, in Tappan & Packer, 1991) discontinuities, they appear to 
presuppose a subject who is transparent to him/herself and whose motivation for action is 
derived principally from rational or conscious intent. Meissner (2004) by contrast holds that 
cognitive and volitional processing contributing to the ethical agent‟s decision-making may 
transpire on a largely unconscious level. From a psychoanalytic perspective, for ethical 
judgment and action to occur “without any unconscious input would be unacceptable” 
(Meissner, 2004, p. 556). What appears to emerge from the data is that the observed 
discrepancies between the ethical ideal and lived behaviour were organised by an array of 
manifest factors which converged with competing countertransference pressures to drive 
“the moral performance” (Day, in Tappan & Packer, 1991, p. 40) of participants in their 
efforts to resolve real-life dilemmas.  
 
The emotional turbulence generated by the therapeutic encounter may be psychologically 
hazardous not only for the patient but for the therapist as well (Siegelman, 1990). 
Unresolved countertransference feelings of hate, envy or aggression towards the patient or, 
alternatively, feelings of sexual attraction (Stevenson, 1999) or “lovesickness” (Gabbard & 
Lester, 1995, p. 96) may unexpectedly emerge in the therapeutic space (Winnicott, 1949; 
Searles, 1959; Lambert, 1972).  Inadequate training may augment therapist unpreparedness 
to respond appropriately to disorienting subjective experiences involving powerful affects 
(Ivey, 1992; Pope & Tabachnick, 1993; Stevenson, 1999). When deep levels of transference-
countertransference are mobilised and a state of “participation mystique” or mutual 
projective identification prevails (Solomon, 2003b, p. 26), it may even be unclear whose 
psychological wound is being tended to or to whom the various affects belong (Perera, 1981; 
Siegelman, 1990). When the clinician routinely identifies himself as a benign, beneficent 
caregiver, such ego-dystonic affects may be difficult to acknowledge and to address (Searles, 
1959).   
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What may be insufficiently recognised by the professional literature is that the context of the 
therapeutic relationship as well as the therapist‟s subjectivity appear to remain fully 
implicated in any encounter with lived ethical dilemmas. This suggests ethical quandaries 
“inevitably touch deeply rooted fears, needs, desires, meanings and values” (Betan, 1997, p. 
361). The discussion below considers the “judgement-action” relationship in the light of how 
participants‟ avowed ethical values fared when the psychological terrain generated by real-
life dilemmas was suffused with anxiety and disorientating countertransference pressures.  
4. AVOWED PRINCIPLES IN THE CONTEXT OF REAL-LIFE ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS 
4.1. Informed Consent and the Collapse of Responsible Caring and Respect for the 
Dignity of Persons 
The avowed principle of beneficence or contributing to patients‟ health and well-being 
emerged as the dominant ethical value across the research interviews. Weighing beneficence 
or Responsible Caring (the CPA‟s second ethical principle) against patient autonomy or 
Respect for the Dignity of Persons (the CPA‟s first principle) raises concerns about 
paternalism or presuming “that an authority has knowledge of what is good for an individual 
and undertakes to regulate that person‟s behaviour according to what the authority believes 
to be good” (Kitchener, 1984, p. 49). From the perspective of psychoanalytic ethics, the 
issues of patient autonomy and informed consent raise additional questions with respect to 
who is giving consent to whom, for what is consent being given and how might the analytic 
process subsequently be affected (Lear, 2003).  
 
Given the unequal power differential in therapy and the patient‟s apparent “desire to please” 
(Interv. 4, p. 120, 27), the excerpts below from different interviews open debate as to who or 
for whom or what aspect of the patient “consented”, firstly, to the therapist‟s invitation to 
enter into an extra-therapeutic organisation; secondly, to the therapist‟s insistence that a dual 
relationship should continue, overriding the patient‟s own efforts to terminate and, thirdly, 
to continued involvement with therapy despite the therapist‟s acknowledgement that acute 
countertransference fears had led to his “decision” to abruptly foreclose exploration of the 
patient‟s homoerotic transference: 
But there‟s no question about it … I‟ve no sense that there was informed 
consent … in the normal use of the term … [but] it wasn‟t like a sort of sell, 
I always raised it … like, look, this is not really part of the therapy but … 
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this is out there and I think you should know about it … and check it out 
(Interv. 4, p. 151, 40-41; p. 152, 10-13). 
And I did … I did push for continuation rather than termination, I did 
promote that, I did feel like, it was something that I thought would be 
possible (Interv. 6, p. 207, 50-51). 
In terms of [the patient‟s] erotic transference to me, I killed that very early, 
I interpreted it very early and I stopped it very early (Interv. 2, p. 48, 19-
20). 
The danger of an axiomatic belief in the benefits or goodness of therapy, Kitchener (1984) 
avers, is that the therapist may well be “enticed” into implementing decisions that disregard 
or disrespect the patient‟s autonomy, often unconsciously coercing the latter into adopting 
the therapist‟s preferred course of action (Steere, 1984). Denial of “blind spots” (Freud, 
1912, p. 116) with regard to homoerotic countertransference, gratification of narcissistic 
needs for professional affirmation as well as seeming unawareness of the relevant code items 
were apparently partially responsible for participants‟ failure in the foregoing excerpts to 
actively seek out treatment alternatives and to inform patients explicitly that multiple 
relationships are ordinarily not professionally recommended as the practitioner‟s objectivity, 
competence and effectiveness may be significantly impaired (APsaA, 2005; CPA, 2000; 
South African Ethical Code of Professional Conduct, 2002). In the context of the preceding 
ethical dilemmas, the principle of beneficence appears to have trumped autonomy or the 
patient‟s right to make fully informed decisions. As Kitchener (1984) argues, however, 
beneficence provided in the foregoing excerpts an ostensible rationale for unconscious 
therapeutic interventions which were arguably not in the interests of enhancing the patient‟s 
well-being but in serving the practitioner‟s inappropriate needs for professional affirmation 
and the alleviation of countertransference anxiety. As a result, the avowed principles of 
Responsible Caring or beneficence and Respect for the Dignity of Persons (which includes 
informed consent) appear temporarily to have been suspended.  
4.2. Collegial Sexual Misconduct and the Collapse of Nonmaleficence and 
Beneficence 
Research participants were clearly committed to promoting and to protecting the 
psychological and emotional well-being of vulnerable others. Caring for patients involved 
wrestling on a daily basis with considering whether proposed therapeutic interventions were 
in the best interests of the patient and the process of therapy. One participant was confronted 
with the ethical dilemma of confronting collegial sexual misconduct. As illustrated earlier in 
this chapter, the interviewee concerned appeared conceptually clear that mismanagement of 
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the sexual power differential remains harmful to the patient (Interv. 2, p. 57, 38-49) and that 
confrontation of “borderline” collegial behaviour needed to be actively addressed in an open 
and honest manner (Interv. 2, p. 63, 37-45).  
 
For the duration of the dilemma which extended over at least a year (Interv. 2, p. 34, 23-25), 
and despite having secured patient consent, the participant desisted from informal 
confrontation of the latter‟s previous gay male therapist. The therapist concerned was 
described as a rare and respected mentor (Interv. 2, p. 36, 22-27), who had once 
professionally “fathered” the participant well (Interv. 2, p. 42, 28-30) but who had also 
repeatedly violated sexual boundaries in the context of the former therapeutic relationship. 
Violent fantasies emerged in which the participant imagined “hitting”, “smacking” and 
attacking the ex-therapist concerned (Interv. 2, p. 41, 17-18; p. 66, 8-9). In psychoanalytic 
terms, the valued mentor/father-figure appeared to have been introjected as an idealised part-
object representation standing in relation to a loving self and safely split off from a hating 
self standing in relation to a hated, dissatisfying object (Ogden, 1986). Writing of 
compromise formations, Peterson (2002) notes that neurotic compromise formations occur 
largely out of conscious awareness and that the behaviours entailed simultaneously satisfy 
multiple competing intrapsychic and interpersonal demands. In this instance, the 
compromise formation appeared to entail fantasies of violent confrontation as well as actual 
behaviours involving prolonged and contrasting non-confrontation. The latter dynamic 
apparently allowed the participant to avoid risking his mentor‟s actual rejection or 
retaliation, protecting from contamination an idealised paternal part-object representation 
while simultaneously expressing, in fantasy only, split off hating and aggressive feelings 
towards the abuser. 
 
The participant‟s “decision” to forgo informal confrontation arguably colluded with the 
erring therapist‟s apparent avoidance of the issue of causing serious harm to the patient and 
the potential risk that future patients would similarly be exposed to sexual violation. In the 
context of the lived ethical dilemma, the participant‟s avowed ethical principles of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence hence appeared to be temporarily lost under the impact of 
unprocessed countertransference reactions. Although “consciousness” and courage to 
confront the emotional truth of the therapeutic situation constituted further ethical ideals 
(Interv. 2, p. 33, 11-15), these too were apparently abandoned in the context of the 
emotionally charged dilemma. The participant acknowledged that, fuelled by 
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countertransference feelings of anxiety, he had been unable to work with “the psychology” 
of the patient‟s homoerotic transference but had instead “killed that … interpreted it very 
early, … stopped it very early” (Interv. 2, p. 48, 19-20). Premature foreclosure or “killing” of 
the homoerotic transference suggests counter-resistance to the patient‟s unconscious (Ivey, 
1999) or the collapse of the capacity to reflect upon the possible meanings of heightened 
countertransference feelings of anxiety. As the interviewee himself remarked, both he and 
his supervisor had lacked the courage to language what needed to be thought about and dealt 
with (Interv. 2, p. 53, 1-2; 8-10), that is, to confront the participant‟s hostility to the 
paedophiliac aspects of the mentor/abuser‟s sexual misconduct as well as the homoerotic 
dimensions of the present transference relationship. Finally, and contrary to the avowed 
ethical value of open and honest self-disclosure to peers (Interv. 2, p. 30, 31-34), the 
participant commented poignantly on his perceived lack of freedom to speak unreservedly 
about the phenomenon of erotic transference, saying that he had felt unsupported by 
ostensibly shocked colleagues. In future, the interviewee thought that he would have to rely 
on himself or that he would alternatively seek consultation with colleagues from disciplines 
other than those of psychology or psychotherapy (Interv. 2, p. 65, 8-16; p. 65, 33-41).  
4.3. Conflict-of-interest situations and the Collapse of Integrity in Relationships 
While nonmaleficence and the derived ethical standard of avoidance of multiple 
relationships (Steere, 1984) did not emerge as prominent ethical ideals, unconscious 
interpersonal pressures exerted by dual relationships appeared to compromise participants‟ 
avowed commitment to professional integrity. In the context of multiple relationships, 
confronting the emotional truth of the analytic situation seemingly gave way to therapist self-
interest and/or self-deception. The following fragments, for example, suggest that dual 
relationships secured several inappropriate therapist gratifications. The first example 
portrays the therapist‟s use of a dual relationship to service her immediate social obligations. 
These involved a patient‟s significant other and temporarily took precedence over the need to 
maintain the boundaries of the therapeutic frame. The succeeding excerpts highlight that dual 
relationships were used for the accrual of money for the gratification of therapist needs for 
“friendship”, for increasing feelings of professional self-esteem and for business dealings: 
Who is [the patient‟s significant other] going to tell (laughs) about these … 
awkward [social] arrangements? ... Anyway she came and … we didn‟t 
discuss my patient at all … but I still was left feeling that I‟d made the 
wrong decision (Interv. 1, p. 8, 42-45). 
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… there was a lot of tensions around … I mean the … one was the, the 
money and … the fact that I had someone coming to see me who was 
wanting to see me for therapy in an ongoing fashion which I was really 
needing at the time. So … I‟m still not sure whether or not if I had a very 
full practice I would have [seen] … my cousin (Interv. 3, p. 101, 28-33). 
So we‟ve become very good friends, in fact [the ex-patient and] I went on 
holiday … we had coffee, we‟re mates, we‟re friends (Interv. 4, p. 128, 19-
21). 
I suppose, at the time, I was a relatively inexperienced … clinician, and it 
felt like [the dual relationship] … could be … a good learning experience. I 
didn‟t want to give up … it felt like it would be giving up … to terminate 
and maybe there was a kind of pride driving me (Interv. 6, p. 217, 47-49; p. 
218, 1-2). 
Ah, in fact [the ex-patient] did some [input] for a programme that I was 
part of and so we had some, oh, I suppose one can call it business dealings 
just on a sort of once off thing … we had some meetings (Interv. 4, p. 120, 
21-34). 
Dual relationships are widely acknowledged as inducing conflict-of-interest situations, 
rendering the therapist vulnerable to impaired integrity and to implementing actions that seek 
to meet the latter‟s own personal, financial or business interests at the expense of the best 
interests of the patient. One therapist described the practice of maintaining dual relationships 
during in-depth therapy and after termination as “pioneering” (Interv. 4, p. 133, 15-20) and 
considered them to be “incredibly valuable” to patients. The CPA (2000) and different 
authors, however, express concern as to whether such high-risk interventions are ever 
ethically justifiable in the absence of any or little research validation. Caution is sounded 
with respect to the possibility that narcissistic difficulties render the clinician vulnerable to 
avoiding formal consultation as well as to believing that his/her “special” professional 
practices are absolved of the usual rules that ordinarily apply to the therapeutic situation 
concerned (Epstein & Simon, 1990; Kitchener, 1984; Norris et al., 2003).  
4.4. Therapeutic Boundaries and the Collapse of Self-reflectiveness 
All research participants addressed the issue of therapeutic boundaries. As discussed, three 
interviewees in particular regarded the maintenance of the psychoanalytic frame as the 
guiding ethical principle that underpinned their daily efforts to secure a well sealed 
therapeutic space. Reflectiveness, self-awareness, thoughtfulness and consciousness were 
likewise consistently foregrounded as an avowed ethical standard. In the context of real-life 
ethical dilemmas, however, the disciplined maintenance of the analytic frame gave way as 
unprocessed affects and potentially harmful boundary “violations‟ as opposed to “crossings” 
emerged (Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Gutheil, 2005; Gutheil & Gabbard, 1993).  
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Self-reflectiveness and the formulation of therapists‟ own idiosyncratic contributions to the 
following countertransference enactments appeared to remain largely absent. The first 
extract below portrays an ongoing nonsexual dual relationship. The countertransference 
enactment found the therapist concerned sitting next to her patient‟s partner. The fragment 
vividly illustrates how the safety of the therapeutic space was predictably endangered by the 
collapse of the structural and relational boundaries of the analytic frame: 
… it‟s the multiple relationships … the … discomfort I felt … in relation to 
this [partner who‟d] probably no idea that [my patient] had spoken about 
very intimate things, … I was sitting there with knowledge [the partner] 
was oblivious to … things were concealed and the frame, I mean, the frame 
just was temporarily … non-existent or completely suspended, I mean, what 
frame? No, it just felt wrong (Interv. 6, p. 221, 32-38). 
In the second example, the boundary of confidentiality, a constituent component of the 
psychoanalytic process (Lear, 2003), was impulsively breached. The identity of the patient 
and the fact of the latter‟s treatment were revealed to nonanalytic third parties, not for 
treatment purposes and in the service of the analytic task but rather to meet the therapist‟s 
personal and social needs:  
Ja, first of all … I spoke to my [spouse] about [the boundary problem], then 
I spoke to [ the patient‟s significant other] about it, not knowing who she 
would speak to … I‟ve got the feeling that she didn‟t speak … about it at 
all, to anybody, but I don‟t know (Interv. 1, p. 10, 1-3). 
Discontinuities between lived professional practice and the ethical ideals of thoughtfulness 
and boundary maintenance emerged in the third example as the research participant 
precipitously implemented her decision to see her relative as a patient. When over a period 
of two years (Interv. 3, p. 83, 8) object relations appeared primarily to take the form of 
projective identification without the benefit of being mediated by an interpreting „I‟ (Ogden, 
1986), psychological boundaries between the therapist and her patient/relative apparently 
blurred. This rendered the patient vulnerable to being unconsciously used as an idealised 
part-object by the therapist to re-establish a sense of familial intimacy and to assuage 
seemingly unresolved childhood feelings pertaining to death, loss and family dispersal: 
… was there a kind of interest that I would like to see her because she is my 
[relative] … there‟s still a connect, a connectiveness which happens when I 
hear about these [family] things and so perhaps unconsciously there was 
another dimension that I would‟ve wanted to see her because she was my 
family, you know, and that saying to her I‟ve got to refer you to someone 
else would‟ve meant I‟d lost that connection (Interv. 3, p. 101, 33-43). 
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The fourth example involves the seeming failure to translate into practice the declared 
commitment to self-awareness and to the ideal of confronting the emotional truth of “who 
we are in relationship together” (Interv. 4, p. 124, 3-5). In the context of sharing a closed 
therapeutic group in the posttermination phase of a nearly two year dual role relationship, the 
role reversal between the therapist and his ex-patient appeared to result in a diminution of 
psychological boundaries and self-other differentiation. The final extract suggests that the 
ex-patient, once the client and now the idealised healer, became the unwitting container for 
his therapist‟s projections and assumed the burden of caring for his former caregiver: 
So now [the patient] was … a member of a support … group that I was also 
a member of … the rules of psychoanalysis say that you shouldn‟t do that 
because … it complicates things and da da da he‟s going to witness me 
going into process and witness me self-disclosing and it‟s going to damage 
the transference. Um now this guy was my patient for nearly two years in a 
psychoanalytic therapy … and he‟s seen me in the most vulnerable of 
spaces, he‟s seen me in inverted commas „as a patient‟ being processed by 
others (Interv. 4, p. 127, 43-44; p. 128, 11-25). 
5. SUMMARY 
Research participants readily identified an array of twelve aspirational ethical principles and 
standards which guided their daily professional practices. These consisted of four 
overarching ethical principles and eight related ethical standards. In apparently descending 
order of significance, the principles included Responsible Caring or Beneficence, Integrity, 
Respect for the Dignity of Persons and Nonmaleficence.  
 
Adherence to clearly articulated avowed ethical principles often seemed to give way in the 
context of real-life ethical dilemmas to countertransference enactments. This suggests that 
efforts to resolve ethical quandaries were motivated not only by rational considerations but 
also by apparently unconscious determinants. Unretrieved enactments, of which the majority 
lasted for over a year, raise disquieting questions with regard to the unconscious role played 
in ethical decision-making by countertransference anxieties and self-serving therapist 
gratifications. The research interviews appeared on occasion to help participants to regain a 
reflective stance wherein renewed commitment to ethical values was demonstrated. 
 
A striking finding was the consistent emphasis research participants placed upon the avowed 
ethical principle of beneficence or Responsible Caring. The latter principle was strongly 
endorsed by all six interviewees. This finding is congruent with the observation made by 
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Knapp and VandeCreek (2007) that beneficence is the principle that is most identified with 
health care professionals. Participants were accordingly deeply concerned with considering 
the best interests of the patient and with promoting the latter‟s emotional and psychological 
well-being. While the moral voice of justice and corresponding concerns with equality and 
fairness were evident, beneficence and Gilligan‟s (1982) ethic of care, which emphasises 
relational commitment and connectedness, appeared to characterise most accurately the 
perceived nature of participants‟ engagement with their patients and their professional work. 
 
The principle of Responsible Caring or beneficence subsumes the ethical standards of 
competence and self-knowledge. Maintaining professional competence emerged as a 
prominent aspirational as well as a lived ethical standard. Participants‟ several descriptions 
revealed their determination to actively seek out new learning opportunities in order to 
increase their professional knowledge and to enhance their clinical skills. Membership of 
professional societies, peer consultation, additional reading as well as receiving regular 
supervision and/or personal therapy provided valuable post-qualifying opportunities for 
continued personal and professional growth. Closely allied to maintaining professional 
competence was the avowed ethical standard of self-knowledge. Thoughtfulness, self-
awareness and consciousness were thus deemed by research participants to be integral to the 
therapeutic endeavour and appeared as a pervasive avowed value throughout the interview 
data. 
 
The overarching ethical principle of Integrity was similarly acknowledged by all participants 
as an aspirational ethical guideline. While clearly reticent to openly and honestly expose 
their professional practices to colleagues, participants provided poignant descriptions of their 
avowed commitment to confronting the emotional truth of the analytic situation. In addition, 
participants courageously and frankly shared in the context of the research interviews several 
instances of exploitiveness, defensiveness and therapeutic failure. In short, Responsible 
Caring or beneficence and Integrity in Relationships emerged from the interview data as 
research participants‟ two dominant avowed ethical principles. 
 
Respect for the Dignity of Persons constituted the third avowed ethical principle. Striving for 
therapeutic relationships which were characterised by “a spirit of respect” (Interv. 6, p. 204, 
4-10) hence comprised a core aspirational principle for four interviewees. Participants 
provided sensitive descriptions of the need to be mindful of, and respectful towards, patients‟ 
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emotional vulnerabilities as well as differences pertaining to the latters‟ age, colour, class 
and culture. While the importance of informed consent and respecting the autonomous 
decision-making ability of patients were briefly mentioned, these did not by contrast emerge 
in the present study as prominent avowed ethical standards.  
 
Perhaps the most unexpected finding was the seeming lack of status accorded to the fourth 
ethical principle. Nonmaleficence apparently constituted the most neglected or “offended” 
(Knapp & VandeCreek, 2007) ethical principle, explicitly receiving only brief and passing 
acknowledgement from two interviewees. Earlier discussion of nonmaleficence in this 
chapter considered both the concept of countertransference management as well as the need 
to avoid multiple relationships where possible. Congruent with the minimising of 
nonmaleficence, the ethical obligation to avoid or to limit potential harm by managing 
personal countertransference was likewise explicitly acknowledged as an avowed ethical 
value by one participant alone. Steere (1984) claims that ethical code injunctions against 
dual role relationships appear to derive from the principle of nonmaleficence. Given the 
striking absence of countertransference management as an avowed ethical value, the 
avoidance of unconsciously gratifying but nonetheless unnecessary dual role relationships 
arguably followed suit, failing to emerge in this study as an aspirational ethical standard. 
This finding is of some concern since multiple relationships rank as the second most 
frequently reported ethical dilemma experienced by South African clinical psychologists 
(Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006; Slack & Wassenaar, 1999) and since four of the seven dilemmas 
described in the present study involved past or current nonsexual dual role relationships.  
 
The directive “primum non nocere” (“above all do no harm”) suggests that nonmaleficence 
assumes a superordinate status among competing ethical principles. Knapp and VandeCreek 
(2007) argue that on the contrary no single ethical principle permanently retains the highest 
priority and that “theoretically any one may be trumped by another depending on the 
circumstances” (p. 399). Earlier discussion of nonmaleficence (see Chapter 2) clarified that 
the non-infliction of harm has by contrast been posited as the “bedrock” (Bersoff, 2003, p. 
44) or governing principle of applied psychology and analytic practice (Brown, 1982; 
Solomon, 2003; Stokoe, 2000). What appears to emerge from the data is the relative absence 
of a collective recognition that the therapeutic encounter potentially mobilises the therapist‟s 
capacity for beneficence but also the latter‟s enduring capacity for unethical behaviour or for 
maleficence. As Epstein and Simon (1990) observe, therapist exploitiveness may manifest 
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along a continuum ranging from gross narcissism and sexual acting out to less severe 
countertransference gratifications including power seeking and enabling behaviours 
unconsciously designed to bolster therapist self-esteem.  
 
In the context of real-life ethical dilemmas, research participants‟ rational consciously held 
avowed ethical principles repeatedly appeared to unravel under the impact of unresolved 
countertransference pressures. Aspirational principles and standards were thus often 
translated, not into congruent professional practices, but into sustained countertransference 
enactments involving ethically compromised behaviours. Bad practice is not about being 
swept up in unconscious processes, however, it is about remaining so (Stokoe, 2000). The 
challenge presented by the data may in part devolve on how to redress the apparent neglect 
of the offended moral principle of nonmaleficence. This suggests, for example, that where 
beneficence is presented as the primary ethical principle informing the therapist‟s conscious 
ethical choices, this does not nullify the obligation to generate “a third area of reflection” 
(Solomon, 2003c, p. 174) wherein to retrospectively examine repeated frame deviations from 
the counterpoles of nonmaleficence and personal countertransference.  
 
Norris et al. (2003) comment that “the bad apple” paradigm hardly provides a satisfying 
explanatory framework whereby the phenomenon of countertransference difficulties and 
boundary violations is resolved through the eviction of a few anomalous “bad” individual 
practitioners. Such an “us-them” divide, Gabbard and Lester (1995) contend, merely 
functions defensively to diminish temporarily therapists‟ own anxieties about their potential 
vulnerability for countertransference enactments and boundary transgressions. Noting the 
shame and professional isolation that frequently surround the clinician grappling with an 
ethical dilemma, Levin, Furlong and O‟Neil (2003) suggest that “there is clearly a lack of 
more general opportunities to exchange firsthand experiences in a context where colleagues 
can speak freely without fear of judgement” (p. 167). 
 
What the data seemingly call for are innovative ways to reinstate nonmaleficence as arguably 
comprising the governing principle of analytic engagement. Foregrounding nonmaleficence 
may involve local forums and societies in thoughtful consideration of both principle-based 
ethical decision-making as well as the countertransference dimension of clinical practice. In 
a hopefully open and nonjudgmental manner, collegial discussion might then embrace the 
likelihood that common ethical dilemmas arising in the therapeutic space routinely appear to 
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provoke enactment phenomena and to mobilise anti-analytic countertransference impulses or 
desires. Discussion of the unconscious and sometimes self-serving dimension attendant upon 
the resolution of dilemmas may see the dismantling of the idealised notion of the 
professional caregiver as uniformly beneficent as well as provide a useful reminder that “the 
therapist‟s countertransference … [is] indeed … the single most important conceptual link to 
ethical practice” (Hewitt, 2003, p. 35).  
 
In the light of the foregoing observations, the next chapter explores the impact of 
unconscious determinants and countertransference phenomena on the ethical decision-
making process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE COUNTERTRANSFERENCE DIMENSION OF REAL-LIFE 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research participants‟ subjective experiences of real-life ethical dilemmas appeared to 
reveal an unanticipated disjunction between espoused ethical principles and lived clinical 
practice. Intense countertransference affects seemingly dislodged interviewee‟s conscious 
adherence to avowed ethical principles over periods of time ranging from eight weeks to 
three years. Reading Guide questions elicited data pertaining not only to the fate of avowed 
principles but also to the impact of unresolved countertransference responses on ethical 
decision-making enactments. Noting the proliferation of professional literature on 
countertransference, Louw and Pitman (2001) observe that the final decades of the 
twentieth century may come to be designated as “the countertransference years” (p. 748). In 
this chapter, countertransference constitutes the central theoretical „hub‟ from which 
participants‟ idiosyncratic responses to real-life ethical dilemmas is explored.  
 
In the context of the emotionally charged therapeutic relationship, countertransference may 
be mobilised “as a virtue” but also “as a vice” (Louw and Pitman, 2001, p. 754). As 
discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 3), countertransference as a virtue encompasses 
the notion that the therapist‟s subjectivity or inner experiences may be harnessed in the 
service of deepening an empathic understanding of the patient‟s hidden internal object 
world (Casement, 1985; Ivey, 1992; Jacobs, 1993; Renik, 1993; Sandler, 1976). “Nudged” 
(Sandler, 1976) and “bullied” (Symington, 1990) by the interpersonal pressures exerted by 
the patient, the therapist may unwittingly find him/herself playing out a prescribed role in a 
potentially benign enactment scripted by the patient‟s internal object world.  
Countertransference may be considered as “a joint creation” (Gabbard, 1995) wherein the 
patient unconsciously seeks to actualise particular responses in the therapist but it is the 
latter‟s own pre-existing internal conflicts and self and object representations that “shape” 
the final countertransference outcome (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). Such benign 
countertransference enactments include the effort to secure, retrospectively and in 
collaboration with the patient, a deeper understanding of the latter‟s psyche rather than 
inappropriately gratifying the therapist‟s archaic needs. 
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Countertransference as a vice by contrast encompasses the notion that therapeutic progress 
ceases or is at least impeded as the therapist‟s unresolved emotional difficulties and 
“unwashed psyche” (Stein, 1984) are restimulated in the interaction with the patient. It is a 
distortion, Racker (1957) argues, to conceive of analysis as an “interaction between a sick 
person and a healthy one … it is an interaction between two personalities, in both of which 
the ego is under pressure … each personality has its … dependencies, anxieties, and 
pathological defences … and each … responds to every event of the analytic situation” (p. 
162). Racker‟s statement suggests that the therapeutic interaction may on occasion be 
skewed by the therapist‟s unconscious exploitation of the patient; the therapeutic couple 
accordingly can potentially collapse into a therapeutic misalliance (Langs, 1975) or malign 
countertransference enactment.  
 
A continuum may be envisaged that charts the relative contributions of the patient and of 
the therapist to the countertransference enactment concerned. At one end lie those 
enactments where the patient attempts to induce the therapist into complying with an 
“internal cast of characters” (Gabbard, 1994) or into actualising an internal object relation. 
In collaboration with the patient, the therapist optimally uses countertransference as a virtue 
to discover and to construct retrospectively the meaning of the enactment concerned 
(Gabbard, 1995; 1997). At the other end, when countertransference as a vice is mobilised, 
contrasting malign therapist-driven countertransference enactments may occur. Louw and 
Pitman (2001) add that enactments may be viewed as “acute” or “chronic”, resulting from 
patient-centred or analyst-centred actualisations respectively. “Acute” patient-centred 
enactments appear less egregious and may even be helpful since the “boundary crossings” 
entailed are likely to constitute single incidents that are “caught” by the therapist, thought 
about and then interpreted or openly discussed with the patient in an attempt to advance 
understanding of the transference relationship (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). Chronic analyst-
centred enactments, however, gratify “the analyst‟s personal motivation … at the expense 
of exploring the analysand‟s transference” (Louw and Pitman, 2001, p. 757). Such malign 
enactments characteristically include repetitive boundary violations that are neither 
“caught” nor brought to consciousness. The latter enactments are usually not rationally 
discussed with the patient or in formal supervision and they typically result in unequivocal 
harm being wrought to the therapeutic relationship (Anonymous, 2005; Glass, 2003; 
Gutheil, 2005; Gutheil & Gabbard, 1993).  
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The six core ethical dilemmas presented by research participants may be construed as 
principally involving therapist-centred ethical decision-making enactments. Examination of 
the data in this chapter reveals three related areas of interest. The chapter considers, firstly, 
the emergence of four levels of differentiation discernable in participants‟ capacity for 
thinking and ethical decision-making. Rather than privileging rational cognitions alone, the 
possible meanings of the bodily and visceral countertransference experiences reported by 
interviewees are also explored and integrated into an interpretive account of the 
phenomenon of ethical decision-making enactments. Potential linkages are revealed 
between unprocessed countertransference arousal and its impact on premature ethical 
decision-making as well as on enduring decision-making enactments.  
 
The chapter examines, secondly, inner moral “voices” and research participants‟ subjective 
concerns as well as countertransference fantasies, images and metaphors. Analysis of the 
data suggests that participants‟ reported phenomenological experience provides empirical 
support for Day‟s (1991) notion of an “inner moral audience” to whom the moral agent or 
actor feels accountable. Thus interviewees describe a multiplicity of “voices” that 
comprised their “inner moral audience”, including those of familiar colleagues, analysts and 
supervisors. Surprising conflicts, deficits and absences in the “inner audience”, however, 
gradually become evident.  
 
In a similar vein, Tappan (1991) writes that “authoring” an authentic moral account entails 
drawing on “internally persuasive discourses” or the internalised “voices” of helpful inner 
others which are integrated into one‟s own increasingly independent moral “voice” or 
perspective. But participants provided evidence not only of contrasting “authoritative 
discourses” (Tappan, 1991), which demanded unthinking obedience to statutory and legal 
injunctions, but also of struggling to access “internally persuasive discourses” that might 
have aided their “authoring” of ethically sound resolutions of the dilemmas concerned. 
Vivid imagery arose which depicted participants‟ subjective experiences of impoverished 
reflective spaces and the need for nonjudgemental, ethically attuned consultation or 
supervision was repeatedly voiced.  
 
The chapter considers, thirdly, the relevance to ethical decision-making of the traditional 
wounded-healer paradigm which is reconfigured from an object relations perspective. For 
  186 
the most part, the data suggest that participants were identified with a professional image of 
themselves as healthy, expert caregivers whose primary interest lay in healing patients‟ 
emotional wounds. Research participants‟ psychodynamic formulations appeared to reveal, 
however, the “countertransference piece that gets skipped” (Interv. 4, p. 123, 28); hence a 
noticeable absence emerged regarding the therapist‟s acknowledgement of his/her own 
potential contribution to the chronic decision-making enactments. Bruising encounters with 
real-life ethical dilemmas and with the research interviews challenged the vulnerable image 
of the “healer-redeemer” (Groesbeck, 1975). Reluctant exposure of countertransference 
“wounds” accordingly revealed participants‟ feelings of anxiety, vulnerability, anger and 
shame. A therapist-driven countertransference enactment unexpectedly emerged in the 
research interview and is discussed below. This fragment seemingly supports the notion 
that, when real-life ethical dilemmas mobilise countertransference as a vice, the healer‟s 
idiosyncratic internal object world may become deeply implicated in the process of ethical 
decision-making.  
 
The summary which concludes this chapter draws together the main findings pertaining to 
the three foregoing areas of interest. In particular, it is suggested that self-analysis or self-
monitoring of ethical blind spots and biases comprises a contradiction and an arguably 
problematic practice in South Africa since no formal training in psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy is currently available. An alternative approach is broached which suggests 
that the requisite third area of reflection may be secured through regular peer supervision 
and consultation. Use of the wounded-healer model in postqualifying ethics training may 
also contribute to securing a much needed professional space wherein to implement the 
normative practice of examining anti-analytic impulses and interventions.  
2. THE FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
The ethical demands inherent in psychotherapy cannot be resolved solely by appeal to 
universal ethical principles (Betan, 1997). From a hermeneutic perspective, ethical 
understanding and interpretation of a dilemma emerges from the dialectical movement 
between moral reasoning about universal ethical principles and sensitivity to the subjectivity 
and particular context of the individual therapist, in which each pole informs the other. 
Ethical judgment is accordingly not objective and value free but continues to be “subject to 
projections, distortions, identifications, sways and pulls” (Betan, 1977, p. 355). This 
theoretical acknowledgement of the centrality of the therapeutic context and of the 
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therapist‟s subjectivity paves the way for the following exploration of the impact on the 
individual decision-maker of powerful countertransference affects generated by real-life 
ethical dilemmas (Abramson, 1996).  
 
Of particular interest are four apparent levels of differentiation discernible in participants‟ 
capacity for thinking and ethical decision-making. Distilled from examination of the ethical 
decision-making pathways described in the professional literature (see Chapter 3) as well as 
from analysis of the interview transcripts, the four levels provide an organising framework 
for the discussion of participants‟ accounts of the different elements which comprised their 
countertransference arousal. Bion‟s (1962) concept of the “container-contained”, as well as 
Ogden‟s (1989) delineation of the dialectical interplay between synchronic modes of 
generating psychological experience, inform the following exploration of the different 
decision-making levels concerned.  
2.1. Level I: Prereflective Identification of an Ethical Dilemma 
Da Silva (in Levin et al., 2003), following Bion (1963), comments that the process of 
thinking commences with an emotional experience. Such experience is first registered as a 
bodily event before being transformed through dreams and symbol formation into thinking 
and meaning. The real-life dilemmas encountered by research participants appeared to be 
invaded by a conglomeration of apparently unprocessed feelings, fantasies, images, inner 
moral “voices” and unintegrated childhood memories. Britton (1992) and Wilson (2007) 
observe that the infant‟s unprocessed feelings or “Beta elements” constitute the precursors 
of thought and that, prior to their “sojourn” (Bion, 1962) and transformation into something 
more mental in the “container” of the good breast, these elements are originally near-
sensory and somatic in character. Writing from a constructivist perspective, Stern (1983) 
argues that “unformulated material”, some of which will never enter consciousness, pertains 
to “murky” experience which has not yet attained sufficient clarification or differentiation to 
allow for the application of the traditional defence mechanisms. 
 
Data analysis revealed several striking reports by participants of visceral or somatic states 
which signalled the advent of the prereflective identification of the ethical dilemma 
concerned. Strong bodily reactions also manifested subsequently as the dilemma unfolded 
as well as occasionally during recall in the context of the research interviews. The latter 
“Beta elements” were not apparently processed and contained; they accordingly remained 
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untransformed “on the boundary of somatic and psychic experience, of mental and 
physical” (Britton, 1992, p. 105). Thus the prereflective or first level of ethical decision-
making often appeared from the start to be rooted in strong countertransference arousal and 
physiological reactions, the psychological implications of which had not yet been 
cognitively grasped. In the following extract, for example, David gave the following 
account of his immediate „gut‟ reaction to his gay patient‟s disclosure of sexual 
involvement with a former therapist: 
Shock …. Shock.  „Cause …. I‟d been working with this boy for some 
months and I was aware that he‟d had a lover and … that he was in therapy 
with a [mental health practitioner]. He‟d not revealed that the lover was 
the [practitioner] … When he told me, I just felt shock … I mean, I actually 
felt my body grow cold when the two came together …. (Interv. 2, p. 44, 
28-39). 
When Gillian initially realised that her patient‟s parent was her cousin, she similarly 
described a powerful affective response: 
Well, I think just when I realized that her [parent] was my cousin I felt 
shocked, I felt really shocked and I felt, gosh, you know, I must actually 
talk to my supervisor about this (Interv. 3, p. 86, 39-41).  
In the next excerpt, Cathy recalled her first responses to anticipated social contact with the 
ex-patient‟s significant other. Behind the social veneer and the participant‟s overtly 
conciliatory attitude lay an apparent sense of threat and anxiety:  
... it was a sinking feeling „cause I knew it was going to be complicated  um 
I responded socially, saying, yes, of course, „cause I knew I needed some 
time to think about it … (Interv. 1, p. 12, 37-39).  
Anxiety and feelings of uncertainty signalled the start of a nonsexual dual role relationship 
and the “slippery slope” phenomenon (Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Glass, 2003; Gutheil & 
Gabbard, 1993; Simon, 1989):  
… when [the patient] told me in the session [that he‟d] registered for [my] 
workshop, … an alarm bell went off in my head, I remember it very clearly, 
thinking „Oh, shit!‟ … going to have this guy in my workshop now and he‟s 
a patient of mine … I remember thinking that I wasn‟t sure what to do, like 
I felt unprepared for that (Interv. 4, p. 134, 14-21).  
Vague feelings of uneasiness and the metaphor of an alarm bell appeared again when 
Theresa first confronted the prospect of a nonsexual dual role relationship in an 
organisational context:  
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... a little alarm bell … went off … around both of us … being employed by 
the same organisation ... I felt niggled by it … I don‟t think I realized what I 
was actually getting myself into, I didn‟t realize how toxic the situation 
would become, how dangerous it would become ... I had no idea, really, 
that it would become that bad (Interv. 6, p. 214, 35-46). 
Grosz (1994) claims that consciousness is always corporeally constituted and that “mind … 
is always embodied, always based on corporeal and sensory relations” (p. 86). Day (1991) 
points out that, contrary to Kohlberg‟s assertion that cognition alone is responsible for 
moral action, research suggests that affect as well as cognition influences the 
“judgement-action” relationship and that both together combine to drive moral 
performance. Kitchener (1984; 1986) suggests that the strong emotional arousal that 
precedes reflectiveness is critical for ordinary everyday ethical decision-making and that it 
may indicate an intuitive level of moral reasoning or “an immediate, prereflective response 
to most ethical situations based on the sum of [an individual‟s] prior ethical knowledge and 
experience” (p. 44). Thus across the interviews, research participants‟ prereflective or „gut‟ 
reactions appeared to usher in the first level of ethical decision-making and to signal the 
original presence of the real-life dilemma concerned.  
2.2. Level II: Registering Continuing Somatic or Emotional Countertransference 
Arousal 
Da Silva (2003) suggests that we have a great reluctance to learn about ourselves and need 
to be reminded of Oedipus‟ prototypical attempt to blind himself to the unbearable truth. 
Similarly, Ogden (1989) comments that “Not knowing deprives us of our sense of who we 
are, and yet to know is to see that which we cannot bear to see” (p. 3). The second level of 
ethical decision-making in the therapeutic space often appears to be characterised by the 
need to keep unacceptable or “undigestible” thoughts and feelings out of awareness. The 
following five fragments provide evidence across the interviews of fears and anxieties 
which were not worded but which were apparently largely expelled into somatic or bodily 
states.  
 
Examination of the interview data reveals that Cathy commented seventeen times on her 
difficulties in thinking about the triangular dynamics involved in the dilemma concerned.  
Over a period of eight weeks (Interv. 1, p.8, 11-12; 30), the participant found herself 
grappling with feelings of confusion, acute discomfort and disappointment. The extract 
below however suggests a more primitive, somatically based dimension of subjective 
experience:  
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 ... but I also got a sick feeling, I got a sick feeling in my stomach, ja, about 
it. Um I didn‟t really want to think about it very much … it felt too 
complicated, it felt, as I say, this sick feeling and the way I dealt with it 
(very softly) was to push it away (Interv. 1, p.16, 17-38). 
When Riaan spoke of his repeated decisions not to follow up or to report statutory rape, 
“unspeakable” feelings of fear and anxiety appeared suddenly to well up and to find bodily 
expression in the research interview. The pain blocking Riaan‟s throat could be understood 
as somatisation of difficulties in thinking about and voicing his own as yet unheard and 
unprocessed story of childhood abuse: 
P: I‟m finding it … anxiety provoking, this … going back … some of the 
detail has been lost [but] the feelings aren‟t lost ... This is coming up, 
I‟m feeling, ja, just when you asked that question, I‟m kind of, kind of 
feeling it here.  
 (Participant holds his throat) 
R: What are you feeling in your throat? 
P: Ja. 
R: What is that, that you’re pointing to your throat? 
P: Pain … I mean I, I should be in therapy and two weeks ago in 
supervision, I kind of broke down … I grew up in a home where there 
was violence … and … the scar, in the end, hasn‟t gone away (Interv. 5, 
p. 177, 6-36).  
“Beta elements” which are expelled into the body, perceptual sphere or action (Britton, 
1992) suggest not only the absence or breakdown of a “container” (Bion, 1962) but also the 
related need to keep “unthinkable” emotional experience at bay or out of awareness. 
“Unformulated experience” or “familiar chaos”, Stern (1993) comments, may constitute a 
state of mind that is familiar and comforting but it is potentially defensively perpetuated in 
the service of the wish not to think and hence not to learn. Thus Stern (1983) argues that it is 
phenomenologically plausible to suggest that “disturbing glimmers of meaning” (p. 92), of 
which we may be momentarily aware, can lead to the discarding or decaying of a disturbing 
thought or feeling before it is fully formed. The next fragment suggests, for example, that 
Cathy‟s earlier description of “a sick feeling in [her] stomach” pertains to the possible 
defensive somatisation of disturbing feelings and nascent thoughts. Apparently unconscious 
hostility directed at a former spouse of her current partner appeared to drive Cathy‟s 
premature decision to breach confidentiality regarding a patient‟s treatment. This unsolicited 
information had the effect of rendering the former spouse acutely uncomfortable:  
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But I felt that … I‟d been too unconscious and I‟m not too sure what level of 
unconsciousness I‟m talking about (laughs) … that I‟d allowed myself not 
to think about it (Interv. 1, p. 10, 31-33).  
I wonder what the word is (pauses) because „dangerous‟ feels too, too 
harsh? Risky, I suppose. Risky in terms of relying on somebody out there 
who’s not even a psychologist to keep the boundary safe (laughs). (Interv. 
1, p. 14, 22-24) 
Resistance is similarly evident in the next extracts as disquieting “glimmers of meaning” 
threaten to emerge into consciousness. Two participants described working with intense 
homoerotic transference relationships. Heimann (1960) and Sandler (1976) comment on the 
therapist‟s need for “free-floating attention” but also for a “free-floating” emotional 
responsiveness which facilitates attunement to the patient‟s unconscious communications 
about his/her internal object world. Common to both descriptions of homoerotic 
transference, however, appears to be a sense of anxiety and countertransference feelings of 
cautiousness or guardedness. The potential meanings of these affects were not apparently 
brought to conscious awareness but they found instead bodily or somatic expression. Such 
emotional inaccessibility may be indicative of defensive “counter-resistance” to the 
patient‟s unconscious communications (Ivey, 1999). Thus when a research participant 
confronted the dilemma of a gay colleague‟s sexual misconduct, he reported, but could not 
elaborate on, the potential meanings of his “decision” to carefully monitor his own physical 
responsiveness to young male patients:  
... for a while I had disturbed sleep, ... felt very confused, very angry … with 
that came little bits of paranoia … looking at other therapists and 
wondering … [There] was a period of a lot of caution around working with 
my own male child patients, ... being extra careful and extra cautious … 
„cause … when you work with little children, often they‟ll climb on you … 
there‟s a lot of tactile stuff going on … a part of me ... felt an extra need to 
keep a boundary between myself and … particularly boy patients, in 
particular … (Interv. 2, p. 39, 5-18). 
Despite her gay patient‟s expressed desire to terminate and repeated attempts “to sabotage” 
the therapeutic space, Theresa acknowledged that she had nevertheless made the apparently 
paradoxical decision “to promote” and “to push” for continuation of the therapy (Interv. 6, 
p. 207, 50-51). This unretrieved enactment was characterised by inhibited 
countertransference responses of guardedness and of marked bodily reactions to the 
patient‟s sexually charged overtures:  
... I had ... strong bodily reactions … I would feel ... almost like the hair on 
my back lift …. I‟d become increasingly on guard around ... attempts to 
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expose me ... She‟d actually say “What‟s your girlfriend‟s name?” ... 
moments like that where ... I would ... get ... a strong physical reaction as if 
my body was saying don’t invade, don’t, don’t do that! (Interv. 6, p. 213, 
41-48; p. 214, 1-14). 
Meissner (1994) comments that the conscious and unconscious dimensions of psychic life 
are mutually implicative and take place simultaneously. In relation to ethical decision-
making, Meissner (1994) asks whether “ethical reflection [can] run its course without any 
regard for the unconscious determinants … that dog its footsteps stride for stride?” (p. 470). 
In short, the preceding five fragments suggest that ethical decision-making at the second 
level may often be defensively organized around the need to keep Meissner‟s (1994) 
“unconscious determinants” or Stern‟s (1983) disturbing “glimmers of meaning” from 
emerging into conscious awareness.  
2.3. Level III: Naming Countertransference Arousal 
At the next and third level, whilst unconscious determinants apparently remained outside 
awareness, some elements of countertransference arousal were retrospectively identified 
and brought to language. In the following extracts, for example, Patrick spoke of the 
anxieties and fears that had surrounded his „decision‟ to continue to engage with a 
nonsexual dual role relationship: 
… we continued to work in the therapy and have this contact outside and it 
was tremen… very anxiety provoking for me and I felt like if, if I was found 
out, so to speak, that I was having this dual relationship ... that I‟d be, in 
inverted commas, “in trouble” ... (Interv. 4, p. 126, 22-25). 
 
I was aware that there weren‟t any (pauses) legal or (pauses) Board 
boundaries that I was breaking … although initially I wondered if I was and 
I had a lot of fear around that initially … (Interv. 4, p. 132, 2-6). 
When Gillian accepted her family member as a new patient, she noted that “questions of 
countertransference” were not thought about much either by herself or by the supervisor 
concerned (Interv. 3, p. 103, 41-44). Yet talking about the ethical dilemma in the research 
interview evoked tearful behaviour and, as the following fragment shows, stimulated 
feelings of sadness and loss:  
... it brings up feelings of feeling sad about our family in a way being 
separated and my sibs being far away and just a loss of an incredibly 
intense experience with that side of the family when I was young ... (Interv. 
3, p. 90, 46-48). 
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While different affective responses were identified at this third level, the unconscious 
determinants driving the premature „decisions‟ to accept, and then to continue, with a non-
sexual dual role relationship appeared to remain outside conscious awareness. In a context 
where the therapist had suffered personal deprivation and family breakdown, consistent 
contact with the patient/family member appeared to secure a gratifying “link” (Interv. 3, 
p.81, 1-7) to memories of emotionally supportive childhood figures and places. The 
following extract, one of many interview texts, emerged from Gillian‟s exploration of a 
family matrix shared by therapist and patient alike. It is situated in the context of a long 
vanished family farm; feelings of sadness are again articulated and a sense of yearning is 
voiced for a childhood space symbolic of freedom, emotional nurturance and aliveness:  
… it was a very beautiful, amazing place [with] a sense of incredible 
freedom … they were very happy moments for me … in a context of my own 
childhood, which wasn‟t very happy … I think …. what comes up is sadness 
… for loss of … a kind of innocent … space … and the memories of these … 
young sons who … looked after me, … so in the dark … when I was afraid 
… one would come with a candle … but there is a sense of loss „cos that 
part of my life has gone (Interv. 3, p. 82, 1-21).  
One striking aspect of premature ethical decision-making was the unexpected appearance in 
three of the dilemmas involving nonsexual dual role relationships of the “slippery slope” 
phenomenon with its characteristic repetition of boundary violations. Gabbard and Lester 
(1995) caution that the dynamics of nonsexual boundary violations frequently resemble 
those of sexual boundary transgressions since a gradual escalation from minor irregularities 
to more seriously exploitative behaviour is likely to occur in both contexts. Later 
interpersonal boundary transgressions, Gabbard and Lester (1995) suggest, are the 
expression of an earlier erosion of inner boundaries between self and object representations. 
The therapist may thus gradually come to consider the idealised patient as “a soul mate” and 
the therapeutic relationship as capable of generating a perfect understanding between its 
two members. These observations appear to be borne out by the following examples:  
I don‟t think that I realised how ... radical ... this sort of dilemma was that I 
negotiated … how successful it was … it didn‟t all happen at once, it was a 
slow process ... it slowly occurred over time. It wasn‟t like this sudden dual 
relationship ... it was a process over two years, fortunately it was like that 
because it, it allowed for a lot of time for adjusting and working through, 
imagine if one had to suddenly do that, it would be overwhelming ... 
(Interv. 4, p. 129, 22-31). 
Descent down the “slippery slope” apparently to culminated in a relationship which saw the 
final erosion of inner, interpersonal and therapeutic boundaries: 
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... our relationship is definitely one in which (pauses) we should honour the 
contact we‟ve had together, we shouldn‟t separate ... It‟s much deeper than 
that ... So we‟ve become very good friends ... he ... came to my [celebration] 
and he ... was with us on holiday, ... we had coffee, we‟re mates, we‟re 
friends (Interv. 4, p. 128, 15-21). 
Previous discussion of ethical decision-making pathways (see Chapter 3) suggested that 
ethical dilemmas arising in the therapeutic space often evoke the analyst‟s own unresolved 
“narrow countertransference” responses. Unexamined countertransference anxieties may 
find disruptive and repeated behavioural expression in ethical decision-making enactments. 
Since the latter enactments are not subjected to post-enactment scrutiny, the risk of harmful 
consequences to the patient is arguably heightened. Relating these theoretical ideas to real-
life dilemmas, the data in this chapter suggests that prereflective somatically based 
countertransference arousal may often accompany the earlier phases of the ethical decision-
making process. Given that the paranoid-schizoid mode seemingly predominates, defensive 
strategies are apparently organised around the need to keep disturbing thoughts and feelings 
out of conscious awareness. At these earlier levels of decision-making, the data accordingly 
suggest that interviewees‟ thinking often appears to reveal the relative absence of an 
interpreting subject who experiences guilt and concern and who can reflectively mediate 
between themselves and their experience (Ogden, 1989).  
2.4. Level IV: Recovery of Reflective Space and Thoughtful Ethical Decision-Making 
While numerous examples of depressive position functioning were evident across the 
interviews, only two appeared to connote the fourth and advanced level of ethical decision-
making. Partial insight into Meissner‟s (1994) “unconscious determinants” was accordingly 
achieved. In contrast with the three preceding levels of decision-making, the context of the 
research interview appeared to have inadvertently provided “a third area of reflection” 
(Solomon, 2003c, p. 174). Thus in-depth exploration of the dynamics of a nonsexual dual 
role relationship apparently facilitated fleeting recognition and formulation of the 
possibility that Gillian‟s original decision to enter into a therapeutic relationship with her 
relative was organised by the hitherto unconscious need to circumvent the threatened loss of 
yet another family fragment: 
... and so perhaps unconsciously there was another dimension that I 
would‟ve wanted to see her because she was my family ... and that saying to 
her I‟ve got to refer you to someone else would have meant I‟d have lost 
that connection (Interv. 3, p. 101, 40-43). 
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Analysis of the text suggests that what apparently could not be fully apprehended was the 
ongoing impact on the transference-countertransference relationship of the therapist‟s 
unconscious attempts to ward off depressive pain pertaining to loss, family dispersal, death 
and the process of mourning. The sustained “decision” to continue to treat a family member 
can therefore be understood as an unretrieved principally therapist-driven ethical decision-
making enactment. The latter enactment appeared to comprise a repeated unconscious 
attempt to re-unite not only the fragmented family unit externally but also to cohere split or 
fragmented aspects of an internal object world.  
 
Similarly, while exploring his decisions not to follow up or to report the statutory rape of a 
minor, Riaan expressed guilt in relation to his young patient and commented on a 
previously unconscious identification with an overwhelmed, passive parental part-object 
representation that had failed to care for him: 
... while we were talking now, this previous hour, I thought about ... two 
things ... it doesn‟t help to report and … the other one was … a kind of 
guilt, ja, well, you‟re doing the same … I mean I didn’t think it at the time 
but … ja, you‟re an adult now, it‟s safe for you … I‟m just wondering 
whether the fact that I didn‟t [report] was about … doing the same as 
people might have done when I was in that position myself or similar 
position myself (Interv. 5, p. 188, 44-48; p. 189, 1-8).  
In relation to the final ethical decision-making pathway discussed earlier (see Chapter 3), 
the foregoing two extracts are similarly distinguished by the therapist‟s renewed 
thoughtfulness and by his/her willingness to submit disturbing countertransference affects 
to post-enactment scrutiny. This arguably mature level of decision-making is characterised 
by Britton‟s (1998) critical third position where it becomes possible to tolerate object 
relationships not only as a participant but as an observer and as a witness. What 
distinguishes these extracts is participants‟ passing experience of themselves not as objects 
“buffeted” by thoughts, feelings and perceptions but as interpreting subjects who can, if 
only briefly, mediate between themselves and their experience and who clearly assume 
responsibility for their psychological actions (Ogden, 1989). The emergence of Stern‟s 
(1983) “glimmers of meaning” and insight into possible linkages between participants‟ 
ethical decision-making and their personal countertransference appears however to have 
been rapidly disestablished. The following fragment provides an example of how an 
advanced phase of ethical reflection may be succeeded by the re-emergence of paranoid-
schizoid functioning: 
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[There‟s] … anxiety around information getting out …. how many mental 
healthcare professionals are working in these sort of settings? … the other 
thing is that [the research interviews have] evoked a lot of emotion around 
that case ... it‟s … highlighted a sense of being alone out there … it‟s too 
big for me, it just feels, now, so what? … I can‟t take it to supervision 
„cause I don‟t have time there for this … old case or emotions … and I‟m 
not in therapy … (Interv. 5, p. 194, 1-19).  
Bion (1963) and Ogden (1989) emphasise the continuous oscillation or dialectical 
movement between different modes of generating psychological experience where “Each 
mode creates, preserves and negates the other” (Ogden, 1989, p. 4). By contrast, ethical 
decision-making models often seem to be portrayed in the professional literature as 
characterised primarily by depressive position functioning and by linear thinking which 
proceeds through a series of well-defined steps of ethical analysis (Betan, 1997; Day, 1991). 
Yet examination of the data suggests that the four levels of ethical decision-making did not 
unfold in an orderly sequential pattern. Each dilemma appeared rather to encompass not a 
single but a series of overlapping acts of ethical decision-making. Participants‟ descriptions 
of their struggles with real-life dilemmas provided strong evidence across the interviews of 
multiple shifts between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. While the original 
process of decision-making appeared to transpire in the absence of a “third area of 
reflection” (Solomon, 2003c, p. 174) and in a predominantly paranoid-schizoid mode, 
Ogden (1989) observes that no one position can exist independently or is permanently 
foregrounded in the dialectical and synchronic interplay between the different modes of 
generating experience. Thus, for example, depressive position functioning and the phase of 
mature ethical decision-making temporarily emerged through the medium of the research 
interview which seemingly provided “the creative potential of the third, whether a third 
person, a third position or a third dimension” (Solomon, 2003c, p. 169). Unprocessed new 
anxieties, however, soon followed and saw the disestablishment of this third area of 
reflection and the emergence once again of the paranoid-schizoid functioning that was 
characteristic of earlier phases of decision-making.  
3. COUNTERTRANSFERENCE FANTASIES, IMAGES, MORAL VOICES AND 
SUBJECTIVE CONCERNS 
Although one or other psychological mode may temporarily predominate, the autistic-
contiguous, paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are all present in every facet of 
human experience (Ogden 1989). Rich descriptive accounts of inner moral “voices”, 
countertransference fantasies, images and participants‟ subjective concerns helped to clarify 
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which mode appeared to be foregrounded at different points in the interview texts, 
stimulating consideration of possible factors which facilitated shifts from one mode to 
another.  
 
Characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position are splitting, projective identification and 
the related effort to secure safety “by separating the endangered from the endangering” 
(Ogden, 1989, p. 22). Thus positive self and object representations are rendered 
discontinuous and kept safely separate from contamination by their negative and 
endangering counterparts (Gabbard, 1989; Ogden, 1986). As a consequence of the 
evacuation of bad or aggressive parts of the self or internal objects into an external object, 
which is subsequently experienced as persecutory, the leading anxiety is paranoid and 
preoccupation is with the survival of the self (Rosenfeld, 1988).  
 
The following descriptions highlight the apparently threatening psychological terrain in 
which countertransference fantasies, images and inner “voices” were frequently situated. 
These descriptions suggest that the paranoid-schizoid mode predominated and that 
projective identification conceived of as an interpersonal elaboration of an intrapsychic 
splitting process (Bion, 1962; Ivey, 2004; Ogden, 1986) was instrumental in generating the 
often persecutory context in which the dilemmas unfolded:  
[there] is a sense of … mistrusting my patient … part of my fear … was 
that somehow he could entrap me in a similar [sexual] dynamic … that was 
the intensity of the paranoia, I suppose, that was floating around, in the 
whole dilemma … (Interv. 2, p. 49, 50; p. 50, 9-11). 
 
… if you have a child patient who‟s wanting to stick a knife in, you‟re not 
saying something around how you think he feels or … what his object 
relations are, you have to say, no, you are not sticking a knife into me! 
(Interv. 2, p. 50, 26-29).  
 
… there were a lot of paranoid elements … it was very persecutory … 
psychically speaking, there was a lot of danger, predatory danger, should 
my patient launch a full-on attack … and make a complaint … essentially 
like fuck [the practitioner] up and have him struck off the roll … (Interv. 2, 
p. 62, 12-15). 
3.1. The Inner Moral Audience and its Many Voices 
Day (1991) writes that narratives or stories about ethical dilemmas typically unfold before 
the subject‟s “inner moral audience” whose „members‟ are crucial to decision-making or to 
the mediation of the “judgment-action” relationship. The moral actor thus always holds 
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him/herself accountable to exemplary inner presences which comprise the “inner audience” 
and which could include, for example, deceased others, family members, work associates or 
even literary characters. The moral actor “rehearses” and explains anticipated courses of 
action before the watchful but supportive gaze of the “inner audience” in order to effect 
judgment and to discern more accurately the sense or meanings anticipated ethical actions 
might hold. Rehearsing his/her understanding of the dilemma before these influential inner 
figures also allows the moral actor “to recruit” from them additional meanings and 
interpretations pertaining to potential actions and to resolution of the dilemma concerned. 
The course of action finally adopted is consistent with and guided by the moral perspective 
and standards of the “inner audience” which the subject seeks to uphold. Judgment and 
action, argues Day (1991), are brought together through the act of narration and “produce a 
psychological house in which [the moral actor] can dwell” (p. 33).  
 
What is not considered in Day‟s account of what may be construed as an elaboration of the 
ego ideal, are the possible unconscious presences or “superego lacunae” (Meissner, 1994) 
that inhabit the “inner audience” and that may in part be responsible for the self-interested 
“judgment-action” discontinuities discussed in previous chapters. Thus not all inner 
presences are necessarily benign or supportive. The following fragment, for example, 
provides an intriguing window onto Cathy‟s “rehearsal” of alternative courses of action 
before an “inner moral audience” comprised of “Lynn” and “Nadine” - two internal 
“colleagues”. The insinuating “non-therapist” (Interv. 1, p. 14, 13) voice of “Nadine” urges 
the easy (and ethical) way out of a looming dual role relationship: 
… if I consulted Lynn she would tell me one thing but if I consulted Nadine 
she would tell me the other and Lynn, I thought, would say most definitely 
not, you must not see this [patient‟s] father [at dinner] and … Nadine 
would say, you‟ve a different name from your practice, I practice under my 
maiden name … so the father wouldn‟t make the link anyway and um I 
could have dinner and nobody would be any the wiser (Interv. 1, p. 8, 15-
21). 
 
Discussion in the previous chapter of “Avowed vs Lived Values” saw the emergence from 
the interview texts of the two moral voices of justice and care. Brown, Debold, Tappan and 
Gilligan (1991) write that use of the Reading Guide facilitates “a polyphonic view” of 
interview texts; hence the researcher‟s multiple readings of the data each “amplifies” 
different voices and perspectives implicit in the moral conflict concerned. Application of 
the Reading Guide to the interview transcripts accordingly appeared to reveal the presence 
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of a multiplicity of unprocessed “voices” and “hundreds” of stories (Interv. 5, p. 181, 2) that 
suffused the body of text. Some “voices” were harsh and condemnatory, others muted, 
silenced or even noticeably absent. Commenting on Freud‟s notion that the rightness or 
wrongness of behaviour is governed by two regulatory systems, Solomon (2003a) writes 
that the superego pertains to prohibited behaviour and to “the internalisation of (usually) the 
parental figures representing power and authority and capable of evoking in talionic ways 
such affects as shame, humiliation, the fear of revenge, and the desire for triumph” (p. 22). 
By contrast, the ego ideal is “based on agapaic emotions such as empathic guilt and the 
wish to preserve and identify with the internalised good parents” (Solomon, 2003a, p. 22). 
This suggests that the paranoid-schizoid position may be envisaged as operating according 
to talionic principles whereas the depressive position sees the emergence of agapaic 
responses as evidenced by the subject‟s capacity for guilt, concern and reparation.  
 
Foregrounded in the inner cacophony reported by research participants were aggressive 
superego voices, “flogging” and “kicking” (Interv. 1, p. 10, 16-19; p. 14, 13-16) the 
violating and “sinning self” (Meissner, 1994). Such persecutory superego voices may be 
considered as derived partly from participants‟ own projected aggression and partly from 
identification with hostile part-object representations based on the internalisation of external 
parental figures or surrogates present in the latter‟s interpersonal world. Participants‟ 
emotionally charged relationships to these inner judging and judgmental voices revealed an 
array of remorseful, fearful, rebellious or distancing attitudes: 
It‟s … the voice of the … pure analysts who would be appalled … those 
voices … [said] this is outrageous, what are you doing? You should know 
that this is not appropriate! But those voices didn‟t have any advice … it 
was more a judgment of what they observed rather than actually being 
helpful in terms of how to proceed … So it was about how could you … 
how could you have allowed this to start in the first place? … when I speak 
of … those critical analysts, I‟m amused because … I don‟t really identify 
personally with those voices (Interv. 6, p. 229, 39-46; p. 230, 1-4). 
 
… at the end … I kind of felt … an internal kick, it was you haven’t thought 
about it enough, you haven’t put enough energy into it … you idiot 
therapist! … you’re not good enough! (Interv. 1, p. 10, 17-18; p. 12, 9-10). 
 
… the group keeps everybody in order … there are voices … which will say 
don’t step out of line … if you step out of line, you‟ll be punished … 
excommunicated in some way (Interv. 2, p. 31, 4-7). 
 
… there‟s a … very … oppressive … superego voice that‟s alive … which is 
about … saying … you‟re wrong, you‟re breaking the rules, you shouldn‟t 
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have extra-therapeutic contact with your patients, what you‟re doing is bad, 
is dangerous … My feeling now is … I don‟t really care about that voice 
and would be … open to publicly challenging [it] … The thing is … it‟s not 
really a public thing, it‟s more, it‟s more fantasy based (Interv. 4, p. 132, 
16-26). 
 
The real-life ethical dilemmas encountered by participants appeared to evoke an “inner 
moral audience” included not only frankly unethical interjections and punitive superego 
tones but also unintegrated or silenced child-like voices. Potential linkages between current 
ethical decision-making and unprocessed anxieties pertaining to participants‟ internal object 
worlds thus appear in the following three fragments. Reflecting retrospectively that she had 
not perhaps sufficiently thought for herself in deciding whether to see her relative as a 
patient but had prematurely accepted the supervisor‟s reassurance that countertransference 
issues seemed of little concern, Gillian revealed her anxiety with respect to the disjunction 
between the child-like, overwhelmed voice of her subjective self and the contrasting adult 
demands of her professional role: 
… maybe it‟s my sense of myself as someone who‟s taken a long time to 
own myself as a professional … maybe always feeling … I‟m the youngest 
in the family, I‟m the baby of the family, my feelings don‟t count, my 
thoughts don‟t count … So I‟m not important enough … to be in a 
profession … not ever believing that I‟m big enough to be really grown up 
and do those big things … So it‟s like taking on serious responsibilities … 
and I think that connects … with am I really a psychologist, am I really, is 
this real, can I charge full rates … and are people going to pay me … ? 
(Interv. 3, p. 99, 35-40; p.100, 8-32). 
 
Riaan similarly referred to his silenced childhood voice in the context of family 
violence. Anxiety was expressed that revived childhood feelings of trauma stirred 
by professional engagement with statutory rape had led to “decisions” not to report 
the rape concerned and to Riaan‟s own unconscious silencing of any further patient 
disclosures of sexual abuse:  
… my own experiences were, (pauses) were also unheard and … that‟s why 
it was maybe easier for the child [patient] to relate to that part of me that 
really understood about having a story, having something to talk about, 
having not been heard (Interv. 5, p. 188, 9-12).  
 
That case did have a negative impact on me.  (Sighs) I haven‟t thought 
about it before … but I think … I had far more disclosure of sexual trauma 
before that than I have had since then. Again, it could be part of 
unconscious communication … I don‟t know and I hope it isn‟t … I don’t 
want to go there, ja, and I don‟t know whether that‟s been communicated 
… (Interv. 5, p. 193, 26-36). 
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Although not a focus of the present research study, of interest are research participants‟ 
reports of patients‟ implicit or explicit voices. The first excerpt below suggests that the 
patient‟s previously unheard stories appeared to find an empathic listener in the participant 
concerned. Embroiled in dual role relationships, patients alternatively expressed their 
apparent excitement or their unease through faint protest and silence:  
… her story hadn‟t been told and it … oozed down to … a whole range of 
severe somatic complaints … and I felt … that‟s what I‟d done for her, 
there‟d been … somebody who‟d listened and somebody who believed her 
story and if that‟s the only thing that I was able to do for her then I think it 
was worth our encounter (Interv. 5, p. 178, 37-45). 
 
I saw you at the meeting last night … you‟re very different [there] … to the 
way you‟re in the therapy room … it was quite uncomfortable seeing you 
because I didn‟t know how to be around you (Interv. 4, p. 137, 41-44). 
 
And then I went back to the therapy and I said to [the patient] … I‟ve 
realised that we are in fact … cousins … I don‟t remember her evidencing 
… surprise or that much interest (Interv. 3, p. 95, 33-35).  
 
And [the patient] said I wanna go into that group, I like … in that group, 
which was my group. You have been absolutely instrumental in the … 
changes … going on for me, you‟re my therapist … why would you not want 
to be in a group with me and … I couldn‟t answer that question other than 
… the rules of psychoanalysis say … da, da, da … it‟s going to damage the 
transference (Interv. 4, p 128, 1-13).  
3.2. Authoritative and Internally Persuasive Discourses 
Bakhtin (1981, in Tappan, 1991) argues that the process of “authoring” or claiming 
authority and responsibility for one‟s moral thoughts, feelings and actions derives originally 
from the internalisation of words, voices and forms of discourse to which an individual is 
exposed in the course of development. Preserved in the psyche, these inner voices engage in 
constant dialogue with one another. Two primary types of discourse may be distinguished 
and their relative prominence in narratives of moral dilemmas calibrates the degree to which 
an individual claims moral authority for what he/she says and does. “Authoritative 
discourse”, says Bakhtin (1981, in Tappan, 1991) is “the word of the fathers” (p. 342); it 
cannot be doubted or challenged and it demands our unconditional allegiance. By contrast, 
“internally persuasive discourse” is comprised of the process whereby the inner dialogue 
between different voices is increasingly integrated and retold in the subject‟s own emerging 
and independent voice. The development of “moral authority” accordingly entails 
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appropriating, transforming and “populating” the words and voices of inner others with 
one‟s own “accents” and intentions.  
 
Examples of “authoritative discourse” emerged in the following three excerpts. 
Commenting on the code of ethics to which he had been exposed as a postgraduate student, 
David suggests in the first excerpt suggests that obedience and strict adherence to “the 
rules” concerned had not necessarily fostered independent thinking or “internally persuasive 
discourse”. Instead the “authoritative” word of the Professional Board for Psychology had 
been accepted as “a name that must not be taken in vain” (p. 342): 
… the Psychology Board and Health Professions Council, their rules of 
ethics hung over as the grand daddy of behave yourself, and it was just 
accepted that you go and read that and you obey those rules … And no one 
realised that … creating a culture of ethics was not about reading the riot 
act, it was actually about engendering a way of thinking about what‟s right 
…  why it‟s not a good thing to breach boundaries, what that means … for 
your patient (Interv. 2, p. 31, 35-41). 
 
The second excerpt provides an example where “authoritative discourse” appears to have 
exacted the research participant‟s unquestioning allegiance without either evoking the 
desire “to understand the reasoning behind the rules” (Allphin, 2005, p. 44) or eliciting the 
altruistic concern for the harm the patient may have suffered that is characteristic of an 
ethical attitude (Solomon, 2003b): 
Well … I have not … ever thought that I was breaking a code in terms of the 
Professional Board that would … endanger my registration … but if I 
thought that … this was a rule that was part of being registered as a 
psychologist … then I wouldn‟t have done it … because … I‟m not prepared 
to put my livelihood at risk (Interv. 4, p. 149, 14-23). 
 
Gillian‟s supervisor considered that the family matrix shared by the patient and the therapist 
was physically and emotionally distant enough not to impinge on therapeutic progress. 
Gillian‟s response in the fourth excerpt provides a sobering example of lived allegiance to 
“authoritative discourse”:  
… but, ja, ,I mean I think that I do tend to … go, go with the authoritarian 
or the authority which was like, Ray, my first supervisor, in this case, it‟s 
okay (Interv. 3, p. 103, 41-43).  
 
While principle ethics traditionally focuses on ethical choices and actions and on the 
question „What ought I to do?‟, virtue ethics concentrates on the ethical agent or actor and 
on the question of „Who shall I be?‟ (Jordan & Meara, 1990). Yet these approaches are not 
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mutually exclusive but exist rather in “mutual symbiosis” (Jordan & Meara, 1990, p. 109). 
Applying ethical principles appears to presuppose traditional virtues including, for example, 
the capacity for courage, prudence (or the ability to reason wisely) and integrity (or the 
consistent commitment to moral principles even under adverse conditions). “Virtuous” 
practitioners on the other hand may equally deploy principles and standards to illuminate 
the process of ethical decision-making and action (Kitchener, 2000). The five fragments 
below suggest that research participants‟ subjective concerns embraced both questions 
concerned:  
I sat with [the dilemma] … I sat with it for about four days and then said to 
my [partner] there is a boundary issue and I don‟t know what to do about it 
(Interv. 1, p. 13, 1-3).  
 
… this one … I was faced with my own professional dilemma, do I need to 
respond? Do I, you know, it‟s a colleague, do I need to do something? 
Never mind the patient, is it right that I say something? (Interv. 2, p. 39, 40-
42). 
 
And so I … was very thrown … and didn‟t quite know what to do (Interv. 3, 
p. 79, 17-18). 
 
… this driving force of is this the best thing?  Is this the right thing?  Is this 
a useful thing?  That … continuous questioning … would be the link to my 
… ethical consciousness … these multiple role moments … would throw out 
the question … and I would go again in my head, is this actually okay? 
(Interv. 6, p. 227, 37-48; p. 228, 1-2). 
 
… my mind was going, sort of racing all over the place … is this legal? Is it 
illegal? Is it sex? Is it just fun? … What do I do? (Interv. 5, p. 176, 6-9). 
 
… my strongest fantasy was … actually a confrontation with [the abuser] in 
the Psychoanalytic Society …  And somewhere in that confrontation… 
somebody came up in my fantasy as one of the visiting analysts, who would 
cast some thoughtfulness and wisdom, like an older person who would take 
it over, so I would have some release and say, okay, now it‟s in the parents‟ 
[hands] … to, to take the burden away from me about what to do (Interv. 2, 
p. 41, 28-38). 
 
Research participants‟ subjective concerns seemed to highlight the apparent paucity of 
ethically significant “internally persuasive discourses”. At the time of the research 
interviews in 2003, for example, not one participant possessed or had read the South African 
Ethical Code for Professional Conduct (2002) for psychologists. Hewitt (2003) contends 
that the therapist‟s countertransference constitutes “the single most important conceptual 
link to ethical practice” (p. 35). Yet no current supervisor or personal therapist had 
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apparently explicitly raised any “voice” pertaining to the ethical as opposed to the 
theoretical dimensions of participants‟ countertransference responses to the dilemmas which 
had confronted them. Exploring the inner “voices” she had drawn on to help her through a 
real-life dilemma, Theresa, for example, made the following discovery:  
I don‟t know, I don‟t remember learning about that, I can‟t say that there‟s 
a specific voice when it comes to that … I can‟t say that I have any voice 
around multiple roles (Interv. 6, p. 225, 39-46). 
 
Authoring an authentic moral account or perspective presupposes dialogue not only with 
“internally persuasive discourses” but also a relational context with an empathic external 
other (Tappan, 1991). For Solomon (2003c), it is particularly the third person of the 
supervisor who helps to restore the therapist‟s capacity for thoughtfulness through the 
former‟s active provision of a third area of reflection. Hence Solomon (2003c) writes that 
the manifestation of Britton‟s (1998) “triangular psychic space”, a third position in mental 
space, “is quintessentially present in the supervisory or consultative relationship. Here, two 
people, the analyst and the supervisor, are linked in relation to a third, the patient” (p. 173).  
 
Through the provision in supervision of a third area of reflection, supervisor and supervisee 
may work together to integrate possibly conflictual inner moral “voices” created by, for 
example, psychoanalytic theory, codes of ethics, legal constraints or unethical interjections 
derived from the therapist‟s unconscious aggression or narcissism. When internalised as a 
thoughtful, benevolent member of the “inner moral audience”, the supervisor may both 
provide an ethically attuned inner voice as well as potentially modifying the shaming 
superego, which appeared at least partially responsible for the abrasive denting of 
participants‟ professional self-esteem and which was often apparently projected onto 
colleagues and professional societies. Internalisation of such a benevolent object may 
constitute one core component in the evolution of a morality dominated not by threat and 
the talion principle but by parental prohibitions experienced as “protective caretaking 
injunctions that provide safety in the face of potential object-related dangers” (Ogden, 1986, 
p. 97).  
 
The issue of professional resources is addressed in detail in a later chapter. At this stage of 
interest is that not only did participants appear to struggle to locate helpful “internally 
persuasive discourses” but they also apparently identified an absence of ethically attuned 
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external professional spaces capable of providing a sustained third area of reflection. This 
seemingly unmet need emerges in the following extracts: 
… it‟s occurring to me … how helpful it would‟ve been to have … 
somebody to go through, in this kind of detail … all the bits and pieces … at 
that time … which I realize I missed, it would‟ve been nice to do that 
(Interv. 2, p. 46, 43-44; p. 47, 1-3). 
 
… [the research interview] has opened up … different dimensions which I 
hadn‟t really thought about … in terms of unconscious motivations and … 
unconscious kinds of hindrances to the process (Interv. 3, p. 108, 47-48; p. 
109, 1-2). 
 
… it was interesting … to reflect on [the dilemma] … so I hadn‟t really 
done that before, like this (Interv. 4, p. 136, 31-32).  
 
… but the biggest mistake was that I didn‟t actually consult anybody …my 
level of discomfort was very … high … and in that „high‟ I should‟ve 
reflected … that I was feeling very uncomfortable and that would have been 
an indication that I [should] confer with somebody … there would‟ve been 
a sense that I was sharing it, I wasn‟t holding it on my own (Interv. 1, p. 9, 
41-42; p. 22, 12-24). 
 
… through your questioning … I‟ve had to think about certain things and … 
things feel clearer for me … at times, … I felt quite anxious … I came away 
feeling rattled, oh, shooh, revisiting all that stuff and „mess‟!  So, it‟s been 
varied but, ultimately, useful (Interv. 6, p. 235, 10-17). 
3.3.  Fantasies, Images and Metaphors 
Vivid fantasies, images and metaphors arose in the descriptions provided by interviewees of 
their grappling to resolve real-life dilemmas. These often seemed to be suffused with a 
sense of threat and persecutory anxiety, suggesting once again that for the most part the 
paranoid-schizoid mode continued to prevail across the body of text. Evidence for the latter 
observations is apparently provided by the excerpts below. One research participant 
breached confidentiality to a patient‟s significant other, “loading” the latter with an 
“awkward” and “difficult” situation. Apparent projection of an aggressive self 
representation generated the following fantasy in which the significant other, like a 
retaliatory “amoeba”, threatened to spread incriminating information about this frame break 
and to expose the interviewee as a deficient professional:  
… there was an awkwardness about … having loaded this onto Heather … I 
particularly like her … and … putting her in a difficult situation, that was 
the initial difficulty.  Then I started realising that … it could become like 
this growing amoeba (laughs), with this spreading out with everybody 
knowing about the therapy … (Interv. 1, p. 21, 10-18). 
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… I wasn‟t … in control anymore.  I have this image of this amoeba 
growing, growing, growing … that was the fantasy (Interv. 1, p. 12, 1-3). 
 
Exploring the sexual abuse of a gay patient by his former therapist, the participant‟s image 
of a snail‟s feeler connotes the acute anxiety and feeling of being endangered that suddenly 
suffused the supervisory space:  
… the supervision almost felt like a, like a, like a snail‟s feeler, when you 
touch it, it recoils, that the vibe in the supervision became suddenly very 
tentative … very cautious … very careful, as if both of us were … touching 
something quite dangerous and without the courage to go to the edge of 
what needed to be thought about, of what needed to be dealt with (Interv. 2, 
p. 52, 37-45; p. 53, 1-2). 
 
Feeling menaced by “the war zone” which surrounded him, Riaan elaborated on possibly 
realistic fears of gang retaliation (Interv. 5, p. 170, 26-31). Fantasies also emerged of violent 
attacks perpetrated against family members (Interv. 5, p. 176, 17-20) or against himself by 
child patients who would in the future reappear as retaliatory adults threatening legal action: 
… one of the fantasies … was that … [the patient] was traumatised and it 
had an impact on her … adult life, that (sighs) … she could then take legal 
action against me for having not … supported her the whole way (Interv. 5, 
p. 174, 28-31).  
 
Defensive splitting in the next two excerpts appears to have effected a separation between 
devalued and idealised sets of object relationships. Thus the following fantasy reveals the 
feared presence of “the psychoanalytic police”, a projected and endangering part-object 
representation, that appears intent on punishing and shaming the fearful self who has 
concealed his rebellious transgressions of the psychoanalytic frame: 
 I‟d a lot of fear … I had fantasies that I was going to get … „found out‟ by 
the „psychoanalytic police‟ and I‟d be shamed or ostracised or frowned 
upon … like in conversation with members of the [Psychoanalytic] Society 
… I would want to say something and then … I‟d choose not to because I‟d 
think whoah! … I‟d better not say anything „cause I‟d be afraid of the 
judgments (Interv. 4, p. 131, 42; p. 132, 1-34). 
 
Juxtaposed against this negative set of self and object representations were the participant‟s 
references to exclusively male fraternities, including Organisation B, a potentially idealised 
paternal part object representation that offered apparently unique opportunities for male 
mentorship (Interv. 4, p. 140, 24-29; p. 142, 11-26). The organisation was ostensibly 
charged with the spiritual mission of reclaiming “the sacred masculine” (Interv. 4, p. 125, 
10) in contemporary times: 
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The most support I got was from non-psychologists … more spiritual 
people who were saying, listen, the work that you‟re doing … in 
Organisation B … is bigger than you … beyond you … you‟re, you‟re a 
channel of consciousness that is hungry to be born and … even if you 
wanted to, you couldn‟t stop this … the psychoanalytic model is too small  
for what you‟re doing (Interv. 4, p. 133, 25-34). 
 
Key to processing the disturbing countertransference anxieties that may emerge in the wake 
of an ethical dilemma is access to “an ethical space” (Wiener, 2003, p. 130). The concept of 
“ethical space” refers to an internal site of moral struggle, a third area of reflection from 
which to view the conflict between, for example, ethical and unethical desires or the 
relationship between codes of ethics and subjective ethical attitudes. From this interaction, 
Wiener (Wiener, 2001) suggests, new meaning and thinking regarding ethical decision-
making and action may arise. Similarly, Solomon (2003a) comments that maintaining an 
analytic attitude and ensuring a stance of non-enactment in the context of the emotionally 
charged therapeutic relationship is contingent upon the act of processing or thinking which 
transpires in the “internal protected space” (p. 5) of the therapist‟s mind. Providing a 
contrast with “ethical space” (Wiener, 2003) and “sustained triangular space” (Solomon, 
2003c) was imagery offered by participants which was suggestive of compromised or 
attenuated reflective space. The Listening Guide method (Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg and 
Bertsch, 2003) discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 4) facilitated the construction of “I 
poems”; the latter “poems” foregrounded participants‟ first-person voice and their 
subjective experiences of reflective space. What emerged were four striking metaphors 
which suggested that attenuated reflective space had arisen in the context of either a failed 
container, such as that provided by ethically derelict supervision, or as a result of 
professional isolation. 
 
In the following fragment, the spatial metaphor of a room graphically illustrates the 
breakdown of the boundary between the realms of personal and professional life. The 
therapeutic space seems to be invaded by domestic stresses and relationships.  In a context 
marred by apparent professional isolation, the therapist‟s capacity to assert her professional 
identity and to create “ethical space” or a “third area of reflection” appears to have been 
eroded by unprocessed countertransference pressures: 
 I only have room … to write up notes quickly, I don’t have room to think.  
Not like I used to … a room meaning room in terms of space and time … so 
many utterly stupid things … have got to be sorted out, when [my partner] 
works in the office my stuff gets moved out of the way and then I can‟t find 
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my stuff … there‟s no space for me … to be respected as a professional … 
And … my professionalism was really on the line … now this has happened 
… and I have to think about it (Interv. 1, p. 17, 24-34; p. 18, 9-18). 
 
In paranoid-schizoid mode, object relatedness does not take the form of experiencing others 
as subjects who can be hurt or injured but rather as objects which are prized or hated 
according to what they can do for or to one (Ogden, 1989). In the context of repeated 
engagement with several dual role relationships, the following excerpts again highlight the 
absence of a generative consultative or supervisory space.  The participative yet reflective 
stance characteristic of the analytic attitude (Gabbard & Lester, 1995) appears to have given 
way to an unretrieved therapist driven enactment of “pioneering in the Wild West”. This 
latter image seems to suggest of a compromised reflective space wherein the therapeutic 
well-being of patients has been forfeited in order to gratify the unconscious need to be seen 
and admired as an iconoclastic “risk-taker” (Interv. 4, p. 137, 25-34) or powerful “warrior-
leader” (Interv. 4, p. 138, 21): 
 I guess Wild West is not a bad term „cause … what I was doing was, I don‟t 
know if I could say the word „pioneering‟ … but I was in territory where 
few have trodden and I was … without much guidance … I remember even 
thinking … supervision-wise, who could supervise me on this really? 
(Interv. 4. p. 133, 15-19). 
 
But there were moments in which … I thought of myself as … a maverick in 
the room … my fantasy [was] let them [the patients] think … that their 
therapist was … pioneering in some way or … a risk-taker, something like 
that (Interv. 4, p. 137, 23-34). 
 
If others are experienced in the paranoid-schizoid mode as prized or hated objects, the self 
too is experienced not as a subject but as an object “buffeted by thoughts, feelings and 
perceptions as if they were external forces or physical objects … bombarding oneself” 
(Ogden, 1989, p. 21). The following images of a tightly buckled briefcase and of a cooker 
under pressure suggest participants‟ temporary collapse under the emotional duress exerted 
by real-life dilemmas in the direction of the paranoid-schizoid mode of experience. Thus the 
two descriptions appear to provide continuing evidence of interviewees‟ subjective 
experiences of an impoverished reflective space that is assailed by “stuff”, by paralysing 
headaches and by an accretion of “undigested” emotionally draining experiences: 
Describe it? … sometimes … where there‟s been a lot of that kind of stuff, 
I‟ll have stuff … I need to do … I‟ll come home on … Friday evening and 
my leather briefcase will stay closed until Monday … I block it out, close it 
off … it‟s an emotional thing, I don’t want to … open the briefcase, all that 
[stuff] is inside there … leave it there, leave it closed – buckled up. Pack it 
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away, close it away and leave it there … I don’t, I don’t want to go there 
(Interv. 5, p. 189, 23-40). 
 
How to describe the tension? ... like a headache, something paralysing.  
When, when, when there are various forces pulling one simultaneously … 
it‟s difficult … to be clear and confident about the decision … there‟s so 
many demands and voices … [there‟s] no, no, no … outlet, a lot of stuff 
going in … too much, … like a pressure cooker and that pressure builds up 
… things just accumulate and accumulate … one incident after the next … 
added to the pot and … maybe there was too much pressure and not, not an 
adequate outlet (Interv. 6, p. 229, 11-28). 
4. ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE WOUNDED-HEALER MODEL 
The wounded-healer model provides a useful metaphor which potentially enlivens debate 
on the process of professional decision-making as it transpires in the therapeutic space. 
Fundamental to the concept lies the interplay between the polarities constituted by health 
and illness (Groesbeck, 1975; Miller & Baldwin, 1987; Sedgwick, 1994; Wakefield, 1995). 
In the context of the model, the therapist is identified at the outset with the role of the 
healthy, charismatic healer who is “wise, insightful, caring, and possessed of healing 
powers” (Ivey 1995, p. 356). By contrast, the patient, who is identified with sickness and 
weakness, stands in need of curing. In object relations terms, the model of the wounded-
healer accordingly suggests that the patient projects an idealised object representation into 
the therapist while the latter in turn responds with projective counteridentifications 
pertaining to disavowed affects, vulnerabilities and narcissistic injuries.  
 
Contemporary ethical decision-making models (Corey, Corey & Callanan, 1998; CPA, 
2000; Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1985; Kitchener, 1984; Rest, 1984; Steere, 1984) are 
arguably largely congruent with the identification of the therapist as the powerful “healer-
redeemer” (Groesbeck, 1975) since the emphasis lies on the latter‟s apparently healthy 
capacity for rational analysis and the dispassionate weighing of competing ethical 
principles. As discussed in earlier chapters, linear models of ethical decision-making may 
take insufficient account of the clinician‟s susceptibility to the enactment of 
“countertransference pathology” (Ivey, 1992) and may not capture fully the emotional 
vicissitudes of real-life dilemmas. Alternative models are thus “needed that account for 
factors that lead clinicians away from ethical practice” (Betan, 1997, p. 350).  
 
What the data reveal is that the theme of the wounded-healer emerged through research 
participants‟ frequent references to physical and psychological scars, trauma, the lancing of 
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wounds, pus, the onset of cancer and to the corresponding process of healing. The 
discussion in the previous chapter on “Avowed vs Lived Values” suggests that the ethical 
principles of beneficence and Gilligan‟s (1982) ethic of care were prominently 
foregrounded as dominant ethical values. The following excerpts accordingly suggest that 
for the most part participants were strongly identified with a professional image of 
themselves as authoritative, beneficent caregivers who expertly tended to patient wounds: 
I saw a [patient] … who was … badly scarred, … this really  horrible 
looking scar … When [the patient] came into the session, the first time ... 
[the patient] held [the body] at just the right angle so that I couldn‟t see 
[the scar] …like not too much and not too little … So the first thing that I 
said …was, I said … nicely, … I see you are holding your [body] in a way 
that I can‟t see how ugly your scar is …and [the patient] was delighted … 
very, very grateful … it was the beginning of a very good therapy … Now 
that was a physical thing, but I applied the same thing to internal things … 
[to patients‟] very deep, difficult wounds … (Interv. 2, p. 33, 26-44; p. 34, 
3-4).  
 
… of all these cases …the benefits to me … were (pauses) really only to see 
the healing of the person … Bear witness … to the healing of the person … 
there was no other value to me … (Interv. 4, p. 154, 2-14). 
 
… often what happens is … once patients have disclosed to me and … 
ninety per cent of the time, I‟m the person that they disclose these things to, 
that same [night] they‟ll talk to [others] about it … It‟s kind of like the, the 
wound is lanced and the pus comes out … (Interv. 5, p. 173, 23-27). 
 
Within myself, I felt very clear … very clear around my role, who I am, the 
work that I‟m doing and, despite the mess that [the patient] was bringing in 
and the attempt to sabotage the space … I felt very clear about what I was 
doing … what was being projected … into me, … what was … transpiring 
between the two of us, ja (Interv. 6, p. 209, 15-22). 
 
When the therapist struggles to acknowledge impairment or narcissistic vulnerability 
(Wakefield, 1995), the likelihood increases that the latter “feels himself to be the strong 
healer; the only wounds are those of the patients, while he himself is secure against them; 
the poor creatures known as patients live in a world completely different from his own” 
(Guggenbühl-Craig, 1971, p. 2). Gabbard (1998) notes that there is often “a kernel of 
reality” (p. 447) to the patient‟s assignment of internal object projections to particular 
individual carers. Thus the nature of the therapist‟s pre-existing inner conflicts and self-
object-affect constellations will determine whether patient projections are likely to find a 
convenient “hook” in the clinician concerned (Gabbard, 1995). In the following fragments, 
research participants‟ psychodynamic formulations of patients‟ emotional difficulties 
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seemed to occur in the absence of any corresponding acknowledgement by the therapist of 
his/her own possible contributions to the countertransference enactments concerned. This 
may suggest the unconscious enlisting of the patient as the carrier of the therapist/healer‟s 
disavowed self or object representations:  
I … have a sense of [the patient] as a person who was not connected to her 
feelings and … the deeper parts of herself … I suppose the term is 
dissociation … she‟s quite, I think, a dissociated person … very scared of 
reaching just those parts of her which have been traumatised … the 
connections between people were very, let‟s say, broken for her … she 
doesn‟t have a family that can hold her … I suppose [another patient] 
might‟ve said, hey … we‟re cousins, maybe I should look for another 
therapist and we should go and have tea together (Interv. 3, p. 87, 45-46; p. 
88, 6-31).  
 
What, what approach did [my own analyst] adopt? I suppose she gave 
meaning to … the kind of projective identifications … where, ja, I felt like 
there was something really being put into me and twisted … at an 
abdominal level and … my sense of having been violated … I had very 
strong reactions and I think [my analyst] helped to normalise those and to 
… hand them back, to be able to say you know what? This stuff belongs to 
you, the patient … to just clarify that distinction, that was quite useful 
(Interv. 6, p. 225, 7-13).  
 
… the concept of projective identification … is used unethically by a lot of 
therapists … To avoid owning their own stuff around the relationship … 
with the patient.  So they‟ll see someone they‟ll … call them „borderline‟ … 
So they‟ll say …I feel overwhelmed in the room … but it‟s because of this 
projective identification going on „cause this person‟s a very disturbed 
borderline … Now … the piece missing is does that mean everyone is going 
to feel overwhelmed in the room with this person and, if not, then how come 
you’re feeling overwhelmed?  … what is it about you … it’s the … 
countertransference piece … that gets skipped which I don‟t think is true to 
the concept but … that‟s how it‟s used.  It‟s used defensively … (Interv. 4, p. 
123, 11-28). 
 
Anomalies evident in the following two quotes by the same interviewee apparently lend 
weight to Bennet‟s (1987) claim that when the therapist‟s impairment is consistently denied, 
the patient carries a double burden of woundedness, his own and the healer‟s: 
… the major reparation for me was around [the patient] developing a 
similar … erotic transference with me and [my] holding that and containing 
that.  So that [the patient] had a chance to repeat the … falling in love with 
the therapist story and that I managed to hold that … and [he] then could 
work through that with … a responsible, thoughtful person who understood 
his needs (Interv. 2, p. 61, 21-26). 
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In terms of … his erotic transference to me … I killed that very early, I 
interpreted it very early and I stopped it very early (Interv. 2, p. 48, 18-20). 
 
While the clinician‟s professional persona is authoritative and ostensibly well-qualified, the 
wounded-healer model confronts us with the uncomfortable notion that the therapist‟s 
unresolved wounded polarity or personal disturbance constitutes the covert and unconscious 
aspect of the “healer-redeemer” (Groesbeck, 1975). Therapist woundedness is, however, 
complex and double-sided in nature (Ivey, 1992; 1995; Miller & Baldwin, 1987; Wakefield, 
1995). As Haumann (2004) writes “The „wound‟ primes the therapist to do the work of 
therapy by leading to the development of an exquisite sensitivity to the unconscious needs 
of others and the ability to subjugate his own needs and desires in order to meet those of 
others” (p. 98). Therapist woundedness thus provides the ground for the eventual 
development of an “agapaic capability” which seems “to be connected with concern, 
patience and a capacity to remain-in-being for his patient. It is a combination of eros, 
humane feeling and respect, together with a freedom from G-d-almightiness” (Lambert, 
1981, p. 24). Although ethical decision-making appeared to transpire largely in the 
paranoid-schizoid mode, the data also revealed repeated instances of research participants‟ 
“agapaic capability” or feelings of empathy, concern and guilt. Patients were thus 
acknowledged not as part objects to be appropriated for narcissistic use in the internal world 
of the healer but as subjects who “can be hurt or injured” (Ogden, 1989, p. 22). The 
following examples offer glimpses of participants‟ remorse, concern and non-defensive 
openness:  
I felt that I‟d let [my patient] down … I felt that I‟d betrayed her and [the 
patient‟s significant other] … somehow, both of them were victims of my … 
ineptitude (Interv. 1, p. 11, 16-23).  
 
Should I be working with this person at all? Is it appropriate … knowing 
the problems that come with (pauses) working in this kind of environment 
… where there‟s a high risk of these kind of boundaries becoming blurred 
or challenged or threatened?  Is it actually safe enough to work with? 
That‟s my question, is it safe enough to work with this person? And in 
retrospect, I don‟t think it was … (Interv. 6, p. 210, 42-48). 
 
She‟s a little girl, she‟s a young, she‟s twelve, a little, little twelve.  A little, 
tiny little girl, vulnerable and she told me that she‟d been raped … (Interv. 
5, p. 175, 36-38). 
 
The consequences? … my decision not to be involved might be that this 
[rapist] might‟ve got off the hook … if I‟d been [a] more active agent, it 
might‟ve been different … (Interv. 5, p. 191, 37-43). 
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Therapist woundedness may conversely destructively colonise the therapeutic space. What 
is immoral and unethical may then unconsciously be “lived out in projection, using and 
abusing the other as a vehicle for holding the bad aspects of the self” (Solomon, 2003b, p. 
23). “Neurotic countertransference” represents a professional hazard not because the 
therapist experiences infantile and primitive responses within himself but because the latter 
may be prone to projecting and enacting unresolved countertransference difficulties which 
have been insufficiently emotionally integrated (Lambert, 1972). In the South African 
context, Ivey (1992) bluntly avers that “The uncomfortable truth is that [therapists‟] 
interventions are very often unconscious attempts … to gratify their own contextually 
inappropriate needs and alleviate the anxiety related to the interactional emergence of both 
their patients‟ and their own psychopathology” (p. 38). 
 
What the data in the previous chapter (see Chapter 5) suggest is that participants apparently 
often struggled to entertain the maleficent or iatrogenic aspects of their therapeutic 
interventions. Nonmaleficence and countertransference management accordingly appeared 
to constitute “neglected” ethical values. Professional self-esteem and participants‟ 
seemingly strong identification of themselves as beneficent caregivers were consequently 
apparently shaken by their encounters with real-life ethical dilemmas and by their 
experience of challenging research interviews. The narcissistic need “to bask” (Haumann, 
2004) in the satisfying glow cast by the inflated image of ourselves as a charismatic “healer-
redeemer” represents an apparently common countertransference difficulty (Anonymous, 
2005; Groesbeck, 1975). The quotes below convey, by contrast, the corresponding 
painfulness and feelings of anger or vulnerability that may follow the reluctant uncovering 
of “festering” (Interv. 5. p. 184, 8) countertransference wounds:  
… I mean that [the dilemma‟s] very difficult to talk about, the question is 
why is it difficult to talk about, what‟s the difficulty, does one feel exposed, 
does one feel vulnerable, does one feel, somehow, one‟s part of [the] 
ethical dilemma and therefore responsible for it, you know?  (Interv. 2, p. 
53, 27-32). 
 
… part of me is quite apprehensive because this, this is messy stuff and it 
feels like failed work … that just ended abruptly, that I feel … I didn‟t 
manage adequately … So, it‟s, … it‟s difficult to talk about … I find it quite 
exposing and maybe doesn‟t reflect very well on me as a clinician. (Interv. 
6, p. 215, 11-16). 
 
Well, I think it‟s all about building one‟s self as a professional … the 
challenge [in the research interview was] … getting in touch with feelings 
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and being able to articulate them … I feel a bit challenged … just asking 
questions about whether or not I feel there might be … unconscious 
resistance on [the patient‟s] part … I have felt … tense, more kind of 
anxious … this … has felt more stressful because it does, you know, it‟s, 
it‟s, I think, it‟s … it wasn‟t okay … (Interv. 3, p. 109, 19-20; p. 110, 1-25). 
 
That of all these … cases, there was no financial benefit to me … so the 
benefits to me … were (pauses) really only to see the healing of the person 
… if that‟s wrong then, you know, I‟m, I‟m in the wrong profession! (Interv. 
4, p. 154, 1-15). 
 
Groesbeck (1975) comments that when mutual unconscious projections continue to reign, 
then “no movement to a real cure occurs though outward remedies, physical and 
psychological, are applied” (p. 128). Holding one another in thrall, the therapist and the 
patient may unconsciously attempt to coerce each other to conform to mutual inner needs 
for dominance and childish dependency respectively (Guggenbühl-Craig, 1971). In 
psychoanalytic object relations terms, Ivey (1995) writes that the patient‟s idealising 
transference fantasies and the therapist‟s unmet archaic needs for narcissistic affirmation 
may potentially create a stable union. In such a scenario, the therapeutic relationship 
defends against shared narcissistic insecurities and may be conceived of as a mutually 
reinforcing “positive narcissistic symmetry” (Ivey, 1995, p. 352).  
 
Only when the therapist withdraws and integrates his/her disavowed projections can the 
“narcissistic symmetry” be dissolved and the healing process once more be resumed. The 
therapist‟s ensuing emotional freedom may then be used in the service of “objective” rather 
than “neurotic countertransference” (Racker, 1957; Stein, 1984), receiving and metabolising 
the patient‟s “wounds” or projective identifications and returning these in a form that the 
patient can use (Bion, 1962; Wakefield, 1995). As Guggenbühl-Craig (1971) notes, genuine 
wounded healers “recognise time and again how the patient‟s difficulties constellate his 
own problems and vice versa, and he therefore works openly not only on the patient, but 
also on himself. He remains forever a patient as well as a healer” (p. 129). 
 
Far from being characterised by rational choice and an emotionally uncontaminated 
capacity for abstract reasoning, the process of ethical decision-making often appears to 
engage deeply with the therapist‟s own woundedness or “blind spots” (Freud, 1912, p. 116). 
The unexpected force of strong affects arising in the therapeutic space may “unhitch” or 
“dislodge” the therapist from the analytic attitude or from the capacity for sustained 
reflection on the meaning of the emotional vicissitudes engendered by therapeutic pair 
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(Solomon, 2003a). The vignette below seems to illustrate the enduring magnitude of 
unresolved countertransference affects which seemingly continued to suffuse the ethical 
dilemma concerned and to “dislodge” the research pair nearly four years after the 
termination of the relevant case. 
 
In the context of describing the real-life ethical dilemma posed by collegial sexual 
misconduct, the participant‟s unexpected request in the course of the research interview to 
switch off the tape recorder (Interv. 2, p. 45, 20-28) and his offer to look at photographs had 
the unsettling effect of relocating us from the research space to the „keyhole‟ of the erring 
practitioner‟s personal apartments. The capacity for reflection or the “otherness of the 
observing object” (Britton, 1998, p. 45), symbolised by the tape recorder and a public 
record in the form of a transcribed interview text, was thus abruptly erased or “switched 
off”. Carried out in virtual silence, the mutual enactment of looking through photographs 
featuring the former therapist‟s dwelling occurred „off the record‟, thereby generating a 
prurient sense of „spying‟ on the latter‟s private life. The tape recording was eventually 
resumed but the incident remained unlanguaged and “undigested” as neither the research 
participant nor I spoke of what had silently transpired between us.  
 
Renik (1993a; 1996) argues that countertransference awareness emerges retrospectively 
after countertransference enactment.  In the context of the research interview, the enactment 
concerned bore the characteristic hallmark of initially bypassing consciousness. It was only 
understood retrospectively with the aid of supervision which created the observing “meta 
level” (Stokoe, 2000) and requisite mental freedom needed for sustained reflection about “a 
third, whether [that] third is an individual, a couple …, or an idea or aspect within the 
therapist … that is relevant to their clinical work” (Solomon, 2003c, p. 174). From this 
perspective, the enactment may be construed as possibly indicative of unprocessed oedipal 
dynamics and as the interviewee‟s imaginative projection of himself into the intimate, lived 
spaces of a valued senior male. The participant ascribed the wound of suffering from very 
early unmet needs for fathering to his sexually abused patient (Interv. 2, p. 50, 7-8; p. 61, 
25-27). But analysis of the data raised the additional possibility that the sustained decision 
over three years (Interv. 2, p. 34, 23), to desist from confronting the abuser/mentor may in 
part have been unconsciously informed by the healer‟s own unacknowledged need to 
protect from contamination an idealised paternal part-object representation.  
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The foregoing description of a principally therapist driven enactment suggests that the 
unresolved countertransference affects which swept over the research pair temporarily 
disrupted independent access to Britton‟s (1998) “triangular psychic space” (p. 13). 
Comprehension of the impact of the therapist‟s disavowed woundedness on the process of 
ethical decision-making accordingly appeared to demand assistance from external 
supervision which provided the requisite third area of reflection. Repeated observations 
during the research process regarding the need to establish a third area of reflection helped 
to construct a psychoanalytically informed model of decision-making. The model is 
presented and discussed in a later chapter.  
5. SUMMARY 
Three areas of interest were outlined in the introduction to this chapter. With regard to the 
first area, the four levels of decision-making, the data suggest that unconscious 
determinants and unprocessed countertransference affects often appear to drive earlier 
prereflective phases of ethical decision-making. Conscious, rational cognitions may initially 
exert comparatively little influence on those real-life ethical dilemmas which revive the 
therapist‟s archaic needs and disavowed self and object representations.  In such a scenario, 
instead of privileging the patient‟s best interests, ethical decision-making seemingly 
collapses in the direction of a paranoid-schizoid mode of functioning. Ensuing ethical 
decision-making enactments appear to be organised around the need to keep Meissner‟s 
(1994) “unconscious determinants” or Stern‟s (1983) “disturbing glimmers of meaning” out 
of conscious awareness. While the paranoid-schizoid mode appeared to predominate, 
glimpses of mature ethical decision-making and depressive position functioning emerged in 
the research interviews. These were apparently predicated on external consultation or 
dialogue with an empathic other which helped to establish an ethically attuned “third area of 
reflection” (Solomon, 2003c, p. 174). 
 
Data analysis focused, secondly, on examination of inner moral “voices”, counter-
transference fantasies, images and metaphors. Research participants‟ reported 
phenomenological experience provided supportive evidence for Day‟s (1991) notion of an 
“inner moral audience”. But in contrast to Day‟s (1991) depiction of its members as 
comprised of exemplary inner others, interviewees described conflictual relationships with 
inner presences who on occasion urged frankly unethical conduct and who often appeared 
to be unhelpful, harsh and condemnatory. Tappan (1991) writes that “authoring” an 
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authentic moral account presupposes dialogue with “internally persuasive discourses” as 
well as a relational context with an empathic external other. Hampering research 
participants‟ efforts to resolve real-life dilemmas was an apparent paucity of readily 
available “internally persuasive discourses”, including those that might have arisen through 
the internalisation of a relevant code of ethics as well as ethically attuned personal analysis 
or supervision.  
 
Lack of an accredited South African training in psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy (Gibson, 2002; Haumann, 2004) renders the individual therapist‟s current 
efforts to attain increased objectivity through self-analysis a relatively problematic practice 
at this stage. The latter approach assumes that the therapist concerned is largely familiar 
with his/her own biases and “blind spots” (Freud, 1912, p. 116) as a result of intensive 
supervision and personal analysis. By contrast, the research endeavour seems to lend 
empirical support for the attainment of a “relative objectivity” (Gabbard, 1997). Solomon 
(2003c) notes that the analyst as a trainee is optimally embedded in different sets of 
triangular relationships. The trainee thus consistently internalises the expectation that “there 
is always a third space created in which he or she as a patient or as a supervisee will be 
thought about by another supervisor-practitioner pair” (p. 175). Similarly, participants 
inadvertently forged a reflective link with the research space which was then used for the 
retrospective examination of unconscious dynamics that had potentially animated the 
original therapeutic dyad and appeared integral to the dilemma concerned. This triangular 
relationship was itself held and thought about by two often contrasting supervisory spaces 
which enhanced a greater, if not an absolute, objectivity through the accrual of ethically 
informed additional and different points of view (Louw & Pitman, 2001). This suggests that 
regular peer supervision or consultation offers a potentially viable local option that may be 
useful in the identification and rectification of “blind spots” and ethical decision-making. 
Vivid imagery accordingly arose which suggested that interviewee‟s efforts to resolve 
ethical quandaries transpired largely in the context of deeply impoverished or compromised 
reflective spaces.  
 
The final area of interest explored the relevance to ethical decision-making of the wounded-
healer model. The model provides a compelling theoretical illustration of the notion that 
countertransference may function as “a virtue” but also as “a vice” (Louw & Pitman, 2001). 
When countertransference is mobilised “as a virtue”, the double-sided nature of therapist 
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woundedness allows the latter to use his/her well developed capacity for empathy to gain 
valuable ingress to the patient‟s internal object world. Detailed discussion of a therapist 
driven enactment that occurred during the research interview seemingly provided evidence 
for the enduring force of unresolved countertransference affects and a contrasting example 
of countertransference when it is mobilised “as a vice”. Thus the data continued to suggest 
that therapist-driven ethical decision-making enactments may arise as a result of the 
healer‟s repeated efforts to ward off threatening countertransference feelings or thoughts.  
 
As a didactic tool, the wounded-healer model exerts heuristic appeal through its theoretical 
and clinical relevance to a varied professional audience (Miller & Baldwin, 1987). The 
model‟s pragmatic delineation of the inevitable mobilisation of the healer‟s unresolved, 
wounded aspects may assist in legitimising a sorely needed professional space wherein to 
engage more publicly with the unethical, destructive and self-interested dimensions of our 
therapeutic interventions. In foregrounding countertransference as a central organising 
concept, the wounded-healer paradigm provides a useful additional theoretical tool to 
decision-making models that emphasise a rational, step-by-step approach to the resolution 
of ethical dilemmas.  
 
Difficulties in resolving ethical dilemmas were compounded not only by the therapist‟s 
susceptibility to enacting his/her personal countertransference but also by lacunae that 
characterised much of the wider professional matrix. Reaching out for support and help, 
participants often encountered problematic professional ethics training, supervision and 
personal analysis. The following chapter thus tracks participants‟ subjective accounts of 
their efforts to utilise professional resources.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
ABSOLUTION, PENANCE OR EXCOMMUNICATION: 
PARTICIPANTS‟ PERCEPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The professional resources that were consulted by the six participants are embedded in a 
post-apartheid society that continues to experience rapid legislative, political and 
professional change. Contemporary South African psychotherapy may additionally be 
influenced by postmodern thinking which eschews the theoretical certainties espoused by 
“the sovereignty of reason, rationality, objectivity and empiricism” (Snyman & Fasser, 
2004, p. 73). The latter author‟s claim that the lack of objective “set facts” and the ensuing 
uncertainty results in the postmodern therapist taking increased responsibility for the 
influence on the therapeutic relationship of his/her own biases, interventions, personal 
values and decisions (Snyman & Fasser, 2004). In the following excerpt, Patrick situates the 
discussion of available resources against a broader backdrop of interprofessional rivalry, the 
introduction of new legislation and the impending breakdown of traditional divisions 
governing the specialist practices of the different professions concerned. A sense of 
profound uncertainty appears to pervade not only psychology but also the contemporary 
practice of psychotherapy in South Africa: 
Well, I think psychology and psychotherapy … the whole psychological 
intervention field across the board in South Africa at the moment, I think is 
in a tremendous state of flux, of change and transformation … there‟s an 
identity crisis … lots of power plays … new legislation‟s coming out … the 
restrictions about counselling, the move to a PhD for psychologists, the 
idea of restricting doctors from doing therapy … the move of psychologists 
to try and prescribe medication, I mean all these happen within a very short 
space of time and I think that the community is tremendously anxious as a 
whole … not just the psychology community, I would say the psychotherapy 
community … counsellors who are counselling without being registered … 
social workers, psychiatrists … no one knows what, what the future looks 
like … and as a result ethics is … like the doing as a response to the 
anxiety. It‟s like what should we do, what we should do is we should make 
sure that we are, you know, behaving properly … And I don‟t think this 
anxiety was present some years ago … some years ago … everyone was 
quite clear on … where you stood … everyone knew … their place and they 
knew how to behave … (Interv. 4, p. 117, 17-43; p. 18, 2-6). 
 
While research studies have documented the nature and frequency of common ethical 
dilemmas (Lindsay & Colley, 1995; Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006; Pope & Vetter, 1992), 
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further insight is needed into how “practitioners, when recognizing an ethical dilemma, sort 
through the complex considerations involved in making ethical decisions” (Welfel & Lipsitz, 
1983, p. 321). The discussion which follows explores a variety of professional resources that 
were available to assist research participants with professional decision-making. The chapter 
considers, firstly, several current debates pertaining to the issue of professional training in 
ethics as well as participants‟ own perceptions of their former ethics instruction. This is 
followed, secondly, by participants‟ further accounts of accessing (or avoiding) the South 
African Ethical Code of Professional Conduct (2002), the Professional Board for 
Psychology, PsySSA, the law, supervision, personal therapy and peer consultation. Three 
potential risk factors pertaining to compromised ethical decision-making emerged and are 
summarised at the end of this chapter.  
2. POSTGRADUATE ETHICS TRAINING 
Comprehensive ethics training is widely endorsed as critical for helping postgraduate 
psychology students to engage effectively with the ethical dilemmas and decision-making 
processes they will encounter as future therapists, researchers or theoreticians (Abeles, 
1980; Bernard & Jara, 1986; Eberlein, 1987; Fine & Ulrich, 1988; Handelsman, 1986b; 
Scherrer, Louw & Möller, 2002). The issue apparently no longer revolves around whether 
ethics education should be included in masters and doctoral curricula but on how best to 
teach it (Pettifor & Pitcher, 1982).   
 
Despite evident consensus, sparse information is available regarding the form, content and 
short and long-term outcomes of graduate ethics training programmes (Eberlein, 1987; 
Welfel, 1992). Their characteristic variability may contribute to clinical psychologists‟ later 
inconsistent decision-making practices (Tymchuk, Drapkin, Major-Kingsley, Ackerman, 
Coffman & Baum, 1982). In the context of overcrowded teaching schedules, arguments 
abound as to whether ethics should constitute a separate formal module or whether it is best 
taught as it arises „naturally‟ during theoretical coursework or clinical supervision (Fine & 
Ulrich, 1988; Gawthrop & Uhlemann, 1992; Pettifor & Pitcher, 1982; Snyman & Fasser, 
2004; Tymchuk et al., 1982). Handelsman (1986b), for example, argues that teaching ethics 
informally “by osmosis” in supervision remains “a dangerous practice” which is constrained 
by the supervisor‟s potentially limited awareness of ethical issues and which does not 
systematically promote the skill of ethical thinking nor the ability to generalise beyond 
individual cases. 
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While an apparent need exists for more detailed information regarding graduate ethics 
courses, the relationship between ethics training and the implementation of actual ethical 
behaviour is not necessarily causal or “linear” (Scherrer et al., 2002). Research attempting 
to demonstrate the efficacy of formal ethics instruction yields seemingly contradictory 
results (Slack, 1997); thus the evidence available remains inconclusive as to whether such 
training positively enhances ethical behaviour with clients (Welfel & Lipsitz, 1984). 
Gawthrop and Uhlemann (1992) argue, for example, that undergraduates who received 
ethics instruction showed a significantly better quality of ethical decision-making than did 
control participants who received no training. The authors concede that ethics taught within 
the confines of a classroom may well not generalise to real-life ethical dilemmas 
encountered in clinical practice.  Haas, Malouf and Mayersen (1988) by contrast observe 
that hours of formal ethics training did not apparently exert any marked effect on 
psychologists‟ preferred choice of action in the context of hypothetical vignettes. 
Commenting on a number of different studies, Bersoff (2004) similarly observes that ethics 
training does not apparently ensure that trainees who complete the programmes concerned 
will act ethically as professionals. 
 
Apparently contradictory results regarding the efficacy of ethics education may point to 
“competing feelings or interests that can interfere with a therapist‟s willingness to act 
ethically” (Betan & Stanton, 1999, p. 295). Repeatedly observed discrepancies between 
intellectual comprehension as opposed to the actual implementation of ethical knowledge 
(Bernard & Jara, 1986; Bernard, Murphy & Little, 1987; Smith, McGuire, Abbott & Blau, 
1991) may well reveal the lack of courage to act (Rest, 1984) or “elements of expediency 
and opportunism” (Smith, McGuire, Abbott & Blau, 1991, p. 238). The disjunction 
identified cannot simply be reduced to arguments suggesting that ethical principles provide 
too little guidance or are too vaguely formulated (Bernard & Jara, 1986). Accounting for 
observed discrepancies between ethical knowledge and action may devolve not only on the 
adequacy of rational analysis but also on the need to identify “the personal and professional 
risk factors that can come between [ethical] decisions and their implementation” (Gawthrop 
& Uhlemann, 1992, p. 41). Additional ethical guidelines, examples and casebooks alone 
will probably not resolve the complexities entailed in ethical decision-making (Smith et al., 
1991) nor necessarily encourage ethical “resoluteness” or the willingness to follow through 
and to actually implement ethical action (Betan & Stanton, 1999). As Bernard and Jara 
(1986) conclude “[The] problem is not how to communicate ethical principles to students 
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more effectively, but rather how to motivate them to implement principles that they 
apparently understand quite well” (p. 315). 
 
Traditional training approaches appear to rely on the reasoned application of ethical 
principles and theories to ethical dilemmas (Eberlein, 1987; Gawthrop & Uhlemann, 1992; 
Tymchuk, 1986). Bersoff (2004) proposes, for example, that acting ethically derives from 
the integration of didactic knowledge including thorough familiarity with formal ethics 
codes and their underlying potentially competing philosophical principles, an understanding 
of decision-making models and personal attributes such as maturity, discretion and wisdom. 
Offering a different perspective on how to enhance ethical motivation in postgraduate 
clinical psychology students, Betan and Stanton (1999) claim that practising psychologists 
make inadequate decisions partly as a result of poor attunement to their own emotions, 
values and contextual concerns. The traditional training emphasis on ethical principles and 
reasoning processes therefore needs to be supplemented by encouraging student awareness 
of how motivation and decision-making may be powerfully affected by the “emotional pulls 
and subjective concerns” experienced by the individual decision-maker (Betan, 1997, p. 
299). Context, personal values and feelings of, for example, shame, anxiety, compassion or 
empathy may accordingly act as “barriers” or, alternatively, as “prompts” to furthering 
ethical resoluteness and action (Betan & Stanton, 1999, p. 300). While acknowledging the 
primacy of emotions and contextual concerns, Betan and Stanton (1999) do not consider the 
role of unconscious phenomena in promoting or hindering ethical commitment and 
decision-making.  
 
Shifting the focus from individual trainees, Abramovitch (2006) suggests that stimulating 
ethical awareness during training encompasses not only individual candidates but also 
necessarily pervades the collective or group life of each institute or society. Similar 
observations are advanced by Kitchener (1992) who argues that training ethical 
professionals goes beyond discrete theoretical modules and remains the responsibility of the 
entire staff. Even when excellent ethics instruction is offered, unethical conduct by 
educators insidiously compromises ethical motivation by contradicting the explicit messages 
conveyed by course content. This provides a less than optimal model, or psychoanalytically 
speaking, source of “identification” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1980) for students‟ later 
professional practices. Of relevance to research participants‟ descriptions of their ethics 
education is the specific caution advanced by Slimp and Burian (1994) regarding social or 
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multiple-role relationships. These authors comment that training staff who embark on dual 
relationships with current supervisees need to consider that the marked power differential 
and possible transference-countertransference dynamics at play carry a high potential for 
exploitation of the supervisee concerned and for negatively impacting on the group 
dynamics of both staff as well as students. Incorporating various suggestions from the 
professional literature, Wassenaar (2002) writes that “the creation of a climate of ethical 
sensitivity” (p. 222) necessitates that ethics education is grounded in formal structures or 
response systems that are publicly perceived to be capable of processing at remedial and 
disciplinary levels actual instances of academic dishonesty or ethical misconduct between 
staff and students. Additional strategies that might help to imbue academic departmental life 
with a sense of lived ethicality include regular staff-student ethics colloquia, the consensual 
designation of particular staff members prepared to develop a specialist interest in furthering 
ethics education and the active encouragement of students to openly share ethical concerns 
derived from their “personal experience, their training experiences or … their interactions 
with or observations of their peers, teachers or supervisors” (Wassenaar, 2002, p. 222).  
 
In South Africa an apparent neglect of ethics education in professional psychology training 
programmes is evident (Slack, 1997). Acknowledging that data collected in 1995 pertaining 
to the training of South African psychologists in professional ethics may be dated, 
Wassenaar (2002) concludes that prior to his study “Essentially, no reliable data [appeared] 
to exist on the teaching of professional ethics in South African psychology programmes, let 
alone information on what, why and how effectively it is taught” (p. 63). While professional 
ethics constitutes a mandatory 10% of the CPD points every registered psychologist is 
annually required to accumulate (HPCSA, CPD, Guidelines for Psychologists and 
Registered Counsellors, 2001), the evident lack of clarity regarding graduate ethics training 
may well extend to postqualified South African psychologists practising as analysts and as 
psychoanalytic psychotherapists. At the time of writing, no published South African studies 
were available which detail the design, content or perceived efficacy of postqualifying 
mandatory ethics educational activities including those offered in the context of analytically 
oriented societies, institutes or reading groups. Of relevance to participants‟ reports of the 
compromised supervision of common ethical dilemmas conducted by local accredited 
Jungian analysts, is Abramovitch‟s (2006) observation that an international IAAP1 survey of 
ethics training in over 50 societies (Wahba, 2005, cited in Abramovitch, 2006) reveals no 
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consensus on what or how ethics should be taught and failed to elicit any response from 
SAAJA2, an affiliated Cape Town based training institute (personal communication).  
 
For South African graduate ethics training to be relevant to prospective professional 
practice, it needs to ensure that it “embraces both the views of the complaining public [as 
well as] the anxieties of practitioners themselves” (Wassenaar, 2002, p. 218). In the context 
of graduate ethics courses, case discussions might accordingly address the most pressing 
complaints lodged against South African psychologists including, for example, the 
management of fee issues, child custody work, child abuse reporting, incompetence and 
improper behaviour (Scherrer, Louw & Möller, 2002; Wassenaar, 2002). Contrasting real-
life ethical dilemmas which could be incorporated and which most frequently trouble South 
African practitioners themselves include confidentiality concerns, non-sexual dual 
relationships and collegial misconduct (Slack & Wassenaar, 1999). While acknowledging 
the need to systematically teach ethical decision-making skills, Wassenaar (2002) notes that 
the emotional dimension of professional decision-making did not comprise a focus of his 
study. A further limitation pertains to Wassenaar‟s (2002) related survey of 26 South 
African masters and internship psychology programmes which omitted to obtain clarity on 
whether and what ethical decision-making models are used by South African training 
universities. The ostensible scarcity of local data regarding South African preprofessional 
ethics training may extend not only to the issue of ethical decision-making frameworks but 
also to whether and how awareness is raised with respect to the potential impact of 
countertransference phenomena on graduate students‟ decision-making practices.  
2.1. Perceptions of Postgraduate Ethics Training 
The length of post-qualifying experience amongst the participants at the time of the 2003 
research interviews ranged from between 4 to 12 years. All six participants underwent 
postgraduate clinical or educational psychology training at various South African 
universities between 1991 and 1999. The foregoing outline of current debates in the domain 
of professional ethics training is used to deepen an understanding and interpretation of 
participants‟ lived experience as they identified the following seven difficulties which 
apparently affected the extent, quality and perceived relevance of their graduate ethics 
training. 
 
                                                 
2 South African Association of Jungian Analysts 
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In the context of participatory, process-oriented ethics training, students are encouraged to 
consult with colleagues, to challenge each other‟s ideas and values and to go beyond ethical 
codes to probe underlying principles and ethical theories (Abeles, 1980; Eberlein, 1987; 
Fine & Ulrich, 1988). In contrast with this apparently lively sense of student engagement, 
Wassenaar (2002) found that most respondents in his 1995 survey of South African 
psychology Masters programmes expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and relevance of 
their ethics training. Across the interview texts, recollections of graduate ethics education 
were similarly characterised by feelings of boredom, poor recall and a perceived lack of 
relevance.  Participants‟ original exposure to ethical issues in the context of their 
professional training thus comprises the initial difficulty: 
I found it unbelievably boring and not very relevant … I think it was 
because I hadn‟t started practising … and I think it would only really make 
sense to me once I‟d got into the real world, rather than a student looking 
at it in a very theoretical way and not seeing it as kind of a very applicable 
here and now issue (Interv. 1, p. 5, 37-41). 
 
I don‟t remember any ethics training (laughs) actually … I don‟t really 
remember it, it actually didn‟t make much impression. I know we had it … 
[but] it was quite theoretical (Interv. 3, p. 75, 20-33). 
 
 … I wasn‟t conscious of links between those two experiences [ethics 
training and this real-life dilemma] … no, absolutely no links … Not from 
the ethics training … no, not from that input, no (Interv. 6, p. 225, 21-26). 
 
This ostensible lack of enthusiasm may derive from student perception that ethical thinking 
and decision-making do not comprise a valued core skill that is integral to the analytic 
attitude and to competent clinical practice: 
P: When I did my training, I wanted more tools … for me [ethics] was by 
the way … I was so hungry for skills [and] the training is so short … My 
feeling was I wanted more and more and more skills … 
R: … ethics didn’t seem to fall into the … 
P: Skills thing, skills, no (Interv. 5, p. 165, 8-19). 
The apparent lack of prominence accorded to ethics in academic departments may stem 
from educators‟ own discomfort and lack of expertise in teaching ethics courses 
(Handlesman, 1986b). The following comments by David suggest that perceived low levels 
of staff interest, commitment and expertise comprise a second difficulty that may potentially 
compromise the quality of South African graduate ethics education: 
… my interpretation of an absence of ethics was … I don‟t think that a lot 
of the … academics and tutors had any real training themselves or interest, 
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and the … Psychology Board and Health Professions Council, their rules of 
ethics hung over as the grand daddy of behave yourself, and it was just 
accepted that you go and read that and you obey those rules … no one 
recognised that … creating a culture of ethics was not about reading the 
riot act, it was actually about engendering a way of thinking about what‟s 
right … so that was the one dynamic, that the ethos wasn‟t there (Interv. 2, 
p. 31, 33-42). 
 
Handlesman‟s (1986b) criticism of teaching ethics “by osmosis” has earlier been noted. In 
the context of different South African training universities, participants recollected exposure 
to both informal ethics teaching as well as to formal ethics modules. The following 
comments highlight a third difficulty, the risk that when ethics teaching is left to chance, it 
may be omitted entirely or merely added as an appendage or “short footnote … to the 
subject matter of various courses” (Fine & Ulrich, 1988, p. 542):  
… I don‟t remember at university (long pause) doing a specific course on 
ethics … I can‟t remember any specific lecture we had on ethics (Interv. 4, 
p. 115, 37-37). 
 
… ethics was always an adjunct to, to doing interpretation [so] what are 
the ethics of interpretation or we‟re talking about transference and what 
are the ethics of transference or … what is the ethics of the setting of the 
room … (Interv 4, p. 116, 33-36). 
Even when participants were exposed to formal ethics modules, these appear to have been 
experienced as discrete and isolated entities rather than as a foundational and integrated 
component of graduate training:  
[Ethics] could have been more … than something in isolation – well, this is 
the book, this is the reading and we‟ll discuss it and have a few seminar 
discussions around different issues (Interv. 5, p. 165, 25-27). 
 
… my training as a clinical psychologist … definitely had some input on 
ethics … I suppose the difficulty I had … was that it wasn‟t integrated … it 
didn‟t feel integrated into the rest of our training. It was something that 
came in a bit of a vacuum … kind of handed over and then … left for us to 
[integrate] with practice and with the rest of our training, it felt … out of 
context … It didn‟t really have roots … Ja, sorry, I feel like I‟m really 
straining to remember … how it proceeded (Interv. 6, p. 201, 24-25; p. 202, 
22-29). 
In the following extract, Riaan advocates adopting an approach to ethics education wherein 
theory and prospective practice are presented as integrated and interrelated components of 
an ongoing ethics education. Ethics should additionally be systematically taught not only in 
the form of a specific introductory module but should also consistently be borne in mind as 
a constant dimension of clinical case material:   
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To me [ethics] could be the introductory thing, when we started off, we 
said this is the framework and this is … pervasive and we need to deal with 
this for everything and when we do these other things, let‟s try and be alert 
to those, it‟ll come up like…you‟re doing an assessment with a child, I want 
you to be aware of [the ethics of] that, make comment on that (Interv. 5, p. 
165, 21-25). 
The professional literature suggests that postgraduate ethics training should optimally be 
comprised of 25 hours of study time; Wassenaar (2002) wrote that the surveyed average of 9 
hours allocated by South African training universities was regarded as insufficient by most 
of his respondents. Qualitative research results appear congruent with these latter findings in 
that lack of time constitutes a fourth factor which similarly contributed to participants‟ 
primarily negative evaluation of their ethics education. When asked about the extent of their 
exposure to professional ethics training, participants‟ responses included the following 
replies:  
None (Interv. 2, p. 31, 29).  
 
… we went basically right through [Steere‟s (1984)] book … but that‟s all 
we had (Interv. 1, p. 5, 31-32).  
 
… there wasn‟t an enormous amount of focus placed on that … I imagine it 
was probably not more than two mornings, two hours of two mornings … it 
was unlikely to have been more than that (Interv. 6, p. 201, 26; p. 202, 1-3). 
In the context of professional practice, four of the six participants describe the sustained 
enactment of dual role relationships. Interviewees‟ could not, however, recall any “voice” 
(Interv. 6, p. 225, 45-46) or ethical framework from their former graduate ethics training 
that spoke to the asymmetrical power relations and potential for harm that might be entailed.  
Difficulties in identifying the potent role of self-interest in motivating participants‟ 
„decisions‟ to engage with dual relationships were arguably compounded by their earlier 
exposure as students to the confusing “modelling” proffered by teaching faculty. As 
Kitchener (1992) notes, the most influential ethical attitudes learnt or internalised by 
students may come not from explicit course instruction but from observation of 
inappropriate boundary crossings by faculty members.  Participants‟ recall of seemingly 
irregular “modelling” or implicit promotion of dual relationships by hospital and academic 
staff thus comprises the fifth difficulty that apparently compromised the quality of their 
ethics training: 
P: I don‟t know, I don‟t remember learning about that, I can‟t say that 
there‟s a specific „voice‟ when it comes to [multiple relationships] …  
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R: Where do you think you came across that concept first? 
P: (Long pause) I think probably my training, like working in a hospital … 
where I might run a group, see the person for individual therapy, maybe do 
another process, so multiple roles within a therapeutic … milieu, 
therapeutic ward, ja (Interv. 6, p. 225, 39-40; p. 226, 1-3).  
I … remember that there wasn‟t a problem even if you were being lectured 
by your therapist, like at „Varsity …a lot of the therapists, the lecturers in 
the Department, their patients are students (Interv. 4, p. 146, 21-23). 
… I knew that it wasn‟t against professional ethics as a psychologist … to 
refer [my] patient to [my] workshop … I knew that was okay … because I 
remembered … the head of the hospital that I trained at … telling us that … 
they actually teach [therapists] to give … a book list … like you go to 
therapy, your therapist says I want you to read these books, and [then the 
therapist] refers them to workshops and … therapists would run the 
workshop that their patient is in, so I want you to … come and … do my 
workshop … it would be good for you (Interv. 4, p. 146, 1-11). 
 
Gaps in participants‟ current ethical sensitivity and basic ethical knowledge comprise a sixth 
difficulty. The next excerpts suggest a lack of systematic didactic input pertaining to core 
reference texts including, for example, exposure to the ethical principles and standards of 
the APA (1992) ethics code as well as the local South African code first published by Steere 
and Wassenaar (1985):  
At that stage [of the ethical dilemma] … I was not even aware that there 
was [a code of ethics] on hand. You know, in our training, we‟d never been 
provided with such (Interv. 4, p. 145, 46-48). 
 
… when does one get [a code of ethics], when you register? … I‟ve got a 
file full of stuff … so verbose and wordy … I don‟t think I have a current 
code of ethics, I would have to apply to get it, wouldn‟t I? (Interv. 3, p. 99, 
21-27).  
 
In the context of participants‟ recall of key ethics texts, Riaan‟s quote strikes a solitary 
positive note; Steere‟s (1984) book on ethics in clinical psychology is recalled as a helpful 
and still relevant resource: 
… we had a book by somebody … can‟t remember the name now but I know 
I‟d …lent it to people who would make photocopies of my photocopy 
because … it‟s excellent … it‟s a very comprehensive little book on ethics 
(Interv. 5, p. 164, 41-43). 
 
While the relationship between ethics training and professional practice is not necessarily 
“linear” (Scherrer et al., 2002), the data suggest that the perceived irrelevance of ethics 
education, irregular staff “modelling” and seemingly low levels of expertise, lack of time 
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and erratic exposure to ethical issues may combine to undermine participants‟ subsequent 
clinical proficiency and competence. In the following extract, for example, the participant 
concerned struggles to identify the presence of common ethical dilemmas: 
… when you think of ethical dilemmas, you think of … big difficult things, 
someone comes to you and they‟ve committed a crime … what do you do? 
… so when I mentioned [the case] around sexual harassment … there was 
a sexual boundary violation [between therapist and patient] but it wasn‟t 
very bad, I mean it was bad but it could‟ve been worse … The other [dual 
role relationship] I suppose I, I wasn‟t sure whether it was an ethical 
dilemma or not (Interv. 3, p. 76, 10-12; p. 77, 23-27).  
 
Core reference texts appear to be conflated. In the following excerpt, the bare legal 
provisions of Act 56 of 1974 (Government Gazette, 1974) are erroneously confused with the 
then available but apparently unread ethics code for clinical psychologists (Steere & 
Wassenaar, 1985):  
When we … registered as intern psychologists, we were given this Code … 
I remember going through it … and some things popping up that surprised 
me like “How you can advertise”, I mean, I found this quite quirky but 
what, what‟s acceptable in terms of advertising, you know, a business card 
and a plaque outside your house … . So, I remember being quite taken … 
by the breadth of what was covered in terms of ethical issues (Interv. 6, p. 
222, 22-29). 
 
Justification for ethical decisions has traditionally been based on four levels of ethical 
reasoning consisting of ethical theories, principles, rules and judgments (Fine & Ulrich, 
1988). In the apparent absence of early professional ethics training which emphasised 
decision-making frameworks and the importance of reflective space or a third point of view 
(Britton, 1998), reliance is currently placed for ethical judgments on impulsive “gut” 
feelings or prereflective “intuitive” levels of moral thinking (Kitchener, 1984): 
… ethics for me has been … sort of common sense stuff, I kind of had a gut 
feeling for what was right and wrong … there‟s the law … the formal stuff, 
this is what you can and can‟t do and then these other times when you 
deduce … [what‟s] in the interest of the patient, what‟s best for the patient 
… that‟s my own opinion about it all (Interv. 5, p. 165, 3-12). 
 
The lack of training opportunities to explore the potential role of emotions and other 
countertransference phenomena in ethical decision-making comprises a final difficulty. 
Steiner (2006) observes that enactments in the analytic setting are inevitable but that their 
usefulness is contingent on understanding their meaning in relation to the patient‟s habitual 
object relationships. Each therapist thus needs to develop sensitivity to those areas in which 
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“enactments are most likely to occur and this requires self-observation and self-knowledge 
on the part of the analyst” (Steiner, 2006, p. 315). Inadequate emphasis in graduate ethics 
courses on the countertransference dimension of ethical decision-making may increase 
students‟ vulnerability to initiating future unretrieved enactments, leaving them 
inadequately prepared to engage with dilemmas that forcibly evoke, for example, sexual 
attraction to clients or feelings of hate, fear and anger (Pope, Keith-Spiegel & Tabachnik, 
1986; Pope & Tabachnik, 1993; Stevenson, 1999).  
 
In the context of South African academic psychology, Ivey (1992) contends that clinical 
training and supervision have long been dominated by humanistic and cognitive 
behaviourist orientations, both of which ignore the transference-countertransference 
dimension of therapeutic interaction. Intergenerational and institutionalised 
countertransference blindness and the ensuing absence of psychoanalytically oriented 
training and supervision may render students particularly prone to the later enactment of 
malignant “countertransference pathology” (Ivey, 1992, p. 34). Haumann (2004) objects 
that these unsubstantiated assertions are essentially speculative in nature and that no 
published research currently exists which determines more precisely what “specific 
theoretical paradigms [are] adhered to by psychology departments at South African 
universities or … how this may relate to countertransference problems and enactments 
among South African psychologists” (p. 5). However, detailed examination of data in the 
preceding chapter (see Chapter 6) apparently supports the contention that the postgraduate 
ethics training from 1991 to 1999 of six experienced psychologists failed to heighten 
awareness of idiosyncratic countertransference vulnerabilities that routinely appeared to 
play a role in the process of ethical decision-making as it transpired within and across the 
research interviews. Certainly the ready acknowledgement of the potential impact of 
countertransference phenomena on ethical judgment is absent from participants‟ accounts of 
their former ethics training and from their subsequent understanding of their own ethical 
decision-making practices. This suggests that if we are to heed Steiner‟s (2006) caution 
regarding the need to sensitise clinicians to those areas in which they may be vulnerable to 
iatrogenic boundary violations, then the systematic and early identification of personal 
countertransference responses should be considered as integral to ethics education and to the 
teaching of the core skill of ethical decision-making. As Epstein and Simon (1990) point 
out, normalisation and frank discussion of countertransference phenomena including erotic 
countertransference should be repeatedly emphasised in both graduate and continuing ethics 
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education “as a reminder of the perils involved in our work and as a preventive safeguard” 
(p. 450).  
3. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ETHICAL CODE OF PROFESSONAL CONDUCT, 
THE PROFESSIONAL BOARD, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF 
SOUTH AFRICA (PSYSSA) AND THE LAW 
Clinical practice is situated within a framework of normative ethics which is comprised of a 
series of documents defining acceptable ethical behaviour (Abeles, 1980). At the time of the 
2003 research interviews, applicable documents included the first legally enforceable 
national Ethical Code of Professional Conduct adopted in 1999 by the Professional Board 
(HPCSA, CPD, Guidelines for Psychologists and Registered Counsellors, 2001). Since the 
data (Interv. 6, p. 226, 21-29) reveal that Act 56 of 1974 (Government Gazette, 1974) was 
mistaken for a professional ethics code, the latter Act arguably constitutes a second statutory 
benchmark. Devised for the protection of the public, the Act‟s spare legal injunctions do not 
provide effective guidelines for complex ethical dilemmas but they do stipulate “which 
actions by psychologists might lead to disciplinary action ... [it is thus] constructed as a 
catalogue of potential offenses” (Allan, 1997, in Wassenaar, 1998, p.135). A third document 
pertains to statutory rape and concerns the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 which obligates the 
treating therapist to report suspected child abuse (Allan, 2001). While these texts constitute 
a necessary statutory and ethical framework for the dilemmas concerned, the data suggest 
that participants were apparently unaware of their existence, their differences and their 
purposes.  
3.1. Perceptions of the South African Ethical Code of Professional Conduct 
Ethical codes offer a set of guidelines or ethical rules that establish the parameters of 
acceptable practice and attempt to secure competent and professional behaviour (Louw & 
Edwards, 1998). The provision of aspirational ethical principles protects the public interest 
by encouraging the individual practitioner to strive for optimal levels of practice (Pettifor & 
Sawchuk, 2006). At the very least, codes may encapsulate minimum standards representing 
the “bottom line below which … practice should not go” (Lindsay & Colley, 1995, p. 448). 
Excessive outside interference by state bodies is accordingly pre-empted by the profession‟s 
autonomous attempts to regulate itself (Steere, 1984) and to enforce disciplinary action 
against behaviour which violates acceptable standards of conduct (Pettifor & Sawchuk, 
2006).  
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Mere exposure to ethical code items is, however, widely agreed to be “woefully inadequate” 
(Gabbard, 1996, p. 318) in fostering ethical behaviour (Clarkson, 2000; Handelsman, 
1986b; Scherrer et al., 2002). Missing from the APA‟s (1992) and CPA‟s (2000) ethics 
codes is the explicit recognition accorded by APsaA (2003)3 to countertransference 
phenomena and the related need identified in the latter association‟s professional code to 
vigorously monitor “behaviours that are likely to misuse the power differential of the 
transference-countertransference relationship to the detriment of patients” (p. 2). The 
current South African ethics code for psychologists similarly does not factor in the potential 
influence on ethical decision-making of “blind spots” (Freud, 1912, p. 116) or of 
unconscious phenomena. As Gabbard (1996) argues, however, even if therapists do not 
practice dynamic psychotherapy, “transference and countertransference issues will always 
be present in the therapy whether or not the therapist acknowledges their existence” (p. 
318). In contrast with the CPA (2000), the usefulness of the present South African ethics 
code is arguably constrained not only by the absence of explicit decision-making guidelines 
but also by any cautionary statement alerting practitioners to the possibility that ethical 
decision-making potentially represents a time-consuming emotionally distressing endeavour 
that can forcibly mobilise “personal biases, stresses or self-interest” (CPA, 2000, p. 4). 
Without the assistance of basic decision-making steps, practitioners may encounter 
increased difficulties regarding the obligation to remain professionally accountable and thus 
to engage “in an ethical decision-making process that is explicit enough to bear public 
scrutiny” (CPA, 2000, p. 4).  
 
The following excerpts highlight participants‟ seeming ambivalence towards professional 
ethics codes. At the time of the 2003 research interviews, no participant had consulted the 
South African Ethical Code of Professional Conduct (2002) or was apparently even aware 
of its existence:  
I‟m just trying to picture it, kind of bring it into my mind … No, I didn‟t 
consult the Code … to be honest, I haven‟t … gone and sat with that 
document for a long time (Interv. 6, p. 226, 13-19). 
 
No, no, I don‟t even know where it is (Interv. 5, p. 185, 8). 
 
No, I didn‟t consult the Code of Ethics … I‟m really very out of touch with 
the … bureaucracy of the professional (Interv. 3, p. 98, 35-37). 
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… I didn‟t even know that there was a document that I could have in my 
possession (Interv. 1, p. 15, 21-22). 
 
The general domain of „ethics‟ appears to be perceived as the province of dry officialdom 
and tedious bureaucracy. Rather than being syntonic with everyday professional practice, 
the current code seemed to represent a distant and split off entity that inspired only 
ambivalence, avoidance or dismissiveness. When asked to describe their relationship with 
past and current ethics codes, participants gave the following replies: 
Ambivalent, „cos on the one hand it‟s quite clear and though it‟s very clear 
… this is what you might do and this is what you might not do … it offers no 
guidance (Interv. 2, p. 55, 35-37). 
 
… the ethics that we got … is so abstract … it feels like a very dry 
background part of things … [My relationship] at this point, very distant … 
It feels extremely distant (Interv. 3, p. 98, 39-41; p. 99, 30-35). 
 
I imagine that the Code … existed in a sphere that was beyond, that was 
elsewhere … my feeling was that this dilemma [involving dual role 
relationships] was so sensitive … that no document could give me answers 
… it didn‟t occur to me to even look … it didn‟t occur to me that it would 
have anything to offer … of any value (Interv. 6, p. 226, 32-45). 
 
At times, the unread Code seems to take on an actively persecutory guise. Fuelled by 
ignorance of its contents, participants‟ transference relationship to the Code is on occasion 
suffused with fear and panic: 
Fear … because I don‟t know enough about it, because I feel vulnerable, 
because there‟s … there‟s uncertainty (Interv. 5, p. 184, 40-43). 
 
“Fear … ah, fear … my sense is that … it‟s a rule book, it‟s not really a … 
mentoring guide, that‟s my projection … it‟s a rule book and there‟s like 
police that police it … on a feeling level, I‟m afraid, I‟m afraid … I‟m 
afraid that … I‟ll be basically applied to a set of rules and … be seen to fall 
outside of those rules … and then be punished accordingly (Interv. 4, p. 
147, 16-32). 
 
When the constraints and caution sounded by the current Code in relation to multiple 
relationships were explored, fear and anxiety alternate with escalating anger: 
I‟ve got a little bit of a paranoid-schizoid feeling … I feel angry … because 
if … this is breaking some professional [rule] of conduct and that would 
mean I wouldn‟t be able to do it anymore … it feeds my sense of mistrust 
and judgment of … the constructors … of this Code … like what I‟m doing 
is being measured against the Code and I feel … angry about that … people 
can‟t see what the hell‟s going on here! (Interv. 4, p. 153, 33-37; p. 154, 
30-33). 
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Analysis of the data suggests that research participants felt isolated and alienated from their 
graduate ethics training and from the current ethics code; neither professional resource was 
perceived as offering support or guidance with the resolution of common ethical dilemmas.  
3.2. Perceptions of the Professional Board and PsySSA 
The Professional Board for Psychology was originally formed in 1974 and is a statutory 
body whose primary aim remains the protection of the public and the safeguarding of 
minimum standards of education and training for psychologists (Wassenaar, 1998).  The 
Board is empowered to take disciplinary action against any psychologist who may be guilty 
of unprofessional conduct including withdrawal of the latter‟s registration and right to 
practice (Wassenaar, 1998). By contrast, the Psychological Society of South Africa 
(PsySSA), founded in 1994, carries no statutory powers and to date represents the 
predominant voluntary professional association in this country (Wassenaar, 1998). 
Paramount aims include the promotion of the mental health of all South Africans in a post-
apartheid society, the safeguarding of ethical standards and the provision of supportive and 
advisory services to its membership (PsySSA website4).  
 
At the time of the research interviews, no participant was a member of PsySSA. Imagery 
evident in the interview texts portrays the formidable difficulties of penetrating the 
perceived institutional armour of both organisations in frustrated attempts to find within a 
humane and helpful voice. Once again key professional resources are depicted as remote 
from the daily concerns and conflicts of practice on the ground. When asked whether they 
would consider approaching PsySSA or the Board for help with ethical dilemmas, 
participants‟ answers reflect collective feelings of frustration, anger and mistrustfulness:  
No, I wouldn‟t … I wouldn‟t do that, I wouldn‟t put myself at risk. Not a 
chance … I don‟t have any trust … at all in the powers that be in 
psychology. Zero trust (Interv. 4, p. 147, 36; p. 148, 34-35). 
 
I‟ve an image of waiting on the other end of the phone and it not being 
answered … being passed from pillar to post, not getting the right person 
… being quite frustrated (Interv. 1, p. 15, 32-34).  
 
I‟m not a member of PsySSA, I was a member … but basically all I was 
doing was paying a fee and I didn‟t feel that there was any value that I was 
getting from it (Interv. 4, p. 148, 13-14). 
 
                                                 
4 www.psyssa.com 
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Where are they? The Professional Board? ... trying to contact them … 
long-distance calls and you‟re on the phone and you hear music … Mozart 
or whatever … there‟s a switchboard that somebody will get back to you 
and (sighs) no, never, never! … you can‟t get through to them … they‟re on 
lunch or they‟re on tea or they‟ve gone home already (Interv. 5, p. 185, 18-
30). 
 
David similarly described struggling with a dilemma involving collegial sexual misconduct 
between 1997 and 1999. Structural changes affecting the profession of psychology during 
this period saw the amendment in 1999 of the name of the original controlling body, the 
South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC), to the new title of the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) (Scherrer et al., 2002). Formerly excluded 
from service on the SAMDC, the professional Board for Psychology is today one of twelve 
Boards which are represented on the HPCSA and which enjoy considerable autonomy with 
regard to ratifying decisions affecting the different professions concerned (Mokhuane, 
2006). In the following excerpt, David refers to the original SAMDC which he too 
experienced as unsupportive of the everyday struggle to foster ethical practice in the context 
of the therapeutic space: 
… the man basically said … listen, it‟s up to you … we can do nothing 
unless you lay a formal complaint … it‟s your pillow and you must lie on it 
… I sort of felt … switched off by [that] … like if that’s their attitude 
towards it, I‟m not going to get any support from them … now I‟m kind of 
on my own … they are not very enhancing of encouraging practitioners to 
feel ethical. I mean my sense of it was … ag, why bother because they‟re 
not going, they‟ve no intention of supporting me … [It was] like trying to 
find your way to the right person to speak to … (laughs) where I [had] to 
fight my way in, really to be heard. „Cos really what I … wanted [was] to 
just talk to somebody on the Ethics Board, with whom I could dialogue my 
dilemma, that was my need (Interv. 2, p. 54, 30-42; p. 55, 1-4). 
 
The Council‟s apparently brusque rejoinder that they could play no role outside the lodging 
of a formal complaint is followed by David‟s reasoned appeal for the creation by statutory 
bodies of a knowledgeable, user-friendly ethics advisory service that would be widely 
available for informal consultation. Such a service would optimally be thoroughly attuned to 
practitioners‟ need for support and to their anxieties regarding the implications both of 
remaining silent as well as of speaking out about collegial misconduct. The next excerpt 
thus highlights the need for professional bodies to adopt an experience-near and more 
invitational approach to anxious professionals seeking guidance on ethical dilemmas: 
… what would‟ve been nice is … if I‟d phoned the [Council] and the person 
… said, look, let me first do this for you, let me fax you the relevant 
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paragraphs of the Medical and Dental Council‟s Code of Ethics … come 
back to me … and we can discuss it … Then they said … you don‟t have to 
reveal the person‟s name … but just give me the facts and let me give you 
an opinion about how we would view this … Then, if you wanted to 
activate something … if there‟s some kind of … preliminary hearing, that 
we would need to interview you … and if the thing should go forward for a 
complaint, this is how you will be involved and this is what we expect from 
you … we have a … view that we encourage practising professionals … to 
speak up … around this kind of misdemeanour and what we recommend is 
that you phone the [health professional] … mention that you‟ve called us 
and that it‟s appropriate for you to have a meeting with him and hear his 
side of the story first hand … That would‟ve been helpful to me, „cos that‟s 
what I would do, if I was supervising somebody now who‟s in a dilemma, 
what I would want them to know is what is the infrastructure … the locus in 
which this all exists and what are the implications for you, as a practising 
professional, to remain silent and to speak up …  That would‟ve been 
useful for me (Interv. 2, p. 53, 37-48; p. 54, 1-26). 
 
The data provide only a single instance where the Board and PsySSA were perceived to 
have offered constructive assistance with the resolution of a dilemma. Although Theresa 
acknowledged that she too did not consider approaching the latter organisations for 
guidance with regard to troubling multiple relationships, she offered the following 
anomalous description:  
Well, subsequently through my experience of a psychoanalytic reading 
group, they‟ve been  involved in an incident around a colleague and it 
suddenly brought those bodies one step closer, that they are bodies that can 
be consulted, they‟re people … not just concepts that belong to a document 
in Pretoria. So, in the last say, six to eight months … I‟ve become more 
conscious of them around ethical issues (Interv. 6, p. 227, 9-14). 
3.3. Perceptions of the Law as a Professional Resource 
The practice contexts that are disproportionately most likely to attract public complaints 
against South African psychologists include child custody work, adult psychotherapy and 
work with minors. This finding foregrounds the “conclusion that Complaints are much more 
likely to arise at the interface of ethical and legal domains of professional practice” 
(Wassenaar, 2002, p. 216). Clinicians are adjured to improve the quality of their work by 
attaining a sound understanding of the relevant legal rules which intersect with their 
professional activities and practices (Allen, 2001). But by virtue of finding themselves in the 
potential role of witness or accused, the “uneasy” relationship which prevails between 
clinical psychology and the law may well arouse “resentment towards the legal profession in 
the hearts of many clinical psychologists” (Steere, 1984, p. 75). Rather than being perceived 
as a “big benevolent force” (Interv. 5, p. 189, 1), the following excerpt suggests that, on the 
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contrary, the law often seemed to be regarded as a mistrusted and not necessarily ethical 
adversary:  
And the whole issue at play in that workshop [on the law and 
psychotherapy] was not what are the ethical issues in terms of what‟s 
moral or what‟s right, it‟s more about what are the issues in terms of what 
will get you in trouble (pauses) legally (Interv. 4, p. 117, 4-6). 
 
Abramovitch (2006) writes of Primo Levi‟s “grey zone” in extermination camps wherein 
the polarities of ethical and unethical are redefined by context and behaviours customarily 
accepted as unethical (including lying, stealing and cheating) may come to constitute ethical 
virtues. Breaking the structure of confidentiality by compliance or “blind obedience” (Slack, 
1997, p. 21) to legal injunctions including mandatory reporting laws similarly does not 
necessarily secure an optimally therapeutic or ethical course of action (Bollas, 1999). 
Professional ethics codes may thus accord explicit recognition to the paradox that refusal to 
abide by legal injunctions may on occasion constitute the most ethical course of action 
(APsaA, 2005; CPA, 2000). In the highly aversive circumstances generated by collegial 
misconduct, for example, “defensive psychotherapy” (Clarkson, 2000, xviii) may serve to 
discharge various legal obligations yet still leave the sexual misconduct concerned 
unchallenged and the dilemma unresolved from an ethical and countertransference 
perspective:  
[The law] … offered me … clarity that … I‟d done everything necessary to 
discharge my practical responsibility … I needed to inform the parents … I 
made an attempt to contact the colleague … I recorded that in my notes. So, 
from that point of view, no-one could point a finger at me and say you 
should have done X, Y and Z … the legal thing … gave me certainty … that 
there was nothing more I needed to do actually (Interv. 2, p. 56, 10-24). 
 
Apart from helping to avoid potential law suits, not a single quote emerges that suggests that 
the legal domain was perceived to be an ethical ally or professional resource that might aid 
the resolution of the dilemmas concerned. Descriptions veer from conceiving South African 
law primarily as a mistrusted adversary to, alternatively, perceiving it as a profoundly 
compromised and corrupt institution:  
The law was unjust … the law doesn‟t protect (pauses) the person who has 
been raped, the law doesn‟t protect me as a professional person … the 
law will protect the rapist, the law will protect the person who gets put in 
jail … the law doesn’t protect the policeman … policemen are prizes, you 
know, you kill a cop, you go up in … status in the gang. Ja, the law, ja, the 
law, the law doesn‟t work (Interv. 5, p. 186, 1-8). 
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Not only is the law perceived as failing to address the legitimate security concerns of both 
the professional as well as the raped patient, but the very act of enlisting its aid and of 
mobilising its procedures may well elicit an unwelcome secondary source of trauma:  
… it just feels like it all went roughshod over the little girl … I don‟t know 
what the forms are called but … there‟s an A130 that‟s been completed, the 
report from the social worker on the B22 … that kind of state bureaucracy 
stuff … and the person‟s lost, ja … there‟s an absence of the person, of the 
little girl … I suppose these people are doing a good job but … this doesn‟t 
feel gentle to me … I just wonder if there was a format, you know, rape 
victim comes in … let them tell their story over and over … work through 
their feelings, „work through their feelings‟ in inverted commas, whatever 
that means … see them for four sessions, terminate … and then guilt on my 
side… I … criticise, but what did you do? (Interv. 5, p. 182, 4-40). 
 
The data thus far disconcertingly suggest that graduate ethics training, the current ethics 
code, the statutory and voluntary professional bodies concerned and the law were to a very 
large extent not perceived by participants as professional resources that could be profitably 
accessed to guide ethical decision-making and action.   
4. PERCEPTIONS OF PEER CONSULTATION, CLINICAL SUPERVISION AND 
PERSONAL THERAPY 
The difficulties inherent in reaching out to colleagues and research participants‟ evident 
reticence regarding exposure of their professional lapses have previously been identified in 
„Avowed vs Lived Values‟. In the following excerpt, for example, David continues to 
reflect on the apparent lack of hospitable professional space wherein therapists can speak 
freely without shame of their ethical concerns and anxieties: 
[It‟s difficult to] find a working space where people don‟t talk theory but 
people can actually talk about what they really do without … the 
persecution that you are going the right thing, you have to do the right 
thing or make the right interpretation … if you look at the sort of primary 
defence … of educated people … with some kind of university degree, the 
first inclination is to use intellect to cover up … I think it‟s an almost 
automatic response … and I think it‟s got to do with shame (Interv. 2, p. 30, 
25-43). 
Collective covert pressure to conform to a cerebral, highly intellectualised ego ideal which 
quotes “the right page in the right articles” (Interv. 2, p. 31, 19) actually functions to seal 
over countertransference difficulties and clinicians‟ “real inside experience of their work” 
(Interv. 2, p. 67, 32). Should this ego ideal be transgressed, David argues, the archaic 
superego of the professional community finds talionic expression through shaming, 
isolating, excommunicating or labelling the „transgressor‟ as mad, maverick or crazy 
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(Interv. 2, p. 31, 1-12). In the context of contemporary South African psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy, David‟s comments regarding professional peers again seem to highlight the 
perceived absence of benevolent third others who might have aided participants‟ efforts to 
resolve the dilemmas concerned.   
 
During the time in which the ethical dilemmas arose, two participants reported avoiding 
supervision. The four remaining participants reported contact with five different 
supervisors. The theoretical orientation of all supervisors, barring one who adopted a non-
analytic pragmatic style of case management, was described as psychoanalytic or as 
Jungian.  
 
Gabbard (1996) notes the inadequacy of the individual clinician‟s reliance on introspection 
or on the internal self-monitoring of primitive transference-countertransference dynamics. 
Such scrutiny “will always be subject to the vagaries of countertransference, bias, denial, 
and unconscious wishes for the patient to meet the therapist‟s needs” (p. 316). While novice 
and experienced clinicians alike are thus encouraged to access ongoing consultation or a 
third point of view (Dewald & Clark, 2001; Gabbard & Lester, 1995; Ivey, 1992), the data 
disconcertingly suggest that receiving regular supervision even from experienced or 
analytically attuned clinicians does not necessarily offer an effective antidote to incompetent 
professional practice. When asked how effectively supervisors were able to assist with the 
processing and understanding of common ethical dilemmas, participants‟ reservations show 
evidence of anxiety, uncertainty or outright disappointment:  
I have a slight worry that if my supervisor … reads [this thesis] … I just 
feel a bit anxious … because … perhaps we didn‟t explore it enough at the 
time … and I sort of feel anxious that she might feel criticised or something 
like that (Interv. 3, p. 72, 11-16). 
 
… it was pretty useless supervision, … never get into anything to do with 
how I felt … In retrospect, … the supervisor was … shocked and undone 
and he probably needed supervision … actually, that was my 
disappointment … he was paralysed, didn‟t know really what to say … 
(Interv. 2, p. 40, 27-29; p. 52, 14-18). 
 
Unfortunately, my supervision … didn‟t feel (laughs) very satisfying … I 
had very … little input and input that didn‟t feel … that useful, not that 
helpful … I probably would‟ve benefited … from outside supervision … this 
[case] is about … detailed, very powerful psychoanalytic work … 
transference and countertransference and projective identification … it … 
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didn‟t feel like they had a place in my supervision (Interv. 6, p. 208, 3-18; 
p. 224, 16-21). 
 
Apparently torn between mandatory reporting laws governing statutory rape and the need to 
consider the potentially disruptive effects on the therapeutic process of breaching 
confidentiality, Riaan‟s following description provides the single exception to participants‟ 
generally negative evaluation of the efficacy of supervision:  
Well, I think [the supervisor] addressed my needs which were around the 
legal/ethical issues … just clarifying my role … as therapist as opposed to 
forensic counsellor [or] investigator and that … I don‟t have training in 
that kind of work (Interv. 5, p. 183, 32-38). 
 
Mills (2005) writes that relational psychoanalysis courageously acknowledges the primacy 
of the analyst‟s phenomenology in analytic work and offers candid accounts of the latter‟s 
intimate countertransference experiences. Relational approaches thus profoundly challenge 
the traditional emphasis on interpretation and insight and forge a new “clearing for honest 
discourse on what we actually do, think, and feel in our analytic work … breaking the 
silence and secrecy of what actually transpires in the consulting room” (Mills, 2005, p.156). 
Yet shame, fear of verbal censure and superego projections onto the supervisor apparently 
continue to lead to the supervisee‟s omission of critical clinical material and to inhibit the 
latter‟s self-disclosures regarding his/her feelings and interventions with patients (Gabbard 
& Lester, 1995). Gabbard (1996) thus suggests that the training of novice therapists needs to 
actively promote normalisation of intense countertransference feelings in an effort to lessen 
resistance to sharing such „forbidden‟ affects with the supervisor concerned. Beginner 
therapists need to learn that “those aspects of their thoughts, feelings, or actions that they 
would most like to keep secret from the supervisor are precisely the issues which should be 
openly discussed in supervision” (Gabbard, 1996, p. 317). The following quotes suggest that 
anxiety about appropriate supervisory intervention but also fear of possible judgment and 
censure were instrumental in postqualified clinicians‟ apparent guardedness and avoidance 
of self-disclosure in the supervisory space:  
I was quite uncertain as to how much to reveal if I‟m really struggling with 
the case. So what I‟d do is I‟d bring [the supervisor] stuff that was … 
processed … refined and thought through … I wouldn‟t come with huge 
questions … huge difficulties, I‟d … work on it…on my own (Interv. 6, p. 
223, 49-51; p. 224, 1-3). 
 
… the feeling … about not … feeling professional in my space … I don‟t 
think I formulated any thought about it consciously … but I still didn‟t think 
of going to colleagues … the feeling of having made a mistake at the 
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beginning would have just made me more reticent about going to speak … 
about it, because it‟s … as though nothing can be done about it now … if 
I‟d taken it to supervision, I feel very safe in my supervision … I‟ve risked 
more … than this before so I can‟t explain why [I didn‟t go] (Interv. 1, p. 
20, 17-20; p. 21, 3-5). 
 
It felt like … I was managing and so I „didn’t need’ supervision. But if I 
think about that, it wasn‟t so much that I didn‟t need but … I was … 
anxious that the supervisor would … act against it … I was worried that 
they would not support what I was doing … and I didn‟t want to risk that 
(Interv. 6, p. 142, 43-46; p. 143, 1-4). 
 
Additional difficulties which beset the supervisory space echoed compromised postgraduate 
teaching practices and included, for example, “rushed” supervision and the irregular 
„modelling‟ or acceptance of dual role relationships. Moreover, current supervisory 
practices often retained an apparent emphasis on pragmatic case management at the expense 
of discussing the ethical and countertransference dimensions of the dilemma concerned. The 
following quotes suggest that Eberlein‟s (1987) observation that few supervisors spend 
sufficient time exploring the ethical implications of their student supervisees‟ interventions 
may also pertain to well qualified clinicians‟ subjective experiences of the supervisory 
space: 
… we didn‟t have enough time really to explore this [dual role] dimension 
… because … there is a … crisis … about whether or not [the patient] 
breaks up with her boyfriend … I would‟ve been interested to get, but I 
didn‟t ask my supervisor … it was a bit rushed … whether he thought there 
was an ethical issue around this [dual role relationship]? (Interv. 3, p. 93, 
46-48; p. 94, 1-7).  
 
… because of her time and my time we‟d sometimes not see each other … 
so … I‟ve had less supervision than I would have liked … often I‟ve ended 
up having more management supervision than … where you‟re really 
tracking a case. So I might come … with … what must I do about this and 
then … maybe looking at someone else (Interv. 3, p. 75, 1-10). 
 
The dual role relationships which form the context for the following three quotes have each 
been described in detail at the outset of the „Results‟ section. In the initial scenario, the 
participant questions whether the supervision of a troubling dual role relationship is itself 
potentially contaminated by a supervisor who apparently unquestioningly provides irregular 
„modelling‟ through her own engagement with multiple relationships. In the second 
scenario, two different analytically oriented supervisors are apparently “unfazed” by the 
therapeutic impasse wherein the participant concerned is both the patient‟s therapist as well 
as her cousin: 
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… I have supervision with my boss once a week … I think in [my 
supervisor‟s] relationship with [my patient], „cause they‟re also colleagues 
… it felt like things were … again contaminated because she had her own 
experience of [my patient] which might‟ve coloured her perceptions and 
her capacity … to supervise me (Interv. 6, p. 200, 27; p. 224, 3-7).  
 
Well [my first supervisor‟s] attitude was … fairly straightforward, it was 
about … [the patient‟s] not in your immediate environment … it‟s all quite 
distant so … it should be okay … it wasn‟t explored an enormous amount in 
that supervision … it was also … what feelings do I have … the feelings 
that had come up … had been quite intense … So perhaps … I was 
surprised, I felt there would‟ve been more … shock … it was … 
downplayed … I think that that felt a little surprising to me (Interv. 3, p. 95, 
13-24; p. 96, 7-10). 
 
… my [new] supervisor … didn‟t appear shocked … about my seeing a … 
cousin … he seemed to take it … in his stride … we didn‟t really explore 
that dimension … but this morning … I had the thought that … [the patient] 
told me about going to family gatherings … and it feels like there‟s an extra 
dimension of interest thinking about those people because … my family 
would know about [them] … I mean to what extent it enters the therapy I 
suppose is the question and I‟m not sure whether it does or not (Interv. 3, p. 
92, 15-32). 
 
Underpinning the teaching of mental health professionals lies the core ethical principle of 
competence (Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Editorial, 1980, in Wassenaar, 2002). 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of derelict supervisory practices is the seeming 
unawareness of the personal countertransference component apparently driving supervisees‟ 
ethical decision-making and chronic boundary violations. The data raises the contentious 
question of whether local analytically oriented supervisors are currently adequately 
equipped to identify the presence and possible countertransference ramifications of common 
ethical dilemmas. Wassenaar (2002) observes that competence as an academic or as a 
practitioner does not necessarily secure competence as a supervisor; this suggests that the 
competent supervision of ethical dilemmas may require the future development of training 
programmes for supervisors which have as their primary focus the issue of ethics education.   
 
From the perspective of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, Steiner (2006) observes that 
countertransference enactments frequently allow the analyst to evade uncomfortable 
psychological truths either about him/herself or about the patient. Enactments may thus 
represent what is split off and projected “because it is too disturbing to be talked about” 
(Steiner, 2006, p. 327). A stance of non-enactment derives from the establishment of 
“triangular space” (Solomon, 2003, p. 174) and from the capacity for reflection on the 
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transference-countertransference pressures mobilised by the analytic relationship and 
setting.  The protection afforded to the patient‟s subjectivity by constraining the therapist‟s 
impulse to react or to retaliate without thought comprises the analytic attitude which, 
Solomon (2003) argues, is therefore quintessentially ethical in nature. The data pertaining to 
analytically oriented supervision, however, seems to support Ivey‟s (1992) contention that 
having an analytic orientation “does not immunise its adherents or guarantee them insight 
into their countertransference issues” (p. 43). General difficulties integral to identifying 
countertransference phenomena may well be augmented by the lack of supervisory 
awareness of the countertransference dimension of ethical decision-making. These latter 
instances of countertransference blindness apparently contributed to the pervasive collapse 
of “triangular space” evident in the supervision of the following dilemmas and to the 
seeming evasion of supervisees‟ disturbing countertransference enactments.   
 
The first example which follows shows a supervisor‟s apparent resistance to openly 
confronting both his own as well as his supervisee‟s countertransference reactions regarding 
collegial homosexual misconduct. The second scenario highlights a supervisor‟s apparent 
failure to consider the possible meanings of the participant‟s reticence to disclose his 
affective responses and of the same interviewee‟s ensuing „decision‟ to passively desist 
from reporting, following up or handing over the statutory rape of a young patient: 
… I think [collegial sexual misconduct] was a difficult situation for 
anybody to think about … supervision became suddenly very tentative … as 
if both of us were … touching something … dangerous and without the 
courage to just go to the edge of what needed to be thought about … I think 
that was my supervisor‟s experience … this information … made him tense 
… his anxiety around dealing with a topic like this was activated and 
therefore he couldn‟t serve me as a supervisor effectively (Interv. 2, p. 52, 
42-45; p. 53, 1-23).  
 
… immediately after the [research] interview, I felt quite emotionally 
disturbed …‟ Cause I generally never talk much in that way about my work 
… [in] supervision, I try and … cram as many [cases in] … it‟s quite 
limited … it‟s about sessional notes and discussion … then moving on  … 
but … this [interview] … made me think about my own vulnerability … also 
my emotion, in terms of my work, my emotional neediness (Interv. 5, p. 178, 
17-27). 
 
… last week after we … explored [the dilemma] … that was the first time I 
really, on an affective level, explored it (Interv. 5, p. 184, 14-15). 
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Personal therapy and supervision are acknowledged as the two primary influences which are 
brought to bear on the professional development of a psychotherapist (Gabbard, 1996; Ivey, 
1992; Solomon 2003). Within the intimate context of a personal therapy, the therapist 
hopefully familiarises him/herself with key defensive patterns and conflicts around which 
countertransference enactments are most likely to occur (Gabbard, 1996; Steiner, 2006). At 
the time of the research interviews, three participants reported attending regular analytically 
oriented personal therapy. When participants turned to their own therapists for help, the 
latter‟s interventions revealed difficulties around basic ethical knowledge similar to those 
evidently experienced by the supervisors concerned. The following quotes suggest, for 
example, that the personal therapists involved failed to identify the specific ethical dilemma 
at stake. Moreover, in the context of participants‟ sustained enactments around dual role 
relationships over periods ranging from 18 months to nearly two years (Interv. 4, p. 128, 23; 
Interv. 6, p. 208, 21), core countertransference difficulties including narcissistic self-interest 
and separation anxieties remain apparently unchallenged and unrectified. Finally, rather 
than helping to establish “triangular space”, personal therapists appeared to blur the 
boundary between therapy and supervision and are perceived by participants as offering 
either “covert encouragement” or, alternatively, absolution of responsibility for chronic 
boundary violations by erroneously locating the site of disturbance solely within the 
patient‟s internal object world: 
My therapy was … at that time … about three times a week on the couch … 
[it] was the primary place of processing everything, including any … stuff 
associated with my practice, so if you go back to that previous question, 
what resources did I tap on … my therapist [was] there with me thinking … 
that was a dominant … very powerful influence was my therapist … a 
qualified analyst … I never had any negative sense about [the dual role 
relationship] from him ... I … remember (pauses) like … covert 
encouragement (laughs) … really covert encouragement … and every now 
and then an overt encouragement (Interv. 4, p. 144, 4-18). 
 
… this current therapist has … had an analytic training … [I‟m in therapy] 
twice  a week … What approach did she adopt? … she gave meaning to my 
experiences, to the ... projective identifications … where I felt …  something 
really being put into me and twisted … at an abdominal level … my 
frustration, my anger … my sense of having been violated … she helped to 
normalise those and to … hand them back … to be able to say you know 
what? This stuff belongs to you, the patient … just [to] clarify that 
distinction that was … useful (Interv. 6, p. 201, 1-4; p. 225, 7-13).  
 
The data reveal that supervision was avoided by two participants. The sample of six 
participants included one practitioner who remained professionally isolated throughout the 
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duration of the dilemma. The remaining five participants approached a combined total of 
five supervisors and three personal analysts for help with processing common ethical 
dilemmas. Analysis of the descriptions pertaining to the combined eight supervisory and 
personal therapy contacts suggests a possible ethics hiatus in the way clinical cases may be 
processed in the field of contemporary South African psychoanalytic psychotherapy. 
Solomon (2003b) reminds us that an ethical dimension is constantly present in the 
consulting room and that an ethical attitude, which constitutes the core of the analytic 
attitude, is integral to all our professional activities as clinicians, supervisors and as 
colleagues. Despite the smallness of the sample, the repeated omission by analytically 
oriented supervisors and personal therapists of the ethical dimension (including the 
countertransference component) of the clinical material concerned seems to suggest that 
„ethics‟ is currently perceived as detached from daily professional practice and can be 
relegated to a formal “set of rules that can be forgotten as long as they are not contravened” 
(Solomon, 2003a, p. 167). The data thus raises the possibility that postqualifying ethics 
education not only of analytically oriented supervisors but also that of personal therapists 
remains a neglected area of continuing professional development.  
 
Introspection and the therapist‟s own self-observations require the additional corroboration 
offered by ongoing individual or peer supervision and psychotherapy. Personal and 
professional isolation is fertile soil for chronic boundary violations (Epstein & Simon, 1990; 
Gabbard, 1996). However the preceding data analysis seems to highlight participants‟ 
perceived alienation from a variety of valuable professional resources. In the excerpts which 
follow an ensuing sense of pervasive isolation appeared to emerge both within and across 
the interview texts as a heightened risk factor for compromised ethical decision-making:  
There aren‟t any resources, I mean, who does one speak to about this? 
(Interv. 5, p. 52, 37-39). 
 
… the biggest mistake was that I didn‟t actually consult anybody …  I tend 
to deal with things alone … I … find it difficult to reach out (Interv. 1, p. 9, 
42; p. 14, 45-46). 
 
… my experience of the supervision was that it left me feeling even more 
alone in managing the dilemma. I mean I had a hope that that would be the 
place, but it wasn‟t to be so (Interv. 2, p. 52, 37-39). 
 
... in conversation with members of the [Psychoanalytic] Society … there 
would be times in which I would want to say something  … about this  
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[dilemma] … and then I‟d choose not to  … „cause I‟d be afraid of the 
judgments … something like that (Interv. 4, p. 132, 30-34). 
 
…in this particular case, I had very … very little input … it was difficult … 
finding myself carrying [the dilemma] alone … that‟s my personal „stuff‟,  
that I land up just doing it myself and doing it on my own (Interv. 6, p. 208, 
16-17; p .224, 37-40). 
5. WHEN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IS COMPROMISED: CONTEXTUAL 
AND SUBJECTIVE RISK FACTORS 
Complex ethical dilemmas are unlikely to be resolved by the practitioner in isolation. The 
professional literature widely endorses the need for consultation (APsaA, 2005; CPA, 2000; 
Dewald & Clark, 2001; Gabbard, 1996; HPCSA, 1999; Jennings, Sovereign, Bottorff, 
Mussell & Vye, 2005; Norris et al., 2003). The preceding data analysis, however, repeatedly 
reveals the felt absence of professional resources or benevolent third others who might be 
called upon to aid decision-making. The third other may be envisaged as comprised of 
postgraduate ethics training, professional organisations, ethics codes, supervisors or peers. 
Interview texts reflect collective anxieties that exposure of countertransference difficulties 
will elicit a mainly punitive third, resulting in labelling, censure, shame, cancellation of 
registration, loss of professional identity and earnings or even complete excommunication 
by the analytic community. As a consequence, „ethics‟ may be defensively dismissed as 
distant, dry and irrelevant and relegated to the confines of ignored or forgotten official 
documents. Alternatively, since its guise is construed as fundamentally punitive in intent, 
„ethics‟ may be feared and actively avoided. In either event, „ethics‟ emerges as detached 
from everyday professional practice and as comprising a mostly unacknowledged and 
silenced dimension of clinical work. This apparent severance affected not only participants 
but also their educators, supervisors and personal therapists.  
 
Research participants‟ reported alienation from the ethical dimension of clinical practice 
provides a contrast with Etchegoyan‟s (1991) claim that a failure of ethics invariably leads 
to technical failure as the “basic principles [of psychoanalysis], especially those that 
structure the setting, are founded upon ethical concepts of equality, respect and search for 
truth” (p. 32). The apparent severance, in the present sample, of ethics from the praxis of 
psychoanalytic work raises the ongoing question of how to foster collectively “a climate of 
ethical sensitivity” (Wassenaar, 2002, p. 66) or benevolent ethicality that might inform daily 
professional activities. Conscious integration of the ethical dimension of clinical work might 
translate locally into useful new practices. This could include increased recognition of the 
  248 
ethical aspects of clinical material presented in supervision or in professional contexts 
dedicated to continuing professional development. Consistent establishment of “ethical 
space” (Wiener, 2003), identification of counter-transference phenomena elicited by ethical 
dilemmas, and regular examination of anti-analytic wishes or impulses may contribute to 
creating safer public forums wherein practitioners‟ anxieties and ethical concerns could be 
openly discussed with less fear of peer censure or judgement.  
 
The following discussion uses the preceding data analysis of professional resources to 
identify three risk factors for compromised ethical decision-making. Strategies are 
suggested which may aid the integration of ethics into everyday professional practices. 
These include consideration of how „ethics‟ might attain a more „user-friendly‟ professional 
profile as well as a recognition among psychoanalytically oriented practitioners that ethical 
decision-making which interrogates countertransference phenomena remains a core skill 
which is integral to the establishment and maintenance of the analytic attitude.  
5.1. First Risk Factor: Compromised Postgraduate Ethics Training 
When participants confronted real-life ethical dilemmas, they appeared unable to summon 
their earlier ethics training as an effective resource that might help to resolve the dilemma 
concerned. Boredom, poor recall, perceived irrelevance and the unintegrated nature of ethics 
training effectively alienated participants from their former ethics education. South African 
graduate ethics curricula may need to adopt teaching strategies that perceptibly enliven 
course content and that materially strengthen perceived relevance by establishing more 
direct linkages between training and prospective clinical practice.  
 
Multifaceted teaching approaches might include values confrontation (Abeles, 1980), 
stimulating ethical sensitivity by reading accounts given by victims of ethical violations 
(Anonymous, 2005; Gabbard & Lester, 1995), the use of role play and simulations to 
process ethical complaints (Abramovitch, 2006) and enlisting the cross-disciplinary services 
of philosophy departments to facilitate the integration of ethical theories and principles with 
clinical practice (Fine & Ulrich, 1988). Given the apparent alienation of participants from 
the Professional Board and PsySSA, additional guest lecturers might be recruited from the 
ethics committees of the latter statutory and voluntary professional bodies (cf. Handelsman, 
1986b). Such a strategy might ease graduate students‟ later consultation of these key but 
apparently underused professional resources. Course content could be further enlivened by 
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presenting the “Exploitation Index”, an innovative self-assessment questionnaire that could 
be used to alert students to the issue of boundary violations and therapist exploitiveness in 
key areas of professional practice including eroticism, narcissism, power seeking and 
enabling behaviors (Epstein & Simon, 1990). Prescribed reading might include 
discomforting professional literature highlighting the issue of ethical motivation and the 
discrepancies identified between knowing and doing the ethically correct course of action. A 
range of well-known surveys provide a challenging context for trainees to reflect upon 
personal ethical motivation and how they themselves might engage with prospective 
dilemmas (Bernard & Jara, 1986; Bernard et al., 1987; Betan & Stanton, 1999; Smith et al., 
1991). The latter surveys discuss challenging data indicating that significant numbers of 
graduate clinical psychology students and practising clinicians are well aware of what they 
ethically should do but they simply won‟t do it!  
 
Direct linkages between training and professional practice could be established by adopting 
Wassenaar‟s (2002) recommendation that postgraduate ethics training should include the 
study of local patterns of public complaints as well as of the real-life dilemmas which 
preoccupy practitioners both locally and internationally (Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006; Slack & 
Wassenaar, 1999). Current gaps in practising professionals‟ basic ethical knowledge could 
be reduced by continuing to focus systematically on the traditional four levels of ethical 
reasoning. These include general ethical frameworks or philosophical ethical theories, 
ethical principles and their application, ethical rules as expressed in professional ethics 
codes and ethical judgements or decision-making processes (Fine & Ulrich, 1998). 
 
Qualitative data generated by this study appear to support Betan and Stanton‟s (1999) 
conclusion that more traditional teaching approaches need to be supplemented by 
heightening student awareness of how emotions and contextual concerns can profoundly 
influence ethical decision-making. Of central important to this thesis, however, is the 
additional finding that while the avowed principle of beneficence ostensibly drove 
participants‟ ethical performance, the latter‟s undetected personal countertransference 
arguably continued to organise ethical judgement and action. Regardless of the theoretical 
persuasion of prevailing teaching paradigms, qualitative data thus suggest that ethics 
education might usefully address the following three areas where countertransference 
phenomena allow for a confluence of ethical and clinical concerns. These include erotic 
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transference and countertransference, the issue of boundaries and boundary violations and 
trainees‟ introduction to new and supplementary ethical decision-making frameworks.  
 
Slack and Wassenaar (1999) write that collegial misconduct comprised the fourth largest 
category of ethical conflict reported by South African clinical psychologists and that most 
respondents “described [such a] scenario as so aversive as to be consistently avoided” (p. 
183). Qualitative data from the present study similarly highlight practitioners‟ apparent 
reticence in confronting collegial homosexual boundary violations and in publicly 
discussing, in local psychoanalytic societies and reading groups, the loaded issue of erotic 
transference. As an early preventive measure, Gabbard (1996) therefore advocates 
encouraging novice therapists to openly discuss countertransference feelings of love and 
sexual desire for patients “and [to] accept whatever feelings may arise [so that] they may 
develop a sense that their human struggles are largely ones shared by other therapists and 
thus be less reticent to discuss them with colleagues” (p. 319). In addition to teaching ethical 
principles, ethics courses could potentially enhance prospective ethical performance by 
deepening trainees‟ understanding of the need to reflect on and to contain the transference-
countertransference configurations (including those of an eroticised nature) which inevitably 
emerge through the re-enactment of the internal object relations of both members of the 
therapeutic dyad.  
 
Boundary difficulties are confined neither to the setting of private practice nor to the “bad” 
apples in the professional barrel but are common to all clinical practitioners regardless of 
their theoretical persuasion (Norris et al., 2003). Breaches of therapeutic boundaries (as 
occurred, for example, when the participant concerned sought out social contacts and 
business deals involving patients) constitute direct actions which point to ethical decision-
making enactments and to the potential mobilisation of personal countertransference. Ethics 
instructors could thus, secondly, educate trainees on the necessity and purpose of boundary 
maintenance. This might include exploration of the differences between being a therapist 
and a parent or lover, highlighting the circumstance that repetitive departures from the 
boundaries of the therapeutic frame (as emerged in participants‟ sustained enactments 
around dual role relationships) reflect countertransference errors that gratify the therapist‟s 
unconscious emotional needs but that are consciously rationalised as actions that best serve 
the patient‟s interests (Gabbard, 1996). Finally, the presentation of a psychoanalytically 
oriented ethical decision-making model, which includes examination of countertransference 
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phenomena, may prove a useful addition to trainees‟ exposure to traditional frameworks 
which conceive of professional decision-making as a fundamentally rational process of 
ethical analysis.  
 
Beyond individual ethics courses, formal procedures that publicly process trainees‟ ethical 
conflicts, concerns or instances of misconduct provide meaningful structures which frame 
and contain students‟ subjective experiences of their graduate ethics education (Kitchener, 
1992; Wassenaar, 2002). If Solomon (2003b) is correct in asserting that clinicians draw on 
their internalised experience of the analytic attitude as conveyed by their own personal 
therapists and supervisors, then students‟ lived experience of their educators and of the 
collective ethical life of the teaching department concerned is arguably a foundational 
component or source of identification for the latter‟s burgeoning professional ethicality and 
capacity for appropriate ethical decision-making.  
5.2. Second Risk Factor: Clinical Supervision and the Collapse of Triangular Space 
When supervisors want to be perceived as “nice people”, they may be reluctant to offer “the 
insult” of confronting their colleagues with dubious ethical behaviour (Handelsman, 1986b). 
Supervisory reluctance may additionally extend to their supervisees‟ therapeutic 
interventions. Rather than bluntly confronting the supervisee with the need to discontinue 
repetitive breaches of the therapeutic frame, supervisors may opt rather to adopt a 
conciliatory stance of “empathic understanding” towards the latter‟s countertransference 
difficulties (Gabbard, 1996). 
 
Analysis of the data in this study suggests that local supervisory practices may be 
compromised in both spheres of professional activity. Participants reported, for example, 
supervisory resistance to exploring the meaning of confronting collegial homosexual 
boundary violations as well as an apparent incapacity to challenge supervisees‟ repeated 
frame deviations in the context of sustained non-sexual dual role relationships. Data 
interpretation is admittedly constrained by the small size of the sample and by the caveat 
that research participants‟ predominantly negative evaluation of supervision remains their 
individual construal of the events concerned. However, accumulative accounts across the 
research interviews of compromised supervisory and personal therapy practices suggest the 
defensive privileging of theory, technique and pragmatic case management at the expense of 
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the confrontation and careful exploration of the ethical and countertransference dimensions 
of the clinical material concerned.  
 
The challenge for local supervision may be twofold. Rather than the easy offering of “covert 
encouragement” (Interv. 4, p. 144, 17-18) or skirting strong affective responses (Interv. 3, p. 
95, 13-24; p. 96, 7-10; Interv. 5, p. 184, 14-15), competent supervision of ethical dilemmas 
demands the uncomfortable probing of the countertransference dimensions of the 
supervisee‟s ethical decision-making and „ruder‟ or more forceful confrontation of the 
latter‟s early relatively innocuous boundary “crossings” (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). Thus the 
first challenge confronting local psychoanalytically orientated supervisors may be that 
informed exploration of their supervisees‟ ethical dilemmas presupposes a confident grasp 
of relevant ethical knowledge. This includes, for example, the capacity to identify common 
dilemmas, thorough coverage of traditional problem-solving approaches to ethical dilemmas 
(Eberlein, 1987) as well as engagement with the familiar four levels of decision-making 
(Fine & Ulrich, 1988) described earlier in this chapter.  
 
The second challenge may not yield as easily to the systematic coverage of relevant content 
areas. This consists of helping to restore the primary function of supervision which arguably 
remains the sustained provision of “triangular” or reflective space. Educative efforts may 
thus be directed to actively attempting to establish an ethos of “ubiquitous triads” (Solomon, 
2003, p. 176), including not just the supervisee, the patient and the supervisor but also the 
latter‟s regular discussions with a consultant about his/her own work with supervisees. 
Competent supervision may entail re-visiting, with the consultant concerned, the issues of 
supervisory resistance and countertransference and how these dynamics may be mobilised 
in the course of supervising troubling ethical dilemmas. Exposure to postqualifying ethics 
education may arguably heighten local supervisors‟ awareness not only of the ethical 
dimension of clinical material but also of the impact of countertransference phenomena on 
their own as well as on their supervisees‟ ethical motivation, judgement and action.  
 
Local supervisors may need to learn to supervise ethical dilemmas more competently but 
supervisees may also need to be taught how to use the supervisory relationship more 
effectively. Given participants‟ reticence and even fear regarding disclosure of 
countertransference difficulties in the supervisory space, Gabbard (1996) suggests that a 
useful precept to be ingrained is the principle that secrecy and therapist reluctance to discuss 
  253 
„special‟ thoughts, feelings and actions constitute a major risk factor and may herald the 
beginnings of a descent “down the slippery slope” of chronic boundary violations (p. 312). 
Awareness of the following risk factors previously identified by Norris, Gutheil and 
Strasburger (2003) may also alert the postqualified supervisee to the need for increased 
consultation. Congruent with the latter authors‟ observations, the data generated by the 
present study suggest that predisposing risk factors include therapist loneliness and the 
precipitation of role reversal, excessive self-disclosure in the place of exploration of the 
transference relationship, narcissistic difficulties which endorse the belief that the therapist 
concerned is not subject to the usual “ground rules” (Langs, 1982) of the analytic frame and 
denial that repeated breaches of frame boundaries are harmful to the patient concerned.  
5.3. Third Risk Factor: Professional and Personal Isolation 
Challenging ethical dilemmas can generate a slew of troubling countertransference 
responses. The South African Ethical Code of Professional Conduct (2002) accordingly 
advises that practitioners should “consult with another psychologist knowledgeable about 
ethical issues, with an appropriate national psychology ethics committee, or with another 
appropriate authority in order to make the proper decision” (p. 34-35). What the data 
highlight, however, are participants‟ contrasting experiences of aloneness and their 
estrangement from core texts, statutory bodies, professional societies, each other and even 
from their own avowed values. Relationships with underused professional resources were 
often suffused with anxiety, disappointment, anger and fear of censure or punishment. Many 
of the excerpts previously quoted in this study appear to confirm that “it [is] difficult to 
reach out” (Interv. 1, p. 14, 46) and that participants consequently felt under duress to 
successfully resolve complex dilemmas alone. Professional isolation and the largely fruitless 
search for robust supervisory space capable of resolutely processing supervisees‟ unresolved 
personal countertransference emerge as key findings and as a heightened risk factor for 
compromised ethical decision-making.  
 
Psychoanalytic psychotherapy necessarily occurs in the privacy of the therapeutic space but 
the very isolation of the setting simultaneously creates the predisposing circumstances for 
boundary violations (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). Consistent relational connections including 
regular collegial contact and the avoidance of professional isolation thus emerged as the 
most important ethical value for 10 master therapists and as central to their maintaining 
competence as practising professionals (Jennings, Sovereign, Bottorff, Mussell & Vye, 
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2005). The importance of relational connections in limiting ethical violations is similarly 
reinforced by Gabbard (1996) who observes that colleagues need to talk to one another 
either in a one-to-one context or in group supervision about difficult cases and about their 
current ethical concerns. One advantage of ongoing peer supervision, for example, is that 
colleagues‟ familiarity with each other‟s work facilitates the ready identification or 
“spotting” of early countertransference difficulties (Gabbard & Lester, 1995).  
 
Sexual boundary violations are a flagrant expression of therapist exploitiveness but also 
provide a telling example of professional isolation. Qualitative data generated by this study 
appear to support local survey research regarding the formidable difficulties of breaking and 
confronting collegial isolation and misconduct (Slack & Wassenaar, 1999). Gabbard (1996), 
nevertheless, insists that when a therapist advocates or is perceived to conduct troubling 
unorthodox practices, his/her colleagues “must … be willing to sit down and talk with the 
therapist who raises concerns, long before a complaint comes to the ethics committee or 
licensing board” (p. 320). Thus designated members of the ethics committees of local 
institutions or societies could be called upon to respectfully talk through with the colleague 
concerned the preliminary appearance of boundary crossings, hopefully before these 
develop into entrenched boundary violations.  
 
This extension of concerned caring in the context of intimate collegial relationships recalls 
Gilligan‟s (1982) ethic of care and its claim “that everyone will be responded to and 
included, that no one will be left alone and hurt” (p. 63). Rather than the defensive 
privileging of theory and technique, analytic societies, reading groups and collegial 
networks that actively promote a genuine ethic of care may contribute to bettering the 
quality of professional relationships. The process of generating a more benevolent „third‟ 
potentially entails risking confrontation with group projections and countertransference 
dynamics, but may eventually ease the isolated practitioner‟s efforts “to reach out” to peers 
and to disclose shameful or „forbidden‟ affects elicited by common dilemmas. Giving voice 
to an aspirational ethic of care and to the increased integration of ethics into daily 
professional practices, David points a possible way forward:  
I think that I do a disservice … to not inform the colleague who‟s not 
functioning or practising at least adequately … they don‟t get the feedback 
… from their colleagues, … we don‟t gather together as a group supporting 
each other in an open and honest manner … there are things that people 
might do that are kind of borderline in a particular way, and … we should 
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talk to each other … so, you know … you‟re discussing a matter with a 
colleague who gets very hot under the collar and very charged emotionally 
about a matter, does one say … to that colleague, you know, when we were 
talking about the case of X, my perception was that you were drawn in, in a 
very powerful way and you need to think about that, you need to think about 
what the charge is for you. And that can be done in a … very generous and 
giving way. (Interv. 2, p. 63, 13-45). 
 
Finally, although only speculatively supported by interviewees‟ data, the professional 
literature highlights the importance of intimate relationships in the prevention of boundary 
violations. This includes the need to actively attend to self-care and to the avoidance of 
personal isolation. The legitimate gratification of personal needs may go against training 
and supervisory experiences which from early on inculcate an attitude whereby the therapist 
consistently attempts to selflessly put aside his/her own needs in favour of attunement to the 
patient‟s internal object world (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). The incipient dangers of self-
neglect may be exacerbated by, for example, career disillusionment, ageing, illness, discord 
in intimate relationships and alienation from the professional community. Such life events 
and a deeply ingrained professional attitude of selflessness may together render the therapist 
vulnerable to „deciding‟ to turn to the patient for excitement or solace (Norris, Gutheil & 
Strasburger, 2003). The achievement of a fulfilling personal life which includes the 
appropriate gratification of emotional and sexual needs is arguably indispensable to 
maintaining competence as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist. Gabbard (1996) concludes 
that “Therapists who make no time for a personal life will ultimately look for personal 
gratification in a professional context” (p. 321).  
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter explored research participants‟ use of professional resources in the resolution of 
real-life ethical dilemmas. Analysis of the data is sobering, suggesting as it does that in the 
main participants reported feeling disillusioned, isolated and alienated from key professional 
resources. These included their graduate ethics training, professional codes, voluntary and 
statutory bodies and their peers.  
 
In general, participants expressed dissatisfaction with the content, relevance and length of 
their postgraduate ethics education. Recollections of ethics training included clear 
descriptions of boredom, poor recall, irregular staff modelling, low levels of academic 
expertise, lack of time and erratic or no exposure to core reference texts, including national 
and international ethics codes. Ethics was additionally perceived as a discrete entity, largely 
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unintegrated with the theory and practice components of professional training. In particular, 
participants‟ accounts suggested the lack of training opportunities to examine different 
decision-making frameworks and to explore the potential role played by emotions and by 
enactment phenomena in the ethical decision-making process. When subsequently 
confronted with the problem of resolving real-life ethical quandaries in professional practice, 
interviewees appeared unable to summon their earlier ethics training as a potentially 
benevolent resource or “internally persuasive discourse” (Tappan, 1991). Participants‟ 
primarily negative experience and evaluation of their postgraduate ethics education 
apparently comprises a possible first risk factor for compromised professional decision-
making.  
 
The absence of an ethically attuned robust supervisory space emerged as a key finding and as 
a second risk factor for compromised decision-making. Derelict supervisory practices 
included “rushed” supervision, irregular modelling of dual role relationships and seeming 
unawareness of the ethical dimension of clinical material. The data suggest that supervisors 
were equally unaware of, and did not pursue, supervisees‟ personal countertransference 
which was apparently deeply implicated in repeated frame deviations and in the decision-
making process. Not a single instance emerged wherein the supervisor concerned 
demonstrated the capacity to bluntly confront the ethical and countertransference dimensions 
of the unfolding dilemma. Research participants accordingly consistently reported feelings of 
disappointment in the perceived capacity of their supervisors to assist with the identification, 
processing and resolution of common dilemmas. The data raises the pertinent question as to 
whether local analytically orientated supervisors are themselves adequately trained to 
conduct supervision which is sufficiently probing of enactments and of their supervisees‟ 
countertransference responses to disturbing dilemmas. This suggests that competent ethically 
attuned supervision may require the future development of comprehensive ethics education 
programmes.  
 
Professional isolation and the portrayal of a seemingly punitive professional matrix 
unexpectedly emerged in this as in previous chapters as a consistent theme. Ethics codes, the 
law, professional bodies and collegial networks often appeared to induce mistrust and 
fearfulness rather than the hope of emotional support and deepened insight. Excerpts quoted 
thus apparently confirm earlier impressions that participants repeatedly experienced 
difficulties in “reaching out” and in exposing their doubts, ethical concerns and 
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countertransference enactments. Thus reticence and apparent fears of peer or supervisory 
censure or shaming apparently often drove interviewees to conceal frame deviations and 
countertransference difficulties and to attempt to resolve complex dilemmas alone. This 
group dynamic ironically only served to entrench the third risk factor of professional 
isolation, heightening the potential for continued involvement in enduring therapist-driven 
decision-making enactments.  
 
Various strategies have been proposed in previous chapters that may be useful in normalising 
discussion of the therapist‟s often anti-analytic countertransference responses provoked by 
charged ethical dilemmas. In relation to the ethical decision-making process, a further 
strategy entails the presentation of a supplementary framework which both addresses the use 
of ethical principles as well as subjective and unconscious determinants that may influence 
ethical performance.  
 
The next and final results chapter accordingly presents a psychoanalytically informed ethical 
decision-making model. The model integrates principle-based ethical decision-making with 
an exploration of countertransference phenomena elicited by dilemmas arising in the context 
of analytic space.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
TOWARDS A PSYCHOANALYTIC ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 
MODEL 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous accounts of ethical decision-making models appear in the professional literature 
(Corey, Corey & Callanan, 1998; CPA, 2000; Eberlein, 1987; Forester-Miller & Davis, 
1996; Garfat & Ricks, 1995; Gottlieb, 1993; Steere, 1984). Yet relatively few empirical 
studies have apparently been conducted on either models or processes of ethical decision-
making. Cottone and Claus (2000) thus critique the many “hodge-podge” (p. 281) practice-
based frameworks available as lacking philosophical and theoretical grounding.  
 
Common aids or “decision-bases” (Woody, 1990, p. 134) used in the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas include decision-making models, statutory laws as well as professional ethics 
codes and principles (Allan, 1997; Betan, 1997; Neukrug & Lovell, 1996). It has been 
argued throughout this study that these latter resources fail to take sufficient cognisance of 
the unconscious dimension of the therapeutic relationship and of the primitive affective 
arousal that often appears to mark the clinician‟s engagement with real-life ethical 
dilemmas. Even psychoanalytic ethics codes (American Psychoanalytic Association, 2005; 
British Psychoanalytic Society, 1991; Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, 1993; International 
Psychoanalytic Association, 1998) fail to provide decision-making models which accord 
due recognition to irrational or unconscious determinants that potentially drive ethical 
decisions and actions (Meissner, 1994, 2004). Data analysis in previous chapters (see 
chapters 5-7) suggests, however, that only once subjective countertransference phenomena 
have been truthfully confronted and processed, can rational dialogue with universal ethical 
principles and professional ethics codes begin. 
 
This chapter presents preliminary work towards the building of a psychoanalytic model of 
ethical decision-making. The proposed model forms an integral part of the research study 
and is directly based on the detailed analysis of the preceding chapters (see chapters 5-7) of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapists‟ accounts of subjective countertransference responses and 
ethical decision-making processes in the context of real-life dilemmas. The model hopefully 
provides a pragmatic decision-making framework that could be used to help resolve 
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common ethical quandaries encountered in the therapeutic space. It thus aims to facilitate 
exploration of the potentially unconscious dimension of familiar dilemmas recognised by 
established ethics codes (APA, 1992; CPA, 2000; South African Ethical Code of 
Professional Conduct, 1999) and categorisation systems (Pope & Vetter, 1992; Slack & 
Wassenaar, 1999) as well as additional professional situations subjectively construed as 
dilemmatic by the practitioner concerned.  
 
Countertransference “blind spots” ensure “that we can never be entirely certain how our 
unconscious reactions to the patient are affecting clinical judgment” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 
117). When the ethical dilemma revives the therapist‟s own repressed “self-object-affect 
constellations” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 477), data from this study support the contention that the 
countertransference phenomena apparently underpinning decision-making remain largely 
impervious to attempts at self-scrutiny. This chapter thus opens with discussion of the need 
to situate the model squarely within the context of ethically attuned supervision or 
consultation. Juxtaposed against research participants‟ descriptions of impoverished 
reflective space (see chapter 6), the model proposes that the ethically attuned supervisory or 
consultative context optimally provides containment and additionally fosters the capacity 
for ethical reflection. The issue of containment and its role in promoting thinking is 
discussed in relation to Bion‟s (1962) concept of the “container-contained”. Balancing 
containment with the need for reflection (Frosh, 1997), the model describes further the 
relevance for ethical decision-making of Britton‟s (1989, 1998, 2003) notion of a third 
position in mental space or “triangular psychic space” wherein the dilemma‟s emotional 
vicissitudes are taken up by the supervisory pair as an object of thought (Solomon, 2003c).  
 
The second part of the chapter presents a proposed psychoanalytic model based directly on 
the previous analysis of participants‟ oscillating four levels of thinking and capacity for 
ethical decision-making (see chapter 6). Five distinguishing features may be discerned. The 
proposed model assumes, firstly, the primacy of multiple unconscious determinants. It thus 
accords recognition to the heat of the clinical moment and to the repeated shifts between 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive position functioning (Bion, 1963; Ogden, 1989; Solomon, 
2003; Steiner, 1992) that may occur in the course of engaging with the dilemma concerned. 
The CPA‟ s (2000) well-known ethical decision-making steps foreground the practitioner‟s 
subjectivity once only; step 3 thus encourages “Consideration of how personal biases, 
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stresses, or self-interest might influence the development of or choice between courses of 
action” (p. 4). The proposed psychoanalytic model elaborates on this third step, highlighting 
the importance of holding open the space between the original identification of the dilemma 
and the subsequent implementation of action. In this intermediate area between unconscious 
fantasy and potentially precipitous action, the model considers how the impact on ethical 
decision-making of countertransference phenomena including enactments and projective 
identification may be tolerated, thought about and given meaning.  
 
Secondly, the model is situated within a contemporary understanding of 
countertransference. Involving unconscious contributions from both the therapist and the 
patient, a contemporary understanding thus “emphasizes the interactional nature of the 
therapist-patient relationship, be that as it is applied in work with individuals, couples, 
families, groups or institutions. This emphasis is most clearly demonstrated by the clinical 
centrality of the analysis of the transference–countertransference relationship.” 
(Ruszczynski, 1998, p. 34). Thirdly, the data suggest that under the impact of raw affective 
arousal, the capacity for rational thinking and for achieving “relative” or “greater” 
objectivity (Gabbard, 1997; Louw & Pitman, 2001) may temporarily be lost and must be 
wrested back again. The model thus argues for the critical need to establish, in supervision, 
a third perspective or area of reflection from which to view the therapist‟s subjectivity and 
the unconscious dimension of the therapeutic relationship. Fourthly, the model proposes that 
mature ethical decision-making involves engagement with the dialectic comprised by the 
two poles of subjective experience and universal ethical principles, or between the 
particularity of subjective countertransference phenomena and objective professional ethical 
standards (Betan, 1997; Wiener, 2001). Finally, the model accords prominence to the 
analytic attitude and hence to the need for truthful self-examination or the “unending search 
for … personal, emotional truth” (Grotstein, 2004, p. 1094) in order to effect decision-
making that is fiduciary in nature and that prioritises the patient‟s analytic journey.  
 
Since the proposed model integrates the CPA‟s (2000) ten ethical decision-making steps 
with the psychoanalytic notion that ethical judgments may be organised by unconscious 
determinants, it arguably constitutes a synthesis of previous points of view and offers a 
third, different, perspective. Drawing this final results chapter to a close, a summary sets out 
the main findings pertaining to the individual decision-maker‟s need for engagement with 
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the objective and subjective poles (including the psychoanalytic dimension) of the ethical 
decision-making process.  
2. SITUATING THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL WITHIN THE 
SUPERVISORY SPACE 
The emotional vicissitudes generated by real-life ethical dilemmas apparently found only 
attenuated containment in the contexts of research participants‟ supervision and personal 
analysis. Evocative metaphors pertaining to, for example, pressure cookers or “buckled up” 
briefcases emerged, suggestive of compromised reflective spaces crowded with 
“undigested” mental and bodily events (see chapter 6). Commonly thought of as referring 
only to the activity of processing the patient‟s intense feelings, Gabbard (1999) points out 
that „containment‟ equally applies to those mental processes geared towards understanding 
the nature of the therapist‟s unconscious contributions to the therapeutic interaction. Several 
of these latter processes are incorporated into the later discussion of the psychoanalytic 
ethical decision-making model and include analysis of the patient‟s internal object world, 
self-examination and restoration of the capacity for reflection.  
 
Real-life ethical dilemmas do not, however, necessarily incur heightened 
countertransference affects.  The following scenarios, for example, are reminiscent of the 
first ethical decision-making pathway which is discernible in the professional literature and 
was discussed in an earlier chapter (see chapter 3). The scenarios suggest the retention of 
analytic poise and the capacity for internal containment; thus the therapist‟s empathic 
observation of the transference relationship continues without primitive affects apparently 
being discharged into premature ethical decision-making enactments:  
… there are other dilemmas that we can have in psychotherapy … one goes 
to a movie and one is sitting in front of a patient, what does one do? One 
can think about it … it isn‟t a shock … one can really think about what 
does one do and [what] does one say … (Interv. 2, p. 45, 1-4). 
… I‟ve come across … less powerful issues which … have given me cause 
to call another therapist and say, can you let me know what‟s going on here 
… and then I‟m glad for … having the internal containing space to say you 
don‟t have to react … you‟re not activated in an acting out way … (Interv. 
2, p. 66, 39-43). 
The next excerpts, in contrast, reveal an apparently unmet need for “a sanctuary” (Britton, 
1992) or container wherein psychotherapists can safely explore deeply disorienting 
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transference-countertransference dynamics specific to the real-life ethical dilemma 
concerned: 
… my level of discomfort was … high, dipped and then was very high … 
and in that high I should‟ve reflected … that I was feeling very 
uncomfortable and that would‟ve been an indication that I could reach out 
and … confer with somebody … to create a kind of holding space … for 
myself … to know that I can share this dilemma (Interv. 1, p. 22 , 12-22). 
I suppose some part of me … is wanting [further processing] that‟s why I … 
volunteered to participate in the research but I [feel] apprehensive … this 
is messy stuff … failed work … that just ended abruptly … so, it‟s … 
difficult to talk about … (Interv. 6, p. 215, 11-15). 
… I was saying that I hadn‟t considered … referring [my relative] on … 
now I‟m thinking that the possibility of exploring [the referral] … could‟ve 
been part of the therapeutic process … the same way as one explores the 
transference – countertransference or the intersubjective space, whatever 
you … call it … that this … is an area that could be explored (Interv. 3, p. 
105, 27-34). 
Bion (1959; 1962a) summarises his “container-contained” model of thinking thus: “I shall 
abstract for use as a model the idea of a container into which an object is projected and the 
object that can be projected into the container, the latter I shall designate by the term 
„contained‟ ” (1962b, p. 90). In Bion‟s terms, projective identification may be conceived of 
as an interpersonal elaboration of an intrapsychic splitting process. Chaotic, irrational 
feeling states or “beta elements” (1962a) are projected into the containing object who, via 
reverie, uses “alpha function”, a hypothetical transformative agency (Grotstein, 2004), to 
tolerate and transform the projected contents into “alpha elements” or meaningful 
experience. This is then reintrojected by the infant or patient who regains not just the 
previously split off aspect of self but also the crucial experience of containment and 
capacity for “alpha-function” or for thinking about him/herself.  
 
Between the original often somatically based identification of the ethical dilemma and the 
action implemented, the data suggest that painful affects or disturbing incipient thoughts 
were precipitously evacuated and evaded rather than tolerated and thought about. Failures of 
external and internal containment, including the absence of any thoroughly internalised or 
“digested” ethical decision-making model, thus often appeared to have resulted in 
participants seeking relief from escalating countertransference anxieties in premature 
decision-making enactments: 
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… the first mistake I made was to make the decision too quickly about what 
I was going to do.  I didn‟t think it through enough … and [I hadn‟t] used 
other resources available (Interv. 1, p. 15, 5-15). 
… I remember phoning [the supervisor] … telling her I‟ve just decided to 
go ahead … it was more or less, ja, it‟s okay, I feel I can contain the 
feelings, it‟s not going to be something that intrudes … if I think about it 
now, I can see that it could‟ve been explored more … thinking about it now, 
retrospectively … but at the time it felt … it‟s not …a big deal (Interv. 3, p. 
95, 20-24, p. 96, 1-4). 
Now here I am, I‟m going to facilitate on this workshop and this … new 
patient [has registered] … this created for me … anxiety, that … this 
person would have this extra-therapeutic contact with me … On the other 
hand … I thought this guy [was] very appropriate … . So, there was 
nothing really to do other than to just go ahead and see what would happen 
(Interv. 4, p. 125, 32-37; p. 126, 4-7). 
… I wasn‟t having supervision that often … in a way, in the hurly-burly of 
your work, you say, okay, I‟m gonna make this decision and I don‟t think 
we always give, with every decision, the amount of time it should take 
(Interv. 3, p. 109, 26-29). 
The preceding extracts are congruent with previous data analysis (see chapter 6) which 
suggests that participants were consistently unable to access the psychoanalytic dimension 
of ethical decision-making through “internal supervision” (Casement, 1985) or solitary self-
examination. What appeared to be lacking was a competent supervisory space or container 
which offered “a cooling off period” (Varghese & Kelly, 1999, p. 110) wherein to engage 
with an appropriate ethical decision-making model. Distressing countertransference 
responses could arguably have then been safely received, mentally “digested” and 
progressively transformed from “unthinkable” bodily and emotional events into a 
retrospective understanding of the meaning of the principally therapist-driven decision-
making enactments which had been provoked by the dilemmas concerned.  
 
The containment provided by Bion‟s model allows the recipient (in this case, the 
supervisee) to experience him/herself as a direct participant and beneficiary of the 
container-contained process (Ruszczynski, 1998). But containment needs to go beyond the 
holding of distressing subjective experiences to an active engagement with insight and 
understanding (Frosh, 1997). As discussed in earlier chapters, it is the supervisory or 
consultative relationship that is envisaged as the quintessential external manifestation of 
Britton‟s (1989; 1998) internal triangular state. It is here that the necessary opportunity is 
created “for analytic reflection, where two people work together to think about a third, 
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whether the third is an individual, a couple … or an idea or aspect within the therapist … 
that is relevant to their clinical work” (Solomon, 2003c, p. 174). The protection given to the 
therapeutic dyad by the supervisory provision of triangular space helps to maintain the 
analytic attitude, to guard against chronic ethical decision-making enactments and to 
consistently ensure that the therapeutic needs of the patient are foregrounded. As such, 
Solomon (2003a) argues, the analytic attitude is essentially ethical in nature.  
 
In summary, the supervisory space in which the psychoanalytic ethical decision-making 
model is situated may be characterised by its capacity for containment of the supervisee‟s 
emotionally charged countertransference arousal. Additionally, the supervisory context 
provides a third area of reflection wherein the unconscious dimension of decision-making, 
including maleficent, unthinkable or unethical impulses, may be normalised, reflected upon 
and given meaning. Thus the ethically attuned supervisory space may be metaphorically 
likened to Bion‟s seventh servant or “truth drive” (Grotstein, 2004) which helps to turn 
attention to internal psychic reality and facilitates processing of the supervisee‟s counter-
resistance and acceptance, rather than the unconscious evasion, of personal emotional truths. 
3. TOWARDS A PSYCHOANALYTIC ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
The following model elaborates the CPA‟s (2000) third step. Clarification of commonalities 
and differences between the CPA‟s ten decision-making steps and the psychoanalytic 
model‟s eight levels of enquiry are summarised in Table 1 below. Through its consideration 
of the influence of the therapist‟s subjectivity, the proposed psychoanalytic model may 
extend contemporary understanding of the psychological processes underpinning ethical 
decision-making. As Mills (2005) comments “… all ethical decisions are filtered through 
the subjective lens of our own personalities, developmental histories, unconscious conflicts, 
transference proclivities, and emotional dispositions. It is from this standpoint that we must 
necessarily engage our own internal processes when confronting the ethical” (p. 240). 
Presented as a possibly conservative conceptual framework that aims to secure maximum 
psychological protection for the patient, the model‟s eight levels of enquiry are derived from 
detailed textual analysis of participants‟ fluctuating capacity for reflection and for ethical 
decision-making.  
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Table 1: Comparison of CPA and Psychoanalytic Ethical Decision-Making Models 
The CPA‟s (2000) Code of Ethics: 10 ethical 
decision-making steps (abbreviated) 
The Psychoanalytic ethical decision-
making model: 8 levels of enquiry 
 1. Prereflective identification of ethical 
dilemmas. 
2. Naming countertransference arousal.  
1. Identification of … individuals and groups 
potentially affected by the decision. 
2. Identification of ethically relevant issues and 
practices, including the interests, rights, and … 
relevant characteristics of the individuals and 
groups involved and of the system … in which the 
ethical problem arose.  
3. Identification of the nature of the 
dilemma and its relational context.  
3. Consideration of how personal biases, stresses, or 
self-interest might influence the development of or 
choice between courses of action.  
4. Ethical decision-making enactments: 
ascertaining patient and therapist 
contributions. 
5. Decision-making as behavioural 
expression of the patient‟s internal object 
world.  
6. Analysis of therapist-driven decision-
making enactments. 
4. Development of alternative courses of action. 7. Maintaining the capacity for reflection. 
8. Resumption of the CPA‟s decision-
making framework.  
5. Analysis of … short-term, ongoing, and long-term 
risks and benefits of each course of action on the 
individual(s)/group(s) involved …  
6. Choice of course of action after conscientious 
application of … principles, values, and standards. 
7. Action, with a commitment to assume 
responsibility for the consequences of the action. 
8. Evaluation of the action. 
9. Assumption of responsibility for consequences of 
action, including correction of negative 
consequences … or re-engaging in the decision-
making process if the ethical issue is not resolved. 
10. Appropriate action … to prevent future 
occurrences of the dilemmas … . 
 
 
Although written as a coherent sequence, the model‟s eight levels are not intended to imply 
an orderly linear ethical decision-making process. What the data suggest is that, in the 
presence of an empathic other, ethical decision-making potentially evolves from somatically 
based countertransference arousal to include a third area of reflection which fosters 
understanding and “multiple points of view” (Louw & Pitman, 2001, p. 749) pertaining to 
the unconscious determinants animating the dilemma concerned. While current trends in 
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relational psychoanalysis suggest enactments are “co-constructed via the intersubjective 
melding of patient and analyst‟s transferences to each other” (Ivey, 2007, p. 5), the data 
disconcertingly highlight that the ethical decision-making enactments considered in the 
present study were saturated primarily with unconscious therapist factors. 
Countertransference is understood, however,  to represent “a joint creation” (Gabbard, 1995, 
p. 481) and the model necessarily allows for the exploration of ethical decision-making 
processes fuelled by both the patient‟s projective identifications and role response pressures 
as well as by therapist-driven enactments. Each of the psychoanalytic model‟s eight levels 
of enquiry are presented and discussed below. Use of the model alone may not in itself 
augment ethical motivation. As Rest (1984) writes “… the production of moral behaviour is 
an exceedingly complex phenomenon and no single variable and no major psychological 
theory is sufficiently comprehensive to represent the phenomenon alone” (p. 27). 
3.1. Prereflective Identification of Ethical Dilemmas 
Heightened countertransference arousal often in the form of somatic states may initially 
announce the advent of the dilemma concerned. At these prereflective or initial levels of 
decision-making, the psychological implications of strong countertransference reactions are 
apparently not yet cognitively grasped. Anxieties provoked by idiosyncratic pre-existing 
conflicts may continue to be expelled into bodily states or inhibited emotional 
responsiveness, signalling “counter-resistance” (Ivey, 1999) or the therapist‟s ongoing 
defensive need to keep “undigestable” thoughts and feelings out of conscious awareness.  
 
Kitchener (1984) identifies an immediate prereflective or “intuitive” level of moral 
reasoning which is comprised of our “ordinary moral sense” and is “based on the sum of [an 
individual‟s] prior ethical knowledge and experience” (p. 44). This intuitive level is often 
deployed to resolve immediate everyday ethical decisions. Moral intuition may not however 
necessarily lead to defensible ethical choices; Rest (1984) thus cautions that initial “gut 
feelings” and strong affective arousal optimally need to be interpreted and understood 
before ethical judgment is implemented. At these levels participants experienced, for 
example, nausea, disturbed sleep, bodily pain, and sensations of blankness, sinking and 
shock (see chapter 6).  
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3.2. Naming Countertransference Arousal 
In the context of an ethically attuned and empathic other, the therapist‟s emotional arousal is 
identified and its various components are differentiated and languaged. Unconscious 
determinants of ethical decision-making may continue to lie outside awareness. 
Retrospective countertransference awareness may also include descriptions of “the slippery 
slope” phenomenon (Gabbard & Lester, 1995) involving boundary violations and already 
realised ethical decision-making enactments. Although the multiple meanings of 
countertransference arousal were not yet accessible, feelings of, for example, anxiety, fear, 
anger, sadness and loss were retrospectively named by the participants concerned (see 
chapter 6).  
3.3. Identification of the Nature of the Dilemma and its Relational Context 
The professional practice and interpersonal contexts which comprise the physical and 
psychological setting for the ethical dilemma are clarified and the specific interactional 
trigger responsible for the therapist‟s original countertransference arousal is located. In 
following a decision-making path, early difficulties that may derail the psychoanalytic 
practitioner include the initial failure to detect the presence of an ethical dilemma as well as 
compromised ethics training or “ill-preparedness” to engage with the ethical dimensions of 
professional practice (Rest, 1984). 
 
Empirical examples include the context of private practice wherein the therapist concerned 
reacted sharply to a new patient‟s history and to the dawning recognition that the latter was 
also her relative (see „Introduction to Third Research Interview‟; also, chapter 6). A second 
participant, also in private practice, confirmed that his original countertransference arousal 
stemmed from the moment his patient disclosed sexual abuse by a former therapist who was 
a known colleague (see „Second Pilot Interview‟; also, chapter 6). Ethically attuned 
supervision or consultation presupposes a competent grasp of relevant ethics codes and 
should help to conceptualise the foregoing dilemmas as comprising, for example, a 
nonsexual dual role relationship and collegial misconduct respectively (Pope & Vetter, 
1992). 
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3.4. Ethical Decision-Making Enactments: Ascertaining Patient and Therapist 
Contributions 
The following two levels of enquiry (levels 5 and 6) specifically address whether and how 
countertransference has been enacted through the medium of premature ethical decision-
making and intervention. As discussed in earlier chapters, countertransference enactment 
may be understood as the patient actualising “an internal scenario within the analytic 
relationship that results in the analyst‟s being drawn into playing a role scripted by the 
patient‟s internal world” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 481). Alternatively, enactments may refer to 
countertransference interpreted in the narrow sense of unconscious idiosyncratic conflicts or 
pathological “experiences from the analyst‟s past that are revived in the interaction with the 
patient” (Gabbard, 1999, p.10). Offering an intersubjective approach for understanding 
ethical decision-making, Varghese and Kelly (1999) propose seeing countertransference “as 
a spectrum encompassing projective identification on the one hand … countertransference 
enactment on the other … [and] the two as interacting with each other” (p. 105). Whereas 
the previous perspectives foreground the patient or the therapist‟s unconscious contributions 
respectively, the intersubjective approach holds that the subjectivities of both parties are 
mutually and equally embroiled in the generation or co-construction of unconscious 
countertransference enactments (Levine & Friedman, 2000).  
 
Drawing on data analysis as well as on Varghese and Kelly‟s (1999) theoretical model, the 
continuation of the psychoanalytically informed decision-making pathway set out below 
turns to exploration of the relative contributions of both the patient and the therapist to 
potential ethical decision-making enactments. 
3.5. Ethical Decision-Making as the Behavioural Expression of the Patient‟s 
Internal Object World 
Countertransference feelings evoked in the therapist are widely regarded as a valuable 
source of information about the patient‟s internal object world (Gabbard, 1999). The 
patient‟s projective identifications are understood as exerting interpersonal pressure on the 
therapist; the projected contents thus “nudge” (Spillius, 1992), “hook” (Gabbard, 1995) or 
“bully” (Symington, 1990) the analyst into playing out the patient‟s intolerable affects and 
regressive object relational patterns.  
 
Data analysis pertaining to real-life dilemmas yields little supporting clinical evidence for 
ethical decision-making enactments driven principally by either the patient‟s unconscious 
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contributions or by “the intersubjective melding of patient and analyst‟s transferences to 
each other” (Ivey, 2008, p. 25). However, in the relational context constituted by euthanasia 
or physician-assisted suicide, Kelly, Varghese and Pelusi (2003) demonstrate, through the 
use of the following hypothetical scenario, the thoroughly interactional nature of patient-
induced end-of-life decision-making enactments. 
 
A terminally ill despairing patient expresses a wish to die. Via interpersonal pressure and 
the process of projective identification, the patient induces in the caregiver a corresponding 
despair and an identification with the patient‟s wish that he/she should die. Kelly, Varghese 
and Pelusi (2003) point out that the physician‟s decision to hasten death can thus become 
the forum for the enactment of countertransference feelings without the true origins of the 
affects concerned ever becoming apparent. In the preceding vignette, for example, the 
physician‟s countertransference response and decision to expedite death could be construed 
as based on the latter‟s predisposing object relational configurations and on an 
unacknowledged concordant identification (Racker, 1957) with the patient‟s projected self-
representation. 
 
To effect emergence from disorienting but potentially useful boundary “crossings” and 
identification with the patient‟s internal object world, the following questions, sourced from 
analysis of the transcripts as well as from Gabbard (1999), Epstein and Simon (1990) and 
Ivey (1998) may help to illuminate possible linkages between patient-induced 
countertransference phenomena and the process of ethical decision-making. Given the 
context of a real-life ethical dilemma, a supervisor could, for example, encourage the 
supervisee to interrogate the following aspects of his/her subjective experience:  
1. What sort of role do I feel myself pulled into and what sort of emotional 
characteristics (e.g., hostile, flattering, sadistic, despairing) do I feel 
“pressured” into taking on in relation to this patient at this specific point in 
time?  
2. What subjective needs, conflicts or stresses have been mobilised for me by this 
ethical dilemma which may predispose my playing out roles derived from the 
patient‟s internal familial drama? 
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3. Are my countertransference reactions potentially based on identification with 
a concordant self-representation within the patient or on an identification 
with a disavowed complementary object-representation? 
4. Given the context of this real-life dilemma, what potential linkages or 
meanings exist between my current „decision-making‟ and elected course of 
action and the patient‟s habitual object relational patterns, personality 
structure and current support systems or life circumstances? 
3.6. Analysis of Therapist-Driven Ethical Decision-Making Enactments 
Data from this study appear congruent with the unsettling observation that, while carefully 
cultivating a sense of self as a caring figure, the psychoanalytic practitioner‟s 
countertransference is not necessarily benign and includes narcissistic, self-interested, 
hating and malicious feelings (Betan, 1997; Epstein & Simon, 1990; Martinez, 2000; 
Varghese & Kelly, 1999). Similarly, in his discussion of the four components of moral 
reasoning, Rest (1984) suggests that in choosing between alternative courses of action, 
competing nonmoral motives (e.g., the acquisition of money or self-serving ambition) may 
be ascendant and thus “it is not unusual for nonmoral values to be so strong and attractive 
that a person chooses a course of action that pre-empts or compromises the moral ideal” (p. 
25).  
 
Participants‟ countertransference arousal has been extensively discussed. The data suggest 
that multiple instances of „ethical decision-making‟ could arguably be construed as 
therapist-driven enactments or as comprising the behavioural expression of the latter‟s 
unresolved emotional difficulties revived in the charged atmosphere of the ethical dilemma 
concerned. The following summary is not exhaustive but highlights ten different examples 
of ethical decision-making enactments that were revealed by analysis of the data within and 
across the eleven research interviews.  
 
In the context of numerous triangular relationships (see „First Pilot Interview‟; also chapter 
5), the unprocessed countertransference responses of the participant concerned appeared to 
have resulted in the gratification and concealment of unconscious hostility through the 
enactment or “intuitive” prereflective “decision” (Kitchener, 1984) to, firstly, breach 
confidentiality to a nonanalytic third party and, secondly, to engage with the latter in a 
social dual role relationship. Textual analysis of three different research interviews revealed 
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additionally that „decisions‟ to engage in prolonged nonsexual dual role relationships 
apparently serviced therapist self-interests for the accrual of money, the negotiation of 
business deals, the inappropriate gratification of friendship needs and for the narcissistic 
heightening of professional status and self-esteem at the expense of heeding the patient‟s 
request to terminate (see chapters 5-6). Brown (in Steere, 1984) cautions against using the 
patient as a means “to work out the therapist‟s personal dynamics in relationship” (p. 40). 
Further examples of therapist-induced ethical decision-making enactments arguably 
included using an ex-patient in the posttermination phase of an in-depth therapy to effect 
role reversal wherein the latter in a closed group assumed the burden of caring for his 
former caregiver (see „Introduction to Fourth Interview‟; also chapter 5). Engaging in 
regular therapeutic contact over two years with a patient/relative, one participant appeared 
unconsciously to strive to re-establish familial and emotional intimacy apparently assuaging 
unresolved childhood feelings pertaining to loss, family dispersal and death (see 
„Introduction to Third Interview‟; also chapter 6). Underpinning an interviewee‟s seeming 
avoidance of confronting collegial sexual misconduct lay unprocessed „decisions‟ which 
functioned to help maintain an idealised paternal object representation of a respected mentor 
(see „Second Pilot Interview‟; also, chapter 5). A final example suggests that repeated 
„decisions‟ to refrain from following up the rape of a minor, leaving the latter exposed to 
possible future abuse, appeared to be organised by the practitioner‟s unconscious 
identification with an overwhelmed parental object who had failed to extend protection in 
the therapist‟s own childhood context of family violence (see „Introduction to Fifth 
Interview‟; also, chapters 5-6).  
 
Given a real-life ethical dilemma, the following questions may help to clarify the therapist‟s 
prevailing psychological mode of functioning, to identify dominant “voices” in the “inner 
moral audience” (Day, 1991; see chapter 6) and to consider the practitioner‟s possible 
contributions to potential or already realised decision-making enactments: 
1. In what ways does the patient or particular characteristics of the latter (e.g., 
greediness, vulnerability, neediness, sexual seductiveness) remind me of 
myself or significant others or events in my (childhood) past? Given the 
context of this real-life dilemma, what subjective fears, fantasies, images or 
conflicts are stirred up in my interaction with this patient? 
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2. In trying to resolve this dilemma, what inner moral “voices” of, for example, 
previous therapists, supervisors, colleagues, lecturers, family members or 
significant others am I “hearing” that might be influencing my „decision-
making‟ and choice of action? What “voices” emanate from legal or 
theoretical sources? More specifically, what are these “voices” saying? Are 
they empathic, shaming and condemnatory or frankly unethical and self-
interested? Have any “voices” been silenced or muted? What feelings and 
attitudes might these “voices” evoke in me? 
3. Is the current ethical dilemma or interpersonal situation with the patient 
reminiscent of any other conflictual or emotionally charged situation in my 
present life circumstances? 
4. Of the courses of action potentially available to me, what do I feel I ought to 
do, ethically? What have I done or what do I think I will actually do? What 
competing self-interested or possibly exploitative factors might this ethical 
dilemma activate that could account for discrepancies between what I know I 
ought to do and what I actually want to do?  
5. Given the preceding questions and my original countertransference arousal, 
what potential linkages or meanings exist between my current „decision-
making‟ and elected course of action and my present understanding of my 
own needs, anxieties and defences?  
3.7. Maintaining the Capacity for Reflection 
This level of ethical decision-making involves ongoing processing of the emotionally 
charged experience of countertransference arousal, tolerating “the inherent ambiguity … of 
ethical matters in psychotherapy” (Betan, 1997, p. 361) and living with the understanding 
that “acting ethically does not always lead one to feel good” (Kitchener, 1986, p. 307). As 
participants aver, ethical decision-making may leave in its wake “moral traces” (Nozick, 
1968, in Kitchener, 1984) or feelings of regret, dissatisfaction, guilt and concern.  
 
At this level, the data suggest that the individual decision-maker increasingly experiences 
him/herself as an interpreting subject capable of thinking about the meanings or possible 
linkages between his/her idiosyncratic object relational world and his/her proposed or 
already realised ethical decision-making and course of action. Responsibility is assumed for 
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the consequences of possibly repeated countertransference enactments. Previously 
unconscious possibly painful determinants driving ethical decision-making and action are 
clarified and integrated. Where the consequences of enactments carry iatrogenic 
implications, the therapist can, in conjunction with the supervisor, thoughtfully consider 
how to re-engage with the ethical decision-making process. This may entail thinking about 
alternative courses of action and how to address and redress the issue of the therapist‟s 
contribution to the original decision-making enactment concerned.  
 
Empirical examples include: participants‟ thoughtful reflections in the later research 
interviews on the possibly negative consequences of, and alternative courses of action to, 
non-essential dual role relationships; the inadvertent breach of confidentiality; and failure to 
confront collegial sexual misconduct. The data suggest further that the creation of a third 
area of reflection which remains critical to mature ethical decision-making is not a 
permanent achievement but may be rapidly disestablished under the impact of fresh 
anxieties generated by renewed shifts between depressive position and paranoid-schizoid 
functioning.  
3.8. Resumption of the CPA‟s Ethical Decision-Making Framework 
Based on increased understanding of the meanings of his/her original countertransference 
arousal, the therapist hopefully experiences relief and relative freedom from 
countertransference pressures. This freedom may see a new level of self-observing ethical 
vigilance emerge and restraint of the impulse to actualise decision-making enactments and 
boundary violations. 
 
Thoughtful consideration of the CPA‟s (2000) remaining ethical decision-making steps may 
be resumed, including the development, choice, implementation and evaluation of the 
optimal course of action (see Table 1 above). Mature levels of ethical decision-making 
accordingly include active engagement with “the dialectic of the universal and the 
subjective of human relations, in which each informs the other … the task is not, and cannot 
be, simply to apply principles a priori, but instead to work toward an understanding of how 
the principles fit within the context, the alternatives, and the interpersonal demands of a 
particular ethical situation” (Betan, 1997, p. 356). Having worked through and clarified 
possible “unconscious determinants” (Meissner, 1994), the ethical decision-making process 
may increasingly focus on the universal or objective pole of the decision-making dialectic. 
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The attention of the supervisory pair thus shifts to critically considering the rational 
application of ethical principles, values and standards housed in professional codes of ethics 
or decision-making models.  
 
In addition to consulting the CPA‟s (2000) rank ordered ethical principles, proposed ethical 
actions may be evaluated in the light of Kitchener‟s (1984) “three tiers [ethical rules, 
principles and theories] of increasingly general and abstract forms of justification” (p. 45). 
Eschewing ethical absolutism, Kitchener (1984) argues, as do Knapp and VandeCreek 
(2007), that absolutising any one principle or any one ordering of ethical principles is not 
practically viable across all ethically problematic situations. The five ethical principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice and fidelity are accordingly considered by 
Kitchener (1984) to be not absolute but “prima facie” binding or “always morally relevant” 
(p. 52) to the dilemma at hand. Resolution of the dilemma, Kitchener (1984) argues, should 
thus be sought in carefully evaluating and interpreting which of the five potentially 
competing principles should be accorded priority and the greatest weighting in the context 
of the dilemmatic situation concerned. Providing a pragmatic illustration of the latter 
perspective, Kelly, Varghese and Pelusi (2003) observe, for example, that professional 
debate pertaining to euthanasia typically ignores the particularities of the interpersonal 
context constituted by the specific doctor-patient relationship, privileging instead the 
general principle of autonomy or the patient‟s right to suicide. Cautioning against any 
simplistic application of the principle of autonomy, the authors emphasise the need to 
explore the interpersonal meaning of the patient‟s request for hastened death and suggest 
that the physician‟s projected nihilism, need for control and disgust with suffering may 
engender in the patient what at first sight appears to be the latter‟s rational and autonomous 
exercise of the „right‟ to die. 
 
The hard work entailed in traversing the „subjective-objective‟ dialectic or continuum of 
ethical decision-making may still leave the formidable challenge of actually implementing 
and evaluating the course of action finally chosen. Faltering ethical motivation may yet 
scupper the combined efforts of the supervisory pair to negotiate the emotionally distressing 
and time-consuming vicissitudes involved in ethical deliberation. Thus the success of the 
ethical decision-making endeavour finally devolves on the individual therapist‟s capacity 
for persistent fiduciary concern wherein the virtues of “Perseverance, resoluteness, 
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competence, and „character‟ ” (Rest, 1984, p. 26) are actively mobilised in the service of 
implementing the course of action most likely to promote the patient‟s analytic journey. 
4. SUMMARY 
Integration of the professional literature with detailed analysis of research participants‟ real-
life dilemmas suggests that the process of ethical decision-making optimally includes both 
the interpretation of subjective countertransference phenomena and the thoughtful 
application of objective ethical principles and standards. When emotionally charged 
dilemmas animate the therapist‟s repressed self and object representations, unprocessed 
countertransference responses may translate into repeated ethical decision-making 
enactments that impede the patient‟s therapeutic progress. By definition, such 
countertransference enactments are difficult to subject to self-scrutiny. The proposed 
psychoanalytic model thus counters the prevailing notion that ethical decision-making is 
logical, reasonable and sequential in nature and that it is effected by a principally solitary 
and rational agent. Based directly on analysis of empirical data, the proposed model 
suggests instead that ethical decision-making encompasses multiple shifts between 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive position functioning and that understanding of 
unconscious, irrational and potentially self-interested determinants is best sought in an 
ethically attuned and containing supervisory or consultative context.  
 
Guided by examination of participants‟ thickly textured accounts of ethical decision-
making, the proposed psychoanalytic model differentiates eight evolving levels of enquiry. 
Earlier levels focus on the identification and interpretation of subjective countertransference 
phenomena. The final levels of enquiry promote active engagement with the objective pole 
of the ethical decision-making continuum and involve consideration and the possible 
application of the CPA‟s rank ordered ethical principles and standards to the dilemma at 
hand.  
 
Since the data are strongly suggestive of the influence of personal countertransference on 
ethical decision-making, the psychoanalytic model has retained an emphasis on processing 
and understanding therapist-induced ethical decision-making enactments. Limitations of the 
proposed model include the observation that its theoretical and pragmatic viability remain in 
doubt until further research demonstrates or disproves its utility and validity across a range 
of common dilemmas. Moreover, contemporary study of ethical decision-making 
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frameworks is as yet “immature” (Cottone & Claus, 2000). The preliminary status of this 
psychoanalytic model leaves open the possibility that self-selecting factors pertaining to 
choosing to participate in this study are largely responsible for the pre-eminence of 
therapist-driven decision-making enactments. Further empirical work may yield clinical 
data that persuasively supports a thoroughly intersubjective understanding of the 
phenomenon of ethical decision-making enactments.  
 
While the problems attendant on application of the proposed model require 
acknowledgement, the creation of a psychoanalytic ethical decision-making model 
hopefully contributes to professional dialogue pertaining to the development and evaluation 
of empirically based decision-making frameworks. More specifically it may provide a 
potentially helpful conceptual framework for engaging with the unconscious dimension of 
ethical decision-making. It may thus usefully supplement the traditional emphasis on the 
reasoned application of normative ethical principles and standards. In legitimising 
examination of self-interested or unethical aspects of the therapist‟s countertransference 
experience, the model may help to secure both ethical decision-making which is grounded 
in the analytic attitude and a therapeutic space which, unencumbered by chronic enactments, 
resonates principally with the sounds of the individual patient‟s unfolding story.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. OVERVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS 
Ethical dilemmas arising in the interpersonal context of the therapeutic space confront the 
psychoanalytic practitioner with the complex and challenging task of ethical decision-
making. It has been argued throughout this study that contemporary theoretical and 
empirical literature, ethics codes, most decision-making models and training curricula rely 
on an overly rational approach to the appraisal and addressing of ethical dilemmas. 
Unanticipated real-life ethical quandaries arguably demand that professional attention 
extends beyond codes of conduct and current models to include “… the inner realities of 
motivation, intention … and attitudes of the person … making the decision” (Abramson, 
1996, p. 195). The literature appears to lack theoretically informed accounts, grounded in 
empirical data, of individual practitioners‟ subjective experience of grappling with ethical 
decision-making challenges in the therapeutic space. This study has thus sought to explore 
and to construct an interpretive account of the subjective, irrational and unconscious 
dimension of the ethical decision-making process. This final chapter summarises the 
principal findings and draws out their possible implications for improved ethical decision-
making guidelines, ethics education and future research initiatives. 
 
The theoretical framework informing the present study included principle-based ethical 
decision-making approaches as well as contemporary psychoanalytic debates on 
countertransference enactments. Principle-based systems and psychoanalytic perspectives 
were related to Gilligan‟s (1982) moral voices of justice and care and comprised the 
objective and subjective poles of the ethical decision-making process respectively. 
Examination of the well-traversed objective pole included a review of empirical survey 
research, the uses and limitations of professional ethics codes and seminal principle-based 
ethical decision-making models.  
 
The literature review confirmed that emphasis has traditionally been placed on linear 
decision-making steps and on the dispassionate and logical application of ethical principles 
to the resolution of ethical dilemmas. The impact of therapist subjectivity on professional 
ethical decision-making has received comparatively little formal acknowledgment. Thus a 
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critique of the familiar ethical decision-making model presented in the CPA‟s (2000) code 
highlighted, for example, that only its third step encourages conscious evaluation of the 
influence exerted on real-world dilemmas by the practitioner‟s personal biases, self-interests 
and needs. The South African Professional Board‟s current ethics code (2002) assumes “a 
logical, linear, and cognitively explicit process in resolving ethical dilemmas” (Burke et al., 
2007, p. 114) and likewise does not refer to the irrational and emotionally charged 
dimension of professional decision-making. Well-known practice-based ethical decision-
making models (Corey, Corey & Callanan, 1998; Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1985; Welfel, 
1998) similarly present clearly defined linear steps of ethical deliberation; these seemingly 
presuppose a consistently rational moral agent whose motives are self-transparent and 
axiomatically beneficent in intent. Even psychoanalytic ethics codes (American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 2005; British Psychoanalytic Society, 1991; Canadian 
Psychoanalytic Society, 1993; International Psychoanalytic Association, 1998) fail to 
incorporate ethical decision-making models that recognise the unconscious and often anti-
analytic determinants that may drive ethical judgment and intervention.  
 
Formal ethics codes, principles and decision-making models provide essential normative 
guidelines for navigating the ethical decision-making process. International surveys and 
empirical studies discussed in earlier chapters nonetheless repeatedly demonstrate that the 
rational comprehension of available codes, principles and standards is necessary but often 
insufficient to secure ethical action. Therapists may well continue to engage with unethical 
behaviours that result in public complaints against them (American Psychological 
Association, 2004; Scherrer, Louw & Möller, 2002) and that violate the integrity of the 
therapeutic space. This study has argued that greater understanding of the widely observed 
judgment/action discontinuity includes consideration of both the objective as well as the 
subjective poles of ethical decision-making, thus integrating the distinctive ethical concerns 
articulated by the voices of justice and care respectively. In-depth interviews and qualitative 
data analysis accordingly explored the competing interpersonal pressures, anxieties, 
disavowed motivations and impulses that comprised the subjective pole of professional 
decision-making. This helped to identify possible risk factors that may deflect the 
practitioner away from the pursuit of ethical practice. 
 
Frequent, albeit brief, allusions are made in the professional literature focusing on principle-
based decision-making to prereflective responses, primitive “gut feelings”, nonmoral values 
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and ethical “blind spots”. The relative absence of persuasive theoretical accounts that 
address the influence of irrational and prereflective phenomena on ethical judgment has 
been noted. Based directly on empirical data generated by open-ended research interviews, 
this study, in contrast, offers a psychoanalytically orientated account of the nature of the 
unconscious linkages potentially forged between the therapist‟s subjectivity and the 
unfolding ethical decision-making process.  
 
In contrast to principle-based approaches, different psychoanalytic schools of thought 
portray the therapist not as a consistently rational agent but as one who remains unwittingly 
susceptible to the “evocative power” (Chused, 1991, p. 617) of countertransference 
enactments. Kleinian, classical and relational perspectives view enactments as alternatively 
initiated by the patient‟s projective identifications, by the analyst‟s personal 
countertransference or by equal unconscious contributions from both members of the 
therapeutic dyad. Enactment phenomena are thus construed as placing interpersonal 
pressure on the therapist to cross the boundary between thought and behaviour, often by 
actualising a role derived from the patient‟s early object relations. “Acute” enactments are 
usually benign single incidents that are retrospectively “caught” by the therapist, 
thoughtfully examined and openly discussed with the patient in an effort to further 
understanding of the transference relationship. “Chronic” analyst-centred enactments 
mobilised by the therapist‟s own unresolved emotional difficulties by contrast typically find 
behavioural expression in repeated boundary violations that are not brought to 
consciousness nor subjected to post-enactment scrutiny. When the unconscious meaning of 
chronic therapist-induced enactments fails to emerge, the risk of harmful consequences to 
the patient is correspondingly heightened.  
 
The notion of an “ethical decision-making enactment” emerging from this study is based on 
both psychoanalytic theory of countertransference enactments as well as on detailed 
analysis of ethical decision-making processes evident in the interview texts. This notion 
addresses the influence exerted by subjective and unconscious determinants on the 
ostensibly rational ethical decision-making process. Confronted by stressful dilemmas, 
therapist “decisions” to resolve the ethical quandary at hand may, on examination, reveal 
evidence of unconscious dynamics that structure countertransference enactments in general. 
As such, the notion of an “ethical decision-making enactment” offers a useful conceptual 
vantage point from which to grasp how even experienced psychoanalytic practitioners may 
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on occasion be dislodged by charged real-life dilemmas from their customary reflective 
stance and adherence to aspirational ethical principles. The collapse or restoration of 
reflective space was proposed as the critical pivot which engendered discrete pathways of 
ethical deliberation and which determined whether an ethical decision-making enactment 
emerged as an analytically useable or exploitative process. While relational psychoanalysis 
holds that countertransference enactments are mutually co-constructed by equal 
unconscious contributions from both members of the therapeutic dyad, this study‟s 
disconcerting data, on the contrary, suggest that the ethical decision-making enactments 
identified were primarily saturated with unconscious therapist factors.  
 
Contemporary psychoanalytic theory on countertransference enactments and the construct 
of an ethical decision-making enactment were integrated and used in the analysis of data 
pertaining to participants‟ fluctuating capacity for appropriate ethical judgment. “Thick 
description” (Geertz, 1973) of engagement with real-life ethical dilemmas suggested 
repeated shifts across the body of text between prereflective, often somatically based levels 
of decision-making and mature phases of ethical deliberation characterised by depressive 
position functioning.  
 
Experience-near accounts of earlier levels of ethical decision-making were replete with 
descriptions of unprocessed “gut” reactions, unformulated thoughts, declamatory inner 
moral “voices” and unintegrated childhood memories. Strong visceral reactions often 
accompanied the prereflective identification as well as the later recall of the ethical dilemma 
concerned. Feelings of anxiety, shock, sickness, blankness, sleeplessness, headaches, bodily 
pain or arousal were common to all accounts. The psychological meanings of the latter 
“unspeakable” reactions were, at these levels of thinking, not yet apparently cognitively 
grasped. Subjective experiences of wrestling with ethical dilemmas were additionally 
suffused with a sense of threat and immersion in a seemingly persecutory professional 
matrix. A stream of fantasies coursing through the text included, for example, feared 
“psychoanalytic police”, vindictive colleagues, retaliatory adult and child patients, 
endangered supervisory spaces and hostile superego “voices”. Evocative metaphors 
suggested that the therapeutic container was alternatively crowded by domestic strife, 
cookers under pressure, buckled up briefcases and reckless pioneering in the Wild West. 
These images similarly suggested that ethical dilemmas had transpired for the most part in 
the context of profoundly impoverished reflective space. Research participants reported that 
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the analytic frame was accordingly consistently assailed by the “stuff” (Interv. 6, p. 229, 11-
28) of multiple “undigested” psychological and bodily events. Without sufficient 
consideration of the possible unconscious determinants of the therapist‟s behaviour, nor the 
impact on the therapy, radical modifications to traditional therapeutic boundaries have been 
vaunted as comprising “humane” and ethical interventions (Lazarus, 1994). The data 
suggested that, on the contrary, frame deviations provoked by charged dilemmas typically 
saw the emergence of boundary violations which gratified, for example, inappropriate 
therapist needs for business dealings, friendship, the re-establishment of lost familial 
intimacy or for heightening professional self-esteem at the expense of heeding the patient‟s 
request to terminate therapy.  
 
While „Beneficence‟ and „Integrity in Relationships‟ were the most strongly endorsed 
ethical principles, data analysis revealed significant discontinuities between aspirational 
ethical principles and lived professional practices. Avowed ethical principles often 
unravelled under the impact of real-world dilemmas, giving way to enduring ethical 
decision-making enactments of which the majority lasted for over a year. „Nonmaleficence‟ 
and the management of personal countertransference by contrast received minimal 
acknowledgement and emerged as the most “offended” (Knapp & VandeCreek, 2007) or 
neglected ethical values. 
 
These findings appeared congruent with the observation that interviewees were clearly 
identified with the compelling professional image of a beneficent, authoritative caregiver or 
“wounded-healer” (Bennet, 1987; Miller & Baldwin, 1987). The model of the wounded 
healer argues that the therapist‟s personal disturbance or capacity for maleficence 
constitutes the hidden and covert aspect of the wise and charismatic “healer-redeemer” 
(Groesbeck, 1975; Groesbeck & Taylor, 1977). This suggests that the therapist may be 
prone to rescuing and to “healing” those disavowed aspects of him/herself that are projected 
into the ostensibly wounded and needy patient. As Solomon (2003b) avers, what is 
disavowed or unethical can unconsciously be “lived out in projection, using and abusing the 
other as a vehicle for holding the bad aspects of the self.” (p. 23). 
 
Ten different examples emerged from the eleven research interviews of ethical decision-
making enactments. Impaired internal and external containment apparently saw participants 
seeking relief from escalating countertransference pressures through precipitate decision-
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making involving ethically compromised behaviours. Psychodynamic formulations of 
patients‟ emotional difficulties often appeared to occur in the absence of any corresponding 
acknowledgement by therapists of their own unconscious contribution to the enactments 
concerned. As one interviewee succinctly suggested, the sometimes unpalatable 
“countertransference piece … gets skipped” (Interv. 4, p. 123, 11-28). This suggests that 
when the psychoanalytic practitioner appears thoroughly identified with the principle of 
beneficence and with the related professional image of a beneficent healer, he/she may 
struggle to consider the maleficent or iatrogenic aspects of their therapeutic interventions. 
 
In short, this study argues that initial levels of ethical decision-making seemingly collapsed 
in the direction of a paranoid-schizoid mode of functioning predominantly structured by 
projective identification and by the defensive need to keep “disturbing glimmers of 
meaning” (Stern, 1983, p. 92) out of conscious awareness. The data suggest that the six 
real-life ethical dilemmas were thus characterised by multiple therapist-driven enactments; 
these were construed as comprising the overt behavioural expression of participants‟ 
unresolved emotional difficulties that were revived in the charged atmosphere of the ethical 
quandary concerned.  
 
Later phases of mature ethical decision-making appeared relatively free of 
countertransference pressures and saw the research interviews function as an empathic 
reflective space. Participants‟ disturbing countertransference experiences were “digested”, 
thought about and a measure of insight into the nature of the unconscious determinants 
driving the ethical decision-making process was occasionally achieved.  
 
A generative ethical decision-making pathway in the context of analytic space apparently 
partakes of “a state of double consciousness” (Gabbard, 1999, p. 18). Earlier unwitting 
participation in the transference-countertransference matrix is optimally succeeded by “the 
mental freedom” (Britton, 1998, p. 42) characteristic of “triangular psychic space” (Britton, 
2003, p. 98) or of mature phases of the ethical decision-making process. In this triangular 
space, the therapist, in the company of a benevolent other, takes up a third position from 
which it becomes possible to view the object relationships involved, to interact with ideas 
and alternative points of view, and to think retrospectively about the meanings of the ethical 
decision-making enactment at hand. Central to mature ethical decision-making is the 
extension of the role of containment from the familiar activity of processing the patient‟s 
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intense affects to apprehending and analysing the nature of the therapist‟s own unconscious 
contribution to the countertransference enactment concerned (Gabbard, 1999).  
 
An array of professional resources were available for consultation at the time of the ethical 
dilemmas. Data analysis foregrounded inadequate postgraduate ethics training, derelict 
supervisory practices and professional isolation as major risk factors for compromised 
professional decision-making. In general, interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the 
content, duration, intensity and perceived relevance of their postgraduate ethics education. 
Boredom, poor recall, staff disinterest, lack of exposure to ethics codes and the unintegrated 
nature of ethics training effectively alienated participants from their former ethics 
instruction. Confronted by everyday ethical dilemmas, research participants appeared 
unable to summon their graduate ethics training as a potentially helpful resource. 
Experience-near descriptions suggested moreover that isolated ethics modules were not 
apparently situated within training institutions that were perceived to actively foster “a 
climate of ethical sensitivity” (Wassenaar, 2002, p. 222) wherein students, their peers, 
academic staff and internship supervisors felt free to discuss and to address their ethical 
conflicts and concerns.  
 
Apart from Wassenaar‟s (2002) work, no recent reliable data are available regarding the 
content, methods used, duration and perceived efficacy of pre-professional ethics 
instruction in psychology programmes at South African universities. South Africa is a 
multicultural society that includes eleven official languages and a prevalent “African 
cosmology” (Burke et al., 2007, p. 114). Over 90% of clinical psychologists are white and 
they appear mostly unskilled in the African languages used by the majority of the 
population (Pillay & Kramers, 2003). Despite these conditions, no clarity presently exists as 
to whether or how cultural and diversity considerations have been integrated into 
postgraduate ethics education. This lack of information extends to whether and what ethical 
decision-making models are taught and how awareness is raised with respect to the impact 
of countertransference phenomena on the decision-making process. At the time of writing, 
there are similarly no publications that discuss what and how ethics is taught in the context 
of the Professional Board‟s postqualifying mandatory ethics educational activities. The 
present study argues that research participants‟ primarily negative experience and 
evaluation of their postgraduate ethics instruction comprises a first major risk factor for 
compromised professional decision-making.  
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Impaired supervisory practices emerged as a second risk factor. Compromised practices 
included “rushed” supervision, irregular modelling or unquestioning acceptance of dual role 
relationships and the seeming unawareness of the ethical dimension of clinical practice. 
Data analysis suggested that personal countertransference was deeply implicated in 
enduring ethical decision-making enactments. Yet not a single instance wherein the 
supervisor bluntly confronted the unethical or countertransference aspects of their 
supervisees‟ therapeutic interventions emerged from the data. When asked to comment on 
their supervisors‟ perceived capacity to assist with the resolution of troubling dilemmas, 
interviewees reported avoiding supervision or, alternatively, of being left feeling 
directionless, disappointed and frustrated. The apparent imperviousness to the ethical 
dimension of clinical practice by most analytically orientated supervisors and personal 
therapists in this study suggests that “ethics” may currently be construed as a discrete entity 
and as separate from daily professional practices. The data raise the question as to whether 
local supervisors are themselves adequately trained to recognise the presence of ethical 
dilemmas and to conduct supervision that actively probes the ethical and 
countertransference aspects of their supervisees‟ decision-making practices and 
interventions.  
 
Data analysis confirmed a pervasive sense of professional isolation that comprised the third 
risk factor for compromised ethical decision-making. This stands in contrast with previous 
studies which found that supportive professional connections and informal collegial 
networks were highly valued by master therapists and psychologists as enhancing the ability 
to practice ethically, as assisting with ethical decision-making and as the most effective 
resource in guiding professional behaviour (Haas, Malouf & Mayerson, 1986; Jennings et 
al., 2005; Pope, Tabachnik & Keith-Spiegel, 1987). The key phrase “It‟s difficult to reach 
out” (Interv. 1, p. 14, 46) succinctly captured a common theme, reflecting participants‟ 
aloneness and estrangement from the relevant ethics code, the law, professional bodies and 
their colleagues. Relationships with the latter underused professional resources often 
appeared to be suffused with mistrust, anger and fears of shaming, censure or punishment. 
Ironically, these dynamics only served to seal over countertransference difficulties, 
entrenching professional isolation and continued involvement in chronic therapist-driven 
enactments.  
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Review of the relevant professional literature revealed numerous accounts of ethical 
decision-making frameworks. Cottone and Claus (2000) comment, however, that relatively 
few appear to be both empirically and theoretically grounded. Based on the literature and on 
data generated by real-life ethical dilemmas, a pragmatic psychoanalytically oriented ethical 
decision-making model was constructed. The proposed model integrates the CPA‟s (2000) 
principle-based ethical decision-making steps with the psychoanalytic notion that ethical 
judgments are impacted additionally by irrational and unconscious determinants. The latter 
ethical decision-making framework thus synthesises previous points of view and offers a 
third or alternative perspective.  
 
Under the impact of raw affective arousal, the data suggest that the psychoanalytic 
practitioner‟s capacity for rational thinking and ethical functioning may temporarily be lost 
and must be wrested back again. Since attempts at self-scrutiny are likely to be clouded by 
countertransference “blind-spots”, the proposed model argues for the need to create a 
reflective space with the aid of peer supervision or consultation. In the presence of an 
empathic other, the model‟s eight levels of enquiry hopefully progressively transform 
“unthinkable” bodily and emotional events into a retrospective understanding of the 
unconscious dynamics animating the dilemma concerned. Specific questions are directed at 
assisting the psychoanalytic practitioner to explore and to think about intense and irrational 
feeling states, including those that derive from patient-induced or therapist-driven ethical 
decision-making enactments. The model thus proposes “a cooling off period” (Varghese & 
Kelly, 1999, p. 10) wherein unethical, maleficent or anti-analytic impulses can be 
normalised, reflected upon and given meaning. Since the model aims to restore the 
therapist‟s customary reflective stance and to protect the patient‟s psychological growth, it 
is congruent with the analytic attitude which, Solomon (2003a) suggests, is at its core 
essentially ethical in nature.  
 
Use of a psychoanalytic model may not in itself augment ethical motivation or ensure 
ethical action. However, it offers a contribution to professional debate and represents a 
preliminary empirically based framework that may help the psychoanalytic practitioner 
engage more effectively with the unconscious dimension of professional decision-making. 
Mature ethical decision-making is apparently predicated upon engagement with the two 
interdependent poles of subjective experience and universal ethical principles. 
Acknowledging the influence on ethical decision-making of both the particularity of 
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subjective countertransference experience as well as the need for objective ethical 
principles, the unitary approach adopted by the proposed psychoanalytic model integrates 
the ethical concerns articulated by the moral voices of justice and care respectively.  
2. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY  
The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. Firstly, the lack of a culturally 
and racially diverse participant sample is acknowledged. As reported in chapter 4, all six 
participants in the study were white, middle-class psychologists working as psychoanalytic 
practitioners. Secondly, and perhaps more pertinent, however, is the possibility that the 
sample was skewed by the fact that participants were effectively self-selected. This could 
conceivably have resulted in, for example, suitable subjects declining to participate because 
they had already successfully resolved charged ethical dilemmas with little or no 
interference from countertransference phenomena. On the other hand, potential participants 
may have been involved in ethical decision-making enactments but declined to participate 
either because they were less concerned about ethical dilemmas and/or infractions or 
because they did not wish to be exposed to the external scrutiny inevitably involved in such 
a research study. However, without available data it is not possible to go beyond conjecture 
around the factors that impeded or facilitated participation in this study. It may seem 
therefore, given both this lack of clarity as well as the small and predominantly 
homogeneous nature of the sample, that the findings are open to the criticism that they are 
confined to a particular emotionally troubled subgroup and are thus limited in scope. These 
possible objections to the generalisability of the present findings may be countered by the 
following observations.  
 
The type of ethical dilemmas presented by research participants in this study included 
confidentiality concerns, non-sexual dual role relationships and collegial misconduct. It is 
therefore likely that the present findings are of wider relevance since these ethical dilemmas 
are of the type identified as „traditional‟ by Lindsay and Colley (1995) and are amongst 
those most frequently reported in local and international studies of both psychotherapists‟ 
and psychologists‟ ethical concerns (Colnerud, 1977; Lindsay & Clarkson, 2000; Pettifor & 
Sawchuck, 2006; Pope & Vetter, 1992; Report of the APA Ethics Committee, 2000; Slack 
& Wassenaar, 1999; Wassenaar, 2002). Additionally, the recurring need expressed 
implicitly or explicitly by research participants for improved ethical guidelines, training and 
supervision, arising out of their experience of significant inadequacies in these areas, 
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appears congruent with the findings and recommendations made by many researchers and 
theorists (see chapters 2 and 7).  
 
More importantly, however, this study has assumed that there is little need to establish the 
fact that ethical violations and related judgment/action discrepancies occur within 
communities of psychological practitioners – the studies reviewed previously (see above 
and chapter 2) provide ample evidence in this regard. The focus of this study has therefore 
not been on the incidence of such violations but rather on the aspiration that a theoretically-
informed analysis of psychoanalytic practitioner accounts of grappling with ethical 
dilemmas may helpfully contribute to a deeper and more detailed understanding of how and 
why ethical violations arise in the therapeutic space. It has been assumed, therefore, that the 
dynamics involved in the latter accounts are likely to be similar, with specific contextual 
variations, to those arising in comparable situations in which such violations occur. In this 
way, potential „universal‟ veracity has been sought through an in-depth exploration of the 
particular. Given this intent, and the appropriate qualitative methodology that gave effect to 
it, the question of whether, or to what extent, the countertransference dynamics identified 
actually do occur in the wider practitioner community is not within the scope of this study 
and could be addressed in future research.  
 
A further criticism of this study could involve questioning the reliability of participant 
accounts given the tendency in self-report studies for subjects to give what they believed to 
be socially desirable responses to the resolution of ethical dilemmas (Pope & Tabachnik, 
1993). However, the emergence of multiple ethical decision-making enactments in the 
interviews (see chapter 8) suggests that the data largely escaped being heavily compromised 
by such „self-censored‟ responses. Indeed the detailed, nuanced and often distressed 
accounts offered by participants appeared to be singularly honest and forthright descriptions 
of subjective countertransference experiences and difficulties that they encountered in their 
efforts to resolve ethical quandaries.  
 
Another potential criticism that should be acknowledged involves other role-players in the 
provision of professional resources. This study focused on foregrounding research 
participants‟ subjective “voices” and perspectives in their recall of encounters with 
professional resources and the resolution of real-world ethical quandaries. The lack of 
specific knowledge of the construction of the present South African ethics code as well as 
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about postgraduate and postqualifying ethics education has been noted. A further limitation 
is thus also the absence in this study of the “voices” of ethics educators, supervisors and 
Professional Board ethics committee members in describing their own efforts, struggles and 
resources in responding to the needs of trainees and supervisees with respect to engaging 
with, and satisfactorily resolving, ethical dilemmas arising in the therapeutic setting. Thus 
this study did not attempt to elicit the opinions and perspectives of supervisors and ethics 
educators as to how, for example, an ethically attuned and responsive learning environment 
might be cultivated or what factors might be salient in improving current ethical guidelines 
and ethics training programmes. 
 
A final point concerns the possibility of idiosyncratic interpretation of the data. However, 
the researcher has tried as far as possible to describe the data analysis process in a 
transparent and rigorous way, in the hope that a second reader might be potentially able to 
replicate the interpretation. Until such a reading is ever done, however, the researcher 
cannot guarantee that the analysis is free of such idiosyncratic bias. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Original taken-for-granted assumptions that the real-life ethical dilemmas presented by 
research participants would eventually be resolved through the thoughtful use of available 
professional resources were belied by the data. Descriptions of lived ethical dilemmas 
unexpectedly highlighted a mistrust of professional bodies, a seemingly persecutory 
collegial matrix and a wealth of disturbing, unprocessed subjective countertransference 
experience. Based on these findings, the following recommendations include suggestions 
for the revision of the current South African ethics code, the improvement of postgraduate 
and postqualifying ethics education and the building of more benevolent relational 
connections in the psychoanalytic community.  
3.1. The Professional Board of Psychology‟s code of ethics 
Research participants‟ relationship to the ethics code of the HPCSA Professional Board for 
Psychology (2002) was characterised by a sense of perceived irrelevance and alienation. 
Rather than being seen as a valuable professional resource, professional ethics codes 
aroused little interest and apparently represented dry, official, experience-distant documents 
of which interviewees were either unaware or which went unused. On occasion, the unread 
code seemed to take on an actively persecutory guise, provoking fear and further avoidance. 
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These findings suggest that a revised South African code of ethics should optimally provide 
a practitioner-friendly and relevant document that was easy to teach, conceptually cohesive 
and that would open up a professional space for debate around diverse points of view.  
 
An alternative and revised code could follow the example of the Canadian Psychological 
Association (CPA) process in which the “collective wisdom” of psychologists in relation to 
ethical issues and ethical decision-making was integrated into their code of ethics (Sinclair, 
2000). The Preamble to the CPA‟s (2000) ethics code unambiguously states that its four 
ethical principles are anchored in the analysis of actual responses given by the CPA 
membership to hypothetical ethical dilemmas. Pope and Vetter (1992) similarly observe 
that the original APA (1952) ethics code was based on actual descriptions of real-life ethical 
dilemmas offered by a representative sample of APA members.  
 
In contrast, the Professional Board of Psychology‟s current code contains no equivalent 
statement as to how the present code came into being. This absence invites speculation that 
an “armchair approach” was adopted whereby a committee of experts devised the 
“authoritarian” (Burke et al., 2007) code presently in use. A revised code might therefore 
include research initiatives actively geared to soliciting real-life ethical dilemmas faced by a 
representative sample of South African psychologists practising on the front lines of a 
multiracial, multicultural and multilingual society. Following the example provided by the 
Canadian model, the latter research initiative could conceivably distil dynamic ethical 
principles from actual practice that could subsequently be used in the construction of an 
experience-near and relevant code of ethics. As Wassenaar (1998b) writes, the challenge 
then would be “to develop ethical standards which are relevant to local communities and 
indigenous values, and which remain simultaneously compatible with international 
standards in psychology” (p. 241).  
 
Previous discussion (see chapter 2) argued that the efficacy of the current ethics code for 
guiding the resolution of ethical dilemmas is additionally hampered by its lack of 
conceptual cohesiveness. No apparent rationale thus appears to inform the overall 
organisation or content of the text concerned. The Professional Board‟s ethics code thus 
fails to identify explicitly its “ethical foundation” (Welfel & Kitchener, 1992, p. 180) or the 
full range of philosophical ethical principles upon which it is based. This necessarily carries 
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consequences for the code‟s capacity to function as an empowering educative tool and to 
offer pragmatic assistance in the ethical decision-making process. 
 
The “vague and brief” (Burke et al., 2007) ethical decision-making guidelines set out in the 
South African code under “Resolving Ethical Issues” (chapter 11) provide neither rank-
ordered ethical principles nor any reference to widely cited decision-making models. 
Revision of the present code could correct these omissions by including an ethical decision-
making framework which acknowledges hierarchical principles and which additionally 
raises awareness of the irrational and emotionally charged dimension of professional 
decision-making. The publication of an educative manual, such as the Companion Manual 
to the Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists (Sinclair & Pettifor, 2001) or the Ethics 
Casebook of the American Psychoanalytic Association (Dewald & Clark, 2001), could 
illustrate the practical application of the ethical principles and decision-making model 
concerned to contemporary ethical dilemmas drawn from the lived experience of South 
African practitioners. Hypothetical and disguised actual vignettes presented in the manual 
could stimulate ethical sensitivity and group debate around common ethical concerns and 
controversies. The foregoing measures might play a role in increasing the perceived 
relevance and sense of ownership of a revised national code of ethics.  
3.2. Postgraduate and Postqualifying Ethics Education 
Efforts to foster an ethical attitude as an essential aspect of professional practice include 
redressing the quality of ethics education available to both trainees and qualified 
professionals. The data reveal that the troubling split between professional practice and the 
misconception that ethics is a discrete entity which consists “mainly [of] slavish attention to 
professional and research ethics codes” (Davidson, Garton & Joyce, 2003, p. 220, in 
Falender, 2006) may be inculcated early on in professional training. Clearly further research 
is therefore needed to supplement the available sparse information and to ascertain more 
accurately when, what and how ethics instruction is integrated into South African 
psychology undergraduate, graduate and continuing professional development programmes. 
Literature outlining relevant debates on professional ethics training was reviewed in chapter 
7. While devising detailed ethics curricula lies outside the scope of this thesis, the following 
recommendations elaborate the relevance of the main findings of the present study for local 
ethics instruction.  
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Lack of ethical sensitivity and deficient role modelling by statutory bodies, supervisors and 
personal therapists (see chapter 7) apparently contributed to the prolonged non-
confrontation of collegial sexual misconduct and to participants‟ continued involvement in 
dual role relationships. This suggests that academic departments, training institutes, 
psychoanalytic societies and reading groups need to provide an ethically responsive 
professional context that models an empathic and humane alertness to ethical issues and 
decisions. As Kitchener (1992) avers, the training of ethically competent practitioners 
transcends the content of any discrete theoretical module and becomes the responsibility of 
the entire staff. Even excellent ethics instruction may be insidiously undermined by the 
unethical conduct of educators and supervisors. Thus the collective life of academic 
departments, institutes and psychoanalytic societies needs to remain ethically congruent 
with the explicit messages conveyed by ethics training programmes. Frank and open 
discussion of ethical concerns and conflicts arising from trainees‟ personal experiences with 
patients, peers, supervisors and educators needs to be encouraged. Additional strategies 
include the establishment of regular conferences and staff-student ethics colloquia as well 
as the designation of particular institute or staff members who are prepared to develop 
ethics education as a specialist interest. If Solomon (2003b) is correct that clinicians draw 
upon their internalised experience of the analytic attitude as conveyed by their supervisors 
and personal therapists, then trainees‟ lived experience of their educators and of the 
collective ethical life of the teaching department similarly functions as a key source of 
identification for students‟ burgeoning professional ethicality and capacity for appropriate 
ethical decision-making.  
 
Deficits in basic ethical knowledge and applied problem solving skills were revealed by 
textual analysis of psychoanalytic practitioners‟ responses to real-life ethical dilemmas. 
This suggests that thorough familiarity with legal frameworks, ethical theories, formal 
ethics codes, principles and standards as well as competence in the application of seminal 
ethical decision-making models comprise the sine qua non of ethics instruction at 
postgraduate and postqualifying levels (Fine & Ulrich, 1988). Wassenaar (2002) 
recommends that postgraduate ethics training should include the study of local patterns of 
public complaints as well as of the ethical dilemmas that preoccupy practitioners locally and 
internationally. A thorough grasp of these several but interdependent components of an 
ethics curriculum would hopefully promote linkages between the theoretical knowledge of 
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codes, principles and standards and their practical application to teaching vignettes and real-
life ethical quandaries.  
 
Within these broad parameters, the professional literature is replete with innovative training 
suggestions that might perceptibly enliven course content. Multifaceted teaching 
approaches previously discussed (see chapter 7) have highlighted the creative use of case 
studies and values confrontation (Abeles, 1980), experiential training including role-play 
and simulation (Abramovitch, 2007) and drawing on guest lecturers from statutory and 
voluntary professional bodies (Handelsman, 1986b). Challenging self-assessment 
questionnaires are offered by Epstein and Simon (1990) and by Falender (2006) 
respectively. These could be used to stimulate group debate around the issue of boundary 
violations and therapist exploitiveness in key areas of professional practice or to encourage 
reflection about the nature of the supervisor-supervisee relationship and the reasons why 
trainee self-disclosures may be censored or suppressed. The foregoing training initiatives 
may help to develop a professional “membership [which is] capable of making 
sophisticated judgments about which course of action may be ethical in situations in which 
no one behaviour seems entirely ethical or unethical” (Welfel & Lipsitz, 1984, p. 31). 
 
Data analysis foregrounded the extent to which unresolved personal countertransference 
impeded and structured the ethical decision-making process. The need for improved 
training in the management of countertransference is supported by local research. 
Investigating sexual attraction to clients, Stevenson (1999) concludes that “Qualitative data 
volunteered by many subjects indicate that they find psychoanalytic concepts and theory, 
including the therapeutic frame and transference and countertransference, useful in 
understanding their sexual attraction, their clients as well as in facilitating the therapeutic 
process. This argues for the inclusion of these topics in training programmes” (p. 108). 
Gabbard (1996) similarly argues that, even if therapists do not practice dynamic 
psychotherapy, “transference and countertransference issues will always be present in the 
therapy whether or not the therapist acknowledges their existence” (p. 318). This suggests 
that ethics education might arguably help to enhance prospective ethical performance and 
reduce ethical violations by encouraging trainees and psychoanalytic practitioners alike to 
interrogate irrational countertransference pressures so that these helpfully inform, rather 
than hamper, the therapeutic process.  
 
  295 
Complex ethical dilemmas are unlikely to be resolved in isolation and the professional 
literature widely endorses the need for consultation (APsaA, 2005; CPA, 2000; Dewald & 
Clark, 2001; Gabbard, 1996; Sonne, 1994). Data analysis repeatedly revealed the felt 
absence of professional resources or benevolent third others who might be called upon to 
aid the ethical decision-making process. The third may be envisaged as consisting not only 
of postgraduate ethics training but also of ethics codes, professional bodies, supervisors and 
colleagues. Four practical educative strategies for encouraging changed ethical decision-
making practices and for depathologizing embarrassing or shameful ethical decision-
making enactments emerged from the different chapters of this study and are summarised 
below. Each strategy attends to the need to implement at postgraduate and postqualifying 
levels the normative practice of examining emotionally loaded, unethical or anti-analytic 
countertransference pressures which routinely arise in the therapeutic relationship and 
which are likely to deflect novice and experienced therapists alike from optimal ethical 
functioning. 
 
Qualitative data confirmed that beneficence was the aspirational ethical principle most 
strongly endorsed by participants. The present study has argued, however, that the first 
strategy of redressing the neglected status of nonmaleficence paves the way for considering 
both competing ethical principles as well as the countertransference dimension of 
professional decision-making. When beneficence is foregrounded as the primary ethical 
principle governing the therapist‟s conscious ethical choices, this does not nullify the 
obligation to limit or to prevent harm by examining repeated frame deviations from the 
counterpoles of nonmaleficence and personal countertransference. Peer and collegial 
discussion of unconscious “blind spots” and the sometimes self-serving aspects of ethical 
decision-making may assist in dismantling the idealised notion of the unrelentingly 
beneficent caregiver and help to confer meaning upon disavowed countertransference 
pressures seeking potential or already realised behavioural expression in boundary 
violations and ethical decision-making enactments. These observations appear congruent 
with Zelen‟s (1985) comments that raising awareness of the practitioner‟s 
countertransference vulnerabilities may “enable the helping professions to drop the false 
model of omniscience and omnipotence” (p. 184).  
 
The wounded-healer model, reconfigured from an object relations perspective, offers a 
second strategy and a compelling metaphor for illustrating how countertransference may 
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function as “a virtue” and as “a vice” (Louw & Pitman, 2001). When countertransference is 
mobilised as a virtue, the therapist‟s woundedness allows the latter to use his/her well-
developed capacity for empathy to gain entry into the patient‟s internal object world. When 
countertransference “blind spots” are, by contrast, mobilised as a vice, unretrieved 
therapist-driven ethical decision-making enactments may arise as a result of the healer‟s 
efforts to ward off threatening and disavowed countertransference feelings and thoughts. 
The model‟s pragmatic delineation of the inevitable mobilisation and ensuing need to 
process the healer‟s projections and unresolved personal countertransference may once 
again assist in legitimising a much needed professional space wherein to discuss the 
possible impact of countertransference and enactment phenomena on ethical performance. 
In foregrounding countertransference as a central organising concept, the wounded-healer 
model provides an additional educative tool that usefully supplements ethical decision-
making models emphasising a rational and linear approach to the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas.  
 
Compromised supervisory practices revealed by the data suggest that the development of 
ethics education programmes for psychodynamically oriented supervisors may comprise a 
needed and useful area in South Africa for continuing professional development. A third 
strategy relates to the recurring argument set out in the present study that the establishment 
or restoration of reflective space remains central to the resolution of real-life ethical 
dilemmas. Confident exploration by supervisors of their supervisees‟ responses to complex 
ethical quandaries presupposes a thorough grasp of the basic components of ethical 
knowledge described earlier as comprising the sine qua non of ethics education. Going 
beyond the need to increase supervisory awareness of the ethical dimension of clinical 
practice, the third strategy widens the notion of reflective space as encompassing the 
supervisor, the supervisee and the patient to the broader ethos of establishing “ubiquitous 
triads” (Solomon, 2003; Solomon, 2004). The latter practice would include the supervisor‟s 
regular discussion with a consultant about his/her own work with supervisees. The ripple 
effect of creating “ubiquitous triads” thus affords the supervisor a useful opportunity for 
reviewing his/her own potential resistance and countertransference dynamics which may 
have emerged in the course of supervising troubling ethical dilemmas. Such an attitude of 
openness, non-defensiveness and thoughtfulness is then more likely to be internalised by 
supervisees as an integral aspect of the analytic attitude. Discussing South African clinical 
psychologists‟ responses to sexual attraction, Stevenson (1999) similarly argued for “an 
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ethos of consultation and supervision seeking, so that when problems arise therapists will 
feel free to get help before they act on feelings of sexual attraction” (p. 107).  
 
Construction of a pragmatic psychoanalytic model of ethical decision-making comprises the 
fourth and final strategy to promote engagement with the unconscious dimension of 
professional decision-making. The model has been extensively discussed and may  provide 
a practical tool that the psychoanalytic practitioner can use to explore disturbing 
countertransference feelings. The model may thus usefully supplement the more traditional 
application of ethical principles and standards to the resolution of complex dilemmas.  
 
The collective task of engendering a non-judgmental ethical consciousness appears to begin 
with practical efforts to construct benevolent professional spaces. Each of the foregoing 
strategies may play a role in raising awareness of and in normalising distressing or shameful 
countertransference experience by encouraging freer and more open disclosure of shared 
ethical conflicts and concerns. This collegial “reaching out” may, over time, foster a 
genuine ethic of care and help to modify the persecutory superego apparently abroad in at 
least some local psychoanalytic societies and reading groups.  
4. FUTURE RESEARCH  
Several directions for future research are suggested by the present findings. This research 
study was limited to exploring and understanding the subjective experiences of a small pool 
of white, middle class psychoanalytic practitioners who encountered ethical dilemmas in the 
therapeutic space. Earlier discussion (see chapter 2) noted that Western liberal ideologies 
that privilege individual autonomy are at variance with the ethical values and decision-
making practices of different cultural and ethnic groups. As part of the revision of the 
current ethics code, surveys could attempt to elicit a wider and more representative sample 
of real-life ethical dilemmas drawn from practitioners with diverse linguistic, religious, 
cultural and ideological backgrounds and worldviews.  
 
Based on the experience of the present study, future qualitative research investigating a 
different range of real-life ethical dilemmas might anticipate the evocation of subjective 
distress and unresolved trauma in veteran and novice psychoanalytic practitioners alike. 
Using the “ethics as process” research model (Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001), informed 
consent procedures could include the offer of debriefing facilities conducted by a competent 
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counsellor. Such research might also usefully provide further opportunities for research 
participants to evaluate and to correct the researcher‟s portrayal of their self-understandings 
and their descriptions of real-life ethical dilemmas.  
 
The need for further research into South African ethics education at postgraduate and 
postqualifying levels has been noted. The data in this study additionally suggest that 
research is needed into the training and development of ethically competent psychotherapy 
supervisors. As Clarkson and Lindsay (2000) observe, both experienced and novice 
therapists may consistently avoid engaging with particular aspects of their therapeutic 
interventions. It is then the responsibility of the supervisor to draw attention to any 
problematic ethical and professional practice dimensions of the work at hand. An absence 
of information currently prevails in South Africa regarding supervisors‟ prior ethics 
education, the state of their current ethical knowledge (including familiarity with ethics 
codes and decision-making models), their subjective conflicts, perceived needs and what 
professional resources are accessed when doubts about supervisory interventions arise. 
Evaluation by supervisees of the perceived capacity of their supervisors to aid the resolution 
of ethical dilemmas is equally lacking but appears to offer a fruitful area for research.  
 
Given that the construction of a psychoanalytic ethical decision-making model has been 
proposed as a practical strategy for enhancing professional decision-making, its utility and 
efficacy could be piloted and evaluated. It is suggested, for example, that small groups of 
graduate students or practitioners could receive instruction in the use of both the 
psychoanalytic model as well as the CPA (2000) ethical decision-making framework. 
Alternative groups might receive instruction in the use of the CPA framework alone. 
Subsequent group discussion of selected case vignettes might provide an opportunity for 
evaluating whether exposure to the psychoanalytic model facilitated greater confidence and 
competence in countertransference management and fewer ethical decision-making 
enactments. Strengths and weaknesses of the psychoanalytic model could be identified and 
used to increase its relevance and utility.  
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This study has sought to respond to the challenge of identifying, describing and 
understanding the irrational and emotionally charged dimension of professional decision-
making. Description and interpretation have repeatedly been woven together to create the 
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text of individual chapters. Each chapter has played an integral part in contributing to a 
hopefully nuanced and coherent understanding of the ethical decision-making process as it 
unfolds in the often turbulent therapeutic setting. In particular, attention has been drawn to 
countertransference phenomena and how these may unconsciously structure ethical 
decisions and interventions. In the end, every psychoanalytic practitioner confronts the 
personal struggle and life-long task of engendering his/her own ethical perspective and thus 
takes or abandons responsibility for the ongoing monitoring of disorienting thoughts, 
feelings and actions so frequently evoked by real-life ethical dilemmas. The final 
interpretive account set out in this study has hopefully contributed a conceptual framework 
for reflecting anew on the unconscious underpinnings of ethical judgment and the basis for 
advancing practical changes in the psychoanalytic psychotherapist‟s everyday ethical 
decision-making practices.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Dear Colleague 
 
Research Project: Psychoanalytic psychotherapists‟ experiences of ethical dilemmas 
encountered in professional practice 
 
As part of a doctoral degree in psychotherapy, I am about to undertake a research project that 
explores psychoanalytic psychotherapists‟ experiences of real-life ethical dilemmas 
encountered in their therapeutic work. I am looking for registered psychologists who practise 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy and who are willing to participate in this research. The 
following information outlines the basic aims of the research and addresses issues that may be 
of concern to potential participants. 
International research into ethical dilemmas encountered in professional practice has often 
been conducted through anonymous surveys and based on hypothetical vignettes. In South 
Africa little research has been initiated in the areas of either ethics education/training or the 
actual dilemmas experienced by practising psychotherapists. In documenting individual 
accounts, this research study aims to explore how psychoanalytic psychotherapists engage 
with and attempt to resolve real-life ethical dilemmas. The data gathered will be of a sensitive 
nature as participants will be involved in talking about their personal experiences of ethical 
dilemmas, and any related conflicts, in the context of their work as psychotherapists.  
It is essential that research participants feel as safe and comfortable as possible and that 
anonymity remains a priority. The following steps will be taken to safeguard both 
confidentiality and anonymity. The interview, at which participants will be invited to talk 
about an ethical dilemma encountered in practice, will last between one and half to two hours. 
It will be held at a mutually suitable time and place. The interview will be tape-recorded and 
transcribed using pseudonyms and with all identifying details removed or disguised. 
Transcription will be completed with the help of a trusted and reliable assistant. Raw data will 
be kept throughout the research process under secure conditions. On completion of the project 
all interview transcripts will be shredded and audio cassettes will be erased or returned to 
participants at their request. Participants may of course withdraw from the study at any time. 
The final thesis will be lodged in the university library but it will not include interview 
transcripts. Should they wish, participants may read the completed thesis and a copy will be 
made available for this purpose. 
The research interview should create a valuable opportunity to share and to reflect upon 
personal experiences of real-life ethical dilemmas as well as contributing to professional 
debate around ethical issues and concerns in this country. 
Potential participants are welcome to contact me by telephone or email to discuss any part of 
this research study (please remember to leave your contact details). I will gladly return any 
initial phone calls from participants who live outside Cape Town and would also conduct the 
interview concerned in the participant‟s home city. 
Your interest and co-operation are greatly appreciated. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
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I, the undersigned, have read the letter outlining the aims of this research project and 
agree to participate in the study on a voluntary basis. 
 
Participant:  
 
Name(print):…………………………Contact address:……………………………………. 
 
Signature:………………………………                         …………………………………… 
 
 
Contact no:……………………………  Cell no:……………………………………………. 
 
Email 
address:……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
WARM-UP QUESTIONS  
 
 Before we begin, are there any questions you‟d like to ask? 
Before we proceed to the main questions, there are a few details about your 
experience as a therapist that I‟d like to clarify…. 
 How long have you been registered as a clinical psychologist and how long, would you 
say, have you been practising as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist? 
 Can you tell me about your work setting: in what settings do you work and what sorts 
of patients do you see on a day to day basis? (Individual/couple/group) 
 Since starting to work as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, what kinds of therapy and 
supervision experiences have you had?  
Do you have supervision / therapy at the moment? 
How often are you going at the moment? 
 During your postgraduate professional training in South Africa, what kind of ethics 
education and training did you receive?  
Yes – please describe… 
No – any thoughts or feelings about this? 
 After qualifying, what sorts of professional opportunities have presented themselves 
for exploring and learning about ethical issues and concerns? 
 What motivated you to take part in this study? 
 What do you believe are the core ethical principles or values that inform your everyday 
practice as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist? 
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We‟re about to go on to the 3 main questions: is there anything you‟d like to add to what 
we‟ve just been talking about? 
 
Can you describe as fully as possible an ethically challenging or troubling dilemma that 
you‟ve encountered in practice over the past 24 months where you weren‟t sure what you 
should do?  
 
Prompts: 
 What was it about this situation that made it an ethical dilemma or conflict for you? 
 Can you recall any actual dialogue, anything that was actually said, between people in 
this situation? 
 CT feelings, physical responses, thoughts 
o Feelings evoked in you? 
o Feelings about others involved? 
o Professional/personal concerns and anxieties for yourself and others? 
o Physical/bodily responses to these events? 
o Images/fantasies? 
o Thoughts occurring to you? 
 How did you first identify or become aware of this ethical conflict? What first alerted 
you to its presence? 
 From the point when you first became aware of this dilemma, can you describe what 
struggles you encountered in yourself? 
What shifts or changes, if any, occurred in your feelings or thoughts before you 
reached the point of deciding what to do? 
 Most difficult aspects of this situation? 
 At the time of the dilemma, can you describe how your feelings and thoughts may have 
affected your behavior or attitude towards your patient? 
While engaged with this ethical dilemma, were you aware of any shifts or changes in 
the patient‟s responses to you? 
 Records and documentation 
o Any kept? 
o Any that you feel may be relevant to our discussion and that you‟d be prepared 
to talk about? 
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You‟ve described the ethical dilemma and we‟ve talked about what encountering it was 
like for you. I‟d like to explore a new question: 
 
Can you describe in as much detail as possible how you processed this ethical dilemma 
and what professional resources you used to help you? 
 
Prompts: 
 Did you struggle alone or consult with others?  
o Alone – thoughts and feelings? 
o Consulted – who with? What was helpful/disappointing? 
 Code of Ethics for Psychologists  
o Familiar with it? 
o Consult it at the time of this dilemma? 
o What approach did you feel the Code adopts regarding how to address the 
ethical dilemma? 
o What are your feelings about the statutory Code of Ethics? How would you 
describe your relationship with it? 
 PsySAA and the Professional Board for Psychology  
o Ever consider approaching them for help with this situation? 
o Feelings/thoughts these structures evoke for you regarding assistance with 
ethical dilemmas? 
 Supervision and personal therapy 
o What role, if any, did supervision play in processing this dilemma? 
o Personal therapy or analysis?  
 Role played by the law, or your thoughts about the law, in processing these issues? 
 Core ethical principles/values mentioned at the start 
o Can you describe their influence, if any, on the processing of this dilemma? 
 Countertransference experience 
o What sense or understanding do you have regarding your feelings, thoughts and 
responses at the time of the dilemma? 
 One‟s approach to understanding and addressing an ethical dilemma may be 
informed by a number of perspectives, for example, the statutory Code of Ethics, your 
adherence to a psychoanalytic way of working and your own ethical values.  
o What sorts of conflicts or tensions, if any, did you experience between these 
different perspectives?  
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We‟ve been speaking about how you worked with and processed the ethical dilemma. 
We‟re coming to the last part of the interview, which has to do with ethical decision-
making. 
 
Could you describe what your final decision was and how you implemented it? 
 
Prompts: 
 
 In thinking about what to do, what kinds of different opinions, actions or interventions 
did you consider? 
 
 Reasons that determined your decision? 
Strongest reason/factor? 
 
 How do you perceive your feelings/thoughts to have helped or hindered you in deciding 
what to do? 
 
 How confident were you about following through and implementing your final 
decision? What anxieties, if any, did you experience? 
 
 Consequences of your decision for yourself and for the others involved? 
 
 Looking back, do you think you did the right thing? Did you do what you believed you 
should do? 
 
 In what ways, if any, has this experience of encountering an ethical dilemma affected 
you professionally or personally? 
 
 If this dilemma should happen again, what might you do differently? 
 
 What do you feel you‟ve learnt from this experience? 
 
 
Closure / Ending Off  
 
 We‟re coming to the end of this interview. I‟m wondering what this experience of 
speaking about this ethical dilemma has been like for you? 
 
 Is there anything you‟d like to add, or to return to, before we finish this interview? 
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INTERVIEW 1: I – POEM  
(p.17, 18-38; p.18, 8-18) 
 
I don‟t know 
I don‟t know 
I‟ve found it difficult  
to balance home and work life.  
I‟ve been over burdened 
and haven‟t had room for my practice. 
I‟ve been dealing 
dealing with it internally 
But I‟ve not really, haven‟t really spoken about it 
I think that might‟ve come into it. 
 
I hadn‟t room to think 
only room to write up notes quickly  
I don‟t have room to think.  
Not like I used to 
a room meaning room in terms of space and time, 
if I‟m not apparently working 
my life, my other life will intrude. 
I can‟t shut myself out 
just to sit and think 
Because it doesn‟t like work from the outside. 
 
So many utterly stupid things to be sorted out 
when he works in my office 
my stuff gets moved out of the way 
I can‟t find my stuff  
there‟s no space for me, as a professional  
And I think 
my professionalism was really on the line. 
 
I haven‟t had time 
for my practice 
I haven‟t been putting thought 
into my practice 
And now this has happened 
I feel absolutely dreadful 
And I have to think about it. 
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INTERVIEW 4: I POEM  
(p.133, 15-20; p.142, 29-46; p.143, 1-7) 
 
Well, I guess 
Wild West is not a bad term 
I felt  
I don‟t know if 
I could say “pioneering” 
I‟m sure it‟s been done before but 
I was in territory 
where few have trodden and without much guidance. 
I mean  
I remember thinking 
supervision-wise 
who could supervise me, who, whose had this experience? 
 
I suppose 
the supervision I did take it to 
wasn‟t formal 
where I sat for an hour 
and took the case 
and da, da, da 
I guess there was the sense 
I was on top of it 
I was managing 
I “didn‟t need” supervision 
 
 
But I think 
it wasn‟t I didn‟t need but more 
I was anxious 
the supervisor would act against it. 
I was worried 
they would not support  
what I was doing 
And I didn‟t want to risk that. 
Because I felt 
I felt 
I was right. 
I felt 
what I was doing 
it was bigger 
than psychology and psychotherapy 
a powerful new development in consciousness. 
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INTERVIEW 5: I POEM 
(p.177, 25-36; p.188, 9-28; p.189, 23-40) 
 
I, I should be in therapy 
two weeks ago 
I kind of broke down.  
I grew up 
where there was violence,  
I mean, the scar 
in the end hasn‟t gone away. 
 
this previous hour 
I thought  
two things, 
it doesn‟t help to report  
and guilt, ja, well, you‟re doing the same. 
I suppose, feeling 
there isn‟t a big, benevolent force out there. 
I mean 
I didn‟t think it at the time but 
I‟m just wondering whether 
I didn‟t report 
evoked guilt  
for doing the same as people have done when 
I was in that position myself. 
 
What I do know is 
I‟ll come home Friday  
and my briefcase will stay closed 
until Monday morning  
I‟ll open it up again. 
I block it out, close it off 
it‟s an emotional thing, 
I don‟t  want to open 
my briefcase, 
leave it, leave it closed, buckled up. 
Pack it away, close it away and leave it there. 
I don‟t, 
I don‟t want to go there. 
It‟s exhausting, nerve-wracking, anxiety provoking. 
I think that‟s why 
I don‟t want to open 
that briefcase, 
there are times 
I‟ll think 
I can think clearly now, it‟s not that bad, 
I thought why not? 
Just Saturday mornings, 
just a few phone calls, 
a few calls, 
but I don‟t, 
I don‟t want to go there. 
 
